THE DYNAMICS OF RADICALIZATION

A Relational and Comparative Perspective

Eitan Y. Alimi
Chares Demetriou
Lorenzo Bosi

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PREFACE

The word "radical" has long entered the inventory of contested terms in the social sciences, along with other terms like "violent," "fanatic," and "terrorist." Like most controversial epithets, the word is value-laden and, in its career in the social sciences, has attracted a measure of notoriety. One would therefore be advised to avoid its use so as to avoid the risk of imbuing analysis with normative implications. What is more, when used as an epithet for actors, the word draws attention to a quality that is held to be central to their existence. For those scholars who wish to avoid essentializing actors, therefore, there is an added reason to avoid the word "radical."

In this book we take these two cautions seriously. We are careful not to allow normative assessment to creep into our analysis and not to develop essentializing theories of actors and their behavior. At the same time, however, we do not heed the advice to completely avoid the use of the label "radical." This is so because the word is a derivative of the term "radicalization," which is the pivot of this study. Thus, while we emphasize that radicalization is a process that is not reducible to the actors who partake in it, there remain moments in our analysis where reference to radical actors is appropriate. Here, however, we ascribe a specific meaning to the term "radical," which is in accordance with our use of the concept radicalization. We hold radicalization to be the process that leads to and includes political violence. Accordingly, we hold "radical" to be the (organizational) actor who has adopted the use of political violence. Whenever political violence remains at the level of rhetoric, possibly wrapped in violence-prone ideology, we use the terms "militancy" and "militant."

Given that our emphasis is on radicalization as a process involving political violence, we take care to draw fine distinctions among the various related concepts. Thus our treatment of radicalization distinguishes among different forms of contention, including not only reactive, resistance-like struggle, but also more proactive forms of contention, such as institutional,

conventional, disruptive, violent, and the varied intensified versions of violence (e.g., selective, categorical, indiscriminate). No less importantly, our analysis rests on an explicit and consistent distinction between values, intentions, and ideologies justifying the use of political violence, on the one hand, and actual engagement in political violence, on the other. It is the possible development of the willingness to engage in violent tactics and how and when militancy is likely to translate into actual engagement in violent tactics that constitutes the central subject matter of this book.

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This project began as each of us was individually developing his own interest in understanding why some social movements engaged in politics of contention experienced radicalization on the part of one or more member organizations. Also independently from each other, we were influenced by an important development in the study of social movements, the publication of McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly's *Dynamics of Contention*. These two common denominators contributed to our collaboration in various ways. While each of us brought to the project his own empirical expertise, we all deepened and broadened our respective expertise as the book developed. Along the way, we also developed joint familiarity with additional empirical material. And as each of us brought to the collaboration his own research style, we kept pushing and influencing each other in a way that ultimately benefited the book.

The actual collaboration that led to this book began several years ago, when Bosi and Demetriou were co-fellows at the European University Institute and when Bosi and Alimi were exchanging ideas on radicalization. The following year Demetriou took a fellowship at the Hebrew University, Alimi's host institution. It was then and there, during 2009, that the seeds of this book were planted most particularly and began taking root. The journey that would last five years involved many face-to-face meetings, countless meetings on Skype, and an early attempt to test the waters by writing a journal article, eventually published in *Mobilization* (2012) to favorable reception by our colleagues. The milestone in the development of the project was the interest James Cook at Oxford University Press showed in our book proposal, and his appreciation of the tenor of our work and its importance to the academic discourse on the topic.

From the early developmental stages of this project and throughout the actual writing of this book, we have benefited greatly from valuable comments made by Mario Diani, Jeff Goodwin, Donatella Della Porta, and especially Sid Tarrow, who not only made thorough and insightful comments

on each and every chapter, but also on a draft of the entire manuscript. In addition to their much-appreciated encouragement, their careful reading and thoughtful insights and suggestions not only helped us address various issues, but also kept challenging us in most constructive ways. We also benefited considerably from the constructive criticism and suggestions from colleagues and friends on specific chapters that each of us took a lead role in writing. Specifically, in working on the episode of al-Qaeda and the Salafi Transnational Jihad movement, Alimi was fortunate to get valuable comments from Alon Burstein and Liora Norwich (who also acted as the best research assistants one could hope for on al-Qaeda), Meir Hatina, Stefan Malthaner, Barak Mendelsohn, Assaf Moghadam, Arie Perliger, and Avraham Sela. Demetriou's work on the Cypriot EOKA episode benefited from a series of interviews with participants of the events surrounding the Enosis movement and from exchanges with Andreas Karyos. And Bosi's work on the Brigate Rosse and the Italian Extra-Parliamentary Left movement benefited from insightful suggestions by Gloria Pazzini Gambetta and Sid Tarrow. We are indebted to them for sharing their knowledge with us. But our appreciation extends to other close colleagues and friends who helped improve our thinking on certain aspects and work on an additional group of cases covered in the book. Our gratitude goes to Massimiliano Andretta, Gideon Aran, Vincent Boudreau, Daniele Conversi, Hank Johnston, Tom Maher, Gregory Maney, Holger Marcks, Lorenzo Mosca, Patricia Steinhoff, and Gilda Zwerman. Much of our ability to offer a rich and nuanced analysis of those secondary cases became possible due to their help. Needless to say, the full and sole responsibility for the analyses provided in the book rests on us.

We would also like to thank the Leonard Davis Institute, the Levi Eshkol Institute, and the Rothberg International School, at the Hebrew University and, in Florence, the large community at European University Institute, particularly at the COSMOS center, and the Marie Curie Association. These institutional sources of support and generous grants greatly facilitated the research on several cases included in this book by allowing us to, among other things, hire the dedicated and diligent assistance of many graduate students. Special thanks go to Therese Abou-Mrad, Kenneth Albert, Timothy Cohen, Efrat Daskal, Angela Gross, Elizabeth Kaplan, Yong bin Lee, Esther Lee, Adi Livni, and Gaya Polat. We would also like to thank the Library of the Archbishopric and the Archbishop Makarios III Foundation Library, both in Nicosia, Cyprus. Furthermore, we would like to thank the Istituto Carlo Cattaneo, in Bologna, for providing access to its archive and in particular to the Documentazione sul terrorismo (DOTE) archive. Finally, our thanks also go to Oxford University

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For the most obvious, yet important reasons, our warmest thanks and deepest appreciation go to our respective families. It is their love, faith, understanding, and toleration that gave us the mental and physical strength to complete this book.

ACRONYMS

AQ	al-Qaeda
BR	Brigate Rosse
EOKA	National Organization of Cypriot Fighters
AKEL	Progressive Party of the Working People
DC	Christian Democrats
EIG	Egyptian Islamic Group
EIJ	Egyptian Islamic Jihad
ESF	European Social Forum
ETA	Basque Homeland and Freedom
GIA	Armed Islamic Group
GSAC	Gaza Strip Settlements Action Committee
IRA	Irish Republican Army
PCI	Italian Communist Party
P/IRA	Provisional/Irish Republican Army
PSI	Italian Socialist Party
SDS	Students for Democratic Society
SID	Italian Intelligence Service
STJM	Salafi Transnational Jihad Movement
TMT	Turkish Resistance Organization
YESHA	Judea, Samaria, and Gaza

The Dynamics of Radicalization

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Social Movements, Contentious Politics, and Radicalization

In the early 1990s, numerous news reports worldwide told stories of mounting opposition from young Sunni Muslim activists in various Arab countries and of the imminent threat to the stability of the regimes in those countries. Take as an example the following excerpt from a news story that appeared in *The Guardian* on May 15, 1993, titled "Saudi Arabia could turn into a centre of Muslim extremism that would make Iran look mild":

> Last week, the Saud family, the guardians of Islam, the keepers of the two holy cities, found itself being stalked by the same phenomenon which threatens many other governments in the Middle East, the specter of Islamic radicalism. . . . These new radical products consider contact with infidel foreigners contaminating and defiling. Instead, their friends are in such places as Sudan, or among the militants of Egypt's Gamaat Islami, and the wild fanatics of Afghanistan. . . . Such a movement could set a new ideological standard for the entire Muslim world, outranking the influence and radicalism of Shi'ite Iran, and undermining liberal thinking Arabs throughout the Middle East. Its location in the holy land of Islam, combined with the oil money, would make it an unstoppable force.

This estimate, we now know, was not far-fetched; many of those Sunni activists were part of what is now known as the Salafi Transnational Jihad Movement (STJM). While local cells and organizations were scattered throughout the Muslim world during the 1970s and 1980s, some with and some without cross-border agendas, the Sunni-led STJM took shape

mainly during the fighting against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan between December 24, 1979, and February 15, 1989. The final stages and the immediate aftermath of the Afghan jihad saw the formation of additional organizations, one of which was formed in August 1988 and became known as al-Qaeda (Arabic for "the base"). Little more than an idea at first, with neither clear goal nor violent anti-regime action strategy and tactics, al-Qaeda was nonetheless able to effectively recruit and swiftly develop an impressive pool of activists and supporters. Based in Saudi Arabia, with Osama bin Laden assuming a leading role, al-Qaeda was forced into exile in Sudan in early 1992, but nevertheless steadily expanded its network of activists, strengthened its operational capabilities, and solidified its ties with other STJM organizations. Operating from Sudan, the organization had already been involved not only in resistance, guerrilla-like operations but gradually also in proactive violent operations against a US-led international coalition of forces (inclusive of Arab states' contingents) in Somalia.

The transformation of Arab regimes and the United States from allies of the STJM activists in Afghanistan (known as Arab Afghans) during the fighting against the Soviets to targets of violent attacks began to unfold earlier. It was during the developing crisis in the Gulf (1990 – 1991) and the Saudi authorities' rejection of bin Laden's plan to use the Arab Afghan volunteers to oust Iraqi forces from Kuwait (instead of allowing the presence of the infidel United States military forces in the Muslim heartland), that the transformation began. As evidence of al-Qaeda's defiant and confrontational tactics of contention accumulated, the rift between the organization and the Saudi Royal family kept deepening; consequently, the organization's enmity and resentment toward the United States was deepening as well.

The intensification of al-Qaeda's tactics of contention resulted in yet one more forced exile, this time to Afghanistan, following the US pressure on the Sudanese authorities in early 1996. By that time it became clear that al-Qaeda leaders prioritized attacking the "far enemy" over the "near enemy," that is, the United States over such perceived corrupt and impious Arab regimes as those of Saudi Arabia and Egypt. On August 23, 1996, soon after its relocation to Afghanistan, and in the wake of the perceived anti-Muslim role played by the United States and the UN in the Bosnian civil war, bin Laden issued a *fatwa* (religious ruling) called "Jihad against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places."

The progression from a predominantly guerrilla-like resistance and nonviolent mode of contention to a predominantly violent and offensive one on the part of al-Qaeda, we now know, did not stop there and then.

In slightly less than two years, from its Taliban-controlled Afghan refuge, al-Qaeda published yet another *fatwa* in the name of a newly formed STJM grouping, called the World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders. This time, the *fatwa* ordered the killing of Americans and their allies (civilians and military alike) whenever possible and wherever they were—a ruling followed to the letter with a series of brutal attacks against United States targets during the late 1990s—culminating in its highest degree of lethality on September 11, 2001.

This summary narration of the consolidation of the STJM and the evolution of contentious repertoire of al-Qaeda sketches an opposition movement member organization's steps toward the adoption and advancing use of political violence. Such a development is not peculiar to the STJM, no matter how analysts, politicians, journalists, and scholars insist on treating it as sui generis. Evidently, diverse historical contexts feature similar shifts of opposition movement organizations toward the adoption of political violence.

Going back in time to the turbulent 1970s, the period that in Italy was called the "years of lead," we observe a similar shift of opposition movement organization toward the adoption of political violence: the Brigate Rosse (Italian for the Red Brigades). This organization was rooted in the mass upsurge of students and workers in Italy during 1968 – 1969 and the subsequent Left-wing activism that developed in the country in response to Right-wing violence. The intended purpose of that Right-wing violence, which mainly targeted Leftists, though occasionally was indiscriminate, was to provoke the Italian state to respond to "the communist specter" with suppression of the Left. In this way, it presented a heightened threat to various Leftists, most of whom had already formed the belief that the state was part of a conspiratorial anti-Leftist "strategy of tension" facilitated by the Italian secret service, the United States CIA, and parts of the Italian military. The introduction of Right-wing violence, then, was a turning point for Left-wing activism, as it led to the consolidation of Left-wing militant organizations and to the adoption by them of unruly and, eventually, outright violent forms of contention.

The Brigate Rosse was the organization that managed to distinguish itself among the other militant organizations of the Left during the 1970s. It gradually developed into the leading Left-wing radical group at that time, building the largest membership and the most violent record of activism. Remaining active until the late 1980s, it outdid the other organizations in longevity, too.

Perceiving themselves as the vanguard of the working class, a role that in their view the Italian Communist Party had relinquished, Brigate Rosse

members, in the early 1970s, began to employ violent tactics as a way of promoting the organization's Marxist-Leninist ideology. A vanguardist armed struggle was for them a necessary and legitimate means for undermining the capitalist status quo. In their own words, such struggle was "armed propaganda whose fundamental task [was] to gain the solidarity and support of the proletarian masses on the way to the Communist revolution . . . to reveal the most hidden power structure and the conniving between power groups and/or seemingly separate institutions" (Brigate Rosse 1971).

Matching their bellicose rhetoric with deeds, Brigate Rosse members engaged in acts of violence against what they thought to be the Italian capitalist class, which they believed to be controlled nationally by the Christian Democrat establishment and globally by American imperialism. These acts, damaging industrial property and harming managerial personnel, went on until 1974. After that time, however, an evolving new strategy aimed at the destruction of the capitalist power by "striking against the heart of the Italian State," a state that the organization saw more as the server of multinational corporations and less as the locus of national political power. Violent actions therefore shifted location away from the factories. The organization initiated its first attacks on government officials in April 1974. But it was from 1976 onward that the tactics of contention evolved to include the premeditated assassination of policemen, politicians, lawyers, and judges and then, in 1977, intensified further to involve the killing of non-state-affiliated civilians, such as journalists, university professors, union leaders, and industrialists. This upgraded campaign of violence characterized the period between 1977 and 1978 and marked the peak of the organization's radical activism with the killing of Aldo Moro, the Christian Democratic leader and former prime minister.

Finally, looking further back in time, we can register a third similar shift toward the adoption of political violence: the episode of EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) in the British colony of Cyprus. EOKA was formed as a guerilla organization by the Right-wing leadership of the Enosis movement in order to promote the movement central claim, namely, that the island of Cyprus, which had a Greek majority population and a Turkish minority population, be transferred to the sovereignty of the state of Greece, a claim to political union that gave the movement its name—"enosis" is Greek for union. During the 1940s and 1950s, the movement was primarily led by the Right-wing Ethnarchy, a body comprising the leaders of the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus and members of the Cypriot Greek bourgeois elite. Although the initial strategy of this

body was to utilize established routes of power brokering, a shift toward a more adversarial strategy did not take long to materialize.

In the post–Second World War period, when the idea of "the self-determination of peoples" was becoming promising for various colonial populations, the leaders of the movement decided to up the challenge to the UK. On December 8, 1949, a circular read aloud in all of the island's Orthodox churches on behalf of Ethnarchy stated the following:

> Protests, memoranda, rallies, embassies—none of them caught the attention of the sovereign, who rather used any available means to suppress and undermine the national beliefs of the Cypriot people. [. . .] Herein, committed guardians of this island's interests, we proclaim a plebiscite as a first measure towards the furthering of our liberation struggle. [. . .] People of Cyprus, you are being called to remain united and to enthusiastically perform your duty towards your enslaved country. It has been for enosis and only enosis that you have struggled, and it is for enosis and only enosis that you are now being called to cast your vote. Forever the only cry: enosis and only enosis. [. . .] This plebiscite is a peaceful battle whose victorious outcome will greatly contribute to our struggle for enosis. (quoted in Kranidiotis 1981—authors' translation)

The signature collection drive, which the alleged plebiscite really was, took place as planned in January 1950, and its greatest achievement was that it provided a means for the movement leaders to pressure successive Greek governments in the early 1950s to support their cause. Whether by design or not, the signature collection drive became indeed the first step toward a strategy to internationalize the cause for enosis and, more particularly, to challenge the UK at the United Nations.

Deciding to sidestep the colonial channels of politics, therefore, the movement leaders sought to utilize the internationally legitimate ones. This they could do only with the active help of the Greek state, help that they eventually managed to get after a period in which Greek governments were lukewarm on the idea of contesting the UK. Nevertheless, as the efforts at the UN on behalf of self-determination for Cyprus (code words for enosis) faced the diplomatic wall set by the British government, the contestation took still another, this time unruly, turn. For at this point the top leadership of the Enosis movement and of the government of Greece together decided that resorting to violence would add to the international pressure on the UK.

Within five years from the time of the signature collection drive, the call for a "peaceful battle" had turned into a call to arms. In 1955 the guerilla organization that was formed with the decision of the movement's

top leadership started a campaign of violence. At the onset of the campaign, EOKA issued a leaflet evoking Greek history and exalting sacrifice and a fighting spirit: "The fighters of 1821 [who waged the Greek War of Independence] are watching us, being the ones who taught us that freedom from the yoke of rulers is won only with BLOOD." The leaflet also implied the campaign's strategic context. Its final words addressed in particular those outside the island who were deemed to matter the most: "Foreign Diplomats, look upon your work. It is a shame that in the twentieth century peoples have to shed their blood to gain their freedom—that divine value for which we have fought alongside your people against, as you proclaim, Nazism and fascisms. Greeks, wherever you are, listen to our voice: TOGETHER FORWARD FOR THE FREEDOM OF OUR CYPRUS" (quoted in Papageorgiou 1984, 59 – 60; our translation, emphases original).

All said and done, the campaign of violence in Cyprus waged by EOKA lasted from 1955 to 1959. Gaining a measure of independence from the Enosis movement leadership, the organization utilized a variety of methods, ranging from sabotage of government installations to clashes with the British Army, to selective violence against Cypriot Greeks, to categorical violence against British civilians. It met a resolute campaign of counter-insurgency by the colonial authorities, while the Greek Cypriot population in general bore the cost of draconian repressive and oppressive colonial policies. At its closing stage the conflict also expanded to include ethnic clashes between Cypriot Greeks and Turks.

* * *

Why have we chosen to focus on such a diverse set of episodes of political contention? On the face of it, al-Qaeda, the Brigate Rosse, and EOKA present us with three very different instances of movement organizations shifting to political violence. One need not be a case specialist to identify differences among the contentious episodes involving these organizations in terms of ethno-national compositions and historical, political, and cultural backgrounds. Nor is it difficult to identify in them different ideological justifications and motivations or different sources of grievance and discontent. Moreover, to differences such as these one could add differences in the severity and targets of the generated political violence. For example, while in certain instances EOKA members engaged in violence against non-state actors based on their perceived or actual affiliation with a specific collectivity, this happened in a selective manner by way of assassination of individuals. Members of al-Qaeda, by contrast, went further to use violence in an indiscriminate manner. We need to

stress, then, that we choose to focus on such diverse episodes of contention not despite their differences but because of them. We choose these three very distinct episodes precisely because we want to demonstrate that, despite all their differences and particularities, common dynamics, such as competition for power between movement organizations or developing distance and disconnect between movement organizations and publics, run through them. Furthermore, we will demonstrate that these relational dynamics play a central role in the shift of opposition movement organization toward the adoption of political violence—a process we later term and define as radicalization.

As those relational dynamics emerge out of apparent differences, their study is particularly instructive as it is likely to promote both a deeper and a broader understanding of processes of radicalization. Indeed, as elaborated below, while respecting and exploring each episode's unique properties and traits, we nonetheless find fundamental and robust similarities existing in the structure and dynamics of relations between movements and societies as well as between movements and authorities. These recurring features factor differently to constitute wide-ranging episodes of contentious politics. They are therefore present in episodes that develop at the national level, such as the episode of the Brigate Rosse, episodes that develop at the intra-national level, such as the episode of EOKA, and episodes that develop at the transnational level, such as the episode of al-Qaeda.

EXPLANATIONS OF RADICALIZATION

To be sure, other scholars see value in grouping together such diverse instances of political violence while citing reasons other than our own, following different theoretical perspectives and focusing on different questions. Broadly speaking, it is possible to identify two clusters of explanations of radicalization and political violence more generally as developed in works on protest movements, insurgencies, civil wars, or terrorism: one focusing on *why* the shift to political violence happens, and another one probing *how* and *when* the shift to political violence unfolds.

Works in the first cluster of explanations typically address the *why* question by focusing on root conditions, facilitative causes, and the added impact of precipitating events at either the macro or micro level of analysis. Accordingly, it is argued that what pushes individuals and movement organizations to engage in political violence is related to profound grievances, violence-prone ideologies, aggressive impulses, incentives, and motives; often it is

argued, too, that these factors become effective when triggered by environmental stimuli and conditions or when individuals and movement organizations capitalize on a situation by linking them to changes in the environment (Sprinzak 1991, 1998; Gurr 1970, 1994, 2000; Olzak 1992; Merari 1998; Post 1998; Collier and Hoeffler 1999; Juergensmeyer 2005; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Pape 2003, 2005; Stern 2003; Ganor 2005; Moghaddam 2005; Hopgood 2005; Piazza 2006; Robison et al. 2006; Asal and Rethemeyer 2008; Gupta 2008; Pedahzur and Perliger 2009; Aran and Hessner 2013; Braun and Genkin 2014). When a given organization holds an ideology that tolerates or justifies the use of violence, experiences deep perceptions of deprivation, or is exposed to environmental stimuli (i.e., changes that undermine basic needs or, alternatively, are seen as an opportunity of achieving benefits or goods), we should expect high levels of political violence.

Intuitively appealing as this line of explanation may be, we find it to be ultimately unable to account for instances where violent forms of contention are absent despite the presence of one or more of those root/facilitative causes, as the Jewish settlers' Anti-Gaza Pullout campaign pointedly demonstrates (Weisburd and Lernau 2006). And, to further problematize our subject matter, there are instances where despite the existence of those root/facilitative causes, we do not see violence developing to its full intensity and possible lethality, as Goodwin's (2007) work on the liberation struggle of the African National Congress demonstrates. Conversely, there are instances where such ideas, grievances, or environmental stimuli are absent or fairly underdeveloped, yet violence emerges. Two of the many cases in point are the radicalization of the Weather Underground in the United States and that of the Brigate Rosse in Italy. Thus, while these factors may be relevant, as may indeed be the more general focus on the propensity, motivation, and susceptibility of a movement organization to engage in violent tactics, explanations relying on them face key challenges in understanding the emergence, persistence, and intensification of violence. Although our knowledge of those root/facilitative conditions, or correlates, has increased significantly, we still lack understanding of how and when the willingness to engage in violence is translated into violent behavior. Moreover, the vast body of works on collective and individualist "combat readiness" characteristics of what is sometimes called "group at risk" tends to produce ex post facto explanations. That is, these works tend to attribute as the cause qualities characterizing the effect—that is, violence and other behavior amidst violence—where in fact there is hardly an episode of contentious claim-making on the part of opposition movements that begin as predominantly violent.

The second cluster of explanations of radicalization focuses more on the activation of those aforementioned root causes. Scholars in this tradition privilege the *how* and *when* questions of radicalization, holding those root causes and motivations to be potentially necessary yet never sufficient conditions. Since the focus on how and when radicalization develops suggests a great deal about its why, these works posit interactions as key to the emergence and dynamics of violent strategies, demonstrating how preexisting motivations, values and norms as well as dispositions are nonetheless shaped by, and even transformed during contention. Unlike the tendency, characteristic of the first cluster of explanations, to emphasize the micro and macro levels of analysis, therefore, works in this cluster pay greater attention to the meso-level (Della Porta and Tarrow 1986; White 1989; Wieviorka 1993; Crenshaw 1995; Della Porta 1995; Hoffman 1998; Peleg 2002; Hafez 2003, 2004; Gordon and McCormick 2003; Sambanis and Zinn 2003; Wood 2003; Oberschall 2004; Bloom 2005; Gambetta 2005; Brym and Araj 2006; Davenport, Armstrong, and Lichbach 2006; Kalyvas 2006; Weinstein 2006; Wright 2007; Almeida 2008; Beck 2008; Horowitz 2010).

Works in this strategic interaction-oriented cluster of explanations have significantly advanced our understanding of processes of radicalization. To begin with, engagement in political violence is not necessarily the result of the psychological profile of the actors, let alone the profiles of madmen or psychopaths; it may well be, rather, the result of strategic planning, decision, and choice—a means to an end, however destructive, illegitimate, and morally appalling it may be perceived. Moreover, engagement in violence is examined not through a solipsistic approach with respect to rationalist calculations and cultural templates, but rather as a process unfolding during contentious interaction, a possible outgrowth of movement protest and mobilization campaign, and typically under specific political circumstances. Third, engagement in political violence—even the extreme use of selective or indiscriminate violence—is but one component of an organization's repertoire of contention, and can be used for different reasons. Thus, rather than treating violence as a sui generis phenomenon, this implies that we raise the question as to what explains the increase or decrease of a given mode of contention.

While we consider the strategic interaction approach more promising and suitable for a better understanding of radicalization, we nonetheless identify several areas and issues that should be further developed and refined if a more nuanced and broader understanding of the progression of the process is to be achieved. To accomplish this, we build on a more recent and radical development of the strategic interaction approach, known as

the Relational Perspective, that posits the *content* of interactions (i.e., contacts, ties, exchange of information, bargaining, mediation, negotiation, etc.) as key to our understanding of the process of radicalization (White 1992; Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; Emirbayer 1997; Diani and McAdam 2003; Tilly 2003; Powell and Dépelteau 2013, 2013b). Elements of relational reasoning have been slowly recognized and used in works on radicalization, even among scholars who previously were strategic interactionist in their mode of investigation (see, for example: Varshney 2002; Alimi 2006; McClurg and Young 2011; Perliger and Pedahzur 2011; Cunningham 2011; Pearlman 2011; Kopstein and Wittenberg 2011; Christia 2012; Dudouet 2013; Bhavnani et al. 2014; Crenshaw 2014; Staniland 2014). Later in this introduction we outline the main propositions of a relational theory of radicalization and in the subsequent chapter we discuss and develop these propositions in length. As a prelude, however, let us point out here these areas and issues that will be further developed and refined, and state how a relational approach of radicalization promises to address them.

First, there is a tendency in the strategic interaction literature to posit discrete, pre-given units such as the individual, the group or society as the ultimate starting points of analysis. This has hampered greater and more deliberate attention to the role of mechanisms, with many works in the literature often settling for hinting the presence of mechanisms or focusing on their implications without actually demonstrating their operation (Tarrow 2007). By contrast, relationalists in general, and our relational approach of radicalization in particular, consider mechanisms to provide causal analogies with wide applicability, and thus to offer the key in understanding and explaining the unfolding of the processes. Second, the growing recognition of the importance of interactions and relational dynamics (e.g., the recent treatment of opposition movements as composite actors) has not been met with an attempt to move beyond the search for the most powerful predictor. A relational reasoning to radicalization takes the existence of different pertinent fields or arenas of interaction and mechanisms as a starting point and considers examination of their interrelatedness from a comprehensive theoretical point of view. Finally, the vast strategic interaction literature has produced an odd division of labor. Students of social movements have tended to focus on the emergence and persistence of political violence, while students of armed insurgencies, civil wars, and terrorism have tended to focus on the intensification or escalation of political violence, as if we are dealing with two essentially distinct and unconnected phenomena that require separate theoretical frameworks. A relational approach offers powerful tools to capture the continuity among the different stages and manifestations of

political violence; at the same time, by tracing how these stages acquire their distinctive features, it also offers tools to analyze how and when stages progress.

Although the movement organizations on which we focus in this book developed in different manifestations of contentious politics (e.g., protest politics, armed insurgency, etc.) and, throughout their history of activism, witnessed and at times were involved in important transformations in this regard, this book centers on the shift from one manifestation to another. Specifically, this book focuses on the shift from predominantly nonviolent forms of contentious politics to predominantly violent ones on the part of one movement organization. To this end, we expand on the strategic interaction works and on other works where a relational approach to the study of contentious politics and political violence, in particular, is more explicit and developed (e.g., McAdam et al. 2001; Diani and McAdam 2003; Tilly 2003; Mische 2008; Tarrow 2011, 2012; Della Porta 2013). The soundness and explanatory power of our theory of radicalization, accordingly, will stand or fall on its relational credentials: on whether or not it establishes the key role of relational mechanisms in processes of radicalization across time and space.

APPROACHING RADICALIZATION

By radicalization we mean the *process through which a social movement organization (SMO) shifts from predominantly nonviolent tactics of contention to tactics that include violent means, as well as the subsequent process of contention maintaining and possibly intensifying the newly introduced violence*.[1] Although the definition stresses the process unfolding on the part of the movement organization, we perceive radicalization as a process emerging out of contentious interaction between various parties and actors. Radicalization involves actual engagement in political violence (not violence-prone ideologies or intention), which we understand as the infliction of physical harm to individuals or damage to property in connection to political claims (writ large). Political violence is therefore encompassing and

1. As will be elaborated in chapter 2, we use the term SMO without implying a professionalized, hierarchical structure that characterizes the relationships among movement member organizations as originally conveyed by McCarthy and Zald (1977). Nor do we assume that all organizations have a similar or fixed degree of affiliation to and involvement in the movement activity during episodes of contention/processes of radicalization, or that no differences in ideologies, strategy, tactics, and goals exist.

includes violence by state challengers, state supporters, and state actors themselves—the latter referring to agents of law and order and other bodies and institutions that are an integral part of the state apparatus.[2] At the same time, furthermore, political violence is recognized to be one of many forms of contentious repertoires that can be employed simultaneously in the course of an episode of political contention.

Based on this definition, and in accordance with other scholars in the fields of social movements, contentious politics, and political violence (Della Porta 1995; Kriesi 1996; Tilly 2003; Koopmans 2004; Goodwin 2006; Bergesen 2007; English 2009; Tarrow 2011; Maney, McCarthy, and Yukich 2012), we treat political violence as a "cut-point" among other forms of contention, a marker that enables us to distinguish between two phases of radicalization on the part of a SMO: the emergence of violence, which we call early radicalization, and the escalation of violence, which we call stepped-up radicalization. Broadly speaking, contentious repertoires in the early phase of radicalization may involve nonviolent forms that are non-institutional yet are legal and/or legitimate (e.g., demonstrations, lobbying, vigils, or petitions), actions that are illegal/illegitimate and disrupt public routine and order (e.g., mounting barricades, strikes, traffic blocking, squatting, tax revolts), but also acts of political violence against state actors and property. This means that, where political violence is present in this phase, there usually is no separation between the target of political claims and the target of violence (i.e., state actors are both the targets and victims).

Contentious repertoires in the stepped-up radicalization phase may also include political violence against state targets, but are characterized most particularly by violence against non-state targets. Political violence against non-state targets may vary qualitatively along dimensions that go beyond the distinction between property and bodily damage. The major categories include the following: (1) harm against specific civilians or their property because their behavior is deemed enemy (i.e., selective violence); (2) inadvertent harm of civilians, when the intended target is different (i.e., collateral violence); (3) harm against civilians or their property because of their membership in a collectivity that is deemed enemy (i.e., categorical violence); and, (4) harm against random civilians or their property (i.e., indiscriminate violence).

2. We consider state actors to be the individuals who are on state payroll and who are in active duty or service, either elected or nominated. Excluded, therefore, are retired individuals, regardless of their past role or duty, and companies and institutions that, though they may be involved in some public role of state-related service or function, even under contract, are not an integral part of the state apparatus.

Our conceptualization of radicalization, therefore, allows for the qualitative analysis of political violence. The presence and absence of the aforementioned forms of violent tactics are telling, as is the progression from one form to the other. It is important to note, however, that making such qualitative distinctions is never easy; the above-suggested categories are not discrete, and variation exists within each. Moreover, one of the most pertinent and perplexing questions is whether to privilege analytically the intention behind violence or the actual violent outcome. The above categories relate to the point of view of the perpetrators of violence, to be sure; but while we accept them, we also maintain that it is wrong to give analytic priority to the intentions of actors. What matters the most is ultimately the actual outcome of violence because this always enters the course of the interactions that comprise a contention. By contrast, the intention behind violence and behind action more generally may go unrecognized; thus, for example, a plan to inflict harm that foils may never enter the field of outbidding between adversaries. As will become clear in the chapters that follow, intentions, motivations, and threats with respect to violence are not overlooked in the analysis of strategy formation by the Brigate Rosse, EOKA, and al-Qaeda. But the locus of our analyses remains the series of actual interactions in time. We thus maintain an outcome-based notion of violence as we hold that acts of violence, however unintentional, ultimately become part of the exchanges in the course of radicalization.

This book, then, treats political violence as a phenomenon embedded in a complex web of socio-political relations, involving multiple parties and actors within parties such as political and social institutions, elites and pressure groups, and movement and counter-movement organizations. The importance of this approach is that by stressing a relational, conjunctural, and contingent reading of political violence, it avoids the over-deterministic explanations of political violence characterizing much of the literature. These explanations, typical of terrorism and security studies, are over-deterministic because they treat what they commonly term a militant or radical group as the sole driving force of the radicalization process. Accordingly, they tend to presume that the emergence of violence lies with some quality intrinsic to or developed by this actor, rather than as the result of the complex web of relational patterns and practices that shape and are shaped by the interactions among a variety of actors and parties involved in contention, as well as by surrounding, at times contingent, events and circumstances. It improves matters to consider the strategic interaction between, say, the movement organization and the state or between two or more organizations within the same

opposition movement, as a considerable number of works suggest and demonstrate; but here, too, the treatment falls short of a theoretically rounded and comprehensive analysis, while actors are often presumed, erroneously, to be autonomous. As this study demonstrates, when this kind of autonomous strategizing develops, it is usually the result of a breakdown of contacts, ties, and exchange of information, a stage typically associated with what we call stepped-up radicalization. This gradual development, furthermore, is also usually associated with an increase in the salience and consequentiality of violence-prone ideas and aggressive impulses in shaping contentious interactions.

This is why we argue that the contentious politics context in which social movements interact provides a promising starting point for analysis, especially since it allows for relational analysis. Contentious politics, according to McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001), is about "Episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants" (p. 5).[3] And, they posit, "[I]nterpersonal networks, interpersonal communication, and various forms of continuous negotiation—including negotiation of identities—as figuring centrally in the dynamics of contention" (p. 22). As we will discuss in chapter 2, social movements are characterized by: (1) informal interaction networks among a plurality of individuals, groups, and/or organizations based on a certain shared purpose and solidarity; (2) frequent, albeit not the only, use of non-institutional forms of protest; (3) consequential claim-making directed at authorities and other elites and power holders, and (4) a focus on political and/or cultural conflict, with the aim of either fostering or preventing social change (Snow, Kriesi, and Soule 2004; Della Porta and Diani 2006; Tarrow 2011). This interactive-oriented approach to social movements allows us to trace several robust relational mechanisms and examine their operations in what we call arenas of interaction (i.e., sites and frameworks of interchanges, communication, bargaining, and negotiation among specific sets of actors). These two sets of conceptual tools, mechanisms and arenas of interaction, are valuable for the analysis of processes of radicalization across time and space and therefore form the key ingredients of a theory of radicalization.

3. We acknowledge the distinction between proactive social movement–led contention and resistance, the latter being mostly defensive and reactive and typically involving individual, sporadic acts of evasion, deception, or other disguised contention either for saving lives or against local power-holders and their property (Gamson 1992; Tarrow 2005). Nonetheless, the analysis of the various episodes of contention includes reference to instances of resistance, whether they precede the development of a social movement or accompany it.

A THEORY OF RADICALIZATION

The theory of radicalization that we develop, one that focuses on the *how* and *when* questions of the process, can be organized around several basic propositions which, combined, form the central argument of this study. Let us state these propositions and briefly elaborate on each:

- *Processes of radicalization involve relational, cognitive, and environmental mechanisms, yet relational mechanisms mediate the salience of the other two types of mechanisms in variable ways*. Here we follow the distinction made by McAdam et al. (2001) between environmental (a change in social conditions and surrounding), cognitive (a change in shared perceptions or meaning), and relational (a change in connections among people and groups) mechanisms. What we add is theoretical elaboration about how relational mechanisms relate to and have primacy over the other two types of mechanisms. Accepting the presence and operation of cognitive and environmental mechanisms and recognizing that relational mechanisms produce their effects in conjunction with cognitive and environmental ones does not mean that these effects are similar or fixed in their consequentiality in the progression of radicalization. Ideas and intentions, as well as environmental stimuli, acquire their consequentiality as they are intertwined with the relational, interactive frameworks that envelope political contention; where these forces become compelling drivers of radicalization is usually when relational mechanisms exert their effects and the process is already set in motion, what we call the stepped-up radicalization.
- *While each relational mechanism has its own distinct influence, what drives radicalization is usually the combination of relational mechanisms and the way in which they reinforce each other's influence*. The works that cover the topic of radicalization, which are vastly growing in number, have identified several common relational mechanisms that play a role in the process. These mechanisms include, for example, "upward spirals of political opportunities," which is about a weakening of the movement's strategic political positioning as a result of constraints and/or threats; "competition for power," which is about tension or at times a rift between two or more movement organizations regarding strategy, tactics, and goals; and, "outbidding," which is about escalating levels as well as forms of protest activity and repressive measures. While each of these and other relational mechanisms has its own distinctive influence on the progression of the process, a fuller understanding of

radicalization is achieved by paying close attention to how mechanisms influence and are influenced by each other.

- *Relational mechanisms operate in distinguishable arenas of interaction; some of these mechanisms and the arenas out of which they arise are more recurring and typically more consequential in processes of radicalization, while others are not as recurring and their consequentiality is likely to be produced in conjunction with the more recurring and consequential mechanisms and their corresponding arenas*. Mechanisms do not operate in vacuums but rather emerge out of specific contexts. We conceptualize these contexts as arenas of interaction among pertinent actors, individual and collective. We hold that three particular arenas of interaction are always present in episodes of radicalization because they feature actors who are always present. Out of these arenas, we further hold, there emerge three corresponding mechanisms that are not only robust but, at least in the early radicalization phase, are also likely to be especially consequential. Without implying fixed order, the most robust and consequential mechanisms and the arenas out of which they arise are: "upward spirals of political opportunities," which take place in the arena between the movement and its political environment; "competition for power," which takes place within the movement arena; and "outbidding," which takes place in the arena of interaction between movement activists and state security forces. In addition, we conceptualize two more arenas of interaction that are not expected to be necessarily present in all episodes of radicalization. The first is the arena of interaction between the movement and the public; the mechanism emerging out of this arena most particularly is one we term "dissociation," referring to the growing social distance between movement organizations, on the one hand, and unaffiliated supporters and third parties, on the other. The second is the arena between the movement and a counter-movement; the mechanism that captures relational dynamics in this arena most particularly is "object shift," referring to a change in one or more movement organizations' object of claims and targets of attack. When these two arenas are present, the two corresponding mechanisms may not operate at the early stages of radicalization, but their influence can nevertheless grow to become important as they interact with other mechanisms in the course of the process.

In the following chapter we elaborate on additional aspects of dissimilarities whose sources stem from the unique particularities and initial conditions of each episode. The combination of deductively-informed and inductively-informed approaches to our theory building and comparative

style is based on the understanding that even though relational mechanisms are traceable in processes of radicalization across time and space, they are constituted by different underlying forces, concatenate differently, and vary in their gravity.

The strategy of investigation that we pursue in order to substantiate these propositions is based on an in-depth, comparative historical analysis of three primary episodes of contention that feature the radicalization processes involving, respectively, the Brigate Rosse in the period between 1969 and 1978, EOKA in the period between 1945 and 1959, and al-Qaeda in the period between 1984 and 2001. The analysis of radicalization in each episode highlights the centrality of the separate and joint operation of the various relational mechanisms. It shows how these mechanisms produce their effect in conjunction with sub-mechanisms (cognitive and environmental as well as relational) and how they mediate the degree to which the sub-mechanisms become more salient during certain phases of the process. Our analysis highlights also how each episode introduces dissimilarities; for example, it shows how in the episode of EOKA "upward spirals of political opportunities" is most consequential in the early phase of the process, while in the episode of al-Qaeda "outbidding" plays the same role during the same phase. Finally, the utility of a relational theory of radicalization is substantiated further by a counterfactual analysis, which follows the logic of path-dependency and utilizes the idea of reverse mechanisms (i.e., how each mechanism has its logical equivalent that operates in the opposite direction). In each episode we identify critical junctures in the unfolding process in each episode where possibilities to put a brake on violence existed (i.e., de-radicalization), and then analyze additional episodes of contention conducive to violence that ultimately do not lead to violence (i.e., non-radicalization).

RESEARCH STYLE, COMPARATIVE APPROACH, AND SELECTION LOGIC

Consistent with our attempt to learn about the dynamics of radicalization, we develop a theoretical framework that promotes a deeper and nuanced understanding of the process and enables comparison by way of mechanisms (defined and discussed in detail in chapter 2). In speaking about mechanisms that concatenate to drive (or impede through reverse mechanisms) radicalization, we follow the logic of the process tracing research strategy. Social dynamics are considered mechanisms inasmuch as they recur and help us trace consequential sequences or pathways (Stinchcombe 1995; Mahoney 2000; McAdam et al. 2001; George and Bennett

2005). Mechanisms therefore stand for dynamics with causal efficacy. Such causality exists at an epistemological level commensurate with social-historical analysis, particularly the analysis of the interplay of social relations over time.[4]

While not being indifferent to dynamics unfolding at either the micro or macro levels of analysis, this book centers on mechanisms that operate and exert their influence at the group/organizational level. We do not reject the influences, say, of personal traits of certain individuals or of systemic changes and developments (e.g., war, economic crisis, or demographical shifts) on processes of radicalization, but we maintain (and demonstrate) that these influences rise and fall within the context of the organizations. It is therefore how these influences are factored in organizational dynamics and reflected through mechanisms at the meso-level that constitutes the core of our investigation.

This book focuses on recurring relational mechanisms and arenas of interaction that constitute a process of radicalization yet combine differently in specific historical and political contexts. These "dissimilarities in similarities" are the result of several sets of initial conditions, usually accumulated through history. Historically specific conditions can therefore include properties and traits of each episode (inclusive of but not limited to the territorial scale or levels of contentious engagement) that inform the development of the radicalization process. In this regard, our mode of comparison is consistent with the logic of mechanism-based research strategy by taking a middle path between social science that seeks general laws and historical accounts that totally reject causal regularities (Goldstone 1998; Tarrow 2010).

As noted, we have decided to focus on diverse episodes of contention precisely because they demonstrate common relational dynamics that play a central role in processes of radicalization despite undeniable differences regarding sources of discontent, ideological justifications for and motivations of contention, and severity and targets of violence. Without implying certain fixed longevity or being indifferent to the influence of background developments and forces, our delimitation of the three main episodes is based on the following logic. We follow secondary accounts where agreement exists over the starting point of each episode, whereas our decision regarding the ending point of an episode is

4. Although we employ a historical-sociological analysis to identify and trace the operation of relational (and other) mechanisms, it should be noted that the growth of the relational approach was accompanied by the development of Social Network Analysis technique, as a means to provide a more quantitative mapping of ties and contacts.

theoretically and analytically informed. Despite variations within each of the above-mentioned qualitative categories of political violence that we examine, our analysis ends at the highest degree of radicalization each episode introduces (e.g., selective violence in the Brigate Rosse episode and indiscriminate violence in the episode of al-Qaeda).

Regarding the selection logic of our empirical material, this rests on criteria that differ from other classifications often found in the literature. Specifically, it differs from those logics that aim at fleshing out structural, behavioral, and motivational characteristics of what is commonly labeled "group at risk" (e.g., Asal and Rethemeyer 2008). It differs also from classifications meant to trace similarities in relational dynamics in individual, organizational, or mass-based radicalization (e.g., McCauley and Moskalenko 2011) or across different types of ideologies (e.g., Della Porta 2013). What our selection logic retains is the standard distinction among three territorial scales or levels of engagement, namely, the national, the intra-national, and the transnational. These three levels of engagement are treated here as ideal-typical categories that serve to demonstrate the wide scope conditions of our theoretical and comparative framework.

Accordingly, we maintain on the one hand that the most fundamental and robust similarities among episodes of radicalization stem from the fields of interaction and relations between movements and societies as well as between movements and authorities. The very fact that movements are inevitably positioned and oriented vis-à-vis authorities and society (including possibly a counter-movement) in their attempt to exert influence, means that the interface among these three broadly conceptualized parties is the locus of emergent patterns of interaction that potentially remain similar across diverse episodes of radicalization. On the other hand, we also maintain that the distinction among the three levels of contentious engagement stems from variation in the specific *content* and *form* of this interface.

Based on our selection logic, it is possible to propose the following ideal-typical categories, which should be seen as forming a continuum of state-movement-society interface:

- *National level of engagement*: At this level, which constitutes the one pole of the continuum, we usually have a system of authority relations wherein the claims raised by the movement tend to accept the pre-existing state-society boundaries and seek to make changes within it. From this perspective, it is possible to classify the Italian Student/Worker movement, the American Students for Democratic Society movement, or the Jewish Settler movement as belonging to the same category.

- *Intra-national level of engagement*: At this "in-between" level, we usually have a system of authority relations wherein the claims raised by the movement may accept state-citizenship practices in general but typically seek a specific change of state-society boundaries. This is the category where we find the greatest degree of variations and complexity, reflected in the variety of conceptualizations and labels proposed or used by scholars in adjacent fields of research—for example, ethnocracy (Rouhana 1998), colonial regime (Fantasia and Hirsch 1995; Krasner 1983), intrastate conflicts (Posen 1993), and segmented composite regime (Tilly and Tarrow 2007). From this perspective, it is possible to classify a variety of movements, such as the Enosis movement, the Basque movement, the Palestinian movement, the Northern Irish Republican movement, and the South African Antiapartheid movement as belonging in the same category.
- *Transnational level of engagement*: At this level, which constitutes the other pole of the continuum, we usually have a system of authority relations transcending the spatial-legal state confines. The claims raised by the movement ignore or even altogether reject state-society boundaries, without necessarily being detached from local roots, networks, and resources. From this perspective, it is possible to classify the Salafi Transnational movement, the Global Justice movement, the Anti-Slavery movement, and the International Labor movement as belonging to the same category.

The distinction between episodes at the national level and episodes at the transnational level makes analytical sense, but in practice it is unlikely that episodes of contention will be purely national or purely transnational or, moreover, that no change will develop in their basic form and content as contention progresses. More often than not, episodes at the national and transnational levels will have some characteristics of the *intra*-national category (consider, for example, the Jewish Settler movement during the Palestinian Intifada episode or the Salafi movement during the Bosnia war episode). This means that episodes at the *intra*-national level may differ from each other, some being closer to the national level and others to the transnational level. It should be stressed that these transformations and the possibility of adaptations in issues such as target of claims, ideology, and legitimacy that typically accompany them are essentially the result of precipitating changes in relational dynamics among and within actors involved in contention.

Our main, though not sole, empirical focus is on the three episodes of radicalization that regard, respectively, the Brigate Rosse, EOKA, and

al-Qaeda. As noted above, this is based on a research design that combines traditional "most different" and "most similar" logics. The soundness of our theoretical framework, accordingly, is supported by its applicability in diverse contexts, which then renders generalizations all the more convincing. While the value of our comparative historical analyses is theoretical, however, the analyses are not merely recycled knowledge; our relational reading of existing accounts yields novel insights that cast new light on known arguments. The analysis of each episode is based on systematic collection of archival materials as well as intimate familiarity with the wealth of secondary sources on these episodes. Thus the analysis of the three processes of radicalization under study here relies on media reports, archival records (Parliamentary protocols and official government reports, court records, movement leaflets, communiqués of the organizations, pamphlets, etc.), and existing as well as original statistics and datasets.

STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK

This book has six substantive chapters. Chapter 2 develops the relationally oriented theoretical and comparative framework that we deem most useful for the analysis of the *how* and *when* of processes of radicalization across time and space. To this end, the chapter builds on the logic and tenets of the relational approach and the closely associated epistemological foundations of the comparative approach through mechanisms, by engaging in a theoretical and methodological dialogue with a range of pertinent works in the literature.

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 constitute the bulk of the book. In these three chapters we establish "similarities in dissimilarities" of the process of radicalization as they are found in our three main episodes of radicalization. Each chapter deals with one episode respectively and follows the same structure of analysis and exposition. Chapter 3, then, focuses on the relational dynamics of radicalization in the episode of the Brigate Rosse in the Italian socio-political scene of the late 1960s and 1970s; chapter 4 analyzes the episode of EOKA, thus considering an example of radicalization unfolding at the intra-national level of contentious engagement; and chapter 5 analyzes the radicalization of al-Qaeda, a paradigmatic example of radicalization at the transnational level of contentious engagement. In each chapter we trace the similarities by analyzing each episode according to the main relational mechanisms as they operate in their corresponding arenas of interaction throughout the duration of the

episode.[5] Concomitantly, moreover, we highlight a key difference among the three episodes, which regards different sub-mechanisms that constitute the main relational mechanisms. Thus for any given mechanism in each episode, we identify different sets of sub-mechanisms.

While chapters 3, 4, and 5 privilege similarities in dissimilarities, chapter 6 is devoted to tracing dissimilarities in similarities. In this chapter we address the question, "How do episodes of radicalization compare with each other?" Accordingly, we establish the utility of our framework further by exploring the lessons of comparison through our concepts of relational mechanisms and arenas of interaction. The main focus, then, is on discussing the dissimilarities that are fleshed out based on our cross-episode comparison. We focus on three main aspects of dissimilarity as they are informed by the initial conditions respective of each episode, conditions that regard the three different levels of engagement, but also differences in social boundaries or cleavages and political styles. These sources of dissimilarities give rise to: (1) differences in the underlying sub-mechanisms that variously constitute the main relational mechanisms; (2) differences in the relative weight of each mechanism/arena in a given episode; and (3) differences in the particular sequence of how the mechanisms combine in driving radicalization forward. In discussing each aspect of dissimilarity, we also draw parallels between our primary episodes and other episodes of contention/radicalization that are similar in their level of contentious engagement (e.g., comparing the particular pathway of EOKA radicalization with that of the IRA). In this chapter, finally, we discuss differences in the degree of radicalization in our three episodes. This allows us to develop a discussion of repertoires of violent tactics, connecting repertoire variation and change to our relational analysis.

Chapter 7 brings us to the questions "Is radicalization a one-way path?" and "Are all opposition movements destined to experience radicalization during episodes of contention?" These questions are important conceptually, theoretically, and comparatively, and the chapter is devoted to demonstrating the utility of our framework to explaining de-radicalization and non-radicalization. Radicalization is not deterministic but, rather, a possible progression resulting from decisions and actions pursued within frameworks of interactions and relations. Following the same logic, we argue that instances of non-radicalization and possibilities of a brake on

5. Given the relative neglect of the relational mode of investigation in treatments of our primary episodes, we occasionally give more space to establishing the presence of a given relational mechanism.

radicalization are found in the operation of the reverse mechanisms of the same set of relational mechanisms and their interplay (i.e., the ability of movement organizations to form and maintain consensus over strategy, tactics, and goals—as the reverse mechanism of competition for power).

First, the purpose of chapter 7 is to provide evidence and illustrations from critical stages in the process of radicalization in each of our primary episodes where possibilities for putting a brake on the process existed. If our contention that radicalization is not deterministic holds, it becomes critical to show that in particular contexts or critical historical junctures there were actual possibilities for different relational patterns that potentially could have altered the process path, either by slowing radicalization down or halting it altogether. How our analysis of those "forgone possibilities" of de-radicalization relates to the literature on counter-terrorism, the literature on disengagement from violence, and the insights gleaned from our analysis regarding both bodies of literature are also discussed. Second, as a means of further substantiating our analysis of de-radicalization and the logic that guides it, we bring evidence of non-radicalization from three additional episodes of contention that are more limited in duration. Following a "most similar-different outcome" and using the same selection logic for each ideal-type category in its respective level of engagement, we analyze: the Jewish settler contention against the Gaza Pullout of 2005 (the national level), the Catalan Nationalist movement contention during the 1970s, before and after Franco's death (the *intra*-national level), and the contention during the European Social Forum inaugural convention in Florence, Italy, in November 2002 (the transnational level). We demonstrate that despite prevalent cognitive and environmental mechanisms in each episode, radicalization was impeded as a result of the joint and separate operations of reverse mechanisms.

Chapter 8, the concluding chapter, brings our book full circle by discussing the main threads of our relational framework as they relate specifically to conceptualizing, theorizing, researching, and comparing radicalization across episodes of contention.

CHAPTER 2

Theorizing and Comparing Radicalization: A Relational Framework

Thinking about radicalization as a process that develops out of multiple, complex webs of relational dynamics during contentious politics across time and space alludes to certain general theoretical approach, methodological logic, and comparative orientation. Accordingly, this chapter begins with a short discussion of the Relational Perspective, the general theoretical approach that underpins our theory. It then elaborates on our mechanism-based research strategy for tracing and comparing processes, a research strategy connected to relationalism. Following this epistemological and methodological buildup, the third part of the chapter presents our relational approach to explaining processes of radicalization in particular. In this part, we develop the main concepts and propositions of our theory, and present a model for a comparative analysis of radicalization; the model, as it will be seen, allows us to demonstrate the utility of our theory for tracing both similarities and dissimilarities across episodes of contention.

THE RELATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

The relational perspective has gained wide acceptance in recent decades. Developing first in sociology, it has gradually spilled over to other social science disciplines, such as political science and communication studies, as well as sub-disciplines, such as conflict studies and political communication. With different emphases, the focus on the inextricable link between social ties and culture has been the thrust of the relational approach

in sociology or, as it is often called, "relational sociology." Dissatisfied with the ongoing dichotomy between macro-level and micro-level analyses—accompanied by the neglect of the dialectic between structure and agency, as well as the prevalence of works that promote invariant explanations and search for law-like formulations—relationalists have called for a greater emphasis on the meso-level of analysis and for attention to dynamic social patterns and practices. It is through the prism of social relations that social phenomena, including those relating to groups and organizations, can best be understood. As pointedly articulated in Emirbayer's *Manifesto for a Relational Sociology* (1997), unlike resolute structuralism, functionalism,[1] or rational-actor and value/idea-based models,

> Relational theorists reject that notion that one can posit discrete, pre-given units such as the individual or society as ultimate starting points of sociological analysis . . . [I]ndividual persons, whether strategic or norm following, are inseparable from the transactional contexts within which they are embedded . . . [a relational perspective] depicts social reality in dynamic, continuous and processual terms, and sees relations between social terms and units as preeminently dynamic in nature, as unfolding, ongoing processes rather than as static ties among inert substance. (p. 287 – 289)

This means that just as individuals, organizations, and societies are not discrete units, neither are values and norms. Indeed, the idea that culture is intertwined with social ties has a long lineage, going back to the works of Pierre Bourdieu, Norbert Elias, and Georg Simmel. In these writings, one finds an utter rejection of the separation between individuals and society, as if we are dealing with two substances with a priori sets of characteristic features, properties, and essences. Instead of proposing and relying on "substantialist" concepts that end up reifying social formations, the starting point for understanding and explaining forms of social interaction (e.g., legitimacy or conflict) rests on the recognition of the centrality of the content of interaction that gives rise to such formations and simultaneously is shaped by them—a continuing and fluid state of production and reproduction, or change and continuity. Some of the analytical concepts proposed by these and other thinkers, such as "habitus," "fields," and

1. Unlike the rational-actor and value/idea-based models, the link between cognition and social relationships has received considerable attention by structural functionalists, especially in studying intergroup conflict dynamics (Allport 1954; Coser 1956; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Pettigrew 1998). Here too, however, the epistemological and conceptual starting point of analysis treats individuals, groups, and societies as pre-given units and inert substances.

"sociation," and the attention given to social figurations, practices, transactions, *intra*personal spaces, and the reciprocal nature and interconnectedness of in-group and out-group dynamics—have all become cornerstones in relational thinking and theorizing.[2]

American Structuralism built on these ideas as well, and in this tradition the most influential work has perhaps been that of Harrison White. White's path-breaking *Identity and Control* (1992) has been primarily concerned with the relationship between the social networks in which individuals are embedded and the individuals' perceptions and interpretations of their social surrounding (i.e., inclusive of changes in the environment but also of other groups). Specifically, it is a dynamic process of social organization that constitutes, through processual interconnections among interactants, a structure of relations (p. 67). What characterizes this relationship of relations and cognition is that it is multiple, fluid, context-sensitive, and temporal.

Relations, it follows, are typical, in fact indissoluble elements of structure, rationality, cognition, and culture. Perception, valuation, motivation, and strategic calculation, for example, are cognitive developments that emerge through chains of relations, as are structures of relation and structures of meaning. Thus, while ideas, values, rational choices and calculations, motives, and dispositions may be consequential in guiding behavior or action, they are not autonomous forces. They are, rather, elements that operate within and gain salience in the context of social relations. Relations are the contents that connect interacting parties and actors and can shape the form and functions of their interactions (i.e., potentially constructive, but also potentially destructive, as is usually the case in interactions devoid of contacts, ties, and exchange of information). They provide the context for strategic calculations, subjective interpretations, and, more often than not, dispositions, and they mediate the degree to which these elements shape behavior.

The relational approach, drawing from both the American and European traditions, has permeated various fields of social science research, ranging from exchange theory (Cook and Whitmeyer 1992) to developmental psychology (Fogel et al. 2006), to discourse analysis (Carver 2002), to civil society and social capital (Edwards et al. 2011), to world politics and policy studies (Brincat 2011; Zmerli and Hooghe 2011). But this has most particularly been the case in the fields of social movements and

2. For useful and comprehensive reviews and developments of these European influences, see Wieviorka (2009), Donati (2011), and two important volumes edited by Powell and Dépelteau (2013, 2013b).

contentious politics, where the emerging consensus holds that exchange of information, negotiations, mediation, bargaining, contacts, and ties play a central role in episodes of contention (Ferree and Hess 1985; Diani 1992, 1995, 2000a, 2000b; Tilly 1995, 1998, 2003; Diani and McAdam 2003; Jasper 2004; McAdam 2004; Steinberg 2004; Steinhoff and Zwerman 2008; Goodwin 2006, 2007; Mische 2008; Gunning 2007, 2009; Tarrow 2011, 2012; Maney et al. 2012; Meyer and Staggenborg 2012—for a review, see Mische 2011; Mische and Krinsky 2013). According to McAdam et al. (2001), to better understand processes and trajectories of contentious episodes, it is critical to "treat social interaction, social ties, communication, and conversation not merely as expressions of structure, rationality, consciousness, or culture but as active sites of creation and change" (p. 22). As will be discussed subsequently, similar to the study of other processes of contentious politics, radicalization, too, has begun to be studied through relational lenses. And, similar to research on other processes and phenomena in the field of social movements and contention, this focus on relational dynamics has been strongly associated with the epistemological and methodological reasoning of mechanism-based research.

TRACING DYNAMICS, COMPARING PROCESSES THROUGH MECHANISMS

While no single perspective or paradigm has grown to dominate the way scholars study social relations, the developing consensus is to study them as emergent phenomena at the meso-level of interaction. This represents a rejection of resolute structuralism but not of the idea that macro-level forces can contribute to the emergence of meso-level phenomena, and a rejection of methodological individualism but not of the idea that acting individuals are generative forces as well. But above all, this consensus forms around the idea that one can explain much about how phenomena at the meso-level develop by focusing on meso-level interaction and organization.

McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly's (2001) *Dynamics of Contention* took the lead in developing this approach. The authors' research program presented therefore an eminent epistemological and conceptual framework. As we will show below, this research program opens the way for the apprehension, analysis, and reconstruction of emergent social phenomena, doing so particularly through process tracing. It also offers a comparative approach that, as we maintain, is superior to the main alternative approaches.

In McAdam et al. (2001), as well as in subsequent publications by these authors, the epistemological starting point is that any given episode of contentious politics is a process that emerges from other processes. Accordingly, to study a given process is to study its relationship with constitutive sub-processes. The authors call the constitutive sub-processes "mechanisms," and it is through this label that they argue their epistemological case. In abstract terms, a mechanism is for them a "delimited class of events and occurrences that alter connections among social units" (McAdam et al. 2001, 24). In less technical language, Tilly also describes a mechanism as "similar events that produce essentially the same immediate effects across a wide range of circumstances" (Tilly 2003, 20). Thus, as they recur, different mechanisms may concatenate to constitute a process. For example, the mechanism *framing* (adopting and broadcasting a shared definition of an issue or performance) may concatenate with the mechanism *brokerage* (production of a new connection between previously unconnected or weakly connected sites) to potentially constitute the process *boundary formation* (creation of an us-them distinction between two political actors—for the definitions, see Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 215 – 216). But it is important that in this approach the relationship between mechanism and process is analytical. This means that the choice to assign the label process rather than the label mechanism to a specific phenomenon is dependent on the analytical demands at hand; framing, for example, may be labeled a mechanism in one context or scale of analysis but a process in another (McAdam et al. 2001, 27).

We embrace this research strategy, particularly valuing the middle course it charts between positivism and epistemological skepticism. At the same time, however, we recognize that it has been marred by certain ambiguities that left it open to criticism. In order to clarify the knotty points and address the criticism, we make two modifications to its premises.

The first modification regards the definition of mechanism/process. The conceptualization of mechanism by McAdam et al. can be presented schematically as <X→Y>, where <X> is an initial condition, <Y> the altered social units, and <→> stands for the "delimited class of events and occurrences" that constitute <Y>. The trouble with this conceptualization is the notion that the events/occurrences constitutive of <Y> have a pre-set form as a class—or are "*similar* events," as Tilly puts it slightly differently. To suggest that the constitutive events have a constant form across empirical contexts is simply untenable, as critics of McAdam et al.

argued.[3] It is noteworthy, however, that McAdam et al. do not adhere to this conceptualization when they analyze processes. For they effectively suggest that a process features an initial condition (X), a constituted processual outcome (Y), and a constitutive concatenation of mechanisms (→), where they allow the concatenation of mechanisms to vary across empirical contexts in constituting the same processual outcome. Our modification, then, is to suggest that any given mechanism, like any given process, be defined by its constituted outcome (Y), not as the package <X→Y>. This way there is no expectation that a given constituted outcome is attached to a given set of constitutive events (or constitutive mechanisms, in the case of processes) (Demetriou 2012; Alimi et al. 2012). Thus, for example, the mechanism *polarization* exists, according to our account, by virtue of the outcome "polarization," not because the outcome "polarization" is constituted by some predefined sequence of events that holds across empirical contexts.

What are the payoffs of this modification? First, it clarifies the epistemology of processual emergence. Raising the epistemological value of the "constituted outcome" at the expense of the "constitutive events" goes hand in hand with accepting that reality is too complicated to neatly correspond to a proposition whereby ready parts constitute a given whole. A given process cannot be expected to be constituted by the same concatenation of mechanisms from one empirical context to the other, just as a given mechanism cannot be expected to be constituted by the same event types. This follows the recognition that it is impossible for any analysis to describe the total forces that generate mechanisms and their concatenation. Thus the events identified by an analysis cannot be considered to exhaust all the constitutive elements of the operative mechanism at hand, for it is certain that other, unidentified and unidentifiable elements also come into play. Likewise an identified set of mechanisms cannot be considered to exhaust all the constitutive elements of the related process. In brief, then, a process is constituted by mechanisms but is not reducible to them.

Furthermore, defining mechanisms based on their constituted outcomes aids the classification of basic types of mechanisms. When McAdam et al. (2001) distinguish among relational, cognitive, and environmental mechanisms, we take it to mean two things. First, the outcome constituted is a change respectively at the realms of social relations, cognition, and the environment. Second, the constitutive events of any given relational, cognitive,

3. The main debates are featured in *Qualitative Sociology* 2008: 31(4), *Mobilization* 2003: 8 (3), and *International Review of Social History* 2004: 49(1). In addition to responses in each forum, see also a special issue of *Mobilization* 2011: 16(1), guest edited by Doug McAdam and Sidney Tarrow, for a more general and applied response.

or environmental mechanism may potentially feature a combination of relational, cognitive, and/or environmental events. At the extreme, in fact, the constitutive events may entirely belong in one realm while the constituted outcome in another. Consider, for example, the mechanism *coalition formation*. Defined as the creation of new, visible, and direct coordination of claims between two or more previously distinct actors, this mechanism features a constituted outcome that belongs in the realm of social relations. However, this outcome may well be constituted by events belonging in the realm of cognition, such as actors' shared understanding and meaning-making of their collective situation and experience. Hence, by calling a mechanism relational only when the constituted outcome is a relational change, calling it cognitive only when the constituted outcome is a cognitive change, and so on, we establish a clearheaded way of referring to and classifying mechanisms.

The second modification we make on the research strategy developed by McAdam et al. (2001) stems from the recognition that a constitutive relationship exists between mechanisms and their social context. This is a point that is foundational for the philosophy of mechanism—where context is understood as material-based bonds and mechanisms are understood as activity (Bunge 1997 2004; Bhaskar 1979; Demetriou 2009)—but which McAdam et al. eschew. The theory of mechanism in their treaty is not contingent on a parallel theory of the mechanism's social context. The broader issue behind this is the structure-agency conundrum, a recurring issue that has been addressed by Jasper (2004), among others, through the concept of "structured arenas" and more recently in Fligstein and McAdam's (2011, 2012) work on Strategic Action Fields. While we find both concepts credible and useful, we wish to flesh out in particular the relational aspect of structure and to link agency to the mechanism-based analytical framework. Accordingly we consider the pertinent interacting actors (and their roles and positions of power) to be the key elements comprising the context of a mechanism, rather than interpretive frames and rules of behavior as proposed by Fligstein and McAdam. As will be explained later in this chapter, our actor-based conceptualization of a mechanism's social context, which we term arenas of interaction, facilitates the comparison of mechanisms.

Comparing Processes through Mechanisms

Mechanisms offer a useful way to discipline process tracing. Searching for them aids the apprehension of process dynamics, evaluating mechanism concatenation aids process analysis, and referring to mechanisms in

exposition aids process reconstruction. But just as mechanisms are key tools of process tracing, so they are useful units of comparison. This is so for two main reasons: because they allow for the comparison of phenomena (processes) through the comparison of constitutive dynamics at the level of not only mechanisms but also of sub-mechanisms, and because they allow for the combined comparison of similarity *and* difference. As we will show below, these reasons—along with the epistemic presuppositions that underpin them—render comparison through mechanisms superior to the main alternative comparative approaches, namely, variable covariance and case comparison.

Conceptualizing, as we do, mechanisms through their constituted outcomes does not mean that the elements constituting the outcome are not worthy of investigation. This in fact remains the crux of the approach toward process tracing, which we adopt from McAdam et al. (2001) and develop. As we noted, a process is constituted by, but is not reducible to, mechanisms. Logically, this premise applies to the constitution of mechanisms as well. Hence a mechanism can be considered to be constituted by sub-mechanisms, without this creating the expectation that any given mechanism corresponds to a pre-set concatenation of sub-mechanisms. With this in mind, the analytical regress to sub-mechanisms (and potentially to further regress) is not problematic. It actually enables us to show in this book that, on the one hand, processes of radicalization (defined by the constituted outcome "radicalization") are constituted by varied, not constant, cross-context combinations of mechanisms and sub-mechanisms, and that, on the other hand, these mechanisms and sub-mechanisms do not exhaust all the forces at play. This perspective, in turn, has important implications for comparisons attentive to both similarities and dissimilarities, as it means that any given mechanism can be produced in different contexts through a variety of sub-mechanism combinations—hence dissimilarity in constitutive forces but a similarity in constituted outcomes. In fact, a systematic treatment of sub-mechanisms captures each episode's particularities and thereby facilitates the understanding of what Falleti and Lynch (2009) call "portability" of mechanisms from one context to another. As we will show in the course of this book, mechanism portability can be linked, among other things, to the historically specific conditions of a given episode, which Goldstone (1998) calls "initial conditions."

Despite claims such as the one made by King, Keohane, and Verba (1994, 85 – 87) that the variable covariance and mechanism-based approaches are compatible with each other, there are clear epistemological difference between our approach and the variable covariance one. The variable covariance

approach aims to produce probabilistic, law-like statements that are expected to explain other similar phenomena; to the extent that mechanisms become part of this sort of enterprise, it is to "unpack" variable covariance (Caporaso 2009; Gerring 2010; HedstrÖm and Swedberg 1998). Our approach does not aim to produce probabilistic statements or to utilize pre-existing probabilistic statements to explain its subject matter.[4] In lieu of the search for law-like regularity, it seeks to approximate as much as possible the multiple forces generating phenomena. We emphasize the term "constitute" at the expense of the term "cause" precisely because the former better reflects the idea that generative forces are hard to pin down in a precise manner. Thus, for example, we do not expect sub-mechanisms to be necessarily temporarily prior to the mechanism they constitute, but rather we remain open to the possibility that mechanisms and sub-mechanisms develop in synchrony or have a loop-like generative pattern.

Related to the issue of causality, moreover, the variable covariance approach tends to side-step the conjuncture that is intertwined with events either by assuming that variables are additive or by "statistically controlling" variable interaction when interaction seems too obvious to be wished away. By contrast, our approach focuses precisely on interaction, aiming to bring its various facets to the theoretical and methodological fore. Finally, and following its presupposition about causality, the variable covariance approach constructs units of comparison that are expected to vary along narrow dimensions of attributes. By contrast, the units of comparison in our approach rely neither on attributes nor on fixed dimensions of variance. Rather, being much less stringently thought concepts that aim to account for actual turning points and other punctuations in the course of interaction, mechanisms relate to diverse aspects of reality and hence correspond to diverse ways of apprehension (or "operationalization").

Steering away from positivism, however, does not mean a swing to idiography. Our aim is ultimately comparative, which presupposes a measure of simplification. Our approach is not to formulate in terms of mechanisms/sub-mechanisms all the pertinent generative forces in a given episode of contention. Thus when we analyze a given mechanism we identify only a handful, albeit the most central, of constitutive sub-mechanisms, where a more comprehensive treatment of any single episode would have justified a search for more. But beyond this, it is important to note that no matter how many sub-mechanisms are incorporated into

4. This goes a long way in explaining why we formulate propositions rather than hypotheses. For a useful discussion of the differences between mechanism-based and variable-based logic, see Mahoney (2001). See also McAdam et al. 2008 on ways of measuring presence or absence of mechanisms' operation.

the analysis, they may not subsume all the events that provide a given mechanism with its raison d'être as a category unto itself; some events having this constitutive role may remain unrelated to the identified sub-mechanisms. Thus, as later chapters show, we describe the operation of given mechanisms not only via concatenated sub-mechanisms but also via events and other mechanism-related features that fall outside the operation of sub-mechanisms.

It should be clear that in our empirical accounts of processes the constitutive relationship between sub-mechanisms and mechanisms is captured by qualitative analysis. Although steadfast guidelines to characterize these constitutive relationships do not exist, it is nonetheless useful to draw attention to certain verbs that denote these relationships differently. We thus use "trigger" to capture instances in which a sub-mechanism outcome follows, through the mediation of certain events, a structural tendency; for example, a presidential speech (event) may trigger polarization (a sub-mechanism constituting a mechanism such as coalition formation) between a movement organization and the administration if the movement organization already mistrusts the administration (tendency). We use "activate" or "precipitate" to emphasize those instances when a sub-mechanism that operates continuously on low levels increases its mechanism effect at a given point in time, again through the mediation of certain events; for example, a public protest (event) activating attribution of threat (sub-mechanism on previously low level of operation, which may constitute a mechanism such as competition for power) among movement organizations.

Beyond variable covariance, another mainstream approach is that of case comparison. The contrast between case comparison and the version of mechanism-process approach that we develop rests on two main points. First, case comparison compares "wholes." That is, a case is normally understood to be a manifestation of a broader class of phenomena, which is to say a category with a set combination of defining characteristics (Eckstein 1992; Ragin 1987). Our approach, however, does not consider wholes because we do not believe that instances of radicalization—or of political contention more generally—are bounded by some pre-set combination of characteristics. In this, in fact, we underscore the choice of McAdam et al. (2001) to refer to *episodes* of contention, rather than cases of contention, because we recognize along with them that setting strict theoretical bounds around contentious interaction is not warranted by the varied and open-ended ramifications of these interactions in time and space. Moreover, reconnecting with the concepts of fields and arenas discussed above, we recognize that episodes of contention involve a multitude of

actors and parties (some existing while others new coming, some domestic while others not) interacting in various sites that are distinguishable according to the roles and positions of power of the interactants. Through our approach, in short, we compare with each other key elements of different processes (i.e., mechanisms and sub-mechanisms as they correspond to certain arenas of interaction) but not processes as pre-defined totalities.

The second and more important point on which our approach can be contrasted with case comparison regards the logic of comparison, at least the most stringent version of it as developed by John Stuart Mill. Mill's method of agreement holds that one considers the causal factors of an outcome to be those (and only those) that are present in all of the cases examined. His indirect method of difference takes the method of agreement to the next step whereby the status of causal factors is verified by additional cases in which the absence of the causal factors corresponds to the absence of the outcome. This approach, however, is reasonable only under the assumption that outcomes are caused by a very small number of factors (Demetriou and Roudometof 2014). In the face of the complexity of the social world the approach becomes problematic. Thus, not only does it wish away conjuncture, as does the method of covariance, it also becomes untenable once a larger number of plausible factors is brought into the analysis. Charles Ragin captures this weakness pointedly:

> Because case-oriented comparative methods are holistic, conditions are examined in combinations. As the number of relevant causal conditions increases, the number of logically possible combinations of causal conditions increases exponentially. An investigator who considers eight different causal conditions conceived in presence/absence terms, for example, might consider a maximum of 256 different combinations of these eight conditions. (1987, 50)

In broader terms, the differences between our approach, on the one hand, and the case comparison and covariance approaches, on the other, relate to the question of what constitutes explanation. In our approach, to describe the unfolding of a process is to *explain* the process. The alternative, more traditional approaches, however, insist on a sharp distinction between explanation and description/narration. For them, such a distinction is warranted because explanation is thought to be systematic whereas description/narration is not. We reject any sharp distinction between these two modes of presenting information because we maintain that it is possible to offer systematic, indeed rigorous, descriptions of processes. Mechanism-based process tracing is precisely the means for this. It allows

for a systematic, structured analysis of "what follows what," while maintaining the rich, dynamic, and open-ended nature of social and political complexities.

A RELATIONAL APPROACH TO RADICALIZATION

How does the foregoing discussion of relationalism and mechanism-based research program for tracing and comparing processes serve us in explaining *how* and *when* processes of radicalization unfold in different contexts and levels of engagement? Relationalism, as discussed, was no stranger to many scholars of social movements, not the least to Charles Tilly. His publications were increasingly permeated by social relations, negotiation, and bargaining between contending actors. But it was his path-breaking *The Politics of Collective Violence* (2003) that introduced a theory of political violence most significantly and explicitly, a theory which, in the spirit of his collaboration with McAdam and Tarrow, utilized the mechanism-process research strategy.[5]

In *The Politics of Collective Violence*, Tilly protests against scholarship that tends to treat political violence as sui generis or a creed, as if it were "a separate variety of politics, or the work of a distinctive class of people" (p. xii). This scholarship on civil wars, armed insurgencies, terrorism, and other forms of collective violence, according to Tilly, privileges ideational explanations, behavioral explanations, or both (e.g., Gurr 1994; Courtwright 1996; Collier and Hoeffler 1999; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Reich 1998; Stern 2003). It is as an alternative to this line of scholarship that his book and subsequent works by him (2004, 2005) develop a radical take on political violence in its various manifestations. Rather than ideational factors (beliefs, goals, and values that are said to guide behavior) or behavioral factors (autonomous motives, impulses, and dispositions that are said to produce aggression in conjunction with environmental stimuli), Tilly posits relations as key. To argue in favor of relations, Tilly holds, is to "argue that humans develop their personalities and practices through interchanges with other humans, and that the interchanges themselves always involve a degree of negotiation and creativity" (2003, 5). For him this position does not render ideational and behavioral factors null; but it does situate their influence in the context of social relations. As he goes on to write: "Ideas thus become means, media, and products of social

5. It is worth noting that Tilly's 2003 book was also a development of his own early treatment of political violence, specifically in *From Mobilization to Revolution* (1978), which heavily relied on the strategic interaction approach.

interchanges, while motives, impulses, and opportunities operate only within continuously negotiated social interaction" (2003, 6).

While privileging social relations, therefore, Tilly does not overlook the influence of cognitive and environmental mechanisms that involve, for example, de-humanizing opponents or a sudden depletion of resources. But while for him relational mechanisms (e.g., brokerage) are not independent from cognitive and environmental mechanisms, he maintains that these types of mechanisms operate within and gain salience in the context of relational patterns and practices. Thus, to use his example, "if brokerage connects factions on each side of an 'us-them' boundary without establishing new connections across the boundary, then it facilitates polarization of the two sides and thus reduces overall coordination of their actions" (2003, 21). Put differently, changes in social relations taking place on each side of the conflict divide would buttress cognitive changes (e.g., boundary formation or boundary activation), thus enhancing the salience of violence. As such, according to Tilly, it is possible to classify types of violence (e.g., "scattered attacks" on state agents and property, "violent rituals" of shaming or lynching collaborators (perceived or actual), or "coordinated destruction" during civil wars or armed rebellions) by assessing the varying relation between extent of coordination *among* violent parties and the salience of short-run damage (p. 14).

Tilly's analytical and explanatory framework, however, has left this reasoning only partially developed theoretically and only partially substantiated empirically. This is because his works on the topic center most particularly on escalation, typically treated narrowly as the intensification of political violence between parties to conflict.[6] Tilly sought to apply the relational epistemology of the *Dynamics of Contention* to explain "what causes collective violence, when it occurs, (a) to vary so greatly in form and (b) to make significant shifts, sometimes quite rapid, from one form to another" (2003, 13). As such, his treatment of collective violence lacks an examination of the interplay between the different types of mechanisms in early stages of contention that are not necessarily violent.[7] What Tilly's

6. It should be noted that at the time Sambanis and Zinn (2003) were among those few non–social movement scholars who have treated escalation more broadly, from nonviolence to violence.

7. Interestingly, given the gradual acceptance of relationalism among social movement scholars during the late 1990s, Tilly assumed that works on radicalization and other processes would follow the same relational trend, rather than settling on the ideational, the behavioral, or the strategic interaction logic of analysis. However, the tendency to convolute radicalization of ideas and perception and radicalization of tactics, also found in *Dynamics of Contention* (2001, 69), continued for more than a decade (see Alimi 2011; Bartlett and Miller 2012).

work does not ask, therefore, is how and when relational mechanisms mitigate the salience of either cognitive or environmental mechanisms or both. In other words, in Tilly's line of inquiry the presence of violence is a given and the focus is on relational mechanisms that operate among parties on each side of the conflict when the conflict lines dividing the warring parties are fully demarcated and conflict dynamics is shaped more by the influence of out-group dynamics on in-group dynamics.

Later in this chapter, as well as in other chapters of the book, we show how we develop Tilly's approach to cover mechanism analysis of different stages of contention. At this point it is worth reiterating that revengeful or vindictive violence does take place and so the motivation of revenge and retaliation can be a factor in propelling members of a militant organization to engage in political violence. But, in line with Tilly's reasoning, it is also worth stressing that cases of "twisted minds" are exceptions; even when carried out individually they are usually driven collectively; and, vindictive acts of "terrorism" presuppose the existence of a rival, targeted population.[8] Thus, while ideologies or environmental stimuli certainly have a role to play in the development of political violence, a sole focus on these factors would present us with two "anomalies." The first regards instances where despite the presence of ideologies that justify violence and environmental stimuli for aggression we nonetheless observe little political violence or, no less tellingly, selective yet no categorical violence. The second anomaly regards those instances where despite little environmental stimuli and nonviolent ideologies, we nonetheless see engagement in political violence against state as well as non-state actors. Failing to recognize the possible incongruence between the willingness and readiness to engage in political violence on the one hand and actual engagement in political violence on the other leaves the critical questions of how and when ideational and environmental mechanisms acquire a role in the emergence, persistence, and intensification of political violence unanswered. Indeed—as has long been demonstrated by scholars researching social movements (Fantasia 1988; Gamson 1992; Rochon 1998) and has recently been recognized and treated by scholars studying political violence—values, norms, identities, as well as motivations, not only precede and

8. Although focusing mostly on the culture-relations nexus at the meso-level, the relational approach applies also to individually initiated violence (violence by so-called lone wolves). That is, even the acts that appear to be solo ventures of rogue activists typically have networks of support and ideologies of validation behind them (Juergensmeyer 2005). Several notable works on relational dynamics and political violence from a micro level of analysis include: Reinares (2001), Viterna (2006, 2013), Bosi and Della Porta (2012). For exemplary works that combine all levels of analysis, see: McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) and Della Porta (1995, 2013).

shape contention, but they are also shaped by and changed in contention (Wood 2003; Brym and Araj 2006; Kalyvas 2006; Almeida 2007; Goodwin 2009; Della Porta 2013). Nonetheless, it would be fair to say (and further elaborated below) that a systematic examination of this interplay, both throughout processes of radicalization and across episodes of radicalization, is still underdeveloped. The relational investigation of political violence emerging from wide-ranging historical circumstances warrants analytical attention not only to the influence of *inter*-group dynamics on *intra*-group dynamics, but first and foremost to the influence of intra-group dynamics on inter-group dynamics. It also warrants attention to the variable interplay among various types of mechanisms. Based on this logic, we propose that *processes of radicalization involve relational, cognitive, and environmental mechanisms, and that relational mechanisms mediate the salience of the other two types of mechanisms in variable ways*.

Our relational approach of radicalization, then, casts a more comprehensive view on political violence than not only the literature on various forms of escalation but also Tilly's work. We put escalation in its broader context, examining the process of radicalization both before and after the onset of violence. Precisely because collective violence stems out of consequential contentious claim-making and interactions, which rarely begin as violent and certainly not by movements in their entirety,[9] we are interested not only in variation in violence but also in the emergence of violence, that is, in social movement organizations' shifts from predominantly nonviolent forms of contention to predominantly violent ones. Given this, we argue that it is important to focus on changes in patterns of relational dynamics *within* and *among* the major parties and actors involved in episodes of contentious politics.

Regarding the relational dynamics *within* parties, such a focus necessitates not only attention to patterns of conflict and coordination unfolding between movement organizations, a topic that has received considerable attention by scholars of social movements and contentious politics (McCarthy and Zald 1987; Gamson 1990; Diani 1992). Rather, and this is of equal importance, this focus warrants attention to similar relational patterns unfolding between members of the authorities or even arms and

9. We do not negate the possibility that (1) pre-existing groups and organizations with violent orientation exist and that (2) they may become interested, active, and consequential only at a stage in the radicalization process when violence becomes likely. But our contention remains, and substantive chapters demonstrate, that the best way to analyze and explain this phenomenon is not through a focus on some particular characteristics of such violence-prone groups, but rather through the analysis of relational dynamics unfolding in the various arenas of interaction throughout the process of radicalization.

levels of government, which rarely form a unitary front vis-à-vis popular contention (Klandermans 1997; Kriesi et al. 1995; Meyer 2004), and the same applies to different forces of security or agents of social control (Della Porta 1995; McPhail, Schweingruber, and McCarthy 1998; Seferiades and Johnston 2012; Bosi et al. 2014).

Regarding the relational dynamics *among* parties, such a focus is attentive to the reciprocal, interactive, and multifaceted nature of contention and to the accumulated influence of these features on trajectories of contention. As actors, groups, or organizations within a social movement make claims that may influence the state and potentially other non-state parties, their activity triggers an interactive chain of moves and countermoves that, at one point or another, may include violence. Whether the episode of contention is abrupt, intermittent, or gradual in relation to violence, brief or sustained, or at the center or the margins of mainstream politics, it cannot be predicted beforehand precisely because the progression of the episode is contingent upon multiple relations and interactions. While specific relational dynamics may have a distinctive influence on radicalization, this influence cannot be treated independently from other relational dynamics in other frameworks of interaction that may have their own distinctive influences. Conceptualizing relational dynamics in terms of mechanisms as we do, this means that the interplay of mechanisms stemming from different sites of interaction can be important. Consider the following illustration of such interplay which, although hypothetical, captures recurring relational mechanisms in many episodes of radicalization. Newly developing political constraints or threats on the movement's space of action or ability to promote its goals, which we label *upward spirals of political opportunities*, might intensify *competition for power* among movement organizations and lead to employment of more confrontational, even violent tactics by one or more of these organizations. The realization of what is considered a more effective tactic of contention by one or more social movement organization (SMOs) could bring about harsh repressive measures by agents of social control against the movement as a whole, which, in turn, could possibly lead to those same SMOs or others to raise the stakes and engage in more confrontational tactics (i.e., the mechanism *outbidding*).

Of course, depending on each episode's initial conditions this interplay can follow a different path. As we demonstrate in the analysis of the radicalization episode of the Brigate Rosse, in chapter 3, the progression of the radicalization process reveals different sequences. The heavy repression by the Italian security forces, which was compounded by newly developing political threats and imposed constraints, led to disillusionment of

the Extra-Parliamentary Left movement's participants. This, in turn deepened tension and discord among different movement organizations further, ultimately pushing for the adoption of more confrontational tactics as a way of beating out political competitors within the movement itself. While certainly not overlooking the unique features and traits of a given episode and how they inform differences in processes of radicalization, the point to be stressed and the proposition to put forth is that *while each relational mechanism has its own distinct influence, what drives radicalization is usually the combination of relational mechanisms and the way in which they reinforce each other's influence*.

The radicalization of social movement organizations, therefore, is dynamic, multifaceted and open-ended, and thereby subject to the contingency of interactions as well as to the structures characterizing the movement and the broader historical context in which it operates. Recognizing this should discourage the search for reductionist explanations, especially those that draw on ideational or behavioral factors. But it need not put a break on comparative research. It remains possible to identify recurring mechanisms that capture most centrally relational dynamics unfolding in corresponding distinguishable arenas of interaction. These mechanisms and arenas are traceable across different episodes of radicalization, thus betraying an important cross-episode set of similarity. At the same time, the quest for this similarity opens a window for further comparative research, one that investigates dissimilarity. As it will be shown below, the dissimilarity stems precisely from the fact that in their cross-episode operation in driving radicalization, the mechanisms carry different gravity, are constituted by different forces (i.e., sub-mechanisms), and combine differently.

Mechanisms and Arenas of Radicalization: Similarities in Dissimilarities

As we have suggested in the introductory chapter, social movements typically feature four main characteristics, which are: (1) informal interaction networks between a plurality of individuals, groups, and/or organizations based on a certain shared purpose and solidarity; (2) frequent, albeit not exclusive, use of non-institutional forms of protest; (3) consequential claim-making directed at authorities and other elites and power holders; and (4) a focus on political and/or cultural conflict, with the aim of either fostering or preventing social change (Snow, Kriesi, and Soule 2004; Della Porta and Diani 2006; Tarrow 2011). These characteristics pertain to four components of episodes of contention: the agent of

contention, the means of contention, the target of contention, and the context of contention. Specifically, social movements entail a sustained, coordinated effort of collective claim-making by a network of informal interactions among a plurality of individuals, groups, and/or organizations on the basis of shared interests, values, beliefs, and solidarity (the *agents* of contention) through the use of strategies that include, but are not restricted to, protest campaigns (the *means* of contention). These strategic protests are aimed at fostering or preventing political change in sustained interactions with elites, opponents, allies, and potential supporters, but most importantly with authorities (the *target* of contention) that can play the role of target or mediator. All of these components of contention, finally, are embedded in and focused on political and/or cultural conflict (the *context* of contention).

The dynamics of contention and the possibility of radicalization stem from the interplay between each pair of components (e.g., agents and target) and among the various components coming together. It is useful to examine these mutual influences on two levels: influences on a given component (changes in the preferred means of contention) and influences within a given component (competition for power among actors within the movement). As an example, a repressive policy exerted by authorities, as the target of contention, might lead to changes in the preferable means of contention by the movement (or by specific organizations within the movement) and/or increased tension and discord within the movement over how to respond to repression, which may even lead to divisions.

The basic components of contention and the interplay among them provide us with several arenas of interactions within which and among which several relational mechanisms operate. Regarding arenas of interaction, which we define as sites and frameworks of interchanges, communication, bargaining, and negotiation, we suggest that it is possible to identify several distinguishable arenas according to the roles and positions of power of pertinent interacting actors. The relational patterns in arenas of interaction are both complicated and connected to each other. Nevertheless, we argue that these patterns take shape in the form of mechanisms such that each arena tends to correspond respectively to a mechanism. The arenas of interaction that we identify and the mechanisms that most centrally capture the relational dynamics within each are:

- *Upward spirals of political opportunities* in the arena between movement and political environment;
- *Competition for power* in the arena between movement actors;

- *Outbidding* in the arena between movement activists and state security forces;
- *Dissociation* in the arena between the movement and the general public movement; and
- *Object shift* in the arena between the movement and a countermovement.

Let us examine these arenas of interaction and mechanisms more closely and discuss how our relational reading of them relates to other works where these mechanisms are used (at times labeled) differently.

Upward Spirals of Political Opportunities in the Movement – Political Environment Arena

Changes in the political environment in which a social movement is situated and operates have considerable bearing on movement goal attainment and strategy formation (Tilly 1978; Kitschelt 1986; Jenkins 1995; Kriesi et al. 1995; McAdam 1999; Tarrow 1989, 1998; Meyer 2003; Goldstone 2004). The arena between the movement and the political environment offers, therefore, a useful starting point. As it must be conceptualized in encompassing terms, we propose that this arena is comprised of the movement's multiple, sequential relations with state and inter-state institutions (e.g., international organizations, formal channels of representation, the court system, etc.), non-state elite centers of power (e.g., parties, magnates, the media, moral authorities, etc.), and symbolic configurations (e.g., political legitimacy, trust toward political institutions, public opinion, etc.).

We suggest that the most crucial mechanism operating in this arena is *upward spirals of political opportunities* (McAdam et al. 2001; Koopmans 2004; Wright 2007; McVeigh 2009; Karapin 2011; Tarrow 2012). By this we mean changes in the movement's political environment that alter the constraints, possibilities, and threats the movement faces, thereby enabling or inhibiting its collective action and/or goal attainment. In distinguishing between influences on collective action and influences on goal attainment, we follow Koopmans' (2004) suggestion that the two aspects may not necessarily be linked. It may well be the case that certain political constellations will increase the chances for goal attainment but reduce movement action or lead to changes in forms of action (p. 71). These changes may be the result of sequences of actions taken or decisions made by authorities as well as by movement actors, allies, or rivals, usually in

response to each other's actions and decisions. Upward spirals of political opportunities are not just about favorable changes (i.e., new possibilities) or just about unfavorable changes (i.e., constraints or threats), but frequently, though certainly not always, about both (Goldstone and Tilly 2001). In the mechanism upward spirals of political opportunities, the general, cumulative direction is upwardly, which means that the overall constellation of changes reflects the weakening of the strategic positioning of the movement, hence its political leverage with respect to space of action and/or goal attainment.

Although the mechanism upward spirals of political opportunities is actor-specific and, as such, evaluated from the particular socio-political location of a given actor (rather than a general reference to changes in the structure of the political system writ large), it is first and foremost relational rather than structural or cognitive.[10] It is not structural because the focus is not on institutional features of a given regime or electoral systems (e.g., centralization or strength of political and state institutions) (Della Porta and Tarrow 1986; Dudouet 2013), nor is it cognitive because the focus is not on how movement leaders attribute or interpret these changes as either an opportunity or a threat (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008; Pedahzur and Perliger 2009). Rather, what matters for our purpose is the alteration of the movement's strategic positioning vis-à-vis the political environment and the subsequent influence on its political leverage—an essentially relational aspect, which was inherent to early formulation of the concept of structure of political opportunities (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982 (1999)), yet came to be read as either structural or perceptual by other scholars. (For a renewed attention to the relational reading of political opportunities, see McAdam and Tarrow 2010; Alimi 2011; McAdam and Kloos 2015.)

Outbidding in the Movement – Security Forces Arena

The second arena we identify concerns the interactions between movement activists and state security forces. Just as dynamics with effects on radicalization exist between the movement and its political environment, they also exist at the area of interaction between movement

10. This perspective orients Kopstein and Wittenberg (2001) treatment of political opportunities, which, even though employed in a particular way to account for the lack of pogroms against Jews in Polish localities during World War II, shows the importance of probing the relationship between this mechanism and polarization between communities (see below).

activists and state security forces. This arena is seen here as distinct, with its own discernible important influences on the process of radicalization. It is distinguishable from the arena between the movement and the political environment given that a change in the strategic positioning of the movement vis-à-vis the political environment may say little about the precise nature of the interaction between protesters and security forces, such as the police (Della Porta 1995; Della Porta and Reiter 1998; Earl 2006; Gillham and Noakes 2007; McPhail, Schweingruber, and McCarthy 1998). Security forces are the ones who actually engage with activists "on the ground"; they are often bound to make decisions that at times go beyond what is required by law or are at odds with formal, not always unambiguous political directives. Moreover, both movement activists and members of the security forces bring with them their own attitudes, perceptions, and prejudice regarding the other. This is also why it is important to move beyond treating this interaction as shaped exclusively by rationalist calculations, as unfolding between two independent actors, or by the threat each side perceives (Lichbach 1995; White 1993; Oberschall 2004; Davenport et al. 2005; Brym and Araj 2006; Kalyvas 2006; Almeida 2008; Soule and Davenport 2009) in order to capture the distinctive influence of this arena and, in turn, its effect on radicalization.

A central mechanism in this arena is *outbidding*,[11] which refers to action-counteraction dynamics that raise the stakes for the two sides as they struggle for control (Gibbs 1989). Such interactive spirals may stay within what Noakes and Gillham (2007) call "negotiated management" or may have what Earl (2006) calls channeling characteristics.[12] This form of interaction is not necessarily free from considerations regarding violence. The threat of violence in particular may be present and come from either side—though given its claim to the monopoly of the use of violence, the state poses the threat continuously. Nevertheless, such interactive spirals may also transgress and shift to actual violence, to what Tarrow (1998)

11. Not to be confused with Bloom's (2005) outbidding thesis, which focuses on dynamics of stepped-up radicalization between radical groups of a fragmented movement, as they vie for support among the population they claim to represent by outbidding each other through reliance on ever more radical tactics. Given that the outcome of outbidding is similar and yet the range of actors differs, in our substantive analyses of radicalization, we treat outbidding à la Bloom as part of the broader relational dynamics of the mechanism competition for power.

12. We prefer the term outbidding over coercion (and underbidding over channeling in the case of reverse mechanism—see chapter 7), because the former captures the mechanism's outcome whereas the latter is conceptualized around the forces that generate the outcome.

calls "interactive violence." Outbidding strongly affects the dominancy of contentious tactics and figures most explicitly when a transgressive mode of contention becomes part of the episode. Whereas in a contained mode of contention all parties tend to be pre-established actors that employ what is considered legitimate means of claim-making, a transgressive mode of contention differs in terms of means, actors, or both. It develops exactly when either a newly self-identified political actor enters the scene and/or at least one party employs innovative action or repression (McAdam et al. 2001).

Competition for Power in the Within-Movement Arena

The importance of the third arena that we identify should also be readily seen. One of the most basic features of opposition movements is that they consist of various actors and organizations that, based on common interest and beliefs, interact informally with one another and mutually affect each other's strategy. Homogenous, "monolithic" movements are the exception rather than the rule; even if a movement begins its campaign as fairly homogenous, which is more seldom than often, differences of opinion over, for example, strategy and tactics are most likely to surface. The *within*-movement interactive arena, then, implies viewing opposition movements as fields of actors with potentially varied and changing relational configurations. These actors do not necessarily hold the same ideology, strategy, preferable modes of action, and goals. It is likely, rather, that the internal dynamics, power relations, and division of labor during contention may induce discord and tension among movement actors. In the main, intra-movement dynamics are not merely expressions of resources, sets of opinions and beliefs, leadership structure, rationalist calculations bounded by contentious interaction or not, and pre-contention social ties (Gupta 2007; Bloom 2005; Horowitz 2010; Asal, Brown, and Dalton 2012; Christia 2012; Maney 2012). While we recognize the importance of these aspects and factors, we maintain that precisely because during contentious interactions values, identities and goals are negotiated and forged, new collective interests emerge and are deliberated, and even justifications and motivations can be adapted, intra-movement dynamics are primarily expressions of relational patterns and trends (Gamson 1990; Hirsch 1990; Klandermans 1997; Zwerman, Steinhoff, and Della Porta 2000; McCammon 2003; Zwerman and Steinhoff 2005; Mische 2008; Pearlman 2011; Diani 2012; Crenshaw, Matanock, and Powell 2013; Polletta forthcoming).

A central mechanism, then, is *competition for power* among movement actors. Challengers sometimes complement and sometimes undercut each other's strategies as they struggle over whose strategy and tactics will dominate and as they vie for the support of yet uncommitted adherents and allies. In this sense, different strategic initiatives are not merely an instrument of competition with an enemy outside the movement, but they are also a means of beating out political competitors within the movement itself. At times, furthermore, the stakes in the competition for power may go beyond strategy and tactics to include broader, more general and more permanent gains, such as popular support that can be used for the pursuit of goals other than the ones the movement ostensibly espouses. As the literature on political violence and terrorism has rightly underlined, competition for power can also support violence against movement competitors and not only against the "state." This might result in higher pressure for conformity and stronger sanctions for in-group challengers, which triggers further radicalization.

Dissociation in the Movement – Public Arena

Our fourth arena of interaction regards the relations between the movement and the public. The general importance of this arena is clear, as social movements typically have a strong performative orientation, which is to say that much of what they do is aimed at an audience. Indeed, their activities typically involve demonstrating to the public the movement's worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment (Tilly 2004). The movement is not necessarily constrained by the public, to be sure, yet turning into a social pariah has a price many movements are hesitant to pay. Despite this rationalist starting point, treating interaction in this arena as an expression of cost-benefit calculations driven by resources (Weinstein 2006), environmental factors such as geographical distance and level of control over information (Kalyvas and Sánchez-Cuenca 2005; Kalyvas 2006) are likely to tell only part of a complicated story. At times the specific type or form of violence initiated by movement organizations against a specific population has little to do with the level of territorial control, the low level of which, furthermore, can be imposed on the movement by authorities as a result of prior dynamics of contention. Additionally, it is possible that in the face of diminishing popular support and resources, movement organizations will try to influence the public through face-to-face contacts and ties and, in turn, moderate their own demands and actions, rather than relying on external support. On a related note, it is important to keep in

mind the diversified nature of the general public and the multiplicity of audiences that social movements are influenced by and are trying to influence.

To better capture the dynamics in this arena of interaction, it is useful to start with a consideration of the public's three main parts: potential supporters, potential opponents, and third parties. The potential supporters are the elements in a public with which the movement has a general ideological affinity. The third parties are the elements in a public that may not have the same ideological orientation as the movement, but which, from the movement's point of view, stand to benefit if the movement's goals materialize; movements often claim supporters and third parties alike as constituencies. The potential opponents are the elements in a public that stand to lose from the movement's activity, something that movements themselves may acknowledge. In negotiating its relations with these elements of the public, the movement interacts in an arena that is not only relationally rich but also volatile. Hence, which parts of the public the movement variously needs to win over, ignore, or mobilize, and how much to do so, may change with the unfolding of the process of radicalization.

The key mechanism operating in this arena is *dissociation*. This refers to the increase in organizational independence, broadly defined, of the movement or parts of the movement from the movement's supporters and third parties. Thus, as the relations of the movement (or parts thereof) with elements in the movement's broad social context become relatively disengaged, the influence of these elements on the movement weakens. The reduced capacity of elements among the movement's supporters or third parties to counter a tendency toward violence may be particularly consequential. This may be the case, for example, when dissociation turns certain third parties into opponents, or at least lost potential supporters, in which case the movement would no longer need to "cater" to their preferences; or, when dissociation entails the exclusion of movement supporters from the organizational structure of the movement, in which case pluralism and moderation would be lost (Apter 1997; Goodwin 2006, 2007; Wright 2007; Waldmann 2008; Malthaner 2011, 2014; Blee and McDowell 2012; Della Porta 2013).[13]

13. Dissociation usually operates as a mechanism conducive to violence on the assumption that the social context of the movement is less favorable to the use of violence than those in the movement who employ violent means. This is often the case during the initial stages of radicalization, before the public experiences violence and a discourse of revenge may develop.

Object Shift in the Movement – Counter-Movement Arena

A fifth arena of interaction, finally, may exist between the movement and a counter-movement, a setting that may entail diverse issues and multiple sites of friction. The counter-movement may be pre-existing and based on a different population segment than the one on which the movement is based, a distinction that may follow ascriptive (i.e., race or gender) or non-ascriptive (i.e., ideology or class) characteristics. On the other hand, it may not be pre-existing but rather mobilized in response to the actions or accomplishments of the movement. In either case, it is likely to act to undermine the movement's actions and goal promotion efforts, whether directly or indirectly vis-à-vis authorities. The *between* movements arena is therefore the field in which two opposing movements interact. Even though this interaction usually is "loosely coupled" rather than direct or structured, this does not mean that it is solely driven by cost-benefit calculations and competition over available resources (Olzak 1992) or by cognitive and affective social-distance-like factors such as different ethnic, class, race, or other affiliations or systems of beliefs (Bhavnani et al. 2014). Nor does it mean that this interaction unfolds between completely separated actors, even though at the aggregate level of population properties and spatial distribution we may indeed find segregation and perceptions of animosity and hostility. Both movement and counter-movement, for example, may find allies among members of the state apparatus, which may as a whole take a neutral stance with likely constructive influences on the interaction, or may take a side that is likely to adversely influence the interaction (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Cunningham 2003; Fetner 2008; Luders 2010; Alimi and Hirsch-Hoefler 2012). The interaction between movement and counter-movement, furthermore, may have mutually benefiting features or develop peaceful, albeit not friendly, patterns (Zald and Useem 1987; Bélanger and Pinard 1991). This may take place at the level of leaders or via third parties, and may also include activists and constituencies as they seek to form understandings and rules of engagement for the purpose of preventing the conflicting interaction from becoming destructive (Varshney 2002; Tilly 2003).

A central mechanism in this arena is *object shift*. Following McAdam et al. (2001, 144), object shift refers to changes in the relation between claimants and the object of their claims. Specifically, we define object shift as a change, full or partial, temporary or permanent, in the objects of claims and targets of attacks by one or more movement organizations. A frequent object shift, illustrated by our historical episodes, occurs when new claims by the movement, either as a whole or by one or more SMOs,

pertain to the counter-movement, thereby complementing existing claims aimed at the authorities, which are usually the immediate, central object of claims. Thus the introduction of a counter-movement with a clear agenda of inflicting damage on the movement and undermining its struggle and goals opens up a new front of contention with significant influence on the process of radicalization. This mechanism, in sum, may not always be present in episodes of radicalization, but when at play it carries the potential of driving radicalization further.

We consider that the most basic and consequential dynamics in processes of radicalization emerge out of these five arenas of interaction and their corresponding relational mechanisms, including mechanism interaction. Far from being a catch-all strategy, our comprehensive approach is supported by the latest theoretical developments in the field. It is based on the recognition that any episode of contention involves multiple fields of interaction between a variety of parties and actors within parties that are interrelated and mutually reinforcing in driving a particular process of contention—radicalization. The fact that other works that cover the topic of radicalization identify and use these analytical tools lends further theoretical and empirical credibility to our comprehensive approach.

Yet, in addition to overlooking or underplaying the relational aspects of these mechanisms, different research styles and disciplinary divides and foci (i.e., dealing with the emergence and intensification of political violence as distinct and unconnected phenomena) have hampered both a *fuller* and a more *nuanced* understanding of processes of radicalization. At the extreme, there are scholars who analyze a single mechanism/arena in search of the best predictor of radicalization, either in the entirety of the process or one phase of it (e.g., Goodwin 2007; Araj 2008; Pearlman 2011; Christia 2012). Less extremely, other scholars refrain from a search for the best predictor, in the strict sense, and, while priming one mechanism/arena, point nonetheless to meaningful interaction with an additional one (e.g., Wright 2007; Cunningham 2011; Crenshaw 2014; Staniland 2014). In either case, the tendency in these works is to assume the consequentiality of other central mechanisms/arenas and to focus on their different implications (i.e., growing social disconnect or revengeful violence) rather than demonstrating their actual operations. When this is not the case, and an attempt is made to broaden the analytical and explanatory framework and to examine the operation of several mechanisms/arenas and their interaction (e.g., Zwerman, Steinhoff and Della Porta 2000; Malthaner 2011; McCauley and Moskalenko 2011; Della Porta 2013), a nuanced and dynamic understanding of processes of radicalization is still inchoate. As a result, there remains a neglect of theorizing the relationship among

the various arenas and mechanisms in terms of their potential gravity in different phases of processes of radicalization and across different socio-political contexts.

While we treat all the aforementioned five mechanisms and arenas in a parallel fashion, we nonetheless maintain that a meaningful difference exists in terms of their relationship and potential gravity on the initiation of processes of radicalization. Accordingly we propose that *some of these mechanisms and the arenas out of which they emerge are more recurring and typically more consequential in processes of radicalization, while others are not as recurring and their consequentiality is likely to be produced in conjunction with the more recurring and consequential arenas and their corresponding mechanisms*. Specifically, the most robust and consequential mechanisms/arenas are: upward spirals of political opportunities in the movement – political environment arena, competition for power in the intra-movement arena, and outbidding in the movement – state security forces arena of interaction. While not the only arenas and mechanisms that drive radicalization, they are the most pertinent, with the arenas omnipresent and the mechanisms recurrent. This we argue to be the case because, regardless of differences among episodes of contention across time and place, those actors who are directly involved in these arenas are the ones with vested interests and who comprise the organizations constituting the social movement, authorities, and forces of law and order/security. Without implying static and invariable temporal order, what this means is that dissociation in the movement – public arena and object shift in the movement – counter-movement arena are unlikely to engender processes of radicalization. It is more likely that in the early stage of radicalization these arenas would relate to the three most robust ones, and mechanisms corresponding to them would likely produce their own discernible influence in conjunction with the more consequential mechanisms. The development of a counter-movement, for example, which is certainly not predetermined or always in direct relation to the rise of the movement, and the potential influence of the relational dynamics unfolding in this arena of interaction on the progression of radicalization could take place in combination with tension and a rift between two or more movement organizations, dynamics which bring us back to the influence of the intra-movement arena. Nonetheless, the influence of either dissociation or object shift can grow to become important, sometimes even crucial, as they interact with other mechanisms in the course of the process. Later in the book, for example, it will be seen that in the Brigate Rosse episode of radicalization the operation of object shift took place in conjunction with outbidding whereas in the EOKA episode dissociation operated in

conjunction with competition for power. Part of the explanation of this difference is found in the specific initial conditions of each episode and the dissimilarities they give rise to.

Mechanisms and Arenas of Radicalization: Dissimilarities in Similarities

Our comprehensive approach—tracing the aforementioned relational mechanisms, arenas, and their key role in mediating the salience of cognitive and environmental mechanisms in processes of radicalization across time and space—sustains a search for cross-episode similarity. Yet the search for similarity is not our approach's end-goal. Rather, an important part of it is its attentiveness to dissimilarities in similarities.

Processes of radicalization may, in general, feature many and varied forces. Given the open-ended quality of dynamics of contention and the unique properties and traits of any given episode of contention, one cannot tell beforehand the specific concurrence of mechanisms and arenas. To systematize the comparison of mechanisms, however, a purely inductive approach is insufficient; empirical evidence, rather, must be disciplined through a deductively informed mode of investigation.

One of the chief gains of this perspective is an enhanced ability to understand the varied historically specific conditions of episodes, such as ones relating to what we have called territorial scale or level of contentious engagement, but also to social boundaries or political style. Instead of ignoring such particularities or limiting the selection of episodes according to them, our approach allows for both an inclusive selection of episodes and attentiveness to the episodes' initial conditions (Goldstone 1998). These conditions—the accumulated historical specificities that characterize an episode at its starting point—become part of theory through the link with the aforementioned three aspects of dissimilarity. Thus, while relational mechanisms operating in their corresponding arenas of interactions are traceable in processes of radicalization across time and space, they are nonetheless constituted by different sub-mechanisms, concatenate differently, and vary in their gravity.

Let us consider these three aspects of dissimilarity—the varied sub-mechanisms constituting a given mechanism's, the varied relative weight (or modality) of a given mechanism, and the varied combination/sequence of mechanisms—more closely. The first, entailing sub-mechanisms, can be illustrated with reference to a specific mechanism. To take outbidding, we find it to be constituted by a different set of sub-mechanisms across our three primary episodes. More specifically, in the episode of the

radicalization of al-Qaeda, outbidding was constituted most centrally by *boundary control*, an environmental sub-mechanism, defined as defending from encroachment by outsiders (Falleti and Lynch 2009, 1150), and *threat attribution*, a cognitive sub-mechanism, defined as the construction of a shared definition concerning the likely consequences of possible actions, or failure to act, undertaken by some political actor (McAdam et al. 2001, 95). By contrast, in the episode of the Brigate Rosse, outbidding emerged through a different set of sub-mechanisms, reflecting different episode-specific particularities (e.g., political style and social boundaries). Thus in this episode outbidding was constituted by *de-legitimization* (a cognitive sub-mechanism defined as a decrease in positive and popularly resonating representations of actors and their actions (Demetriou 2007)), *provocation* (a relational sub-mechanism that we define as acts initiated by one actor with the intention of inciting the response of another actor), and a second relational sub-mechanism we call *repression by proxy* and define as outsourcing by state actors to non-state actors of law-and-order activities.

The second aspect of dissimilarities relates to varied combination of mechanisms. This may regard the temporal order in which mechanisms concatenate, such that, for instance, the sequence *upward spirals of political opportunities → competition for power → dissociation → outbidding → object shift*, which we observe in the radicalization of EOKA, presents a different dynamic than the sequence we observe in the radicalization of al-Qaeda: *upward spirals of political opportunities → outbidding → competition for power → object shift*. Partly the result of the actual dynamics of contention, but also informed by the initial conditions of the episode, the radicalization of al-Qaeda features, for example, little if any influence of dissociation throughout the period we investigate (1984 – 2001). Whereas dissociation was operating and playing a role in the radicalization of organizations of the broader movement operating locally, the enforced distancing of al-Qaeda away from its leaders' societies brought about consistent attempts to avoid alienating the larger community of Sunni believers (the *ummah*).

The third aspect of dissimilarity relates to the relative salience each mechanism carries against the others. Initial conditions in a given episode may likely relate to the factors that render a relational mechanism more consequential than the others in shaping the sequencing. To draw on one of our secondary episodes of radicalization, we demonstrate how upward spirals of political opportunities were far more consequential than the other mechanisms in the radicalization process of the Weathermen faction of the US-based Students for Democratic Society. This we

argue was the result of the specific structure of power relations between the opposition social movement and the authorities respectively. That is to say, the presence of a clearly defined and institutionalized system of rule in the case of the Weathermen rendered upward spirals of political opportunities highly salient. Indeed, few would disagree that the worsening political conditions (e.g., the assassination of King in April 1968 and the Nixon victory in the 1968 Presidential elections) vindicated militancy and rendered violent tactics more attractive, as was the case in the "ten days of resistance," and exacerbated outbidding between the movement and security forces—for example, in the violent clashes between police forces and antiwar movement activists during the Democratic National Convention in Chicago. The inflating militancy and increased radicalism, in turn, played into the hands of the Republicans during the presidential elections campaign and backed Nixon's declared policy of a tougher policy of law and order vis-à-vis the antiwar movement activists (Daniels 1974; Alimi 2011). Revealingly, despite similarities between the episode of the Weathermen and the episode of the Brigate Rosse in terms of configuration of power relations between movement-society-authorities, in the latter episode it was outbidding that had greater weight and consequentiality during the early phase of the processes, with upward spirals of political opportunity assuming gravity only in the stepped-up phase. What gave rise to this difference in modality, as will be discussed in detail in chapter 6, related to the Italian episode-specific policing style and frequent attempts at shaping politics based on insidious and Machiavellian-like practices.

A Relational Model for Comparing Processes of Radicalization

A relational approach for tracing and comparing processes of radicalization through mechanisms is suitable for capturing cross-episode similarities and dissimilarities. Regarding similarities, we maintain that relational mechanisms as they operate in their corresponding arenas of interaction are key to the progression of the process across different contexts and levels of engagement. We also hold that, by tracing separate and combined operation of relational mechanisms throughout the process (i.e., the early phase and stepped-up phase), we can identify fluctuations in the salience of cognitive and environmental mechanisms. Moreover, an additional important facet of similarities is found in the pertinent and robust role of the three central arenas and mechanisms. This suggests that when the other two arenas of interaction are present and their corresponding mechanisms

operate, the consequentiality of the operation of these mechanisms tends to be produced in conjunction with one or more of the three more pivotal mechanisms, usually in the initiation of the process. Regarding dissimilarities, the analysis of sub-mechanisms (cognitive and environmental as well as relational) allows us to respect the particularities and unique set of initial conditions of each episode. By conceptualizing the relationship between sub-mechanisms and any given relational mechanism in constitutive terms and by investigating it inductively our comparative framework enables inductively informed assessment of the relative weight of mechanisms in each episode and more generally, of the different radicalization paths taken.

Figure 2.1, based on the foregoing epistemological, methodological, and theoretical buildup, sketches a model for a comparative analysis of radicalization. It depicts the five relational mechanisms, placed in the inner circle and, for illustrative purposes, two sub-mechanisms—*threat attribution* and *boundary control*—placed in the outer circle. Consistent with our proposition regarding the more consequential role of upward spirals of political opportunities, competition for power, and outbidding in the early stage of the process of radicalization, these mechanisms are assigned bigger areas in the inner circle. Nonetheless, the dashed lines separating the spaces are meant to flesh out not only variation in consequentiality throughout the process of radicalization in its different phases, but also the importance of paying attention to the combined influence of all mechanisms. This combined and mutually reinforcing influence is represented by the arrows, both single-headed and double-headed.

As for the boundary between the inner and outer-circles, we use the dashed line separating the sub-mechanisms and mechanisms and the double-headed arrows connecting the mechanisms with each other and with the sub-mechanisms in order to represent three important aspects. First, these depictions aim to convey the dynamic interplay between relational and non-relational mechanisms and, therefore, the possibility that either cognitive or environmental drivers may become more salient in processes of radicalization. Second, they aim to indicate the constitutive relationship that we hold to exist between the mechanisms and sub-mechanisms. As stated above, when discussing this relationship, we use two verbs to capture this relationship: the verb "to trigger" in instances where the operation of the sub-mechanism induces forces that previously might have related to a tendency toward the mechanism outcome but were not generative of it; and the verb "to activate" in instances where a sub-mechanism that previously operated in low levels becomes fully operative. And, third, the dashed lines and double-headed arrows are an

important reminder of the interaction that takes place at both levels of abstraction—the level of mechanisms and the level of underlying constitutive mechanisms.



Figure 2.1:
A Relational Model of Radicalization

Furthermore, the relational model in Figure 2.1 facilitates understanding of how any radicalization process may reverse or what a non-radicalization process may look like. As noted earlier in this chapter, any mechanism stands for generated outcomes, which means that the generation of the opposite outcome can be considered a reverse mechanism. This is seen through a large-scale analysis, where non-radicalization is the reverse of radicalization, inasmuch as there is potential toward radicalization at the onset of the non-radicalization process. This is also seen at the level of the mechanisms identified here. Thus, for example, the mechanism *downward spirals of political opportunities* is the reverse of upward spirals of political opportunities, the mechanism *consensus mobilization* the reverse of competition for power, and the mechanism *underbidding* the reverse of outbidding.

However, it is important to add that the distinction between mechanism and reverse mechanism is not the same as the distinction between the operation of a mechanism and the discontinuation (or the slowing down) of the operation of the mechanism. Thus, for example, it is possible for the mechanism upward spirals of political opportunities to slow down in its operation (e.g., removal of constraints on space of collective action) without this bringing about a strengthening of the movement strategic positioning hence political leverage (i.e., the generation of downward spirals of political opportunities). Thus a mechanism and a reverse mechanism may operate independently from each other, as they are not expected to be constituted necessarily by the same underlying forces. Likewise, mechanism and reverse mechanism may cease to operate independently of each other.

With this in mind, the difference between non-radicalization and de-radicalization becomes clear. Non-radicalization is a process of contentious politics in which the switch to violence is prevented by the process's constituent forces. These forces, we maintain, may include the mechanisms consensus mobilization, downward spirals of political opportunities, and underbidding. De-radicalization, by contrast, is the slowing down or discontinuation of a radicalization process that is well underway. De-radicalization may happen through combined changes in two or more of the mechanisms constituting radicalization, either when they cease or slow down their operation, and/or through the operation of the reverse mechanisms.

The foregoing implies that in processes of radicalization one can search for not only reverse mechanisms but also for reverse sub-mechanisms. Here, however, one needs to bear in mind the constitutive nature of the relationship between mechanism and sub-mechanisms, which is not the least deterministic. Thus it is possible that a given mechanism is constituted by a given sub-mechanism in a certain episode of radicalization, but is constituted by the reverse sub-mechanism in a different episode of radicalization. This phenomenon, in fact, transpires in the analyses of our three main episodes of radicalization. It will be seen, for example, that the mechanism outbidding was constituted by the sub-mechanism *de-legitimization* (the generation of unfavorable and resonating representations of a SMO) in the episode of the Brigate Rosse, but by the sub-mechanism *legitimization* (the generation of favorable and resonating representations of a SMO) in the episode of EOKA. This phenomenon only underscores the fact that sub-mechanisms do not work according to a "billiard-ball" notion of causality, but rather through complicated, contextual interactions that include other sub-mechanisms. In short, the idea of reverse mechanisms is consistent

with the processual and comparative logic that we have developed. Accordingly, and as it will be discussed in detail in chapter 7, it offers a powerful analytical tool for examining possibilities for de-radicalization as well as making sense of those episodes of contention where radicalization does not develop.

WHAT'S NEXT

The historical analyses that follow (chapters 3, 4, and 5) begin to demonstrate the utility of our framework and the soundness of its premises. In the backdrop of significant historical diversity, the episodes analyzed demonstrate not simply the constant importance of the three arenas of interaction that are identified as key, but exactly the reason of this importance: namely, that these arenas foster across-the-board important relational dynamics by way of corresponding, consequential mechanisms. The salience of a given mechanism may vary from episode to episode, as does the relative importance of the additional two arenas and corresponding mechanisms; but all three mechanisms, and potentially the two additional ones, are part of the engine that drives radicalization. Thus, rather than being organized chronologically, the analysis of each episode in each chapter is structured according to the arenas and mechanisms.

The analysis of our three primary episodes, while meant to flesh out the similarities among them, accomplishes two additional tasks. First, and consistent with the underlying, overarching theme of this study, in each analysis we demonstrate the primacy of relational dynamics in understanding the dynamics of radicalization and how cultural forces and environmental stimuli operate and gain salience and consequentiality as part of these relational dynamics. Second, and with an eye on cross-episode dissimilarities, in each analysis we identify different sets of submechanisms (inclusive of relational, cognitive, and environmental) and trace their constitutive relationship with the mechanisms in different phases of the process.

The explanatory power and utility of this type of analysis will be substantiated further in the two additional chapters that bring this study to a close. In chapter 6, we engage in a systematic attempt to flesh out the dissimilarities among the three episodes, most particularly how the peculiarities and initial conditions of each episode render one mechanism/arena of interaction more pivotal and how each episode produces a distinct path of radicalization. The analysis of each episode, therefore, traces

the progression of radicalization in a more sequential, longitudinal fashion. Counterfactual analysis of each of our primary episodes in order to trace forgone possibilities for de-radicalization from a relational perspective, coupled with evidence from episodes of non-radicalization in different settings are offered in chapter 7. Indeed, as noted, a mechanism-based approach opens the way to the study of reversals of radicalization. Any given mechanism has its reverse logical equivalent, and it is up to empirical research to investigate the ways in which mechanisms reverse operation and the conditions under which they do so.

CHAPTER 3

The Italian Extra-Parliamentary Left Movement and Brigate Rosse (1969–1978)

Every proletarian alternative to power is, from the beginning, political-military. The armed struggle is the principal way to the class struggle.

Renato Curcio, *November 1969*[1]

Italy did not avoid the general wave of Left-wing contention that swept many western countries in the 1960s and 1970s. For the relatively young Italian democracy, in fact, the contention presented one of the most extensive, intensive, and sustained challenges to its base of power and legitimacy. As in other countries, the popular challenge was essentially an anti-authoritarian revolt, demanding more democratic decision-making, rejecting over-bureaucratization, and aiming for a more humanist understanding of politics. Initially led by students, who took to the streets in 1966, this wave of protest attracted workers in 1969 and formed what became known as the Extra-Parliamentary Left movement. Quickly politicized around a predominantly anti-capitalist agenda, the movement eventually led a contentious episode that was to last until the end of the 1970s. While its ability to mobilize support during this period of time waxed and waned, the movement unquestionably put its mark in the Left-wing political culture of the country in the tradition of Italian revolutionary socialism.

1. *Collettivo Politico Metropolitano*, "Lotta Sociale e Organizzazione nella Metropoli," 1/1970.

Though encompassing a multitude of organizations with different ideological strands and preferred action strategies, including organizations not averse to the use of violence, the movement cultivated a workerist general outlook. Its main orientation was toward the re-affirmation of the worker's revolutionary autonomy, rejecting as co-optation any attempt at alliance with members of the middle class, which was considered state-protected. Yet, despite the existence of militant rhetoric and revolutionary ideologies, and despite such chants as "Smash the bourgeois state, don't change it," the rallies and marches organized by the movement were predominantly nonviolent. Sharing a strong sense of making history, leaders and activists across the movement spectrum firmly believed that change from below was not only possible but also necessary. They genuinely believed that they were able to create a revolutionary situation by providing militant support for the insurrectionary activities of striking workers—a belief supporting chants such as "the factory is our Vietnam." What the movement ultimately sought through this strategy was to implement an internationalist communist vision in the country. In light of this, movement leaders claimed that the movement represented the broad constituency of the Italian Left, and at least in the movement's early phase, some of them considered the Italian Communist Party as a possible ally from within the country's institutional structures.

It was in this social-political context and out of this milieu that the Brigate Rosse (Red Brigades, henceforth: BR) was announced for the first time on October 20, 1970, in the bulletin *Foglio di Sinistra Proletaria* (Proletarian Left Newsletter). The origins of the BR are to be found in the merging of several worker and student militant organizations. In one of its earliest documents, the BR defined itself as an "autonomous worker organization that indicates the first moment of proletarian self-organization to fight the bosses and their henchmen on their terrain with the same means that they [the bosses and their henchmen] utilize against the working class."[2] The quote at the top of this chapter, taken from a speech delivered by Renato Curcio, a leader of the BR, expresses the same idea more succinctly.

In its first two years of operation, the BR was mainly active in large factories in Milan, with its leaders and rank and file participating openly in public activities along with other movement organizations and supporters. By 1972, however, the organization was being pushed underground as a result of tightened police repression and oppressive political conditions.

2. BR, "Autointervista," 9/1971.

Still, in this period the BR managed to broaden its base of operation and support throughout Italy. It was therefore able to engage in factory-centered activism in different locations, mostly by way of disruptive and confrontational operations. This activity gradually grew to include the destruction of property, but it was not until 1974 that it covered violence against state targets. Beginning in that year, the BR leaders carried out violent operations against politicians, especially those of the Center-Right, and such state employees as judges, policemen, and military officers. The organization maintained this tactical repertoire for a long time, but another turning point came in 1977. On June 1, the organization started a violent campaign against journalists aiming "to disjoint the counter-revolutionary behavior of the mass media," and within three days three important journalists were seriously injured. This presented a change in tactics, as the organization was now inflicting harm on individuals for their perceived or actual role as supporters of the general establishment. Likewise, during the following months and years, the organization went on to engage in a series of acts of selective violence against academics and union leaders, as well as more journalists.

The BR reached its highest level of radicalization in the period between 1977 and 1980. It was during this period, in 1978, that the kidnapping and subsequent assassination of the Christian Democrat leader Aldo Moro took place (with five bodyguards also killed). But this period of heightened violence also led to a deep rift within the movement, dividing those who still believed that violence was justified only in situations of self-defense and those who believed that the armed struggle was necessary to overthrow the regime. As the individuals favoring violence continued perpetrating it—some from within the ranks of the BR and some from within the ranks of other radical organizations—they effectively broke away from the movement in terms of action strategy.

But political violence in this era of Italian history was not only committed by Left-wing radical organizations. Right-wing organizations, most often with the collusion and protection of the security forces, were responsible for many violent operations. Indeed, violence was mostly perpetrated by Right-wing organizations in the first period of the cycle of contention, between 1969 and 1974. This type of political violence mainly took the form of bombs, for the majority of which no responsibility was ever claimed and few people were persecuted. Only between 1977 and 1979 did Left-wing radical organizations leave more victims in their wake than their Right-wing counterparts.

The period, known as the "years of lead", came to a close in the early 1980s, even though a few more acts of violence were carried out by the

BR during the entire decade.[3] The actions by the BR, especially during the organization's stepped-up radicalization phase, left a distinct mark on the broader pattern of violence by Left-wing organizations. Regarding the 164 victims of events of political violence initiated and driven by Left-wing organizations during the "years of lead," more than half of the victims' deaths were attributed to the BR (Della Porta and Rossi 1984). This makes the emergence, persistence and intensification of BR activism, above any other contemporary Left-wing organization's activism, a puzzle to explain.

The relational framework of analysis presented in the previous chapter enables a comprehensive and nuanced examination of the episode of radicalization in which the BR was the protagonist. Specifically, the analysis of relational dynamics unfolding in the various arenas of interaction between and within different Italian political actors allows us to address the following two related questions: how and when did the radicalization process of the BR unfold? Addressing these questions demonstrates the soundness and utility of our framework as it helps explain empirically the context of BR strategy formation and course of action; through this framework, for example, we can explain why the BR committed its first premeditated killings after five years of being in existence, rather than sooner, despite the presence of violence-prone ideology and environment stimuli for aggression from the outset. Thus the analysis of the radicalization of the BR's mode of contention within the wave of protest that shattered Italy during the late 1960s and the entire 1970s is organized in sections corresponding to our five arenas of interaction and the mechanisms as well as sub-mechanisms that operated within each.

UPWARD POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES SPIRALS: "NEO-GAULLISM" AND "THE HISTORIC COMPROMISE"

The relational dynamics in the arena of interaction between the Italian Extra-Parliamentary Left movement and its political environment were not only consequential in the mobilization stage of the movement, but

3. The BR never announced a complete cessation of its military activities, but essentially folded due to lack of armed activists, given that most of them were either dead, in prison, or had decided to quit. In 1988 it committed its last lethal attack, murdering Senator Roberto Ruffilli. A "new" group with few links with the BR performed violent attacks, in 1999 killing Massimo D'Antona, and in 2002 Marco Biagi, both labor advisors to the Italian government. This armed group, the BR-Partito Comunista Combattente, would deserve a totally separate analysis, despite its claim to links with the old organization.

also in the radicalization of the BR more particularly. These dynamics took the form of upward spirals of political opportunities regarding both collective action and goal attainment. This mechanism was in this episode mainly constituted by three sub-mechanisms: *attribution of threat*, *attribution of opportunity,* and *boundary activation*. As demonstrated below, attribution of threat triggered opportunity attribution and raised the salience of the boundary between the Extra-Parliamentary Left movement and the Italian Communist Party.

Italian post-war society was polarized along two major and mutually exclusive sub-cultures: the "white" and the "red." These were politically represented, respectively, by the *Democrazia Cristiana* (Christian Democrats, henceforth: DC) on the Center-Right and the *Partito Comunista Italiano* (Italian Communist Party, henceforth: PCI) on the left. Under heavy American influence in the context of the Cold War, the Italian political system witnessed a deadlock whereby the PCI was permanently forced into opposition from 1947, while the DC was the main party running the country through patronage policies and periodic bouts of severe repression (Canosa 1976), legitimated by the "Red Threat" (Crainz 2005). Although exhibiting a highly unstable form of parliamentary politics, due to a diverse set of political parties, Italy was therefore lacking any real *alternanza* (alternation).

At the beginning of the 1960s, the Cold War "thaw" process and the continuing secularization of Italian society created the conditions for transcending the Left-Right division at the level of elite politics. Such an early depolarization was instrumental for the first Center-Left governments, starting from December 1963. The DC started to involve the *Partito Socialista Italiano* (Socialist Italian Party, henceforth: PSI) in coalition governments in order to open itself to the "moderate" Left. This enabled the DC not only to reinforce its hold on power, but also to cope with the social contradictions that were emerging out of the rapid economic, social, and cultural developments of the 1950s, thereby stabilizing the Italian political system and further excluding the PCI (Ginsburg 1990).

These developments and the promised "season of reforms" (education, pensions, planning) raised great hopes for changes and new demands in the country. At this stage, collective actors saw an opening to push the government toward more progressive agendas; part of their calculation was that the Center-Left government would be more tolerant toward dissent, since the PSI "could ill afford to be identified with repression" (Tarrow 2011, 99). In part inspired by the global revolt mounting in different western societies in those years, people started to take to the streets with nonviolent marches, sit-ins, mass assemblies, occupations of public buildings, unofficial strikes, and so on (Tarrow 1989).

Once it became clear that the Center-Left government was unable or unwilling (because of being constrained on their right) to respond to the demands of the protesters and when it began to react with heavy repression, Left-wing organizations started to take the lead in setting the pace and tone of the movement mode of contention. Building on previously submerged networks, these organizations called for more revolutionary demands and action strategy. Of these organizations, three were most prominent at the national level: *Lotta Continua* (Continuous Struggle), *Potere Operaio* (Worker Power), and *Avanguardia Operaia* (Workers Vanguard). All these organizations prided themselves on being the avant-garde, interpreting their role as workerist forces in the fight for revolutionary change. In their view, they could no longer wait for a revolutionary situation to arrive. Instead, they had to provoke such an environment through continuous mass agitation and low-level illegal actions. In a document drafted by Potere Operaio and directed toward other organizations within the then-emerging Extra-Parliamentary Left movement, the question was posed as follows:

> Do you really believe that elsewhere there are more, so-called, objective circumstances than we have here? And where are these objective "circumstances" if not in the subjective political will, to travel to the end of the revolution? When you chant, "Tupamaros, Fedayun, Black Panthers / armed struggle for power" do you really believe that there, in those places, the circumstances are more mature?[4]

Upward Spirals of Political Opportunities for the Extra-Parliamentary Left movement started to unfold most significantly in the aftermath of the national elections of May 1972, which saw the rise of a DC-led Center-Right coalition. In the context of a worsening economic situation for the country due to an international crisis,[5] the DC managed to form a Center-Right government with the participation of liberals and the social democrats. The advent of this coalition meant the loss of political allies for the Extra-Parliamentary Left movement within the executive, and the attainment of the movement goal of systemic rapture therefore became far more unrealistic and threat inducing. This development, in other words,

4. Potere Operaio, "La rivoluzione non è un pranzo di gala: organizzazione e violenza" in *Potere Operaio*, 38–39, 17/4–1/5 1971: 3. Quoted in Panvini (2009, 201).

5. The international economic crisis was the product of two main transformations: first, the change, in 1971, from an international monetary system based on fixed exchanges (Bretton Woods) to one based on flexible rates; and second, from 1973 the 70 percent increase in the price of oil. Given Italy's expanding State deficit and structurally weak economic-productive system, the international economic crisis served to greatly increase the inflation rate and unemployment and also slowed down the economic growth, resulting in stagflation of the Italian economy (Salvati 1979).

triggered *attribution of threat*—a cognitive sub-mechanism defined as the construction of a shared definition concerning the likely negative consequences of possible actions, or failure to act, undertaken by a political actor (McAdam et al. 2001, 95).

The perception of threat increased during the first months of the new government. With the strengthening of the position of hard-liners, due to a slight shift of public opinion to the right at the recent elections, the new government felt it could legitimately take a markedly anti-working class physiognomy from the outset. For one, it stopped initial progresses made in the previous years toward social industrial reforms. Also, fearing the loss of the basis of the consensus upon which the hegemony of the DC was founded, it took drastic austerity measures in order to confront the economic crisis—measures such as restrictions on the movement of motor vehicles, the opening hours of shops, public lighting, generalized increases in public tariffs, and massive layoffs.

The exclusion of the PSI from government, which at that time combined with the traditional exclusion of the PCI, and the turn of the DC toward the right were interpreted by the entire Italian Left (political parties, trade unions, and the Extra-Parliamentary Left movement organizations) as unprecedentedly threatening. Moreover, as a result of meaningful change in policing style (to which we return subsequently when analyzing outbidding dynamics) upward spirals of political opportunities also extended to imposition of constraints on the movement's space of actions. The new position and policies of the DC increased the salience of threat attribution—long present, but with alarming magnitude as the political positioning of the Extra-Parliamentary Left movement was weakened in this juncture. Upward spirals of political opportunities were, in fact, perceived as signs of a state-backed project that could bring down the nascent Italian democracy. Left-wing militant organizations feared the existence of a counter-revolutionary agenda aimed at turning the Italian system into a traditional fascist regime.

If this was the dominant reading on the Italian Left, and in particular within the Extra-Parliamentary Left movement, BR leaders and activists read this changing political environment at the beginning of the 1970s as leading not really toward a fascist regime but toward a neo-Gaullist

6. In the aftermath of the Second World War the French Fourth Republic suffered from weak executives and lack of political consensus (very similar to the post-war Italian case). During the Algiers crisis, in 1958, the retired former general Charles De Gaulle, who was brought back to power, called for the suspension of the government and the creation of a new constitutional system. The French political system shifted then from a parliamentary system of government to a presidential one, with the emergence of the Fifth Republic.

authoritarian one[6]; a regime that, in the view of the BR, could live under the guise of a new type of democracy by aiming "to strengthen the executive with the assignment of the legislative and administrative power to head of state and the Prime Minister, the progressive emptying of the legislative powers of the parliament, the use of consultation through direct popular referendum, and changing the electoral system from proportional rule to majoritarian one."[7] As far as the BR was concerned, therefore, the "neo-Gaullist restructuring process" of the Italian democratic system aimed at the "centralization of power, organization of consent, institutionalized dispute and repressive law."[8] This effort at control, the reasoning went, signified a global imperialist counter-revolution to the international revolutionary forces. Following such reasoning, responsibility for the exploitation of the working class no longer fell solely on the shoulders of national industry organizations, but also on international capital (above all American corporations) and the western states representing it. In this scenario, the Italian state was portrayed as the agent of the imperialist bourgeoisie for class domination and exploitation. Accordingly, the strategy of the struggle shifted from the national economic capital to the state. In fact, for the BR, the process of economic restructuring in the early seventies was mainly implemented in the form of mere control by means of repressive force of the state.

In the changed socio-political context of the early 1970s, and confronted by the threat of a neo-Gaullist restructuring of the state, leaders of the BR concluded that it was necessary to start going beyond the "armed propaganda"[9] in the factories. This previous strategy of the BR amounted to no more than low-level, resistance-like illegal actions (such as torching factory managers' motor vehicles and the sabotaging of industrial equipment, as well as breaking into factory offices and Right-wing headquarters), quite similar to the actions of other Left-wing militant organizations of the time. The armed propaganda was, in fact, intended to keep a steady relation with the Extra-Parliamentary Left movement and aimed to show new possibilities of political action. High in symbolic content and low in physical injury, the attacks were on property rather than on people, so to defend, in the view of the BR's leaders, material gains in the social conflict.[10] They were followed by the open distribution of explanatory literature, which described such attacks as having two purposes: the punishment

7. BR, "Contro il neogollismo portare l'attacco al cuore dello Stato," 4/1974.
8. Collettivo Politico Metropolitano, "Lotta Sociale e organizzazione della metropoli," 1/1970.
9. BR, "Autointervista," 9/1971.
10. BR, "Autointervista," 9/1971.

of specific "anti-worker" actions and the exposition of state connivance with capitalist centers of power.[11] They were not directed at Italian society at large, but instead were designed at sparking the workers' struggle to come out of its shell in the battle against the management for the control of production and profits. In the view of the BR's leaders, the aim of these actions was to raise the consciousness of the working class and to contribute to the formation of an elite that would later give birth to a truly combatant communist party.

But, in the face of the significant weakening of the movement strategic positioning vis-à-vis the political environment and the deepening attribution of threat that accompanied these political changes, the BR decided "to break the encirclement of the workers struggle,"[12] a break from which new strategies and goals were to follow. While shop floor confrontations could be won, the BR realized, firstly, that by staying only in the factories they were running the risk of becoming isolated and, secondly, that the "revolutionary war" could not be won there alone. This strategic shift and corresponding change of tactics stood in contrast to the preferred strategies of other Left-wing militant organizations and intensified competition for power, as will be elaborated below in analyzing *intra*-movement dynamics. In a document published in 1974, the BR leaders warned against those forces that were trying to limit the struggle to the factories as a way to curtail it, stating:

> The forces of counterrevolution [(the Italian establishment and the international capital)] tend to shift the principal contradiction outside the factories. They commit themselves now to decisive battles in order to isolate our struggle for power inside the factories, to be able to control it more easily, and then destroy it.[13]

The BR sensed the limited nature of the factory struggles in the context of the perceived growing influence of political institutions in the economic sector, due to the international economic crisis of those years. Accordingly, its actions strategically started to shift from the local support of workers' struggles to more direct attacks on political targets, a shift envisioned to attain a full social dimension. The objectives were, on the one hand, to stop the neo-Gaullist authoritarian attempt to transform the Italian democracy that was "born out of the Resistance"[14] and, on the

11. BR, "Autointervista," 9/1971.
12. *Espresso*, "A domanda rispondono," pp. 23–25, 5/19/1974.
13. BR, "Contro il neogollismo portare l'attacco al cuore dello Stato," 4/1974.
14. BR, "Contro il neogollismo portare l'attacco al cuore dello Stato," 4/1974.

other, to reveal to everyone the existence of secret links binding the imperialist forces with political parties and the Italian state. The violence deployed, in the view of the BR leaders, was designed to spark off conflicts within and between the political parties, the state, and its citizens, finally unleashing the latent "civil war" from which a new communist order would finally emerge.

Whereas the Left in general continued to attribute threat to the Italian authorities' reaction to the workers' struggle, the BR leaders, highly committed ideologically to the use of violence at this stage, began perceiving specific policies and other political developments as an opportunity for action. *Attribution of opportunity*, a cognitive sub-mechanism defined as the construction of a shared definition concerning the likely positive consequences of possible actions by a political actor (McAdam et al. 2001, 95), worked closely with attribution of threat. With regard to the events at hand, opportunity attribution was triggered most evidently when the Right-bound turn of the DC was seen by the BR as an opportunity to step up the intensity of its struggle in pursuit of the movement's ultimate goal, that is, to destroy the capitalist state and facilitate the emergence of a communist society. Also significant was the loss of the Extra-Parliamentary Left movement at the elections of 1972. The BR, which in the month before the elections released a document titled "Voting Does Not Pay, Let's Take the Rifle," saw the electoral failure of the movement as a positive sign. Its leaders read this to imply that the movement was abstaining from voting and was ready to move on and embrace the armed struggle. In their view, the direr the movement's prospects for institutionalization, the better were the prospects of their own struggle (Albanese 2011).

It is true that already in late 1969 the future leaders of the BR were developing the idea that the only acceptable means to oppose the total domination of the Italian working class and the imperialist oppression of the world's working classes was to adopt a strategy of armed struggle. This is seen, for example, in the speech by Renato Curcio that we excerpted at the opening of this chapter, in which, quoting the Brazilian revolutionary Marcelo De Andrade, he calls for the education of the proletariat through a campaign of avant-gardist violence. Yet such rhetoric and ideas were not translated into action until years later. At this juncture, however, what the BR called the "neo-Gaullist" project served to confirm the previous view of the organization's leadership on the nature of the Italian state and to legitimize the choice to pursue armed activism—a decision taken as early as 1969 when the BR was not yet born. If its vanguardist orientation was correct early on, now the BR members thought the organization had a certain amount of legitimacy to radicalize its mode of contention in the

changed political environment of the early 1970s. The "new" task of the organization, elaborated in 1975 with the development of the "Strategic Resolution," was that of attacking and destroying the capitalist power by "striking at the heart of the State,"[15] seen as the imperialist state of the multinationals (*Stato Imperialista delle Multinazionali*).

The kidnapping of Judge Mario Sossi in Genoa, on April 18, 1974, marked the transition from low-level illegal actions, which were also locally in scope and focus (i.e., relating specifically to realities in factories or neighborhoods in Milan and Torino), toward a mode of contention that involved proactive and deliberate violence against symbols and representatives of the state.[16] In the first leaflet claiming responsibility for this operation, the BR talked of the beginning of "a new phase of class war: the main task of the revolutionary forces is to break the encirclement of workers' struggles and extending the lead armed resistance to the vital centers of the state."[17] This was, in fact, much more than a simple kidnapping in the view of the BR. It was the first time that the organization had put into practice its aim to expose the contradictions and divisions within the Italian state. On this occasion, its new strategy showed very successful results.

Faced with the threat of an authoritarian shift of the regime, the BR was not the only actor to go through a change of strategy; as noted, the entire Italian Left also did so, though not necessarily in the direction taken by the BR. What is particularly relevant here is the new direction undertaken by the PCI toward a compromise with the DC. The prospect of a strategic compromise between the two historical enemies, which began between the end of 1973 and early 1974, left a certain amount of social and political space on the left of the PCI for its competitors. Such party policy did not surprise the leadership of the BR or of the other Left-wing militant organizations, all of which took the reformism of the PCI for granted and even provoked the PCI in different situations, with the deliberate intent of unmasking its real reformist objectives. In fact the early "armed propaganda" strategy of the BR was also aimed at revealing the contradictions between the leadership of the PCI and part of its constituency so as to lay the foundations for future new recruits and a possible sympathetic audience. The BR, as well as other Left-wing militant organizations, was influenced in this reading by the Italian *Nuova Sinistra* (New

15. BR, "Risoluzione Strategica," 4/1975.

16. This was not the first time that the BR organized a political kidnapping. A precedent existed in March 1972, when the group kidnapped the manager of an electronic company, Sit-Simenes, and kept him captive for 30 minutes.

17. BR, "Sequestro Sossi, Comunicato numero 1," 4/19/1974.

Left), which through its most important organs[18] re-elaborated the classical Marxist theory and provided a framework of interpretation for the new Italian socio-political conflict during the 1960s.

However, it was only with the new line of the PCI (which, given its dual role of both social organization and political party, had a marked influence on dissociation dynamics—discussed below) that many Left-wing activists felt further "abandoned" by the party's unwillingness to continue to serve as a vanguard in the struggle for the deliverance of the proletariat, in its drive to become a credible force, as well as being unwilling to support any alternative political power to its left.[19] This withdrawal of recognition and support from the factories struggles not only left the BR free to pursue its goals through a radicalization of its strategy. It also led to an increase in the salience of *boundary activation*, a cognitive sub-mechanism defined as the "increase in the salience of the "us-them" distinction separating two political actors" (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 215). Indeed, nowhere before was the ideological and social divide and animosity between the movement organizations and the PCI more deep and meaningful.

The threat induced by the strategic compromise worked, then, as a confirmation of the BR leadership's previous beliefs that the PCI, seen as a "revisionist" party and dubbed as the "middle class working movement,"[20] was collaborating in the construction of a capitalist society built on the backs of an oppressed proletariat. Feeling vindicated, BR leaders decided to take their struggle to the next level of intensity and lethality, further legitimizing resorting to violence as a means of resisting attacks, while also striving to destroy the capitalist state once the state was under an alleged "authoritarian regression." The following excerpt from an interview, released for the weekly magazine *Espresso* in 1974, synthesizes the new strategy of the BR in relation to the economic crisis, the possible authoritarian turn, and the strategic compromise:

> With the Sossi action . . . our organization showed its rejection of the "tactical" choice of the "compromise" adopted by the parties of the constitutional left. We attempted to block the complete resolution of contradictions which had opened up within the government as a result of the repression of the workers struggles of these last years. If, as we maintain, the government crisis is above

18. These organs were the reviews: *Socialist Problems* (Problemi del Socialismo, since 1958), *Red Notebooks* (Quaderni Rossi, since 1961), *Piacentini Notebooks* (Quaderni Piacentini, since 1962), *Working Class* (Classe Operaia, since 1963).

19. BR, "Risoluzione n. 2 della direzione strategica," 5/1975.

20. Sinistra Proletaria, "Chi ha paura della crisi," 7/1970.

> all a crisis of bourgeoisie's hegemony over the proletariat, the task of the revolutionary forces must be to deepen this crisis and carry it to its furthest point, while at the same time building the political-military tools needed for a revolutionary outcome. . . . Furthermore, we are heading for a radicalization of the political and social struggle, and we believe that with the progress of this struggle the Left will inevitably undergo a process of polarization in which the decisive criterion will be the position on armed struggle. The PCI or at least its communist soul will also be caught up in this process.[21]

As the above interview passage clearly testifies, BR leaders considered the specific political constellations an opportunity for championing the revolution and for outflanking the PCI leadership. The BR identified itself completely with this role—further radicalizing its repertoire of contention in order to attract those Extra-Parliamentary Left militants who were not so keen on being institutionalized in trade union and party politics (a most meaningful set of intra-movement dynamics to which we return later). Further elaborating on the BR's role in this time juncture vis-à-vis both the political system and the broader Left-wing milieu, Renato Curcio, in an interview he gave while in jail, adds the following:

> First: communism is more than a party, it is a conception of the world. In this sense, in Italy there are many communists not enrolled in the PCI (and some members of the PCI can hardly be seen as communists). Second: some of the Italian revolutionary communists do not share the line of compromise and have chosen to fight for a different perspective of historic turning point capable of producing socialism. Third: this does not imply "hatred" but a political struggle between two different strategies. The crisis of the state, the majority party and the development model demand a "historic break" and not a compromise.[22]

Up until the early 1970s, despite radicalized rhetoric and worldviews, we have observed very few, if any, corresponding radical tactics. In the aftermath of the weakening political positioning of the movement as a whole, as was most markedly the case following the national elections of 1972 and the formation of the Center-Right government, the Extra-Parliamentary Left movement resorted to more violent tactics and rhetoric and the PCI strategically withdrew its recognition of the Extra-Parliamentary Left movement fearing, too, an authoritarian shift. If previously Left-wing

21. *Espresso*, "A domanda rispondono," pp. 21–23, 5/19/1974.
22. *Espresso*, "E noi lottiamo per la rottura storica," p. 9, 1/5/1975.

militant organizations and the PCI's constituencies were still very closely connected to each other, the operation of upward spirals of political opportunities and the widespread threat attribution induced by these changes, which pushed Left-wing organizations for greater militancy, was accompanied by an ever-greater divide and a deepening boundary between both the institutional Left, represented by the PCI, and Left-wing militant organizations. Consequently, the BR, followed by other Left-wing militant organizations, moved into the vacuum created by the visible reformist policies of the PCI and thereby started to draw political material and psychological support from a core element in the Italian political tradition: the faith of the extreme political Left in revolution.

The material and psychological support the BR enjoyed in this particular time was related to the age-old and deeply rooted internal division in the Italian political Left subculture between minimalists (reformists) and maximalists (revolutionaries) which, once surfaced, historically tended to be accompanied by violent clashes. The following excerpt from a leaflet circulated at the time of the kidnapping of Ettore Amerio, a director of the personnel at the FIAT factory, strongly backs up such reading:

> What we think is that we will not get out of this crisis with a "compromise." On the contrary, we are convinced that it is necessary to follow the main road outlined by the workers struggles of the last 5 years and that is: not to agree to truces that allow the bourgeoisie to reorganize itself. . . . [we need] To operate in such a way as to deepen the governmental crisis. To transform this crisis into the first moments of armed proletarian power: this is the choice that the comrades must make today, because all middle paths have been eliminated.[23]

In the BR's view the economic crises unfolding across the whole of the West, but in particular Italy, foreclosed any opportunity to "buy" the consent of the working class through material gains, such as better salaries and new welfare reforms—the old reformist strategies. This would have implied that even reformist forces in the near future would have started to repress any form of dissent as a form of silencing revolutionary forces. The fact that the PCI, under the new party line, started to help the police with important information on Left-wing militant organizations (Bosi 2013) testified, in the BR's view, as to how much this force was also actively participating in the militarization of the Italian society (we will further expand on this when we examine dissociation between the movement

23. BR, "Volantino Sequestro Ettore Amerio" 12/10/1973.

and the public). Left-wing militants were chanting at the time "In Chile, tanks; in Italy, the Communists." In the view of the BR, then, the only solution was to stop such an alliance from being formed—using any means necessary. By murdering Aldo Moro (1978), who had twice served as Italian Prime Minister and was one of the most important leaders of the DC (Giovagnoli 2005), the BR attempted to block the efforts to resolve the systemic crises of the day through the complete co-optation of the PCI into a mainstream coalition. For the BR, Moro represented the architect who was trying to enslave the working class under the mastery of the imperialist state of the multinationals. He was considered to be the greatest threat to the BR's grand scheme and goals; hence his assassination meant a successful attack at the heart of the system.

OUTBIDDING: "STRATEGY OF TENSION"

To get a fuller sense and processual understanding of outbidding it is necessary to backtrack to the autumn of 1969, prior to the actual formation of the BR, when peaceful protest, legal trade-unionism and parliamentary politics began to be perceived as sterile and ineffectual means of contention for a large number of movement activists. Moreover, in the face of intensifying repression by security forces, many of these activists became attracted by the strategy and tactics of Left-wing militant groups and increasingly engaged in violent operations, resulting in an interactive spiral of violent moves and countermoves. This outbidding dynamics was constituted most centrally by three sub-mechanisms: *provocation*, *repression by proxy*, and *de-legitimization*. Where provocation was fundamental during the entire process of radicalization (both early and stepped-up phases), repression by proxy was particularly relevant in the early phase (until 1974), activating and operating closely with de-legitimization.

While repression in Italy became "softer" during the first Center-Left governments (1963–1967), with no demonstrators being killed, by the end of the decade security forces started to abandon previous restraints and three demonstrators lost their lives in 1968, and another three again in 1969 (Delle Porta 1995, Chapter 3). In fact, after a first period of tolerance toward the early student mobilization, from late 1968, when the mobilization moved outside academia and started to polarize society further, the security forces began to employ heavy repressive measures more frequently. Public order in Italy during the late 1960s and early 1970s, as Della Porta and Reiter have pointed out, was maintained through "military

interventions, not selective, and based on instruments of strong coercion, with the utilization of firearms" (2003, 209). The unreformed security forces of the post-war period, started in 1968 to abandon their restraint and took the license of repressing student demonstrations, charging with jeeps and targeting the crowd with tear gas, occasionally causing fatalities among protestors and bystanders. Repression then became one of the major issues for the growing Extra-Parliamentary Left movement, which viewed the police as being at the "service" of the middle class and interested in militarizing the emerging workers' struggles by criminalizing dissident voices.[24]

The repressive behavior of the security forces, in connection with "widespread rumors of complicity between police officials and Right wing militants" (Della Porta 1995, 60), as we will see subsequently, had a major role in prompting the shift, early on, to the confrontational illegal violent tactics of Left-wing political groups. If the police repression was progressively detrimental to mass mobilization, it also prompted the establishment of Left-wing militant organizations. Left-wing militant organizations, such as Lotta Continua, Potere Operaio, and Avanguaria Operaia, as well as other minor ones, perceived themselves and their mode of contention, in comparison to other movement organizations, as being in a better position to resist the militarization of the conflict imposed by the security forces. At this point in time, between 1969 and 1972, Left-wing revolutionary ideologies, which developed throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, found enough resonance in, and appeal among those sections of the movement that could eschew institutionalization or de-mobilization. Left-wing militant organizations' ideologies tended to justify the use of violence as a way to defend the movement against the repressive actions of the security forces, conjuring up the tradition of the labor movement and the war of liberation—referring to the post-fascist period between 1943 and 1945, when Italy was liberated from Nazi occupation in the post-fascist years.[25] For BR leaders, in particular, as they stated in September 1971, the Italian state was responsible for the onset of violence and had a clear and unequivocal agenda, one that aimed "to eliminate the capacity of resistance of the working class."[26] Units were then established inside Left-wing militant organizations that specialized in the use of violence (paramilitary "marshal" bodies, *servizi d'ordine*) as a way to counter repression and to resist

24. BR, "Autointervista," 9/1971.
25. BR, "Un destino perfido," 11/1971.
26. BR, "Autointervista," 9/1971.

violent attacks from Right-wing organizations. As an article from the BR news outlet, published in May 1971, reads:

> Comrades must understand that we can no longer continue successfully with the political struggle without taking on the military dimension of the conflict, and this is because there can no longer be peaceful change. The authorities have taken the initiative to militarize the clash . . . [therefore] the revolutionary left, the comrades must take the initiative and form organizations of revolutionary struggle that are able to oppose the militarized power.[27]

According to the BR, then, state repression embodied the authoritarian nature of the regime and this, in turn, should be used to accelerate the realization among members and groups of the working class of the need for armed organizations. In a nutshell, the strategy of the BR was to beat the system with exemplary actions and, through these actions, to train the cadres and propagate the only truly revolutionary political line—armed propaganda. The pursuit of this strategy was carried out through *provocation*, a relational sub-mechanism defined as "acts initiated by one actor with the intention of inciting the response of another actor" (Alimi et al. 2012, 17). Thus, while the initial violence of the BR was justified in defensive terms, it also had an offensive plan, intended to awaken the awareness and activate the commitment to militancy of the proletariat, without which there could have been no overturn of power. By provoking the security forces' repressive measures the final aim was to marginalize its political competitors within the movement and in the broader Left, so as to obtain more resources and recruits for the BR itself. However, as we will see below, if the BR was initiating provocative acts, it was nonetheless forced to respond to much severer provocation coming from some deviant sections within the authority forces.

On December 12, 1969, a bomb exploded in Milan, killing 16 people and injuring 90. This was not the first bomb to explode in the country in this period, nor would it be the last. More than 200 bombs exploded during that same year, but none of these caused any death. This bombing marked the beginning of the *strategia della tensione* (strategy of tension). This strategy had an anti-communist agenda, and was orchestrated through a collaboration between different branches of the police, the Italian intelligence service (SID), the military, and the upper echelons of the state administration. The bombing epitomized the beginning of *repression by proxy*, a relational sub-mechanism that we define as informal outsourcing by state

27. BR, "Nuova Resistenza," 5/1971; (quoted in Saccoman 2013, 66).

actors to non-state actors of law-and-order activities. Thus, by using Right-wing militants as their foot soldiers, certain sections within the security forces outsourced dirty repressive measures as an instrument of "counter-mobilization" to control social struggles. According to the magistrate Guido Salvini, who investigated the December bombing, "instead of introducing repressive measures, the State, with a large part of its apparatuses, colluded with those who were planning the massacres."[28] This strategy was meant to control protest through the instrumental recourse of Right-wing violence. The common denominator among these different "co-belligerent" forces was anti-communist paranoia, in that they perceived communism to be the main threat to the security of the country. Similarly, Giovanni Pellegrino, the Chair of the Parliamentary Commission for the Failed Identification of Those Responsible for the Massacres, has reached the conclusion that:

> Immediately after the war, secret paramilitary structures were built with tasks that were not only defensive, but also informative and of counter-insurgency; simultaneously, there also arose in the country a number of organizations of a private nature with anticommunist functions . . . it is likely that the rise of such organizations was also helped with financial aid by the United States. (Pellegrino 1996, 44)

It is not clear how comprehensive and deliberate the strategy of tension was; it may be true, as Ferraresi states, that the strategy was never a "plan of action or the overall concept determining a sequence of decisions set in a hierarchically ordained, closely coordinated means ends chain" (1996, 88). However, it is clear that the Right-wing radicals responsible for planting bombs were subsequently protected from persecution by branches of the intelligence services, armed forces, and the police. These same branches severely hampered the investigations of Right-wing militants using cover-ups and false leads, in order to prevent their activities or indeed their existence from becoming known to the judiciary. Such obstructions of justice took the form of falsifying or concealing important information, preventing crucial new witnesses from testifying, and assisting suspected perpetrators in fleeing the country.

Right-wing organizations, such as *Avanguardia Nazionale* (National Avant-garde), *Movimento di Azione Rivoluzionaria* (Movement of Revolutionary Action), and *Ordine Nuovo* (New Order) were not considered a threat to the security of the country at this stage. They were, instead, seen

28. *Il Resto del Carlino* April 16, 2005; (quoted in Cento Bull 2007, 64).

as allies in the strategy of tension, which had the aim of discrediting the institutional Left and, particularly, the students' and workers' mobilization campaigns of those years (Crainz 2005, 481–485; DeFelice 1989). In doing so, these "allies" benefited from the complicity of parts of the Italian establishment as well as the United States, the CIA, and NATO, in terms of resources. Thus, using fear, disinformation, psychological warfare, agents provocateurs, attempted coup d'états, and false flag political violent actions that were then blamed on the Left, the strategy of tension deliberately sought to further polarize the social-political conflict of the time so as to manipulate the public opinion toward the right and to prevent the emergence of a communist Italy (Biscione 2003).

If, at first, the use of categorical violence was seen by some sectors within the security forces as an instrument of "counter-mobilization," it gradually became treated as a way of de-legitimizing the institutions of the Italian republic and ushering in the strong state. Sectors within the security forces were hostile to the growing strength of the Left in the country (the Extra-Parliamentary Left movement, trade unions, and PCI). More specifically, they feared that the PCI might soon assume power. At the same time, they opposed the new economic policies of the Center-Left government, which provided "a significant redistribution of income in favor of wage-labour" (Salvati 1979, 32) from 1969.

In May 1972, a minor shift to the right of public opinion in the national elections was perceived by the Left as a sign that the strategy of tension was working. The *Movimento Sociale Italiano* (Italian Social movement), a neo-fascist party claiming it was representing the "silent majority" of those Italians who were tired with social movements' mobilization, received 8.7 percent of the votes (in contrast to the previous elections of 1968 when it received 4.45 percent). While in absolute numbers it meant little, the increase in the popular support to the Movimento Sociale Italiano, combined with a small drop in the share of the votes for the Left, reinforced the fear among leaders and activists of the movement of an authoritarian shift in the Italian state, inducing, as discussed in the previous section, high levels of threat perception.

This dirty war, originating from the "promiscuous plot" (Franzinelli 2008) between Right-wing organizations and the corps of the security forces, served to heighten perceptions of de-legitimization among the Extra-Parliamentary Left movement in particular, and the broader Left more generally, toward the security forces—*de-legitimization* being a cognitive sub-mechanism defined as a decrease in positive and popularly resonating representations of actors and their actions (Demetriou 2007). The illegitimate conduct of those responsible for maintaining Italy's

constitutional order not only generated a deep sense of mistrust, but also spread an image of the state, not as a defender of democracy, but as a "state of the massacres."[29] Infuriated by the dirty-war tactics and feeling vindicated, on January 25, 1971, BR activists burned three trucks sitting in the Pirelli tire testing track in the Linate neighborhood of Milan. It later issued a leaflet, which said:

> Piazza Fontana, Pinelli, cops who kill, comrades in Jail, Della Torre and many others fired, gangs of fascist thugs protected by the police, judges-politicians-governors, servant of the bosses. . . . These are the instruments of violence that the bosses turn against the working class to squeeze it more and more. Asking us to struggle while respecting the laws of the bosses is like asking us to cut off our balls! But one thing is sure: we will not turn back! We will continue with more advanced forms of struggle on the road already chosen: attack production, lots of damage for the bosses, little cost to us.[30]

The strategy of tension affirmatively consolidated BR Leaders' previous views that the Italian state needed to be revolutionized because it was still fascist at its roots. Through such dirty tactics, its dictatorial nature was revealed. References to the anti-fascist resistance and the specter of a creeping civil war became central to justifying the necessity of violence. Alberto Franceschini, one of the leaders of the BR, recently explained that the ideas of developing an armed struggle existed before the Piazza Fontana mass murder, and he adds: "However, to our eyes, Piazza Fontana was a confirmation of the need and the rightness of our project, and it expedited its realization. If we needed something that would strengthen us in our beliefs and that we should say, ["]there is no time to lose["], the mass murder of Piazza Fontana was exactly this" (Fasanella and Franceschini 2004, 56).

For BR's leaders, recourse to exceptional repertoires of action was now required in order to save Italy and, in particular, its working class, from criminalization, first, and from the total elimination of the entire Left that could follow. In their view, the delegitimized security forces, with their domestic counterintelligence program of allowing repressive actions to be initiated through Right-wing paramilitary and vigilante organizations, had to be resisted with every means. This indeed was the case with progressive scaling-up of their violent repertoires. This stepped-up radicalization was

29. Collettivo Politico Metropolitano, "Lotta sociale ed organizzazione nella metropoli," 1/1970.

30. BR, "Brigata Rossa Pirelli. Comunicato numero 6," 2/5/1971.

justified by depicting the Italian state as responsible for having broken the rules of the democratic game and launching a war that demanded an armed response in order to overthrow the capitalist system. Accordingly, leaders of the BR decided to move from defensive and reactive violence to proactive and offensive attacks directed against the state and its "fascist allies."

After the events of Piazza Fontana, another 271 bombs exploded before the middle of 1972 including notable mass murders: on July 22, 1970, 6 people died and 66 were left injured in the bombing of a train close to the Gioia Tauro station; on May 31, 1972, a bomb exploded that killed 3 policemen at Peteano; on May 17, 1973, a bomb exploded at the central police station of Milan, killing 6 people and injuring 46; on May 28, 1974, a bomb exploded in the main square of Brescia during a trade union demonstration, killing 8 people and injuring 102; on August 4, 1974, 12 people died and 105 were injured in the bombing of the Italicus Roma Brennero train at San Benedetto di Val di Sambro (province of Bologna).

It is true, as we will see subsequently, that the strategy of tension came to an end in 1974, but this could not have been foreseen at the time by the BR or any other Leftist Extra-Parliamentary political actor.[31] Moreover, from recent investigations it seems that some distinction should be made between the first mass murders before 1971 and those that followed, up to 1974. Regarding the earlier period, it appears that those sections within the security forces that collaborated with Right-wing radical organizations in order to promote a "putschist" strategy realized, at a certain stage in the early 1970s, that this military strategy could not be applied in Italy (Pellegrino 1996). They began to progressively withdraw their support from Right-wing radical organizations and to instead manipulate Left-wing militant organizations, including the BR, for the purpose of achieving the same goal. This strategy was essentially about favoring the maintenance of a certain level of tension in the country in order to maintain the *status quo* through, among other things, not entirely repressing the BR on two occasions in 1972 and 1976. As we will argue below, when analyzing the operation of object shift, this change of strategy on the part of certain sections of the security forces took Right-wing militants by surprise. These militants, infuriated by and full of vengeance over what they considered state betrayal, started to re-direct their attacks against the state, initially

31. To clarify, the strategy of tension did not terminate completely in Italy in 1974, since other bombs were set off with the collusion of the Italian security forces later in the early 1980s. On August 2, 1980, in Bologna, 85 persons were killed and 200 were injured in a railway bombing; on December 23, 1984, 17 people died and 260 were injured in the bombing of a train in San Benedetto Val Di Sambro. Other bombs exploded in 1993, in Florence (May 27) and in Milan (July 27), each of which resulted in five deaths.

and up until 1974 through violent operations and, then during the second half of the decade, through the type of violence typified by armed struggle (Pellegrino 1996).

If up until now we have examined the influence of outbidding with respect to the entire movement, in what follows we pay particular attention to this influence on the BR, an influence that, as noted above, was fundamental to both the early and the stepped-up phase of the organization's radicalization. In the aftermath of the first instance of kidnapping by the BR, of a factory foreman at Sit-Simens, which took place in Milan on May 2, 1972, the police undertook their first major operation against the BR's leadership and operational networks. However, the most wanted militants managed to escape arrest. From this moment on, the BR turned from a semi-clandestine organization into a full-fledged clandestine organization. As the BR later stated, in one of their documents, "the question of clandestinity was only posed in its real terms after May 2, 1972. Up to then, enmeshed as we [BR] were in a situation of semi-legality, it was only seen in its tactical and defensive aspects rather than its strategic importance."[32]

The state apparatus's counter-terrorist efforts, which involved "widespread use of restrictive, preventive measures and of charges brought against activists and sympathizers" (Reiter and Weinhauer 2007, 384), and extended to infiltrating the organization, resulted in the arrest and jailing of BR's founding fathers by September 1974. In that same year, two counter-terrorism inspectorates were created. The first was responsible for the struggle against Right-wing militant organizations; the other counter-terrorism institution focused its attention on countering Left-wing militant organizations, in particular the BR, which was by then the most capable and outspoken Left-wing radical organization. The new repressive measures, revolving around surveillance and infiltration, had the effect of weakening the BR considerably.

Increasingly isolated and struggling for its very survival, the BR was nonetheless able to muster resources and to channel them to a confrontation with the repressive apparatus of the state (Della Porta 1995). Being forced into the defensive and away from its initial "armed propaganda" strategy inside the factories, BR activists and leaders who escaped captivity began to target political officials more directly since, from then on, its best form of defense was "the attack at the heart of the State."[33] But such a change of strategy was also possible due to a change in the composition

32. BR, "Alcune questioni per la discussione sull'organizzazione," 7/1974.

33. Between 1974 and 1976, three representatives of the security forces were killed during firefights with the BR.

of the armed organization at the leadership level, first, and then at the grassroots level.

Indeed, the unintended consequence of the repressive campaign and the arrest of the most prominent and known BR radicals was that it led to the rise of a more ruthless type of leadership, which redefined the aims and strategy of the organization. Lauro Azzolini, one of the new leaders of the BR along with Moretti and Bonisoli, recalled: "We had a long discussion and we came to this alternative: either we take this war seriously or it is better to leave now. Either we get it into our heads to win or we are seriously beaten" (Bocca 1988, 132). It was, therefore, not by coincidence that the first premeditated lethal attack was committed against the General Public Prosecutor of Genoa, Francesco Coco, and two personal security men, in June 1976. At that time most of the BR membership had been hollowed out by police action, leading to the eventual arrest of almost the entire historic nucleus of the organization and the discovery of its clandestine bases.[34] With the violent attack on Coco, the BR wanted to assert, as David Moss suggests in his thorough research, "that the 'revolution' they represented could not be successfully halted by the use of ordinary judicial processes against participants" (1989, 69–70).

Another meaningful change regarded a change in organizational structure. Prior to 1976, the BR was strictly organized into city columns, with each column subdivided into brigades of "cells" of three to five members each. At the top of this organizational structure was the strategic directorate, responsible for overall political and organizational guidance. The BR was further divided into fronts, one responsible for the factories struggle, one for the counter-revolutionary struggle, and one for logistics (Caselli and Della Porta 1991). Significantly, in September 1976, the BR decided to dissolve the front responsible for the factories struggle and allow it to be absorbed into the front for the fight against the counter-revolution, as the latter seemed at that point to be the main battle line from which to better hit at the heart of the state. The murder of Coco and of his two bodyguards just 12 days before the important national elections of June 20, 1976, was vindicated with these words:

> In the attempt to resolve its crisis, the middle class has accelerated its strategy of militarization of the state. [. . .] The elections of June 20 should establish the new political environment, the political alliances, that will manage the

34. In June 1974, the BR made their first lethal attack against two members of the Italian neo-fascist party, *Movimento Sociale Italiano*. However, this was declared as a "work accident" and not a premeditated killing (BR, "Nessun crimine fascista rimarrà impunito!," 6/18/1974).

> realization of this project. On June 20 it would be possible to select which force will realize the state of the multinationals, who will give the order to shoot to the proletarians. He who believes today that with the elections it will be possible to determine a balance in favor of the working class or, what is more, to arrive at an opportunity to build an alternative power structure is an adventurist on a suicidal path. The only alternative for power is: the armed struggle for communism.[35]

Finally, it should also be stressed that the militarization that the Italian state had imposed on the socio-political conflict and the resultant detrimental influence on the mobilization potential and readiness on the part of the entire Extra-Parliamentary Left movement (as discussed below), became instrumental to the ramped-up radicalization of the BR. That is, the decline of the mass movements freed a certain number of activists who had lost faith in legal and peaceful repertoires of action and who consequently constituted a possible source of recruits for clandestine organizations such as the BR. In the early 1970s, as noted, the BR was one of several operable semi-clandestine organizations, but in the second half of the 1970s it was recognized by both the security forces and other movement organizations to be the most committed radical force in the Left-wing milieu. Indeed, the changing of the guard within the organization was meaningful in this regard, as the new recruits pushed forward meaningful organizational and ideological innovations, and tended to be less disciplined and less loyal to the ideological orthodoxy of the armed organization (Bosi and Della Porta 2012). Not surprisingly, the following period, from 1977 to 1979, saw a dramatic rise in the lethality of violence, and the injury and death toll as a result of BR-led violent operations almost tripled.

COMPETITION FOR POWER: "NEVER AGAIN WITHOUT A RIFLE!"

The Extra-Parliamentary Left movement was clearly a heterogeneous composition of very different groups and organizations. What kept these different political actors united within the same movement was not only the sharp and unequivocal objection to the authoritarian features of the state and the chronic ills and malfunctioning of the democratic system, but also, and in a related vein, their common criticism of the institutional Left, judged in their view as being revisionist. Even though the PCI was traditionally excluded from the government, as part of the total and ongoing

35. BR, "Rivendicazione delitto Coco," 6/8/1976.

de-legitimization of communist political forces on the part of the hegemonic Christian Democrats, it was nonetheless criticized for stifling the struggles of the working class so as to defend the bourgeoisie democracy until some distant day when the final insurrection would take place. The fact that the PCI adopted the practice of disowning any political forces to its left only led to the sharpening of the criticism leveled against it. If this was what kept the Extra-Parliamentary Left movement together, what divided them was, first of all, the issue of whether violent means "should be used as a surrogate for, or as a supplement to, non-violent political and social conflicts" (Moss 1989, 3) and, second, the question of which organizational form was the most suitable to prompt a revolution in Italy in those years.

Competition for power among the various organizations and groups that were part of the movement had its own distinctive influence on the process of the BR radicalization, activating *disillusionment* and triggering *emulation*. Violence turned out to be a way to emphasize differences in the preferable strategy of contention.

Within the Extra-Parliamentary Left movement, organizations, such as *Il Manifesto* (The Manifest), *Partito di Unità Proletaria* (The Proletarian Unity Party) and *Avanguardia Operaia* (Worker Avant-Garde) soon started to organize themselves along the lines of political parties. They aimed to sharpen the divides of the socio-political conflicts of those years in order to move the electorate toward the Extra-Parliamentary Left, which meant toward them. The use of violence, according to their strategy, was considered legitimate only in situations of self-defense.

Lotta Continua as well as other worker-student organizations formed another strand of the movement that saw revolution as coming not from the creation of armed organizations such as the BR but spontaneously from the masses. This led Lotta Continua to criticize the BR for having substituted itself for the masses through "Don Quixotian" and "Robin Hood" strategies (Lumley 1990). Lotta Continua, instead, explicitly spoke of mass workers' struggles and sought to invoke "mass violence." This, in the organization's view, should have been used strategically in order to exacerbate the conflict and uncover the substance of social relations and power.[36] Militant anti-fascism, as we will see in the following sub-section, when analyzing movement–counter-movement interaction, was for Lotta Continua the preferred way in which the masses could become more and more involved in violent forms of action. Violence was then legitimized as a defensive tool at the hands of the oppressed, in the face of the state's use

36. Lotta Continua, "la violenza e il terrorismo," *Lotta Continua*, 20, 11/12/1970.

of reactionary violence, which was meant to suppress the diffused oppositional mobilization in society.[37]

Yet, another strand in the movement was represented by the workerists, among which Potere Operaio was the strongest organization. According to their action strategy, the revolution was seen as coming from the economic struggle in the big industries between capitalists and factory workers as well as from the "new" proletariat represented by the students, unemployed, lumpenproletariat, and all those marginal forces able to bring a radical push. Potere Operaio was not questioning the *use* of violence (as was the case with Lotta Continua), but rather *how* it should be used. Potere Operaio aimed to arm the entire movement. The semiclandestine parallel structure was, for this strand, the best organizational form for armed struggle. Renato Curcio described what mainly distinguished Potere Operaio from the BR:

> [Potere Operaio's] line substantially differed from [the BR] only on how to conceive the armed wing. [Potere Operaio] thought of a kind of double track, a political organization and a military group separated from each other, instead we called for political-military unity, arguing that the two elements were inseparable and mutually functional. (Curcio 1993, 55)

The debate over armed struggle that had divided and split the Extra-Parliamentary Left movement also resulted in the dissolution of Potere Operaio, in 1973. A number of militants eventually joined the BR, while others went into the loose network of revolutionary factories and student collectives in Padua, Rome, Bologna, or Milan, which together became known as Autonmia Operaia.

Then there was a smaller strand, whose main Left-wing militant organization came to be represented by the BR. In this strand there were two smaller organizations, distinguished from the BR, the *XII Ottobre* (12th of October) and the *Gruppi d'Azione Partigiana* (Groups of Partisan Action). The two groups had been present in the scene from early 1970 but soon disintegrated, the former by 1971 and the latter by 1972, as a result of the security forces' repressive operations. The BR interpreted the struggle against imperialism as a combatant communist party (Marxist-Leninist) whose armed activities were "scientifically" enforced by a vanguardist force. Such activities were therefore thought to be necessary in Italy in order to respond to the "creeping civil war" that had been triggered

37. Lotta Continua, "Legalità borghese e violenza riovoluzionaria," in *Lotta Continua*, 10, 5/18/1970.

by the state. The BR refused to fight as a "third internationalist force," according to which the revolutionary process was divided into two phases, one consisting of the preparation and political propaganda and another of the insurrection of the army. This strategy, which was held and practiced by the Lotta Continua, for example, was criticized by the BR as a policy of just waiting for the right moment, as reformist forces had done in the past. BR leaders adopted, instead, a model that called for united phases of preparation and armed struggle. Following this model, they perceived other Left-wing militant organizations as being petit bourgeois in their tendencies and as resembling miniature versions of the "revisionist" parties of the traditional Left. In 1971, the BR, in one of its earliest documents, made very clear what distinguished it not only from Potere Operaio, but also from other Left-wing militant organizations, seen as incapable of defending real working-class interests. As it reads:

> We must have it clear that the extra-parliamentary [left movement] today no longer means anything. The distinction is even sharper and contrasts between those who want to build an armed left and those who wish to prolong the powerless childhood of groups, between those who wish to maintain the '68 matrix and those who are fighting for a re-foundation of the vanguard of class as a political and armed vanguard; and among those who intend to separate the "political" from "military" and those who want to develop a unique military policy strategy so to build a single proletarian political and militarized organization.[38]

In the aftermath of the 1968–1969 stage of the students' and workers' protest and the progressive decline of street and factory mobilization, signs of *disillusionment* on the part of movement activists mounted, and with it a sharpening competition for power. As a cognitive sub-mechanism, disillusionment refers to the "decline in the commitment of individuals or political actors to previously sustaining beliefs" (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 216). To counter the disillusionment of activists, Left-wing militant organizations began to innovate tactics in an attempt to be seen as more revolutionary than the rest. According to Tarrow, "extra-parliamentary groups used mass mobilization to outbid the unions and the PCI, while the terrorists used violence to outbid the extra-parliamentary groups" (1989, 310). This strategy aimed to keep activists within the organizations and to recruit new members from disbanded groups. Della Porta, in her own work on the topic (1995), goes further to suggest that "violence itself proved a powerful resource for survival. That is, militancy substituted

38. BR, "Un Destino Perfido," 11/1971

other resources: when volatile material conditions and ideological factionalism weakened a movement organization, militancy became its only unifying principle" (p. 107).

The use of violence became integral to the measurement of the revolutionary commitment of these militant organizations and was instrumental for attracting attention in the absence of mass mobilization and given the drop-off in the number of willing militants—first, after the heavy mobilization of 1968–1969 and, then, in the further decline of the Extra-Parliamentary Left movement in 1973–1974 (Tarrow 1989). Dramatizing and sharpening their violent repertoires seemed to be the only way for these organizations to outflank their competitors within the same movement, a meaningful relational dynamic that reached a critical level once radical organizations became progressively secluded from the broader Left constituency, as we will see in the next section of this chapter.

But a closer reading of BR published materials suggests that in the view of its leaders, choosing the path of armed struggle was not just about outflanking other militant organizations, but was also needed in terms of distinguishing BR from the other groups. Given the state of lawlessness that prevailed in those years within the movement as a whole, BR leaders who considered and destined themselves as the vanguard of the movement feared that their distinctive voice would get lost. For Mario Moretti, one of the leaders of the BR, it was hoped that publicizing their violent action via the media would help the organization to achieve this:

> We force the media to give us the attention that otherwise we would never get, [in fact] we did not suspect we could even have such an amount of attention. Our actions, and what we wanted to provoke, have a resonance that no struggle has ever had . . . [W]e are, I insist, an organization of armed propaganda . . . [W]e never passed the stage of armed propaganda: we keep there still, and continue to do so. (Moretti 2004, 46–47, quoted in Saccoman 2013, 69)

The BR's declared goal of attacking "the heart of the State" and the subsequent change of strategy, then, should be in part interpreted in this light. Its aim was now to be considered as the reference point within the armed struggle milieu, a vanguardist force within the vanguard. This was how the BR self-represented itself in its documents of the time.

It is important to note that even though, during the so-called years of lead, the BR was the largest, deadliest, and most successful Left-wing radical organization to engage in an armed struggle against the state, it certainly was not the only one. The Italian contentious arena at the time also featured a number of armed organizations that came into existence

between 1974 and 1977, such as *Prima Linea* (Prime Line), the *Nuclei Armati Proletari* (Nuclei of Armed Proletarians), and the *Formazioni Comuniste Combattenti* (Fighting Communist Formations)—to name only a few. "Hundred Flowers are blooming . . . like the hundred new armed groups" chanted the organizations of the Extra-Parliamentary Left movement at the time. In the aftermath of the failure of the movement at the national elections of 1976, however, Potere Operaio and Lotta Continua ended their activities. This caused many former members of those two Left-wing organizations to gravitate toward the armed struggle and, subsequently, to either join the BR or organize another armed organization.

At this stage of already high-level tension and mutual repudiation within different groups and organizations of the Extra-Parliamentary Left movement, the increase in the number of organizations accepting the use of violence boosted the confidence of the BR. In fact, the BR's ability not only to survive "underground" but also to strike at ever-more prominent targets, inspired the other radical organizations and triggered *emulation*, a relational sub-mechanism defined as "the deliberate repetition within a given setting of a performance observed in another setting" (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 215). Revealingly, the success of the BR made it both the envy and inspiration for the smaller organizations and, in turn, intensified competition for power further in a twofold, mutually reinforcing manner. As existing and newly formed radical organizations became more and more detached and alienated from the broad Italian Left, and as they acted to make their voices heard with action strategies, they began to emulate each other's actions, which in turn led to an increase in the level and form of violent activities (see Figure 3.1).



Figure 3.1:
Casualty Rate by BR and Other Left-wing Radical Organizations' Operation (1974–1978)
Source: Data are reproduced from Edwards (2009).

Indeed, BR leaders became pressured by the other organization's engagement in similar violent operations and felt compelled to engage in more daring and lethal ones, as a way to maintain its leading role and inspirational status among the clandestine milieu. The diffusion of "armed struggle" repertoires with different organizations emulating the BR made this same organization particularly conscious of its own status within the Extra-Parliamentary Left movement. The rising number of attacks from 1976 onward (Figure 3-A) is one important consequence of this interactive dynamics unfolding within the movement.

* * *

But two other mechanisms/arenas of interaction were important in driving the radicalization of the BR forward: the mechanism of dissociation, operating between the BR and the broad Left-wing constituency arena of interaction, and the mechanism of object shift, operating in the arena of interaction between the Extra-Parliamentary Left-wing movement and the Right-wing counter-movement. Although exerting their respective influences in conjunction with one or more of the above-analyzed mechanisms, both, as we demonstrate below, are nonetheless important for a fuller understanding of the process, with object shift being particularly important in the early phase of the radicalization process and dissociation an important element during the stepped-up phase of the process.

DISSOCIATION: CHRONICLE OF SOCIAL ISOLATION

While in the early phase of its radicalization the BR enjoyed some degree of support from the part of the broader Left-wing constituency and toleration of its tactics, this was certainly not the case in the later stage of its struggle (Falciola forthcoming). The intensified radicalization by the BR produced disgust and condemnation not only by the general public, but also among the Left-wing constituency. Results from public surveys, carried out between 1976 and 1979 by the *International Gallup Polls*, suggest that the Italian public's support for "radical change by revolutionary action" decreased from 13 percent in 1976 to 6 percent in 1979, whereas support for "valiant defense against all subversive forces" increased from 17 percent to 32 percent, respectively (Hewitt 1993, chapter 4). Regardless of the problems and limitations typically associated with public polls, the results do suggest that from 1976 onward, popular support for

revolutionary actions, which was marginal to begin with, nonetheless diminished, and, conversely, that support for government's counter-terrorism measures increased, in particular in the aftermath of the murder of Aldo Moro, when a nationwide strike brought millions of people to the streets.

The operation of dissociation in the BR episode was constituted most centrally by the interrelated operation of *decertification* and *encapsulation*. During the early stage of the students' and workers' mobilization, the PCI, reflecting its movement-party, hegemonic agenda, functioned as a gate-keeper for the growing mass movements of the time and maintained, in general, an inclusive approach vis-à-vis the myriad of organizations, regardless of differences in ideology and goals. This approach, however, changed during the early 1970s, as the party withdrew its support from certain movement organizations—a development that amounted to *decertification,* a sub-mechanism defined as the lack or withdrawal of validation and recognition of actors, their performances and their claims by external authority (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 215).

To be sure, initially, the PCI considered the mass mobilization as part of a united front of the Left, emerging primarily from the civil society in favor of mass-based activities in the struggle for the structural reforms of the country. The students' and the workers' mobilization, however, were not part of the strategy of the PCI, as Right-wing elements believed. In fact, movement organizations, in particular Left-wing militant ones, were very critical of the PCI, accusing it of questioning inherited dogmas and seeking support from the new middle class. However, despite the tension existing between the movement and the PCI, the first stage of protest mobilization and activities saw both of these actors acting together. This tension could have heightened further as a result of the shift to harsh and unrestrained security forces' repression which, as noted, began during 1969. Yet, due to the repression experienced by movement activists of all organizational and ideological affiliations, this tension was contained and hardly resulted in decertification; that is, police repression tended to operate through certain sections of the security forces secretively backing the violent attacks led and carried out by the neo-fascists, to which all Left-wing activists were exposed and indeed targeted. We will return to these important relational dynamics in greater detail when discussing movement–counter-movement interaction below. At this point, it is important to note that this unique feature of Italian contention of those years was instrumental in moving the institutional Left (trade unions, PSI, and obviously, the PCI) and the mass movements even closer to each other. Not only did the PCI show no signs of decertification at this time, but also,

in fact, went as far as adopting and endorsing elements of the new repertoires (Tarrow 1989). Until 1973 (at least), many movement organizations perceived the PCI as a major institutional ally as well as an important carrier of their demands of participation, representation, and reforms.

Dissociation began to operate from 1972, amidst the changes unfolding in the political environment, where at the recent national elections the Movimento Sociale Italiano had increased its votes and the DC became able to form a Center-Right coalition. These changes, combined with mounting evidence of militancy on the part of Left-wing organizations in response to Right-wing violence (a dynamics that took on its own momentum, as examined below), triggered decertification. The PCI progressively redirected its line toward the Extra-Parliamentary Left movement, accusing it of the failure in the elections, and withdrawing its recognition of several organizations and its support for their tactics. The change in the approach and strategy of the PCI was motivated by the fear of an imminent coup d'état similar to the one in Chile—"the fear of a repetition of the trauma of 1922 dominated" (Amoyot 1981, 204)—in fact, that fear precipitated the choice of the party's leadership to collaborate with other democratic forces. In a very simple way the PCI was offering the DC an exit strategy from the crisis on its left instead of the one on its right, fearing an authoritarian turn. The historic compromise proposed by the PCI was then a strategy in order to save the Italian democratic institutions, not the status quo. To promote this new strategy of compromise with the moderate parliamentary forces, the PCI needed to appear as a reliable party and a possible coalitional partner capable of taking governmental positions and maintaining stability in the country. Accordingly, the PCI not only withdrew its recognition from some militant Left-wing organizations and openly opposed their tactics, it also tried to co-opt others with a reformist program, which was devised in accordance with the new Center-Left government. PCI leaders, in fact, went as far as to support many newly legislated laws meant to allow security forces harsher repressive measures against Left-wing militant organizations.

The Extra-Parliamentary Left organizations were now stigmatized in the coverage of the PCI's newspaper, *l'Unità*. They were portrayed as antidemocratic and extremists, criminal provocateurs, adventurists, irresponsible revolutionary maximalists, lumpenproletariat, and even as neo-fascist (Edwards 2009, Chapter 5). The BR, too, was rejected since it was, according to the PCI, the enemy of the workers' movement. Any form of contiguity with most organizations within the Extra-Parliamentary Left movement did not sit well with the new line of the party, which viewed the movement's repertoires of action as dangerous as the violence of Right-wing

radical organizations. In November 1977, Ugo Pecchioli, an important party official, delivered an internal speech to the main leaders of the PCI confirming that political violence, whether from the Right or from the Left, was against the main goal of the party: "The terrorist progression aims to unravel the relationship of the working class to democracy, prompting the abandonment of the democratic process and the development of divisive operations within the labor movement."[39]

Moreover, in 1973, the "new phase of anti-fascist revolution" proposed by Enrico Berlinguer, then general secretary of PCI, was built on the "historic compromise" between catholic, socialist, and communist forces as a way of saving, by reviving the memory of the anti-fascist Resistance coalition, the young Italian democratic state from a possible collapse. Addressing the XXIII congress of the PCI in Milan, on March 13, 1972, Berlinguer supported the necessity of such a broad alliance because of "the pressing nature of great social questions which are also political and ideological . . . [and] the depth of the roots of fascism" (Edwards 2009, 49). For the leadership of the PCI, power-sharing was the answer to the social and political crises and a way to isolate those forces, which were somehow tempted by an authoritarian turn.

By the second half of the 1970s, in the face of further intensification of violence, the PCI turned out to be the most outspoken advocate of public order, supporting repressive police measures (Taviani 2010). This toughening of strategy resonated first, with its historic preference for a long-term "war of position," á la Gramsci, within the framework of Italy's democratic order, and second, with the progressive shift of the PCI toward the "right" due to its interest in broadening its support among the Italian old and new middle classes (Amyot 1981).

The change in the PCI's strategic approach vis-à-vis the movement as a whole, but most particularly toward the by-now radical organizations, the new repressive "emergency policies" measures fully endorsed by the party, to the point of providing the government with a "safety net" following the 1976 elections (see above), not only perpetuated decertification, but at that point in time, triggered *encapsulation*—a relational sub-mechanism which, similar to Della Porta (1995), we define as an actor enclosing itself from society. The proactive and resolute campaign of the PCI isolated these organizations from the broader Left, pushing them to further radicalize and, as it turned out, reinforced their social isolation.

39. Ugo Pecchioli in Verbale della riunione del 24.11.77 sui problemi dell'ordine pubblico alla luce dei recenti avvenimenti, in IG, Archivio Ugo Pecchioli, B. 31 (quoted in Taviani 2010, 116).

With little if any source of confirmation, justification, and legitimacy other than their own, BR leaders and activists developed an increasingly elitist vision of themselves, which was predicated on a requirement for an unprecedented level of ideological commitment, in order to survive repression and societal isolation (Della Porta 1995; Bosi 2013). The initial preference for an "armed propaganda" left ample ground for the armed struggle against the state, with more lethal attacks against the authorities and civilians. BR's violence stopped being a means to an end, serving no clear ideologically driven agenda, to the point that a number of militants became disgusted and left the organization, accusing the leadership of having lost all links to the working class.[40]

If in the first period of its operations the BR stressed in its publications the need to remain linked to the mass struggles of the period,[41] later, from the mid-1970s onward, it began to move away from this popular orientation, gradually abandoning the strategy of using violence as an incentive for an insurrectionary process. Ideologically, this shift lost its Marxist-Leninist reasoning and began to be infused with a more cryptic language aimed at "a paradoxical 'expressive' search for [its] own existence" (Melucci 1981, 119). This was a fundamental feature in the BR process of isolation from its working-class base and from the public at large. As Mario Moretti, one of the leaders of the BR, stated in the second half of the 1990s in one of his biographies: "Ever since, the only evaluation of our political line was undertaken in relation to our own capacity to practice it, with a view to reproducing ourselves rather than establishing a dialogue with society" (Moretti 2004, 98).

The BR started progressively to care less about the political and social legitimization of its violent attacks and to care more about its capacity to produce such violence. On June 1, 1977, it started to shoot at journalists whom it considered to be making misleading and mystifying representations of the BR. In a matter of three days it seriously injured three important figures in Italian journalism, while on November 16 it murdered Carlo Casalegno, journalist for the newspaper *La Stampa*. In the view of the BR, journalists represented an official organ—the psychological one—of the counter-revolution and this made them legitimate targets of its violent campaign; in the following years, and based on similar views,

40. Although beyond the period under analysis, it is important to note that in 1979, as part of the ongoing and demanding underground experience, and the extreme worldview it generated further, BR activists went as far as killing even a Left-wing civilian, Guido Rossa, a member of the PCI in Genova. We will return to this development in chapter 7.

41. BR, "Organizziamo un grande processo popolare," 1971.

the organization would find targets among other civilians, such as professors and trade unionists.

With greater and heavier reliance on violence, encapsulation also provoked newer and harsher repressive policies. This brought the BR to completely close itself off and to develop sect-like features, united only around the notion of a private war against the state. The broader Left as well as the Extra-Parliamentary Left movement progressively became merely spectators of a conflict they did not care to support. With ever-greater reliance on deadlier, more expressive violence, and with more brutal police counter-measures, members of the BR became their own and only reference with, expectedly, a growing portion of the Italian Left turning its back on them. In this process, contentious interaction with the Right-wing paramilitary organizations, beginning to unfold as early as the late 1960s, had an important role to play.

OBJECT SHIFT: MILITANT ANTI-FASCISM

Both the extreme Right, from the mid-1960s, and the extreme Left, from the late 1960s to the early 1970s, tended to replace the Italian security forces. The extreme Right deemed the state to be ineffective in ensuring law and order, while the extreme Left was increasingly mistrustful of the connivance between some branches of the security forces and the militant Right. Defensive activities were then carried out by activists on both extremes of the political spectrum, with the effect of further militarizing the political struggle, as each side saw the other as the object of claims and diverted at least part of its attacks to it. Object shift operated through the interrelated influence of two sub-mechanisms: *vigilantism* and *retaliation*, both operating throughout the time period under study but with the latter gaining added salience from 1973 onward.

In the changing international situation of the late 1950s and early 1960s, and given the emergence of the Center-Left governments, the extreme Right in Italy was living with the fear that the country could possibly become the target of worldwide communist forces. This fear was further aggravated by the perception that the progressive "infiltration" of the Left forces into the political establishment would go as far as a Leftist uprising. Right-wing militants started, then, to organize paramilitary organizations, aiming to defend the status quo and to explicitly attempt to repress their historical enemy: the Italian Left. They organized lists of loyal citizens who would join the paramilitary organizations in critical moments, got some military training, and collected arms and explosives.

Once the students and workers took to the streets in the late 1960s and managed to broaden the scope of protest nationwide, Right-wing organizations interpreted this as part of a revolutionary plot to overthrow the Italian regime. They responded with counter-insurgency measures that consisted, on the one hand, of throwing bombs at the headquarters of Leftist organizations and parties, physically attacking Left-wing militants in the streets, and using intimidating tactics in schools, universities, and factories. On the other, Right-wing militias also started to collaborate with sections within the security forces under the auspices of the "strategy of tension." This was translated into infiltrating Leftist organizations, planting bombs in public places, and provoking civilian mass killings. Such Right-wing violent repertoires, to which the police and the courts turned a completely blind eye, became the norm during the late 1960s and early 1970s (Ferraresi 1996).

Right-wing violence took on a central role in the militarization of the conflict. To counter such violence, Left-wing organizations were forced to take self-defensive measures in order to be able to protect and support the students' and workers' struggles. In late 1970, Lotta Continua spoke of the necessity of the "revolutionary self-defense"[42] and, similar to many other Left-wing militant organizations, mobilized and organized accordingly. No longer trusting the Italian state, which was seen as colluding with Right-wing militant forces, Left-wing militant organizations invoked self-defensive strategies and a form of "proletarian justice." They organized branches specialized in the use of violence, which adopted paramilitary forms of action.

Initially, these consisted mainly of inviting Left-wing militants to mobilize in order to safeguard the factories, schools, universities, and neighborhoods from Right-wing militants; writing detailed inquires where Right-wing militants were denounced of their alleged activities of provocation, infiltration, and participation in the strategy of tension (what they called "counter-information"); and, collecting detailed information on Right-wing militant activists (first and last names, features, habits, home addresses, phone numbers, license plates, and other personal information). These repertoires of action formed part of the "militant anti-fascism" strategy (*antifascismo militante*) (Panvini 2009).

In the face of an increase in the intensity and lethality of self-initiated Right-wing attacks, Left-wing *vigilantism* was activated—a relational submechanism defined as the initiation of provisional law-and-order activities by a non-state actor outside the control of its government and security

42. Lotta Continua, "Rapporto sullo squadrismo; La strategia della tensione e la necessità dell'autodifesa rivoluzionaria," in *Lotta Continua*, 11/12/1970.

forces (Alimi et al. 2012, 19). Many of the Extra-Parliamentary Left movement organizations saw Right-wing militants as agents in subversive plans aimed at stopping the nonviolent revolutionary processes, which started in the late 1960s. Following such a reading, the Right-wing organizations became justified as targets of violence, seen as enemies of the working class. "Killing the fascists is not a crime. It is the justice of the workers" was what Left-wing militants were chanting in this period, asking for some form of "proletarian justice" when confronted with Right-wing violence.

The BR was no exception; its leaders identified the Right-wing militants in general and Right-wing radical organizations in particular, as the enemy of the working class, even during its incipient stage of 1970. In their view, the neo-fascists were concentrating their efforts on exploiting the economic crisis to further disadvantage and discriminate against the workers. A leaflet distributed by *Sinistra Proletaria* (BR's incepient group) at the Sit-Simens factory, in November 1970, reads:

> To the fascist Lords of the Simens:
>
> With reference to your latest initiatives and communications, namely:
>
> -Collection of signatures by fascist telegram;
>
> -Anonymous letter of the "death squad";
>
> -Article in "Candido" of 09.24.1970;
>
> [. . .] We inform you that we have identified all of you. We know you, and so we know that you are mostly poor devils, foolish servants of the master. We are not interested in you in any particular way, we aim at your principals, the heads of Simens, on those carrions that rage over the working class, we aim at your important fascist comrades. (quoted in Albanese 2011, 72–73)

A year later, the review of the BR published a message from the Gruppi d'Azione Partigiana, which was very strongly rooted within the militant anti-fascism mindset:

> FASCISTS we know all of your names, surnames, addresses and even the time you go to the toilet, so [. . .] it is not wise for you to walk around freely, nor will it be easy for you to stay alive. BEWARE: NOTHING WILL GO UNPUNISHED.[43]

43. Gruppi d'Azione Partigiana, "Per una nuova resistenza," *Nuova Resistenza*, 5/1971, 13.

Similar to other Left-wing militant organizations at the time, the BR conducted inquires on the radical Right, especially within the big factories of the North, where they aimed to be perceived very much as a vigilant organization in defense of the working class. The results of such inquiries were then distributed via leaflets and other means of communication, containing the personal information of Right-wing militants. In order to counter the Right wing's project of destroying the working-class struggles, the BR proposed an armed opposition:

> The war against neo-fascism is a time of war for the revolutionary class, it is a necessary step in the popular resistance movement on its long march to build a proletarian and communist power. Like all wars it must be fought not only on the political and ideological levels, but also and especially on the military level [. . .] joining the revolutionary left in the armed struggle against neo-fascism and against the state that produces it, is the task of communist militants.[44]

Leaving the early defensive repertoires and information-gathering work behind, in the face of the continuing and at times worsening Right-wing paramilitary activities, Left-wing militant organizations began using violence in retaliation for the Right-wing militants' violence in a more systematic and frequent manner. *Retaliation*, following Tilly (2003), is a relational sub-mechanism defined as reprisals by an actor of wrongs experienced by the actor or members of its constituency. Indeed, the intensification of the conflict with Right-wing organizations and growing reliance of vigilante operations on the part of Left-wing militants brought about more serious and "routinized" forms of militarization. The growing confidence of Left-wing vigilante organizations led to more frequent reliance on individual acts of violence against specific persons, identified as opponents. In cities like Milan and Rome, it was common that soon after a murderous attack against one of the parties, acts of reprisal in kind by activists of the battered party followed, at times resulting in yet an additional round or even rounds of unstoppable retaliation (Tarrow 1989; Panvini 2009).

In 1973 the BR reached the decision that the movement needed a strategy that went beyond traditional militant anti-fascism.[45] It called then for a strategy that focused on violently defeating the hard-line neo-Gaullist faction within the state by playing on the contradictions and divisions within the ruling class. The first intended injury inflicted by the BR was on

44. BR, "Il voto non paga prendiamo il fucile!," 4/1972.
45. BR, "Autointervista," 1/1973.

a DC city council member in Milan, Massimo de Carolis, on the May 15, 1975. In claiming responsibility for the attack, the BR wrote that the "DC should be liquidated, beaten and dispersed. The DC is the principal vector of the restructuring imperialist state project."[46] To be sure, other politicians were targeted, as was the case with the assassination of two Movimentio Social Italiano members in Padua, June 1974. But it was the DC that ranked highest on the BR list. Of those 29 politicians killed since 1969, 22 were members of the DC, with the BR responsible for the killing of 19 of them (Galleni 1981). Among these the kidnapping and killing of Aldo Moro represented an unprecedented step taken by the organization.

CONCLUSION

Despite the presence of ideology that justified the use of violence and a radical socio-political agenda, the radicalization of the BR was not inevitable. It was contingent on a complex set of interactions among pre-existing structural settings, institutional constraints, regional and international transformative events, and uniquely combined relational dynamics unfolding within and between different actors in the aftermath of the students' and workers' mobilization of 1968–1969. Separately, the relational dynamics unfolding in each of the five arenas of interaction have had a distinctive influence on the process in the Italian episode of contention. These mechanisms and arenas of interaction, as we will see in the two chapters that follow, play a similar role in the radicalization of Enosis-EOKA (chapter 4), and al-Qaeda (chapter 5). Moreover, as with the BR episode, we will see that in the episodes of Enosis-EOKA and al-Qaeda, these relational dynamics provide the context for cognitive and environmental forces to exert their influences on the processes of radicalization. Yet, on top of the similarities, the next two chapters will also single out an important element of differences among our three episodes; indeed in each of the episodes (inclusive of the BR), the particularities and unique sets of initial conditions factor in to produce a different set of sub-mechanisms for each mechanism.

46. BR, "Comunicato dell'assalto alla sede di Iniziativa Democratica," 5/15/1975.

CHAPTER 4

The Cypriot Enosis Movement and EOKA (1945–1959)

The blood which was being shed was the result of [Under-Secretary of State at the Colonial Office] *Hopkinson's famous "never"* [of 1954] *which Secretary of State at the Colonial Office Lennox-Boyd repeated, albeit using other words, when in the Parliament meeting of May 5, 1955, asserted that the position of the government of Great Britain was that the British control of the island must not be reduced—and this against the views of the Labor, which the former Secretary of State at the Colonial Office, Creech Jones, presented in Parliament, that there must be a referendum on a timetable, the result of which the British government would have to accept.*

Georgios Grivas, 1962

The movement championing the political union of Cyprus with Greece, which became known by the Greek word "enosis" (union), is a historical child of the so-called Eastern Question. Referring to the fate of southeastern Europe at the time of the Ottoman Empire's decline, the Eastern Question was relevant for Cyprus as it stood for changes in the regional balance of power that led to the creation and expansion of the Greek state. The project of Greek state-formation was overall successful since the incipient state more than doubled the size of its territory, mostly at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, during the first century of its existence (1832–1932). Still, Cyprus, though inhabited by an 80 percent majority population that considered itself to be Greek, would not easily fit this irredentist pattern. A forceful claim was never laid on the island by the Greek state nor was there nationalist agitation on the island itself during the Ottoman rule (1571–1878). By the time such agitation began to build, the

island's administration had already passed from Ottoman to British jurisdiction, first under protectorate status that maintained Ottoman sovereignty (1878–1923) and then under full British sovereignty (1923–1960).

Greek nationalism, an ideology that postulated a cross-temporal and cross-spatial notion of peoplehood, referred to as Hellenism, had already affected Cypriot politics during the British protectorate period. It was out of this form of nationalism that a movement started developing under the leadership of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus, demanding the enosis of the island with the Greek state. The Enosis movement's demand became systematically vocal following the change from protectorate to colonial status for the island. The clearer and more explicit the movement's claim was made, however, the greater the opposition it faced. The British government was not willing to alter Cyprus's colonial status, and this stand was supported by the leadership of the island's minority population, a population that considered itself to be Turkish. Nor was the island's semi-democratic formal political channel, the Legislative Council, conducive to the goal of enosis, since the votes of the Cypriot Greek elected members of the Council were offset by the combined votes of the Cypriot Turkish elected members and the British appointed members.

The formal political channels in the 1920s were therefore frustrating for the Enosis movement and this frustration eventually led to extra-institutional politics. The enosis demand, voiced more and more in non-state fora, came to a head in 1931, when a rally organized by the Church turned, first, into street demonstrations and then into more widespread protest with human and heavy material cost. This event led the British government to end any form of elected representation on the island and to adopt a series of repressive measures, including restrictions on the freedom of speech and assembly. This heavy-handed approach continued for years and managed to curb the movement. But things changed with the end of the Second World War. The repressive measures were relaxed and this allowed the movement space to reorganize itself. In this new context, the leaders of the movement became able by the early 1950s to bring the Greek government actively into the question of the island's future and to pursue a policy of internationalization of the claim for enosis. The mainland and Cypriot Greek leaders thus raised the issue of self-determination for Cyprus to the United Nations and then, once the UN move yielded no results, covertly supported an armed campaign against the British administration of the island. The emerging strategy of the movement was to put diplomatic pressure on the UK government through a locally waged yet internationally visible campaign. The underground organization that was set up to carry out the violence, dubbed EOKA (National Organization of

Cypriot Fighters), started its campaign in 1955. By this time, however, the mainland and Cypriot Turkish leaders reacted and also mobilized support. Their claim, should Cyprus's colonial status change, was the partition of the island and the award of sovereignty respectively to Greece and Turkey (despite the island's geographically mixed population). Eventually the mainland and Cypriot Turkish leaders, too, organized an armed underground, which became particularly active in 1958.

Thus, while before the Second World War the Cypriot Greek nationalist movement employed essentially nonviolent tactics, in the postwar years elements within it went through a process of radicalization that culminated in anti-colonial armed campaign and interethnic strife. The armed phase of the Enosis movement, lasting from 1955 to 1959, ended when the governments of the UK, Turkey, and Greece reached an agreement establishing a Republic of Cyprus which, though otherwise sovereign, would not have the right to partition itself or unite itself with another state; excluded from the sovereignty of the Republic, furthermore, would be two areas that were to remain under British sovereignty and were to be used as military bases. Representatives of the Cypriot Greek and Turkish communities accepted these agreements and the new state came into existence in 1960.

Measured by the relatively short period of the insurgent campaign and the small size of the population of the island (at that time about half a million), the use of violence was not only high but also widespread. EOKA was involved in more than one thousand incidents. They included the plating or throwing of hundreds of bombs and the assassination of hundreds of British security forces men, British civilian, and Cypriot Greek and Turkish state employees, and other civilians. The organization also led hundreds of street demonstrations, many of which entailed clashes with the security forces and arrests. The security forces, in their turn, killed scores of EOKA members, including nine hanged, and caused the death of several civilians. Under emergency law, the colonial administration also detained thousands of Cypriot Greeks and convicted hundreds of them under various extraordinary charges.

What is the process through which members of the Enosis movement adopted violence as a means toward the movement's goal? What is the process that sustained violence for four years, and how does this process account for the fluctuations in violence? This chapter offers answers to these questions by way of an analysis of the mechanisms through which key actors within the movement formed their strategy and their stance vis-à-vis violence. As suggested by the book's analytical framework, the analysis starts before the onset of violence and follows five arenas of interaction, examining the mechanisms operating

within them.[1] Thus what follows below is organized in sections corresponding to those five arenas and relational mechanisms, with rough temporal analyses featured in each section.

UPWARD POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY SPIRALS: VIOLENCE IN THE SERVICE OF DIPLOMACY

The Enosis movement was intra-national in character. It connected Cypriot Greeks with mainland Greeks and therefore transcended state boundaries. This was the case before the Second World War—when, for example, the Greek Prime Minister lobbied the British Prime Minister on behalf of the movement during the Paris Peace Conference in 1919—but much more so after it. In the postwar period, not only did the movement involve a colonial power (the UK) and two "mother countries" (Greece and Turkey), as well as the islander colonial subjects (the Cypriot Greeks and Turks), it involved also an "international scene" that went beyond these countries. Reflecting this orientation, the movement leadership's evolving strategy was to bring the claim for enosis to the world's attention and through this to put pressure on Cyprus's colonial rulers.

When examining the movement's evolving strategic positioning, therefore, it is important to examine the arena between the movement and its transnational political environment. It is amidst this broad and multilevel arena with an intra-national outlook that the mechanism of political opportunity spirals, seen broadly at first, to include both upward and downward developments, unfolded in ways that were consequential to the formation of the movement's strategy. Accordingly intra-national in character were also the mechanism's key constituent sub-mechanisms: *diffusion*, *brokerage*, and *certification*. Underpinned by these sub-mechanisms, political opportunity spirals changed the relations in which the movement operated. Initially, the parties to the contention were the movement and the state, but later new actors were firmly added on. They included the UN, NATO, and the governments of Greece, Turkey, and the United States.

1. Several areas of inquiry remain beyond the scope of the present analysis. They include: first, the genesis and development of Greek nationalism in Cyprus (studied, for example, in Loizos 1974; Markides 1977; Worsley and Kitromilides 1979; Bryant 2004); secondly, the politics that led to the creation of the Republic of Cyprus (studied, for example, in Averoff-Tossizza 1986; Holland 1998; Soulioti 2006); and, thirdly, a rounded account of the Cypriot Turkish nationalist movement (studied, for example, in Nevzat 2005; Kezilyurek 1993). No matter how important these inquiries are on their own right, they are part of the present analysis only insofar as they elucidate the radicalization within the Cypriot Greek movement.

NATO can be ignored here, since its most distinct role was to promote the eventual Greek and Turkish diplomatic initiatives leading to the creation of the Republic of Cyprus. But examining the other actors and their interrelations is a critical step in the analysis of radicalization from within the movement, the culmination of which was the underground campaign of violence. As will be seen below, the sub-mechanism diffusion was temporary prior to the sub-mechanisms brokerage and certification, while the most critical role of all three sub-mechanisms in the course of radicalization took place before the onset of violence. Thus, while these sub-mechanisms still operated during the period of the campaign of violence, their chief importance was that they precipitated that campaign.

The world was transformed by the Second World War, and some aspects of this transformation entailed *diffusion*—a relational sub-mechanism that in general refers to the spread of a contentious performance, issue, or interpretive frame from one site to another (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 215). In the context of the arena under examination, diffusion meant, for one thing, the global spread of liberal ideas. Thus the widening use and appeal of liberal interpretive frames of politics (e.g., the joint statement of 1941 by the governments of the United States and the UK, known as the Atlantic Charter) presented possibilities for strategic action and goal attainment to the Cypriot Greek nationalists as early as the mid-1940s. Accordingly, the general difficulty of colonialism to excuse itself in the face of liberalism—especially with respect to Cyprus, where the claim to "civilizing non-Europeans" could hardly be sustained—offered an opening for, and fuel to, the nationalists' unionist appeals. Moreover, as the diffusion of liberalism increased following the Second World War, it was coupled with the spreading acceptance of the principle of self-determination of peoples, forming a significant new feature in political agendas at colonial peripheries across the world. Importantly, the general ideas of liberalism and self-determination found correspondence in newly created international institutions. Most particularly, the UN General Assembly offered an unprecedented and relatively democratic forum to present colonial grievances (Cassese 1995; Calvocoressi 2009).

These institutions and their purported ideas, then, presented possibilities for collective action to the Cypriot Greek nationalists, which they were quick to see and value. The movement leaders therefore reoriented their strategy accordingly. Before these transformations had occurred in the world scene, the movement leaders' options had been limited, to the detriment of their own sense of efficacy. They had directed their claim to the British government with the faint hope[2] that the latter would come to

2. This hope partly relied on historical precedent, since the UK government in 1864, under the Liberal Party, had transferred the Ionian Islands from the UK to Greece.

see enosis not as an imperial loss but as a gain in the Anglo-Greco alliance (Georghallides 1979; 1985). Now they could direct their claim to a broader audience that could potentially pressure the British government to make concessions. Thus claim-making was being shifted away from the ruler-subject direct relationship and toward the multiple-actor web of international politics.

Developments in 1947 and 1948 marked this reorientation. They pivoted on a relatively conciliatory colonial policy on Cyprus, initiated by the Labor UK government which came to power after the war (Kelling 1990; Pelling 1961). Thus the new government relaxed the suppressive policies of the 1930s (e.g., they lifted the restrictions on the press and on public assembly) and made an effort to introduce a constitution of limited self-government on the island, referred to as "liberal constitution." The UK announced its intention for a new constitution in 1947 and scheduled a convention on the island for 1948 in which the island's political leaders were invited to present their perspectives. However, the leading Cypriot Greek nationalists declined the invitation because it did not offer a guaranteed path to self-determination. Their unwavering advocacy of enosis-and-only-enosis led to the collapse of the consultative convention and, more broadly, of the British effort at devising a constitution (Katsiaounis 2000). This political failure left the Cypriot Greeks with no political representation save for mayoral offices determined by municipal elections. It was in assessing this predicament in 1948 that the nationalists turned to the general opportunities that the international postwar context presented them. To realize these opportunities, however, they needed first to enlist the support of brokers.

The relational sub-mechanism *brokerage* refers, in general, to the connection of previously unconnected or weakly connected sites (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 215). In the case at hand, the Cypriot claimants hoped that brokers would bring the claim for self-determination for Cyprus—code words for enosis—to significant institutions outside the island. Prospective brokers included statesmen and diplomats in the recently decolonized states and the United States, Labor MPs in the UK, and a series of politicians in Greece. The latter were, of course, the most important source of potential support, but in fact this support went beyond brokerage, since it was vital not only to the movement strategy but also to the movement's very existence; for, clearly, in cases of irredentist nationalism the support of the national center is vital for the *irredenta*, as the latter becomes an unwanted child without it. Thus Greek politicians were for the movement critical potential certifiers as well as brokers—*certification* being a relational sub-mechanism defined as an external

authority's signal of its readiness to recognize and support the existence and claims of a political actor (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 215). Triggering the brokerage of, and certification by, the Greek government was for the movement an indispensable move.

At the level of rhetoric all mainland Greek politicians supported the Cypriot Greek aspiration for enosis (Averoff-Tossizza 1986). Nevertheless, a concrete political program in pursuit of enosis made Greek politicians in office uneasy. In fact, if the potential for brokerage and veritable certification from Greece entailed downward spirals of political opportunities for the Cypriot Greek nationalists, it entailed upward spirals too, since the mainland Greek support was not a foregone conclusion. This was so because Greek governments had been caught in a patron-client relationship with British governments ever since the Greek state came into existence, a relationship that became all the more stringent in the late 1940s as Greek governments leaned heavily on British (and American) support in dealing with the Communist Greek armed movement active at that time. To enlist Greek governments in an international diplomatic campaign against their British patron in the name of enosis was therefore a difficult and risky task for the Cypriot Greek nationalists. Failure in this task would mean not only failure at brokerage but also devastating decertification. Thus, while the certification and brokerage of the Greek governments afforded the movement inimitable new possibilities, potentially improving its strategic positioning, these sub-mechanisms were nonetheless part of volatile spirals of political opportunity, which gradually spiraled upward and influenced the progression of radicalization.

Ultimately, the Cypriot Greek nationalists won Greek support through moral/political pressure and after the communist-nationalist civil war in Greece had ended in the autumn of 1949. As will be elaborated later in this chapter, this took place following the reorganization of the Enosis movement in the postwar period and particularly during the upgrading of Ethnarchy, the Church-led nationalist umbrella organization. It was Ethnarchy that took the pivotal step in 1950 to organize an island-wide signature collection drive on the question of enosis. The result of this effort, which is usually referred to as a "plebiscite," indicated overwhelming support for enosis among the Cypriot Greeks and offered the nationalists leaders a springboard for a campaign of internationalization. They attempted yet failed to have some of the collected signatures deposited at the UN headquarters in New York City, but had the Greek Parliament receive them. That gesture by the mainland Greek politicians was important, as it demonstrated the popularity of the cause of enosis at the national center. It is exactly through the leverage this popularity afforded them that the Cypriot

Greek nationalist leaders managed to enlist a reluctant Greek government to sponsor a discussion on Cyprus at the UN General Assembly meeting of 1952 (Stefanidis 1999; Averoff-Tossizza 1986).

While the relations with various potential brokers could improve the movement's strategic positioning, however, the broader international environment in the early 1950s threatened such strategic advantage. This related to the fact that Britain's Middle East policy was facing challenges in that period and, more particularly, British geostrategic interests in Egypt were being contested. This conjuncture raised the military importance of holding Cyprus. In this context it was becoming clear that actors sympathetic to the self-determination of Cyprus would not deliver (Kelling 1990). Thus, as the British government fell back to the control of the Conservative Party in 1951 (the Tories stayed in power until 1964), the Labor Party MPs who were sympathetic to the Cypriot cause had very little influence on government policy regarding Cyprus. Further, given Britain's diplomatic clout, many newly decolonized states refrained from spending their diplomatic capital to support the Greek efforts at the UN. Importantly, at critical moments during backstage UN meetings in 1952 the United States backed its British ally despite its principled support of self-determination (Stefanidis 1999). All in all, therefore, the strategic positioning of the movement was weakening in the face of worsening diplomatic odds.

As the Conservative government in London assigned unyielding priority to the empire's geostrategic concerns, the Cypriot Greek nationalist leadership opted to stress its position for enosis by "exposing" the British refusal to abide by liberal norms regarding self-determination. It is in the service of this tactical maneuvering that a group within the movement, headed by Archbishop Makarios, supported the formation of EOKA in 1952 and then, in 1955, together with the Greek government, gave it the green light for operations. Violence and counter-violence, their reasoning went, would show the world both the determination of the Cypriot Greeks and the suppressive colonialist nature of the British (Kranidiotis 1981). As the leader of EOKA put it after the fact, his armed organization's "general plan" was to "gain the interest of the international community and especially [the Cypriot Greek's] allies through acts of heroism and self-sacrifice" (Grivas 1962, 14, authors' translation).

It is debatable whether or not the movement got closer to attaining the goal of enosis during the period of the EOKA campaign. But with respect to the tactical goal of internationalization, the EOKA insurgency and the colonial counter-insurgency offered the movement means for advancement. In the period of violence, therefore, the question of Cyprus was

getting international attention and was, most particularly, discussed in the British Parliament and at the UN. In the context of initially developing downward spirals of political opportunities, we saw a gradual development of upward spirals of political opportunities, which included both threats and constraints on the movement's ability to realize its goals. As will be explained in the next section, this happened in conjunction with the mechanism of outbidding. Thus the sub-mechanisms examined above—of diffusion, brokerage, and certification—kept operating in the face of violence, but after they had "set in." That means that they acquired predictability in the course of the violent outbidding. For one, the diffused frames of liberalism, affecting the rhetoric of the UN General Assembly and the Greek and British parliaments—and, for that matter, the Greek and British media—interpreted both the insurgency and the counter-insurgency but did so in predictable ways which, ultimately, had circumscribed influence on outbidding. In their turn, brokerage and certification acquired as well a stable shape during the period of violence, with the diplomatic involvement of the Greek government becoming a given (though not assured to fall in line with EOKA) and that of other actors remaining marginal. The involvement of Turkey, to be sure, was the obvious exception to this predictability, presenting the movement with increasing threat during the period of violence. The resultant intensification of Upward Spirals of Political Opportunities, therefore, took place during the closing months of the radicalization process, and the mechanism's concatenation with object shift will be analyzed in the last subsection of the chapter.

OUTBIDDING: SHAME THEM THROUGH HEROISM AND SELF-SACRIFICE

The Enosis movement hardly challenged the colonial security apparatus in the postwar period up to 1955, the year when EOKA began its campaign. Tension and clashes with the authorities during the pre-EOKA years had been few and far in between, with street demonstrations at the time of the celebrations of the Queen's coronation in 1953 as the most notable instance. In 1954, in fact, it took a labor strike, rather than a nationalist-inspired event, to prompt the authorities to reinstate some of the prewar restrictions on civil liberties. Outbidding between the Enosis movement and the colonial security apparatus essentially started with the EOKA campaign. But this does not mean that the onset of the campaign was fierce. To the contrary, it was initiated on April 1, 1955, with a series of explosions aimed at sabotage, went into a lull through April and

May, and only during summer gained some momentum. In September, the most visible movement activism consisted of street demonstrations by school students, who acted on EOKA's instructions. Still, the nascent EOKA campaign presented an unprecedented phenomenon in the colony and prompted the colonial authorities to react. Thus, for example, in August the authorities imposed curfew for the first time, a pilot project that was accompanied by mass arrests from among the population of the village under curfew; and by the end of September, security forces had shot dead a sixteen-year-old demonstrator.

As the EOKA campaign accelerated in autumn, however, London stepped in decisively. As the campaign entered its sixth month, the UK government replaced the island's governor with no less a soldier than Field Marshall John Harding, the Chief of Imperial Staff. Following Harding's arrival, UK-based police constables, several military regiments, and military hardware, including helicopters, were transferred to the island. The imposition of emergency law followed suit, entailing arrest and indefinite detention without trial as well as mandatory death penalty for a series of acts (Crawshaw 1978). By this time, EOKA augmented its own military readiness, particularly regarding its supply of weapons and explosives, which were primarily from sources within the island. But it also got ready for the contestation over public opinion, a contestation in which the colonial administration had the comparative disadvantage.

This last point is key in understanding how outbidding pushed radicalization forward. Obviously, EOKA's operational ability, and limits thereof, explains much about the organization's selection of tactics. But a less obvious yet complementary explanation, and hence one in need of elaboration here, regards the tactical leeway afforded to EOKA through its relationship with its publics. It is here that two outstanding mechanisms that underpinned outbidding existed: the sub-mechanisms *attribution of similarity* and *legitimization*.

Attribution of similarity played a significant role in how the public understood the new situation and EOKA's place in it. This cognitive submechanism in general refers to the identification of another political actor as falling within the same category as your own (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 215). Triggered during the first months of violence, attribution of similarity effectively provided answers to the puzzling question at that time as to which groups in the Cypriot Greek community supported EOKA and which ones did not.

Though an unknown organization prior to the onset of its campaign of violence, EOKA arrived on the public scene claiming that it represented and was supported by all Cypriot Greeks. Much of the established leadership of the movement did support it, of course, but these leaders could not

endorse it publicly, as this would be incriminating. It was therefore indirect indications that gave early credence to EOKA's claims of leadership and popularity. One set of such indications followed EOKA's campaign against Cypriot Greek members of the colonial police force. Guerillas attacked police stations already in the summer of 1955; they did so not only to collect weapons but also to intimidate the Cypriot Greek policemen (Grivas 1961, 35–49). While not numerous, these attacks were coupled with an EOKA campaign of threats against Cypriot Greek policemen (Demetriou 2007). This tactic proved successful, as the colonial security forces preferred not to use Cypriot Greek policemen for counter-insurgency operations, but rather to rely on British armed forces and a newly created, Cypriot Turkish-manned auxiliary force. As a result, EOKA could project the image that even the Cypriot Greek "servants of the Crown" supported it rather than their employers.

What amounted to even more important attribution of similarity was the tacit support of EOKA by the established nationalist leadership. While explicit public statements in support of EOKA were rarely made, indirect indications of the nationalist political support to EOKA abounded early on. For example, at the trial during autumn 1955 of the first EOKA member accused of murder, the defense team was comprised of six prominent Cypriot Greeks lawyers, including a former Attorney General of the Crown. This suggested to the general public, both on the island and outside of it, that the established nationalist elite was taking EOKA's side. Similarly, indirect indications implicated the Church. Thus several of the individuals who were added to the colonial administration's "wanted" list haled from Church-led youth organizations, while the first EOKA man to be killed in a gun battle with British troops was a cousin of the archbishop. With regard to less-public indications, interviews conducted with average Cypriot Greeks who were adults during the events point to a similar conclusion: the understanding that the established nationalist leadership was supporting EOKA was also swiftly generated by word of mouth through relations of trust (Demetriou 2007, 180–182).

Not that outbidding was detached from diplomacy. Upon his arrival on the island, Governor Harding promptly entered negotiations with Archbishop Makarios; the deliberations went on intermittently for several months before collapsing early in 1956. After this failure, the administration exiled the archbishop and claimed that law and order was its utmost priority. With the help of new military forces numbering more than 30,000 men by the summer of 1956, the colonial regime concentrated its efforts at counter-insurgency (Karyos 2011, 107). British efforts, or at least the appearance of them, to reach a political compromise

did not fully evaporate; but whatever their worth, they had no interlocutor in the absence of the archbishop and thus no real prospect for success (Holland 1998, 120–143). The Enosis movement, leaderless as it was, claimed that only the realization of enosis would justify Cypriots' accruing sacrifice. More than diplomacy, therefore, EOKA's operational capabilities and the influence of its public set the parameters for outbidding from 1956 onward.

It is under these conditions that the activation of the sub-mechanism *legitimization* added to the force of outbidding. This is a cognitive sub-mechanism defined as the increase of positive and popularly resonating representations of actors and their action. As a sub-mechanism constituting outbidding in the context of Cyprus, it worked when EOKA and its actions were being legitimized, but also worked on its flip side when the colonial administration and its actions were being delegitimized. To start with the flip side, the British administration was losing ground in the field of public relations just as it was making progress in the field of operations. This was not only because it could find allies among the Cypriot Turks but not the Cypriot Greeks, nor simply because its main strategy to gain the sympathy of the Cypriot Greeks was limited to the rather hollow appeal to law and order. It was also because Cypriot Greeks detested and were offended by the intensified counter-insurgency operations. These operations included not only intensified policing activities, such as cordon-and-search operations, but also punitive measures, such as curfews and collective fines. They also included an intelligence-gathering strategy that was centered on mass arrests, long-term detention, and violent interrogation. Ultimately, more than three thousand Cypriot Greeks would be detained in newly built camps and twelve would die while in custody (Spanos 1996; Lyssiotis 2012). Further, the emergency law allowed for swift prosecution under a variety of charges, and that resulted in the conviction and imprisonment of 894 Cypriot Greeks (Marathevtis 2007; Demetriou 2007). All in all, therefore, the number of Cypriot Greeks who were directly affected by the counter-insurgency was high, considering the island's population, and this made the conflict appear not as one between the colonial government and some fringe extremists but as one between the colonial government and practically all Cypriot Greeks. Legitimization, as well as attribution of similarity, became all the more facile under these circumstances.

Furthermore, legitimization was also the making of EOKA and its supporters, who capitalized on the negative image of the counter-insurgency as well as on the popularity of enosis. The number of Cypriot Greeks who ultimately became part of the EOKA network is said to have been around

twenty-five thousand.[3] Even if this number exaggerates the underground's strength, one must nevertheless recognize that the organization possessed a strong force of opinion leaders. Acting on the EOKA chain of command, some of these individuals distributed EOKA leaflets or placed wreaths to commemorate EOKA fallen men; other individuals, who may have been less involved in the organization but were nevertheless sympathetic to it, wrote letters and articles to newspapers or gave speeches in churches and other forums. Directly or indirectly, the projected message was that EOKA was worthy, popular, strong, and used appropriate tactics. The message, further, delegitimized the opponent, such as by alleging that the security apparatus used torture systematically—an allegation that was not at all farfetched.

In the final analysis, the narratives favoring EOKA not only were widely generated but also resonated with the Cypriot Greek general public. These narratives were indeed able to, on the one hand, turn fallen EOKA men into heroes, and on the other, turn imprisoned or executed men into victims. The conditions that allowed such transformations to happen included not only the fact that EOKA was the underdog, but also, and far more importantly, the fact that the cause of enosis was popular and the colonial regime was not. Hence, an achievement in operations by EOKA was seen as heroism and thus generated pride to many Cypriot Greeks, while a failure in operations was seen as victimhood and generated sympathy (Demetriou 2007). Either way, EOKA received symbolic capital.

All this does not mean that EOKA gained a totally free hand in its choice of tactics. There were limits to what tactics the organization could employ without risking alienation and harming its cause. One indication of those limits is provided by the series of state executions of EOKA men, which began in May 1956. As the scheduled day of the first two executions was approaching, EOKA threatened to execute in reprisal two British soldiers whom it had captured earlier. As it turned out, neither side blinked on the due day, each killing its captives as announced. About three months later, as the day of the execution of another three EOKA men was approaching, EOKA abducted a British civilian and threatened to execute him in reprisal. This time, however, one of the EOKA men on death row joined forces with other Cypriot Greeks to plea for the release of the civilian, who happened to be an elderly longtime resident of the island. EOKA released its hostage as the hanging of its three men proceeded. The

3. Private correspondence with the chairman of the "Council of Historical Memory, EOKA 1955–59" in March 2003.

organization did not attempt another reprisal of this sort even though the Crown carried out more executions. The emergent caution of the British armed forces in protecting themselves meant that it was all but impossible for EOKA to keep taking British soldiers as hostages and that the "eye for an eye" option was limited to civilians. Apparently the organization, and in particular its leader, Grivas, deemed this option more harmful than beneficial. The colonial administration, for that matter, had to make similar calculations. In November 1955 it had expanded the law on the mandatory death penalty to cover possession of arms, a decision that within a year led to the sentencing of about two dozen EOKA men. Given the uproar the preceding executions had caused—involving not only outrage in Cyprus but also deliberations in Westminster and, at least on two occasions, interference by American politicians—the authorities eventually deemed it preferable to unofficially freeze these killings. Hence the ninth execution, carried out in March 1957, turned out to be the last (though in December 1958, a stay of execution for two EOKA men was issued in the nick of time).

The range of EOKA tactics, then, was wide but not as wide as it could have been. British military targets were apparently preferable but not easily available. British civilians, who lived on the island in large numbers, made for softer targets, but the organization was relatively restrained in this regard. Whereas assassinations by EOKA were frequent, far more of them claimed Cypriot Greek lives than British civilian lives. Thus, while EOKA could afford to ignore much of the controversy raised by many of the assassinations of Greeks and British, there were limits to it. Public opinion, including international opinion at critical junctures for diplomacy, set up some parameters for EOKA action; for example, EOKA appears to have restricted its activities in January 1958, as representatives of the European Court of Human Rights were making inquiries on the island about the conduct of the counter-insurgency (Crawshaw 1978, 274). At the same time, it must be added that EOKA must have often discovered public opinion by trial and error, when critical voices were raised after the event (e.g., see Foley and Scobie 1975, 111).

These considerations make it difficult to ascertain clear patterns regarding the progression of EOKA tactics and, more broadly, outbidding. To be sure, Grivas in his memoirs paints a picture according to which many of his tactical choices were replies to British diplomatic and/or military initiatives, while memoirs by his lieutenants partially corroborate this general claim (e.g., Seraphim-Loizou 2005; Grivas 1961). Thus, insurgent violence was said to have answered particularly violent acts of counter-insurgency and reduction of insurgent violence to have answered

colonial measures of goodwill. But Grivas's ability to engage in a dialogue through deeds with the colonial forces was limited, and, as some of the same memoirs suggest, EOKA's operational capabilities at any given moment were crucial factors in how actual violence developed.[4] Consider the numbers of fatal civilian casualties, based on official statistics, presented in Figure 4.1.

These numbers, distinguishing Cypriot Greek from British civilian casualties, show sharp fluctuation from year to year. But what this means is not readily clear. The compilation must be taken with a grain of salt, first of all, because it does not specify the culprit behind these casualties. But assuming that EOKA shared most of the responsibility for these deaths, which is a fair assumption to make, the compilation can be taken to offer a rough indication of the violence EOKA wielded against civilians across time.[5] Thus these numbers show that the organization's activity against civilians was at high levels in 1956, low levels in 1957, and medium levels in 1958. The fact that the organization entered into a



Figure 4.1:
Civilian Casualties in Cyprus (1955–1958)
Source: Crenshaw (1978). Data does not include Cypriot Turkish casualties

4. On March 4, 1956, EOKA managed to place a time bomb in a British charter airplane scheduled to depart from Cyprus, but the flight was by chance delayed and so the explosion destroyed an empty airplane, killing nobody. It is plausible to think that EOKA would have liked to repeat an act like this with more success, but that it was not able to achieve the task.

5. Kyriakos Markides estimates that EOKA made attempts on the lives of 230 Cypriot Greek civilians, killing 148 of them (1977, 19). The official list indicates 207 Cypriot Greek civilians dead, excluding the ones who died in the ethnic clashes of the summer of 1958.

ceasefire period during most of 1957 goes some way to explain this trend, though the explanation loses some of its power vis-à-vis the decline of assassinations of Cypriot Greeks—at least inasmuch as these represent action against traitors, presumably constantly lured by colonial monetary rewards.

A complementary explanation, however, may be suggested based on EOKA's shifting orientation toward its public and on its shifting capacity to wage violence. Thus the high numbers in 1956 are explained by the need of the organization to discipline Cypriot Greeks at the early stage of the campaign, while the low numbers of the following year are explained by both a reduced need to do so and a reduced ability to do so, since by then many of the organization's core gunmen had been apprehended or killed; hence the need for a ceasefire. The medium numbers of 1958 appear to relate to a rather deliberate campaign against Leftists—of which more in the next section—as well as to the inability of EOKA's new wave of recruits to attack hard British targets and thus their resort to soft ones. This general understanding also relates to the fatal casualty list suffered by the British military—60 casualties in 1956, 6 in 1957, and 27 in 1958—though a few of these deaths were caused by car and other accidents, rather than by EOKA.

In short, legitimization and attribution of similarity kept EOKA relatively unrestrained by its public, thus adding to its ability to keep challenging the security apparatus and to generate violence to meet the counter-insurgency. Many of the organization's "less moral" tactics did not have a devastating impact on its local image because they were already taking place at a time when the support for EOKA met critical mass—that is, when nationalist organizations threw their entire weight behind it, when the press had lost its initial intimidation at hinting its support (hinting, because there was no freedom of press), and when average Cypriot Greeks had started engaging in quotidian displays of support relatively openly. Dynamics covering the relationship between the movement and its constituency were, therefore, critical for outbidding. As we will see toward the end of the chapter, other dynamics regarding this relationship were also relevant, as they produced dissociation, which is to say, a reduction of the constituency's control over the formation of violence-prone strategy by movement members. Also, in the section following immediately, we will see that the Left-wing faction of the movement shifted its stand on EOKA from opposition to acquiescence, and this further added to EOKA's ability to act with legitimacy and relative moral impunity.

COMPETITION FOR POWER: THE ENOSIS TURF BATTLE

The Enosis movement was top-down yet also had broad popular appeal. This left room for multi-layered relations to develop among the various movement actors. Nevertheless, the relational arena within the movement acquired a prominent shape right after the Second World War following the bifurcation between the Left and the Right. It is between these two political poles that the mechanism of competition for power operated. This competition took place over issues that had far broader political ramifications than disagreement over movement tactics, and the sub-mechanisms that constituted the mechanism reflected this. Thus the constituent sub-mechanisms *boundary formation* and *marginalization* operated more through the efforts of the movement actors to benefit the political standing of either the Left or the Right than through disagreement on how best to serve the movement's goal. All the same, competition for power added its contribution to the process of radicalization, most particularly by reducing any moderation effect coming from the Left.

The sub-mechanism *boundary formation* means, in general, the creation of "us-them" distinctions between two political actors (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 215). Despite the simplicity of this definition, this can be a complicated mechanism because the notion of boundary is multidimensional. As Charles Tilly underlines, a boundary operates when distinctive relations exist within each of the two sides of the boundary, distinctive relations exist across the zone between the two sides, and shared understandings of the zone itself exist within each side (2005). The dynamics precipitating boundary formation in the episode at hand regarded these kinds of relations and understandings.

The dominant Cypriot Greek political forces in the 1920s and 1930s were nationalist and bourgeois, save for the exceptional large landowner (Arnold 1956). It was these politicians who, under the leadership of the Church high prelates, had developed and championed the Enosis movement, sharing with each other an ideology that they called *ethnikophron*—a compound word meaning "of national conviction." During the late 1930s, however, a Leftist labor movement was developing as well. In this period it organized pre-existing scattered unions in a confederation, grew in membership, and won colonial government concessions toward new labor legislation, often through strikes. It was not a political movement in a strict sense, but the fact that several of its leaders were Marxists affiliated with the tiny and underground Communist Party of Cyprus bestowed it with an ideological mark (Fantis 1995). This rather vague Left reorganized during the war period through the formation of the Progressive Party of

the Working People (AKEL), established in 1941. Most of the leadership of the new party came from the underground Communist Party, which AKEL replaced, and had therefore Marxist leanings. While AKEL's platform was based on labor politics, however, its leaders had aspired to create a mass legal party and so they not only downplayed Marxist ideology but adopted the goal for enosis as well—a goal that they couched in anti-imperialist, rather than *ethnikophron*, terms. Thus AKEL may have called for enosis not so much because it espoused Greek irredentism as because it was unpopular not to do so; but a pro-enosis policy it sustained nevertheless.

The Left-Right boundary, therefore, had been firmly formed by the mid-1940s. The emergence of AKEL brought about the bifurcation of elite politics and the development of an encompassing Left-Right competition, leading to social differentiation. As will be shown, multifaceted competition in effect weakened the Left-Right cross-boundary relations in Cypriot Greek society and enhanced the respective relations on each of the boundary's side; it created, too, divergent narratives about the boundary, ones respectively evoking the "reactionary" Right and the "communist," "atheist" Left.

Mayoral offices were the main prizes of political competition in postwar Cyprus, and the ballot gave a slight lead to the Left in 1946 and to the Right in 1949. Competition for power between the Left and the Right went beyond elections, however, to cover social control at different levels. In the late 1940s the Right organized its own labor unions to meet the challenge of the Leftist unions, and managed to expand their membership, albeit not nearly to the degree that the Left had managed to do. In 1946 the leftist labor unions had 11,114 members and the newly founded Right-wing labor unions 1,031 members; in 1952 the corresponding numbers were 12,540 for the Left and 2,702 for the Right, and in 1958, at the height of the EOKA campaign, 31,728 for the Left and 11,852 for the Right (Fidas 1969, 118). In its turn, the Left made an effort to establish cultural associations and clubs to counter the Right's predominance in these areas, an effort that was successful with regard to sports clubs more than anything else. Ultimately the Left-Right boundary became so firm that in the island's urban neighborhoods and larger villages one could find two coffee shops, one Leftist and one *ethnikophron* (e.g., Markides et al. 1978).

Given such pervasive Left-Right competition for power, the participation of the two sides in the Enosis movement featured no sustained cooperation, notwithstanding some meetings and coordination between Leftist leaders and Ethnarchy members in 1946 and 1947 (The Minutes of the Council of Ethnarchy of Cyprus, 12/30/1944–8/12/1947). To the contrary, the question of enosis became a focal point for competition, as each side

claimed that it was the one most worthy to pursue the cause. The Right in particular, suspicious of the motives of the Left and having the longer history in the service of enosis, claimed the monopoly over the movement. This put pressure on AKEL to prove its "patriotic credentials" by adopting hard-line positions. It is characteristic that during the campaign for the municipal elections of 1949, AKEL replaced its position of enosis-and-only-enosis with a position that left room for conditional self-determination, only to be punished at the polls for this and to be forced to re-adopt the enosis-and-only-enosis line (Fidas 1975, 36; Fantis 1995, 15–22).

At the end of the day the Right proved successful in guarding what it considered its turf, and this success amounted to a long-unfolding sub-mechanism of *marginalization*—the relational sub-mechanism defined here as the exclusion or distancing of an actor from decision-making. While maintaining discursive efforts at de-legitimizing the Left through the 1940s, the Right proceeded in the 1950s with the internationalization campaign without conceding the Left a place in it, despite the Left's electoral successes. Thus it was Ethnarchy alone, usually through its head, Archbishop Makarios, that talked to Greek governments and coordinated with them the diplomatic forays at the UN and the various foreign capitals of power.

However, it must be added that the marginalization of the Left was not only the making of the Right. The fact that the Greek governments were Right-wing and in bitter conflict with the mainland Greek Communists made it impossible for AKEL to undercut Ethnarchy's link with the Greek governments. Further, the colonial administration was in its turn apprehensive toward AKEL on ideological grounds and maintained no links with the party; it is telling, for example, that the British did not seek a constructive dialogue with AKEL in such key diplomatic moments as the attempted constitutional conference in 1948.

Under these conditions, the Left remained in the dark regarding the decisions to form EOKA and to give it the green light for action. And just as the ushering in of the campaign of violence meant a more radicalized movement, the campaign intensified the mechanisms comprising competition for power. Thus the Left-Right boundary deepened, the Left was further marginalized, and, more generally, competition for power acquired new gravity. Already in the first week of the campaign of violence, in which the links between EOKA and Ethnarchy were not publicly known, AKEL through its newspaper voiced criticism of the "agitations," while EOKA, through leaflets written by its deeply anti-communist leader, passionately returned the criticism (Demetriou 2007, 180). Deeds were soon added to this discursive sparring as EOKA initiated a tactic of targeting Leftists.

The organization maintained that its targets among Cypriot Greeks were not political but rather operational, that is, aiming at traitors irrespective of political affiliation. But the fact remains that Leftists were disproportionally represented among the 148 or so Cypriot Greek victims of EOKA, while in several instances violence against them was clearly gratuitous or part of scare tactics toward the Left at large[6] (Markides 1977, 9 ; Poumpouris 1999, 34–36, 50–53, 65–70). AKEL on its part never formed armed organizations, and Leftists did not resort individually to any form of violence against EOKA. Rather, the party and its affiliated newspapers maintained a balancing act in which they praised the anti-colonial struggles of the Cypriot Greeks in general but at the same time criticized EOKA's "sectarianism" (Demetriou 2007).

As EOKA's pressure on the Left deepened the Left-Right boundary, AKEL was further marginalized in the Enosis movement. Not only was Ethnarchy but not AKEL the interlocutor of the colonial government in negotiations taking place in 1955–1956, but the British side never allowed AKEL to fill some of the vacuum that was created when it sent the archbishop into exile in early 1956, following the collapse of the negotiations. To the contrary, by late 1955 it had already proscribed AKEL, expelled some of its leaders from the island, and started imprisoning many of its members. The party's moderate role within the movement was therefore weakened as it was forced underground. In the next two years, the Right's vigorous opposition and marginalization of AKEL, along with the apparent popularity of EOKA, put the Leftist party so much in the defensive that it conceded legitimization space to EOKA. This happened most importantly when in a party conference in 1957, AKEL declared EOKA a patriotic organization (Servas 1975, 48–50; Fantis 1995, 35–38). This move added to the ability of EOKA to pursue wide-ranging tactics of violence with certain moral impunity as far as the Cypriot Greek general population was concerned. In light of AKEL's acquiescence to the EOKA campaign, in fact, it was an affront to the party that when its expelled leaders were allowed to return to Cyprus in 1958, EOKA engaged in a wave of attacks on Leftists in an apparent effort to prevent through intimidation AKEL's re-entry in the politics of enosis (Holland 1998, 242–251).

6. The question regarding the political activities of the Cypriot Greek victims of EOKA and the question regarding the motives of EOKA in these attacks have not been answered sufficiently by historical investigators. In fact, replies to these questions have for decades generated disputes among such investigators, as well as among Cypriot Greek politicians and veteran participants of the events. As a result, there is no agreement as to how many Cypriot Greek victims of EOKA were targeted because of their anti-EOKA action and how many because of their Leftist affiliation.

In short, in the face of the underground armed campaign, competition for power between the Left and the Right, though no longer concerned with municipal elections since those were suspended, went on with the same effect as before: pressure on the Left to prove its unionist credentials. At the same time, the marginalization of the Left increased to the point where it had little space for action within the movement. It could, as it did, protest the physical aggression against it, but this only made it appear more alienated from the "anti-colonial struggle."

* * *

The arenas and mechanisms discussed so far are the ones expected to have been relevant because the actors in them are safely assumed to have been directly involved. But, as it turns out, the two other arenas of interaction put forward by our explanatory framework also pertained to the Cypriot process of radicalization. These arenas featured two distinct webs of actor relationships and this means that the mechanisms respectively operating in them were also distinct from each other. Thus the mechanism dissociation, operating in the arena between the movement and the general public, did not affect the operation of the mechanism object shift, which originated in the arena between the movement and the countermovement. Nevertheless, these two mechanisms were connected to the mechanisms discussed above, with object shift being particularly linked to upward spirals of political opportunities.

DISSOCIATION: THE LEEWAY OF THE MOVEMENT ELITE

Though the arena between the Enosis movement and its constituency was multifaceted, the operation in it of the mechanism dissociation stands out for its effect on radicalization. This mechanism implies that the social links between the leadership of the movement and the movement's supporters, primarily, and between the leadership and third parties, secondarily, are weakened, which means that the restraining effect of supporters and third parties on the leadership is also weakened. In Cyprus, dissociation was most consequential during the period leading to violence and indeed affected most particularly the critical decisions to set up EOKA and to give it the green light for action. Obviously, this mechanism combined with dynamics that were at play in the arena between the movement and its political environment and the arena within the movement. Nevertheless, while dynamics in these two other arenas

generated relatively broad collective decision-making toward the strategy of internationalization, dynamics of dissociation allowed for extremely narrow collective decision-making toward the adoption of violence. As a result, violence was not opposed at the stage of planning because it was little known.

Dissociation's constituent, underlying mechanism most important in this juncture was *marginalization*, specifically marginalization within the networks of the Right. The relative weakening of the ties between the Ethnarchy top leadership, on the one hand, and other Ethnarchy members and their corresponding particular constituencies, on the other hand, was therefore crucial. Once the EOKA campaign was underway, to be sure, links between EOKA, emerging as a leader of the Right, and a support network from within the movement developed. However, while this may seem to suggest that dissociation went in reverse during the period of violence, the novel relations between EOKA and its supporters were relations of subordination and thus hardly constrained the tactics of the armed organization; the legitimacy bestowed on EOKA by large segments of the population, as it is seen, also added to the organization's radicalization of tactics. The marginalization of Ethnarchy, in fact, continued during the phase of the insurgency as well, thus limiting the pre-established nationalist leaders' influence on EOKA tactics. Concurrently with this development, another constituent sub-mechanism, *social appropriation*, also became relevant.

As seen earlier, marginalization played a role in the way competition for power within the movement developed, reducing in that case the influence of the Left. But looking at the dynamics within the Right-wing faction of the movement, rather than those between the Left and the Right, one finds the sub-mechanism marginalization activated as well. More specifically, this sub-mechanism became consequential by way of the increasingly elitist fashion in which decisions were taken within the Right. This assessment does not mean that the Right-wing leadership at some early point in time devised its strategy through broad democratic means and then moved away from them; in fact, it never deliberated with much transparency or accountability vis-à-vis its broad constituency. Nevertheless, in the postwar period, as Ethnarchy was formed in order to reorganize the movement, it got into a pattern of marginalization. As it is seen below, therefore, the top leadership of Ethnarchy was increasingly marginalizing other members of the organization and, by extension, the constituencies represented by these members.

Ethnarchy was an umbrella organization. It had no formal structure or constitution, nor a declared political goal other than enosis. It was a

coalition of like-minded nationalists forming around the leadership of the Church. The Church, for its part, had an established political role, albeit one that was not sanctioned by the colonial authorities. During the later part of Ottoman rule, the Church had developed a rather formal institutional role as the representative of the Orthodox Christian population of Cyprus, and this claim for representation was carried through the British rule. While not sanctioned by the colonial authorities, the political authority of the Church was widely accepted among the Cypriot Greeks, who kept referring to the archbishop as the *ethnarch* and kept heeding, generally speaking, the socio-political decisions of the *Holy Synod* (i.e., the college of high prelates) (Markides 1974). It was in relation to this traditional authority that Ethnarchy was created in 1946. Convened under the leadership of the Church, the body included the island's two main nationalist parties (one formed in relation to the mayor of Nicosia and the other to represent rural interests); the headmaster of the teacher's college and main institution of secondary education; and some newspaper editors, lawyers, and merchants.[7] Given that a number of these individuals stood for independent organizations and constituencies, these could be brought to the Ethnarchy's disposal, as could the Church youth organizations and parishes. In addition, Ethnarchy itself developed local committees, thus reaching constituencies directly.

In 1948, in the aftermath of the failed colonial effort to promote a constitution of limited self-government, Ethnarchy reorganized its core structure by creating, first, a subgroup called the Ethnarchic Council and then a yet smaller group called the Ethnarchic Office. These two groups were designed to facilitate Ethnarchy's executive functions rather than to replace or compromise its decision-making ones. Nevertheless, while delegating tasks to these small groups within its ranks, the Right-wing, *ethnikophron* faction of the movement fell, as an organizational totality, behind the important decisions it faced in the early 1950s. Instead, these decisions increasingly fell under the control of the archbishop, who, acting on behalf of the movement, had considerable control over the Ethnarchic Council and, more so, the Ethnarchic Office.

In 1950 the leadership of the Church passed to a 37-year-old bishop, who became Archbishop Makarios III. As a monk 1938, Makarios had left the island to study theology and had returned in 1948 upon his

7. According to the record of the minutes of the Ethnarchy meetings, the question of the body's representation of the general Cypriot Greek population was raised only once. In an ad hoc manner, a member questioned whether such representation existed, but other members countered him; apparently no intense or complex deliberation followed.

election, in absentia, to bishop. Thus as a bishop and two years later as the archbishop, he was a newcomer to the movement and rather detached from the webs of the relations it had fostered. Not surprisingly, he promoted another newcomer as his close associate and Ethnarchy secretary. Nikos Kranidiotis, the young intellectual-turned-secretary, soon gained an insider's view of the development of the movement and much later in time summarized his insight in a memoir. In it he describes, most importantly, the idea of coupling the enosis claim with violence as one that developed in discussions not in Nicosia among Ethnarchy members but in Athens among individuals hardly connected to Ethnarchy.

According to Kranidiotis, a reluctant Makarios yielded to pressure persistently brought upon him by a small number of nationalists in Greece to consent to the creation of an armed organization. These nationalists were Greek citizens, mostly retired military men, and some Cypriot Greeks; the latter included Georgios Grivas, the would-be EOKA leader who was himself a retired officer of the Greek Army, and individuals close to the Bishop of Kyrenia in Cyprus (Kranidiotis 1981, 54–59; also Grivas 1961, 14–27; Foley and Scobie 1975, 13–20). What is particularly remarkable about this is that neither the possibility of violence nor the advancing plans for EOKA were discussed formally in Ethnarchy meetings. Kranidiotis himself knew from Makarios of the development of EOKA, but did not know details about it until six months before the onset of violence. "Makarios," Kranidiotis writes, "preferred to discuss with me the political, rather than the military, facet of the matter" (1981, 79—authors' translation). To the extent that Makarios discussed with, or even revealed to Ethnarchy members "the military facet," he did so selectively, secretively, and certainly off the Ethnarchy record.

The decision to start EOKA's campaign was similarly opaque vis-à-vis the movement. Kranidiotis suggests—and Grivas through his own memoirs corroborates (1961, 14–27)—that Makarios, Grivas, and the Greek Prime Minister Alexandros Papagos were the partners in this decision. The Papagos government "was sold" on the expediency of using violence when its attempts at reaching a friendly compromise with the British government were rebuffed during 1953, and by 1954 a few Greek diplomats were liaising among Makarios, Grivas, and the Greek Premier regarding the organization of EOKA (Kranidiotis 1981; Averoff-Tossizza 1986). Absent in all this were once again most members of Ethnarchy—as well as the Left.

Ethnarchy, to be sure, met frequently in the early-to-mid 1950s, as the existing records of the minutes indicate; but on its agenda was the

diplomatic side of the internationalization campaign, which it deliberated and around which it mobilized its base. It is characteristic of this that in the summer of 1954, less than a year before the start of the EOKA campaign, Makarios and his close associates assembled a meeting of the movement's affiliated Right-wing organizations from across the island. At this meeting he presented an analysis of the political situation to date, which was devoid of any hint of the potential for violence and, on the base of this analysis, he asked and received a resolution renewing the call for enosis-and-only-enosis (Kranidiotis 1981, 67). That preparations for the campaign of violence were well underway by that time was little known to most leaders of the Right, let alone their constituencies. Still, during this period the organizers of the underground were at work recruiting members, drawing particularly from the Church youth organization. Their recruitment method, in fact, was an early expression of the constituent, relational sub-mechanism *social appropriation*—that is, conversion or incorporation of previously existing non-political groups and networks into political actors (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 217)—which was to play an important part during the period of the underground.

Makarios's role as the "autonomous foreman" of the movement reached its apogee when, after the introduction of violence, he entered into negotiations with the island's governor. For as the eyewitness Kranidiotis testifies, in the middle of negotiations that seemed promising for the achievement of enosis at a foreseeable future, Makarios decided on his own initiative to opt out (1987; see also, Soulioti 2006, appendix 11, and chapter 7 of this volume). This act led to the archbishop's exile and thus to the abrupt end of his role in the movement for the duration of the following year.[8] Nevertheless, the marginalization of Ethnarchy was not reversed in the absence of the archbishop but rather continued further, only now to the benefit of EOKA's leader, Colonel Grivas.

As was seen earlier, EOKA received effective endorsement by the established leaders of the Right, many of whom were Ethnarchy members, during the first months of the underground campaign. This tacit endorsement meant that at the time of the archbishop's exile EOKA was unequivocally considered by the British and the Cypriots alike to belong in the *ethnikophron* establishment. But while individual Ethnarchy members were free to attach themselves to, or detach themselves from, the underground, neither they as individuals nor Ethnarchy as a body had control of EOKA.

8. Makarios was in exile in the Seychelles from 1956 to 1957, where he was practically cut off from developments in Cyprus. He was subsequently allowed to reside in Athens, where he was able to play a role in the movement.

Some of these individuals might in fact have shared Archbishop Makarios's alleged aversion to violence—it is alleged by Kranidiotis (1981) that, at the time of the decision to establish an armed organization, Makarios had envisioned only a campaign against colonial property and that he later expressed regrets over the emerging bloodshed—but practically could do little to contain EOKA activities. Given that EOKA's ranks featured a vertical cell organization and strict hierarchy, whereby all major tactical and organizational decisions were taken by the leadership, the latter not only could drive the campaign of violence but precisely through this campaign could also influence the direction in which the movement was heading.[9] Many Ethnarchy members, it is now known, did support EOKA one way or another because they considered the organization to be a legitimate vehicle toward enosis. But they had hardly any ability to influence the organization's tactics.

Thus, while the earlier marginalization of Ethnarchy members reduced them from decision-makers to inadvertent supporters of Makarios's path toward violence, their later marginalization due to Grivas's military initiative reduced them to mere assistants of EOKA. This phenomenon extended to cover the constituencies of Ethnarchy members. Hence the sub-mechanism of social appropriation was activated. Following the onset of violence, many of the EOKA burgeoning support networks drew members from *ethnikophron* organizations, including Christian and cultural organizations, sports clubs, and secondary schools. The relations within and between the members of these organizations were relations of trust, something that facilitated secrecy and risk-taking. For example, on at least one occasion, EOKA men were able to use, through their networks, the government chemical laboratory to manufacture bombs. Similarly, a secondary school alumni association kept arms and ammunition in a ditch outside the association's house (Demetriou 2007). But as with the dynamics of marginalization of Ethnarchy members, the relations between the EOKA leadership and the EOKA support groups went in a one-way direction, in the service of the leadership. Indicative of this is that the oath of loyalty the support network members typically took was exclusively toward the EOKA organization and its leader, not toward Ethnarchy or the Enosis movement in general. "I shall obey absolutely" one line from the oath reads, "the orders of the leader of the organization and only his" (Grivas 1961).

9. Members of the Greek government, too, maintained secret contact with Grivas and so had a measure of influence on him. However, EOKA's initial dependency on arms and ammunition supplies from Greece subsided as the insurgency and the counter-insurgency progressed, and this gave Grivas relative independence along the way.

OBJECT SHIFT: RESISTING ETHNIC POLITICS

The Enosis movement faced Turkish and Turkish Cypriot opposition in addition to colonial opposition. That ethnically based opposition grew to become a movement in its own right, propelled by mechanisms that mirrored to a large extent those underpinning the Enosis movement. When the focus is on the counter-movement's effects on the movement, however, two interrelated sub-mechanisms are particularly relevant: *polarization* and *boundary activation*. It is through these mechanisms that the mechanism object shift took place, whereby the Greek Cypriot movement developed a stand vis-à-vis the counter-movement. The movement–counter-movement dynamic eventually generated clashes and thus created a new line of radicalization, one that was intense yet short-lived. This dynamic also fed the animosity between the movement and its primary target—the colonial authorities—since the former saw the latter as aligning with the counter-movement.

As a cognitive sub-mechanism, *polarization* refers, in general, to increasing ideological distance between political actors or coalitions (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 217). Polarization between the Turkish and Greek elite in Cyprus was already building in the earlier phases of the island's British rule, as the Cypriot Turks consistently reacted to the enosis claim. In that period, though, the Cypriot Turkish elite had a traditional Ottoman attitude toward the ruling authority rather than a nationalistic one, and its reaction to enosis was a sincere support of the status quo. This was to change with the advent of Kemalist nationalism. During the 1930s, Kemalist Cypriot Turks engaged in politics through professional associations and newly founded newspapers and political organizations, and by the end of the Second World War they dominated the Cypriot Turkish elite through the emerging bourgeois class. Still, even if this new elite wished in the late 1940s and early 1950s to see Cyprus divided between Turkey and Greece, it did not press for any claim other than the maintenance of the status quo.

Paradoxically, however, this stand was consonant with the stand of the Turkish government but not with British wishes. The government of Prime Minister Eden, in order to counter the increasing Cypriot Greek mobilization for enosis, sought to get the involvement of the reluctant Turkish government. The British calculation was that the Cypriot Greek nationalists would opt for the colonial status quo over the island's partition (Reddaway 1986, 97; Holland 1998). In the mid-1950s, therefore, the sub-mechanism polarization was activated in earnest. One step that the British government took in pursuit of this tactic was to organize a

meeting in London in the summer of 1955—on the heels of the EOKA campaign's start, though extraneous to it—in which the prime minister discussed the Cyprus question with his Turkish and Greek counterparts. Around the same time, moreover, the British colonial administration in Cyprus encouraged the Cypriot Turkish elite to lobby the Turkish government of Adnan Menderes to come to the defense of Cypriot Turkish interests, something that the Cypriot Turkish elite swiftly did (Kezilyurek 1993, 29–31; Athanasiades 1998).

These developments meant that polarization between the Turks and Greeks of Cyprus became a policy favored both by the British government and by the Cypriot Turkish leadership. The Menderes government also became part of it when the EOKA campaign of violence was underway. That campaign, it must be noted, prompted the creation, early on, of a few Cypriot Turkish underground organizations that assumed a defensive role in the event of EOKA aggression against their ethnic community (Athanasiades 1998). But these organizations were small and poorly armed. The better organized among them was a group set up in 1957 by Rauf Denktash, a Cypriot Turk who was a prosecutor for the colonial administration, and two others; dubbed TMT (Turkish Resistance Organization), this organization was essentially a network of associates drawing on preexisting cultural and political associations (Athanasiades 1998). By 1958, however, the Turkish government's interest in Cyprus had become a commitment for involvement. With the full support of the Turkish prime minister and the foreign minister, therefore, officers of the Turkish military covertly went to Cyprus to organize and lead an armed group. Accordingly, they incorporated Denktash[10] and other Cypriot Turkish leaders in their effort, appropriated TMT's brand name and social networks, and started shipping weapons from Turkey to Cyprus (An 2004a, 2004b; Athanasiades 1998).

Polarization between Turks and Greeks in Cyprus was therefore a top-down affair, the result of policies to counter the claim for enosis. On the Cypriot Turkish leadership's part, the policy included not only nationalist rhetoric and readiness for armed struggle, but also a push to break Turkish-Greek cooperation. This was especially so with respect to the campaign to break the cross-ethnic membership of the Leftist, AKEL-connected labor unions. Through appeals to members' Turkish national loyalty and to their fears vis-à-vis the Greek threat, as well as through threats of violence and actual use of violence against union

10. In early 1958, Denktash was elected president of the Federation of the Turkish Associations of Cyprus and left his position as Crown Prosecutor.

members themselves, this campaign was very successful (An 2004b, 136–139). Scores of Cypriot Turks left their old unions for the newly created Cypriot Turkish labor unions. Thus, in its comprehensiveness the policy toward polarization paved the way for *boundary activation*—a cognitive sub-mechanism which refers to the increase in the salience of the "us–them" distinction separating two political actors (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 215).

In Cyprus's ethnic context, to be sure, neither polarization nor boundary activation served the interests of the Enosis movement; yet both mechanisms unfolded all the same. While polarization prior to the advent of EOKA activated the boundary between Turks and Greeks, however, it was the use of violence, and especially deadly violence that truly made the boundary salient. Boundary activation was therefore triggered most particularly during the period of the EOKA campaign. Ironically, the earliest type of cross-ethnic deadly violence in this period entailed EOKA's assassination of Cypriot Turkish policemen or the death of Turkish policemen in clashes with EOKA. According to the official casualty list, seven were killed in 1956, three in 1957, and twelve in 1958. This series of violent events was rather constricted considering the Cypriot Turkish overrepresentation in the colonial security apparatus[11] and was without ethnic intention, given that EOKA deliberately tried to steer its campaign clear from a confrontation with Cypriot Turks.

But EOKA was not able to keep a distance from ethnic conflict once the renewed TMT became active. Thus in the summer of 1958, a series of interethnic clashes left 56 Cypriot Greeks and 53 Cypriot Turks dead. Though it is not possible to sort out precisely who was behind each of these deaths,[12] it is clear that to a large extent TMT initiated ambushes and assassinations, and that, to one extent or another, EOKA answered likewise[13] (An 2004b, 139–134; Crawshaw 1978). For the deaths that were not

11. The colonial administration created an auxiliary police force during the emergency period, which was manned by 1,700 Cypriot Turks against only 70 Cypriot Greeks. The regular police force was manned by 891 Cypriot Turks, 932 Cypriot Greeks, and 469 British (Crawshaw 1978, appendix 5). One Cypriot Turk from the auxiliary force is listed as a casualty in the entire period of the force's existence (Crawshaw 1978, appendix 6).

12. According to the official record presented by Crawshaw (1978, appendix 6), among the 56 Cypriot Greeks killed, 16 were shot, 4 were killed in riots, 8 were killed in an ambush, and the rest died from injuries caused by other means; among the 53 Cypriot Turks, 32 were shot, 9 were killed in three ambushes, 8 were beaten, and the rest died from injuries caused by other means.

13. Besides the Cypriot Turkish civilians (some of whom may have potentially belonged in the underground) killed in the summer of 1958, the official record lists another eight Cypriot Turkish civilian casualties for the entire emergency period. This small figure corroborates that EOKA's general tactic was against ethnic violence.

directly caused by the two underground organizations, one could plausibly blame mob tendencies due to boundary activation.

The events of summer 1958 were serious and denoted a new facet of radicalization; yet they were confined in time. Both TMT and EOKA announced a truce before the end of the summer, and international diplomatic initiatives later in 1958 and in 1959 meant that top-down directives restrained the use of violence by the two undergrounds (though EOKA used violence on British targets after the summer of 1958, including violence on Cypriot Turkish policemen). If the ethnic clashes had continued, there is no doubt that the Enosis movement would have been locked in an expansive and multilayered ethnic competition with its own momentum. As it turned out, however, diplomacy and ethnic violence in this juncture went in tandem. The Enosis movement, and particularly Archbishop Makarios (now residing in Athens) and Ethnarchy, essentially came to terms with the facts that its opponents (the British and Turkish governments and the Cypriot Turkish leadership) managed to shift the object of the movement's contention to a degree, and that they were indeed in a position to shift it all the way down the path toward the island's division.

CONCLUSION

The quote by Colonel Grivas with which this chapter begins focuses on the intransigence of British colonial policy on Cyprus and implies that this was the root cause of the insurgent and counter-insurgent violence on the island. Our approach in this volume is to move away from root causes—whether they regard colonialism, nationalism, or something else—in order to trace the ways in which movements turn to violence. Our analysis of the Enosis movement, therefore, has shown that concatenated relational dynamics stemming from five arenas of interaction account for the way in which members of the movement radicalized. As seen, much in this process pivoted on the introduction of EOKA, and this related most directly to the arena between the movement and its political environment. Yet it is also seen that the operation of upward spirals of political opportunities in this arena of interaction was interwoven in different arenas of interaction, and so all mechanisms reinforced each other in fueling radicalization. This mix created a multifaceted, dynamic, and contingent process in which cognitive and environmental sub-mechanisms operated in conjunction with relational ones. Unlike many studies of the Enosis movement and the EOKA campaign that focus on ideology, therefore, our

approach explicates how cognitive forces relating to ideological and other pre-commitments became part and parcel of a relationally driven process of radicalization. As was seen in the previous chapter, this approach applies to the course of radicalization of the Brigate Rosse and, as will be seen in the next chapter, to the course of radicalization of al-Qaeda. The next chapter, then, will offer yet another demonstration of the relational workings of the radicalization process.

CHAPTER 5

The Salafi Transnational Jihad Movement and al-Qaeda (1984–2001)

The situation at the land of the two Holy places became like a huge volcano at the verge of eruption that would destroy the Kufr [impiety] *and the corruption and its sources. . . . The* [Saudi] *regime is fully responsible . . . however the occupying American enemy is the principle and the main cause of the situation . . . efforts should be concentrated on destroying, fighting and killing the enemy until, by the Grace of Allah, it is completely defeated.*

Osama bin Laden, *August 23, 1996*

The above excerpt, taken from Osama bin Laden's *fatwa* (Islamic ruling), titled "Jihad against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places," marked the first, most meaningful shift in the ideology and action strategy of what shortly afterward became publicly known as al-Qaeda—a member organization of the broader movement of fundamentalist Sunni Islam, called the Salafi[1] Transnational Jihad movement. The development of the Salafi Transnational Jihad Movement (STJM) in general, and the rise of al-Qaeda ("the base") (AQ) in particular, are part of the re-emergence of the vision of pan-Islam: the Quranic notion of the community of believers (the *ummah*) in which Muslims, regardless of ethno/national or cultural differences, constitute a solidarity group whose members have a binding responsibility to help each other. Taking shape most concretely during the 1970s, pan-Islamic sentiments were promoted "from above," notably by the Saudi King Faisal through the formation of charitable transnational institutions and organizations meant to cultivate

1. A fundamentalist interpretation of religious beliefs and practices, which envisions the way of life practiced by the forefathers of Islam as a model for society.

mutual solidarity and religious awareness and to support Muslims in times of crisis. Concurrently, the 1970s also witnessed the proliferation of popular movements in various Arab and non-Arabs societies, whose Salafi leaders and activists eagerly sought to epitomize pan-Islamic values "from below" (i.e., via the Islamization of their respective societies).

Despite ample sources of tension and a history of confrontation between these two carriers of pan-Islam, given the different set of religious interpretations, rationales, and opportunities and constraints each held and faced, both interacted closely and complementarily during the most significant manifestation of classical jihad at the time: the struggle against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979–1989). The fighting against the Soviets—known as the Afghan Jihad—turned into a consolidation hub for the gradual shaping of the STJM.

The Afghan jihad witnessed the gradual flocking of thousands of Muslim activists from all over the Muslim world, as well as from many parts of the non-Muslim world, primarily to the bordering city of Peshawar, Pakistan. Supported most notably by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, the Gulf Emirates, and Sadat's Egypt, as well as the United States, these "Arab Afghans" became involved in aiding the huge waves of Afghan refugees; trained in fighting; and, although to a far less extent than later on boasted, took part in the actual fighting across the border together with the Afghan Mujahidin forces. Some of these Arab Afghans, led by Sheikh Abdulla Azzam and bin Laden, formed what turned out to be the organizational precursor of AQ: the Bureau of Services (*Makhtab al-Khadamat*), in 1984, which also focused on recruiting and training newcomer jihadists.

As the Soviets began their withdrawal in May 1988, tensions surfaced between the Arab Afghans and the Muslim/Arab rulers, as well as among the Arab Afghans internally. Whereas state-sponsored pan-Islam held a conception of jihad as a *collective* and mainly nonviolent duty, decided on and carried by state authorities with the ratification of state-controlled religious scholars (*ulema*), for most non-state-sponsored pan-Islamists jihad had been defined and perceived as an *individual* permanent duty, essential to the establishment of an overarching Islamic entity—a Caliphate. The Arab Afghans' attempt to build on this common ground led to the August 1988 formation of AQ as an umbrella organization, bringing together some fifteen activists from Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia, most of whom had prior organizational affiliations (e.g., Egyptian Islamic Group). This common ground, however, did not alleviate broader and deeper disagreements concerning what shape jihad would take (defensive or offensive), who was the enemy ("apostate" rulers/regimes or infidels), and how and to which end should the newly formed Islamist network

of jihadist volunteers be utilized—all of which soured following the completion of the Soviet withdrawal in early 1989.

Despite no shortage of pan-Islamic causes and jihad fronts (both "classical" Muslims versus non-Muslims and non-classical within Muslim fronts, as well as within or outside of what is traditionally considered *Dar al-Islam* [House of Islam]), it became clear that the convergence of interests and values between the two social carriers of pan-Islam, "from above" and "from below," took on a diverging, conflicting path. Afghan veteran Salafis tried to return to their respective states and to engage in anti-regime operations or to Islamize their countries, while others kept pressuring their governments for greater involvement in Muslim affairs around the world (e.g., the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the war in Bosnia). Arab regimes, either for domestic, regional, or international considerations, responded differently in coping with the mounting pressures and challenges. While most refused to allow the return of many of the Afghan veterans and engaged in heavy crackdowns against their local organizational branches, a few sought to maintain a certain measure of modus vivendi, albeit a tenuous one, with their local Salafis; fewer still welcomed them, notably Sudan.

Toward the mid-1990s, a period during which many STJM leaders and top-rank activists found refuge in Sudan, a fairly marginal version of violent and global jihad gradually took shape, and shortly after gained visibility and influence in setting the tone of the struggle against secular Arab regimes/rulers and their superpower patrons, chief of which was the United States. This process, expressed most emphatically in the above-cited *fatwa* "Jihad against the Americans," was not only rhetorical. Preceding the 1996 *fatwa* was a gradual shift in AQ's mode of contention from a predominantly resistive and defensive mode to a violent one, inclusive of collateral violence. This process culminated in the November 1995 bombing in front of the US-run Saudi National Guard building in Riyadh, and was a key factor behind AQ's expulsion from Sudan, following heavy US pressure, and its relocation to Afghanistan in May 1996.

But the process of radicalization did not stop then. In early 1998, following an intensification of contention between the Afghanistan-based AQ and other STJM leaders and a joint Arab–US/Western front, a second *fatwa* was issued in the name of a new convergence of forces within STJM, the "World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders." This new grouping, consisting of leaders from various organizations that gradually managed to acquire a powerful standing within the Taliban regime, prioritized the struggle against the "far enemy" (i.e., the United States) over the "near enemy" (i.e., Arab rulers), and ordered the killing of Americans

(civilian, political, and military targets alike) and their allies whenever possible and wherever they were. Within several months, the February 1998 *fatwa* was translated into action with a series of violent operations carried out via suicide missions, culminating in the most notorious indiscriminate airborne attacks on US soil on September 11, 2001.

This chapter traces the process of AQ radicalization by paying attention to how and when relational dynamics play a pivotal role in its progression.[2] Similarities to the previous analyses of the Brigate Rosse and EOKA are twofold: comparatively, the analysis that follows is structured according to the five arenas of interaction and examines the mechanisms and sub-mechanisms operating within each; theoretically, the analysis demonstrates how despite the operation of environmental and cognitive mechanisms throughout the episode under examination, these mechanisms gained salience and became consequential in the process in the context of the operation of relational mechanisms. An analysis of AQ radicalization, as well as of the Brigate Rosse and EOKA, is offered in chapter 6 in a more chronological, albeit non-linear, manner.

UPWARD POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES SPIRALS: UNWANTED CHILDREN

Just as the rise and consolidation of the STJM were closely linked to the interplay among domestic, regional, and international politics, so too did changes in these nested political conditions play a role in the radicalization of AQ. First taking shape in Saudi Arabia (1989–1992) and then in Sudan (1992–1996), the operation of political opportunities spirals was constituted most centrally by *internalization*, *decertification*, and *uprooting*. As will be demonstrated, all three sub-mechanisms, while unfolding previously and inducing tension between movement organizations and their respective political environments, gained salience in influencing radicalization in the context of developing meaningful upward spirals of political opportunities regarding both possibilities for collective action and realization of pan-Islamic aims.

For their own respective interests and goals Muslim rulers in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, or Egypt had strong incentives to actively support participation

2. Two points of clarification. First, to simplify, we use the term AQ even when referring to its embryonic and conceptual stage, without making any post-hoc claims. Second, given the broad geographical scope of the movement, the analysis is limited to those most central loci of the movement operation, with particular focus on AQ. References to other sites and their respective organizations will be made insofar as they bear a distinctive added value to the analysis.

of Arab activists in the Afghan war alongside the Afghan Mujahidin. The Saudi authorities, for example, supported the Afghan jihad not only symbolically and diplomatically but also materially through funding and weapon shipments. While the regime was not necessarily directly or exclusively committed to the Arab Afghans, domestically it became clear that the Arab jihadi activists had become highly popular and influential. Support for the Afghan jihad extended also to include the United States, which, in line with its anti-Soviet policy, engaged in what Gerges (2005) has called a "marriage of convenience" with the Arab Afghans. In practical terms this involved, for example, pressuring Arab regimes to broaden their support for the Afghan jihad, and allowing fundraising campaigns to take place throughout the United States (Sageman 2004; Wright 2006).

Against the backdrop of the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, STJM leaders and activists sought to translate the theretofore acquired possibilities for actions and realization of pan-Islamic goals into meaningful political positioning in their various locales, capitalizing on the thousands of Arab volunteers still pouring into Pakistan and Afghanistan and the deepening pan-Islamist sentiments (Hegghammer 2010). Pursuable pan-Islamist goals were in no shortage. On the Afghan scene the pro-communist regime remained, which managed to stay in power in Kabul after defeating the mujahedin and the Afghan Arabs in mid-1989. Other pan-Islamist goals, although not constituting classical jihad in the sense of pitting Muslims versus non-Muslims, included the secular and socialist/communist regimes such as Egypt, Algeria, and South Yemen, to name only a few.

Attempts to promote these goals, however, proved partly successful at best, indicative of the prior operation of *decertification* (a relational sub-mechanism, defined as the lack or withdrawal of validation and recognition of actors, their performances and their claims by external authorities [McAdam et al. 2001, 204]) and *uprooting* (an environmental sub-mechanism defined as displacement of a person or a group from native or habitual surroundings against their will). In many cases, those STJM Afghan veterans who sought their way back in order to reenergize their respective political agenda were refused entry and, upon attempting to do so from nearby countries, were sentenced in absentia. In Egypt and Jordan, for example, some of those Afghan veterans were allowed in only to go through interrogation and at times imprisonment (Gunaratna 2002; Sela and Fitchette 2014). This hostile environment could be said to have been expected, most notably in Egypt, given the secular characteristics of the regime and President Mubarak's traditional suppression of Islamic opposition. Not surprisingly, many jihadists had fled the country after being

engaged in heavy confrontation with the regime, while others were encouraged to leave for Afghanistan as a tactic meant to "absorb the jihadist shocks threatening their rules" (Gerges 2005, 62). However, it quickly became clear that even those more sympathetic Arab regimes (e.g., Saudi Arabia and Yemen) had become concerned with the growing momentum of the STJM and were far from enthusiastic about continuing to support its goals.

Due to the central role of the Saudi authorities in the Afghan War in particular and in the pan-Islamic project in general, as well as the Saudi origin of AQ's soon-to-be most influential figure, Osama bin Laden, upward political opportunities spirals in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (the Kingdom) turned out to be most consequential in the radicalization of AQ. While not sharing the uprooted experience of his Afghan expatriates, upon his return to Saudi Arabia in late 1989 bin Laden found himself in a position of contradiction. On the one hand, bin Laden enjoyed popularity and esteem based not only on his role in the Afghan jihad and rapidly broadening network of activists under his leadership, but also due to his close ties with the Saudi authorities, which had turned him into a valuable asset during the war (Jacquard 2002; Scheuer 2006; Wright 2006). On the other hand, AQ's strategic positioning vis-à-vis the Saudi Royal Family, whose approach toward non-state Islamic activity was highly suspicious and restrictive to begin with, remained fairly tenuous. In the context of developing challenges to the state's domestic as well as foreign policies, mounted by an unprecedented wave of a mostly reformist, albeit bold Salafi movement (i.e., the Awakening movement—see below) during the late 1980s and early 1990s, even a less polemic and indeed similarly non-confrontational organization with which bin Laden was associated—the Advice and Reform Committee—was forced to operate in secrecy (Dekmejian 1994; Fandy 1999, Chapter 6).

But it soon became apparent that AQ's tenuous positioning vis-à-vis the Saudi authorities also extended to constraints on realization of pan-Islamic goals with mounting evidence of decertification. Bin Laden's attempt to persuade members of the Royal Family to stop supporting the Soviet-proxy regime in South Yemen and to utilize the Afghan Arabs network in order to topple it proved unsuccessful. Later, when rebel organizations in North Yemen engaged in fighting to sabotage the May 1990 unification of both states, bin Laden decided to act independently through financing and dispatching AQ activists to join the rebel organizations and even traveled there personally to try and broaden the opposition. His refusal to follow King Fahd's direct instruction to stop all involvement in Yemen resulted in confiscation of bin Laden's passport in 1991. A second

source of mounting tension between Saudi authorities and AQ forces in the Kingdom developed when the latter engaged in a public campaign against what was perceived as a wrongful appeasement policy of the Saudi king toward Saddam Hussein (Bergen 2001). Despite intensive lobbying among allies inside the Royal Family and intelligence service to utilize AQ's network of activists against the Iraqi belligerent moves, the Saudi authorities rejected bin Laden's plan and dismissed it as ridiculous (Sageman 2004; Katzman 2005; Wright 2006).

Amidst growing evidence of decertification, *internalization* (a relational sub-mechanism, defined as the migration of international pressures and conflicts into domestic politics [Tarrow 2005, 79]) began to play a greater role in the process, operating closely with uprooting. Upon the Saudis' decision to temporarily allow the deployment of American forces in the Kingdom, bin Laden's defiance became even bolder. On top of making his criticism of the Royal Family's policy public, it soon became clear that the Saudi leader of AQ was willing to go as far as acting against the Saudi policy. In the face of brewing civil war in Afghanistan, bin Laden began lobbying for permission to return to Pakistan. Using his connections among Saudi elite members, bin Laden's appeal produced only mixed results. Although bin Laden was allowed to leave the country and was able to get his passport back, the Saudi authorities made it plainly clear that he must not interfere with Saudi politics in Peshawar (or any other Muslim country for that matter) and went so far as to oblige the AQ leader to express his consent in writing (Wright 2006, 174). Once in Peshawar, in March 1992, it became clear that bin Laden had no intention of abiding by his commitment and, in fact, acted in ways that clashed with the interests of the Royal Family.[3] Shortly after his return, bin Laden was instructed to leave the Kingdom, which prompted him to accept an almost two-year-old invitation and relocate to Sudan in early summer 1992.[4]

It is telling that at this point, despite bid Laden's expulsion and that he was highly critical of the Royal Family's policy, there was, from what we observe, no radicalization on the part of the bin Laden-led AQ, a fact that

3. According to Wright (2006), whereas the Saudis favored the strengthening of one warlord (Gulbuddin Hekmatyar), bin Laden tried to promote a truce between the various Afghan warlords.

4. As will be elaborated subsequently, Sudan, following the 1989 Islamist military coup led by Hassan al-Turabi and General Omar al-Bashir, gradually became a halfway house for AQ and other STJM organizations. This was so despite profound initial theological differences between bin Laden and al-Turabi, especially over cooperation between Shi'ite and Sunni forces.

contrasted with an already advanced stage of radicalization on the part of other STJM organizations (inclusive of AQ members), in their respective locales, as will be elaborated later. The rifts between the Arab regimes and the emerging AQ network in particular and the STJM in general further deepened during the Bosnian War (March 1992–November 1995). Whereas Sudan and Iran fully endorsed the new jihad front and handsomely supported the STJM activists who flocked there, the Saudi and other regimes' policies differed in a most meaningful manner. According to Hegghammer, while the Saudis, like other states' governments, did intend to exploit the Bosnian jihad for their own interests in regaining pan-Islamic credibility and credentials in the wake of the Gulf War and mounting domestic opposition, they nevertheless made sure that "most . . . military assistance went to the Bosnian army, not to the foreign fighters . . . [and] . . . took a number of measures in 1993 to keep the financial support for the Bosnian jihad under state supervision" (2010, 35). This and other measures on the part of the Saudi regime were indicative of how the Royal Family turned its back on the STJM-led pan-Islamic cause.

In the context of intensifying decertification of AQ on the part of the Saudi Royal Family, and against the backdrop of bin Laden's expulsion from the Kingdom, internalization kept gaining momentum. The sense of alarm on the part of AQ in particular and the broad STJM in general was heightened not only because the United States and other Western "coalition" forces' presence in the Kingdom became de facto permanent, but also, as will be elaborated later, by the fact that President Bush's "coalition," which aimed at establishing a "New World Order," was backed by Pakistani, Egyptian, and Saudi contingents. To varying degrees these Western involvements were welcomed by the various local, pro-Western rulers, who at times criticized their Western patrons for not doing enough to help their domestic cause. Such was the case, for example, with the Algerian military junta pressuring France to help it crack down on the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) (Gerges 2005, 68)

Following the overthrow of the pro-Western military dictatorship in early 1991, some of the rival Somali forces welcomed the involvement of US-led UN coalition forces, particularly during Operation Restore Hope (December 1992 to May 1993). Deeply resenting Arab regimes' involvement in the US-led operation and seeking to broaden AQ's base of operation in Africa as an alternative to Saudi Arabia, bin Laden sent a small group of activists, mostly military instructors called the Africa Corps, to Somalia in order to support the fighting of Somali rebel organizations (Harmony Project 2007). Although this involvement was limited and similar to a previous mode of contention (i.e., a defensive, guerrilla-like

operation), it was nonetheless clear that Saudi and other Arab forces could potentially become the target of AQ.

Alarmed by this ominous development, the combination of external and internal pressures pushed the Saudi Royal Family to toughen its policy, which, in the process, resulted in a complete severance of ties by both sides. Internally, the Saudi authorities were facing a meaningful challenge to their legitimacy, led by the Sahwa (Awakening) movement. The challenge, this time, developed into a wave of unrest involving protest rallies throughout 1993 and most of 1994, and expanded to include other Islamist militants, some of whom were Afghan expatriates (Dekmejian 1994; Hegghammer 2010; Lacroix 2011). Externally, the Saudi authorities were facing pressure exerted not only by the Yemen and Algerian authorities, but mainly by the Egyptian authorities (who had already been facing a wide-spread and lethal wave of attacks by the Egyptian Islamic Group [EIG] and Egyptian Islamic Jihad [EIJ]) as well as the CIA to act together against the STJM organizations situated in Sudan.[5] Responding to these pressures, King Fahd sent messengers to Khartoum and demanded bin Laden's return to Saudi Arabia as well as an expression of loyalty from him. In March 1994, upon bin Laden's refusal, King Fahd took an additional, highly meaningful, critical step of further decertification and revoked bin Laden's Saudi citizenship (Wright 2006, 210; Hiro 2002, 167).

Realizing that AQ's strategic positioning in the Kingdom was on shaky grounds, bin Laden, together with EIJ activists, relocated the Saudi-based office of his Advice and Reform Committee to London. From there, bin Laden initiated a massive public campaign against the Saudi Royal Family, accusing it of corruption, of being un-Islamic and submissive to the Americans, and attacking the *ulema* (religious scholars) for their disingenuous and cowardly backing of the state's wrongful policies. Even though the Sahwa's broadening opposition had little to do with AQ (or the broader STJM for that matter), the participation of several Sunni militants (some of whom were Afghan veterans) in the wave of unrest led the Saudi authorities to respond indiscriminately. This included not only the severance of Osama bin Laden from all his family financial sources, but also a wave of brutal crackdown on the opposition, lasting until summer 1995. As will be shown below, the break between Saudi Arabia and AQ had already reached critical levels, reflecting not only unprecedented levels of

5. 1996 CIA Assessment "Usama Bin Ladin: Islamic Extremist Financier," website of the National Security Archive, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB343/index.htm (accessed November 23, 2012).

outbidding, but also a meaningful convergence between Sunni and Shi'ite pan-Islamic forces.

Several months later, on November 13, 1995, a bomb exploded in front of the US-run Saudi National Guard Office building in Riyadh, injuring sixty and killing seven, five of whom were Americans. Bin Laden never publicly claimed responsibility for the attack, and the attackers were not known to have links to AQ, yet at that time the Saudis had already acknowledged that bin Laden was behind the attack.[6] Evidence suggests that AQ's involvement took the form of a shadowy organization called the Islamic Movement for Change (IMC), which brought together activists from other STJM organizations as well as from Iran-sponsored Shi'ite radicals. The IMC was also behind the bombing of US Air Force barracks in Khobar in June 1996 and, shortly after, for the crashing of TWA flight 800 in July 1996 (Yaphe 1996; Fandy 1999; Ottaway 2008), both of which were precipitated by meaningful political developments.

Amidst the complete rift between bin Laden and the Saudi authorities and the utter decertification of the former, internalization and uprooting also played a meaningful role. If before the Riyadh bombing AQ leaders were only sporadically under the US radar, the situation changed drastically afterward, with the United States systematically pressuring Sudan to hand bin Laden over, pressure about which he was fully aware. What began as a coordinated regional effort on the part of the United States, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia to extradite bin Laden and to expel other STJM leaders from Sudan[7] developed into a US-led international front, intensifying in early spring of 1996 into sanctions and international isolation aimed at pressuring the Sudanese authorities (Coll 2004). This pressure yielded more significant results, and in May 1996 bin Laden was instructed to leave Sudan, with the sole blame for AQ's organizational and financial predicament placed on the United States.

Changing Fortunes and Stepped-Up Radicalization

The Afghan exile period, beginning May 1996, witnessed a process of intensifying radicalization of AQ, expressed in growing instances of collateral violence, but also of categorical violence, in which decertification,

6. The attackers did admit to having links to bin Laden's Advice and Reform Committee and other radical Islamic figures both within the Kingdom and elsewhere.

7. Involving a series of meetings with Sudanese leaders and high-officials, which proved only partially successful with EIJ leaders instructed to leave the country in late 1995.

uprooting, and internalization continued to shape upward spirals of political opportunities. AQ had little alternative bases, lacked strategic positioning, and was also in bitter enmity with some Afghan warlords—remnants of the post-Afghan War period (Gutman 2008; Bergen 2001). Several months after establishing a base in Jalalabad, AQ's lack of strategic positioning became most evident with a series of newly imposed constraints and threats on the organization's possibilities of collective action and goal attainment.

Although willing to allow AQ to remain in their newly conquered territories mostly due to the belief that AQ's funds could be used for their own benefit, Taliban rulers were nevertheless highly suspicious of the unwelcome guests, whose loyalty and agenda, at a time when their fighting against the Afghan warlords was still raging, was unclear. Immediately after the provocative Declaration of War of August 1996, bin Laden was instructed by Taliban leaders to refrain from engaging in any kind of political activity. Taking a step further, following a CNN interview aired in May 1997 in which bin Laden accused the United States of being a terrorist state and claimed that it was religiously permitted to kill members of the Saudi Royal Family,[8] the Taliban ordered him to evacuate Jalalabad and move to Kandahar, where it would be possible to keep a close eye on him (Wright 2006, 247). In addition to the continuing operation of decertification and uprooting, internalization also played a part in inducing threat. Throughout the first two years of the Taliban's struggle to take control of Afghanistan, its leaders were seeking international recognition, primarily trying to appease and form alliances with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United States (Cole 2004). For their own respective security and economic interests[9] these countries adopted an engagement strategy, which would quickly be used to exert heavy pressure on the Taliban to extradite STJM leaders, most notably bin Laden himself. These attempts were increasingly made public and, at least initially, the Taliban was seriously considering adhering to the pressure.

8. The full version of the interview can be found at http://www.information clearinghouse. info/article7204.htm (accessed on May 12, 2012).

9. With respect to the United States, for example, the Taliban had many of the Stinger missiles left from the Afghan War, and the American oil company, Unocal, was heavily invested in its Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline operation. On the series of meeting between US diplomats in Afghanistan and Pakistan and Taliban leaders, in which consistent pressure was made to extradite AQ leaders as early as January 1997, and a suggestion to urge Egyptian and Saudi authorities to follow suit, see unclassified US Department of State report ("Afghanistan: Taliban Agree to Visits of Militant Training Camps, Admit Bin Laden is their Guest"—January 9, 1997).

AQ's strategic positioning within the ruling Taliban, however, would improve dramatically by 1998. This was the result of a combination of domestic and regional developments, *realpolitik* moves and ideologically driven misconceptions on part of all sides involved in the Afghan front, and AQ leaders' ability to capitalize on them and to secure a powerful strategic positioning within the Taliban ruling apparatus that, by 1999, gained the notorious status of a pariah state. Specifically, two developments influenced this process: the involvement of regional and international states in assisting Afghan warlords who opposed the Taliban, making their threat more tangible, and the inconsistent policy of the United States and the UN regarding recognition of the Taliban as Afghanistan's legitimate government (Griffin 2003). The combination of these two developments was already apparent in May 1997, when Taliban forces marched into a trap set for them by one of the Afghan warlords in the largest Hazare-Shia city in Afghanistan, Mazar-i-Sharif. When the Taliban forces were slaughtered by Shi'ite and Uzbek forces, which were heavily supported by Iran, Uzbekistan, and Russia, the United States and the UN responded with a mild condemnation of the massacre. The result was a deepening of the Taliban's siege mentality, which would become an opportunity for AQ, not only leading to a stronger convergence between the Taliban and AQ forces, but also resulting in the latter becoming a significant ally of the Taliban regime, with AQ gaining a central role in shaping the Taliban's politics. If previously AQ's support amounted to symbolic funding as a way to assure the Taliban of its loyalty, in the wake of the debacle at Mazar, bin Laden was asked to take charge of military operations, which included an integration of AQ forces into the Taliban army (Gunaratna 2002). Subsequently, AQ leaders positioned themselves within the Taliban's highest echelons of power, making sure to align their own agenda with that of their new internationally isolated and contemptuous patron (Gutman 2008).

During the summer of 1998 the first most significant manifestation of this convergence took place. On August 7, 1998, the same day when two suicide attacks took place in US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224 and injuring over 4,000 people, Taliban forces and AQ fighters stormed Mazar-i-Sharif in a killing frenzy, which resulted in the slaughtering of thousands of Shi'ite fighters and civilians. The coordinated attack on US embassies was the first meaningful translation into actual deeds of the highly militant rhetoric voiced in yet one more declaration of war, the February 1998 *fatwa*, in which AQ and several other organizations ordered the indiscriminate killing of Americans and their allies, the result of continuing upward spirals of political opportunities that unfolded

domestically and internationally.[10] However, as will be demonstrated, this was also the result of outbidding as well as competition for power dynamics, each exerting its own distinctive influence on the progression of the process. In what follows, we backtrack in time to the late 1980s in order to trace the development and operation of both mechanisms in their respective arenas of contentious interaction.

OUTBIDDING: "TAKE YOUR FILTHY HANDS OFF MY DESERT"

During the late 1980s and early 1990s the newly self-identified political actor that entered the scene of pan-Islamic contention, AQ, maintained a predominantly defensive, resistance-like mode of contention, despite occasional statements made to the contrary. Moreover, as noted, on the domestic Saudi level even when bin-Laden engaged in illegal and ideologically defiant activity through the Advice and Reform Committee, following his return from Afghanistan, this activity was strictly nonviolent and certainly not an anti-regime one (Fandy 1999; Esposito 2002). This sharply contrasted with the more proactive, offensive, violent version of pan-Islam that, at the time, was being promoted by other STJM organizations, such as the Egyptian EIJ and EIG and the Algerian GIA. Indeed, as shown in Figure 5.1, compared with these central STJM organizations, the amount of violent operations in which AQ was directly involved or actually initiated is strikingly small. This pattern, which seems to hold throughout, and which would remain steady even when abortive plans and other operations carried out by other organizations using bin Laden's funds, whether in full or in part, are factored in[11]—offers support to those who argue that bin Laden's AQ was more active in endorsing (often after the fact) and guiding operations than it was actually involved in carrying them out or even knowingly supporting them.[12] Moreover, as will be further discussed later, it reinforces the claim that bin Laden and other STJM leaders who gradually adopted a global-jihadist ideology and action strategy constitutes a small minority, with only a limited social basis to support their operation (Hoffman 2002; Gerges 2005; Pedahzur 2005; Wright 2006).

10. For example, in late 1998 the Taliban was on the verge of military defeat by the Northern Alliance, and in mid-1999 the United States initiated a ban on trade with the Taliban regime and a freezing of its US assets.

11. Such as financially supporting the struggle of the Yemen Islamic Jihad and the GIA, or a plan to attack the US consulate in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, in January 1998.

12. As was the case with the bombs in Yemen airport in December 1992, and the 1993 World Trade Center bombing (Schanzer 2005; Gerges 2011).



Figure 5.1:
Level of Violence by STJM Organizations (1989–2001)
Author's data, based on a compilation of events from: START, Global Terrorism Database; US State Department Patterns of Global Terrorism Reports; Lexis Nexis search yields dataset on STJM organizations and their operations; and secondary sources search.

Nonetheless, and with the exception of one known involvement of the incipient AQ in a guerrilla operation in 1989 against Soviet forces, it seems that beginning in 1993 AQ became directly involved in violent operations, a development that coincided with the dramatic rise in the level of violent operations of both the EIG and the GIA (we return to the EIJ exception below). With regard to AQ, this development included engagement in proactive violence and, although not involving selective violence (a meaningful aspect discussed in chapter 6), did involve engagement in collateral, categorical, and indiscriminate violence; with regard to the other organizations, their violent repertoires included all types of violence against non-state actors. Outbidding played a central role in these developments, the operation of which was constituted most centrally by *boundary control* and *threat attribution*. Both boundary control and threat attribution were at play already following the institution of the pro-communist regime in Afghanistan, in early 1989, yet their respective salience and consequentiality in the process of radicalization increased in the context of outbidding dynamics.

The Bosnian War (beginning March 1992) and the Tajik civil war (beginning May 1992) offer good examples of initial operation of *boundary control*—an environmental sub-mechanism which, following Falleti and Lynch (2009, 1150), we define as defending from encroachment by

outsiders. In the face of Russian involvement on the side of non-Muslim forces in the Bosnian War and pro-communist government in the Tajik civil war, both were considered by many Afghan Arabs as a continuation of jihad and, accordingly, prompted action. However, because Bosnia was not an integral part of the Muslim world and Tajikistan hardly presented a case of classical jihad (Tajik authorities were nominally Muslims), the extent and type of AQ involvement was fairly limited, carried out mostly via sending training instructors and symbolic financial support, both of which were channeled through Islamic NGOs (Gunaratna 2002; Kohlmann 2004; Hegghammer 2010).

Concomitantly, there is little doubt that the ongoing presence of US military forces in the Saudi Kingdom, as well as the move into Yemen, in late 1992, and from there to Somalia, also activated *attribution of threat* (a cognitive sub-mechanism defined as the construction of a shared definition concerning the likely negative consequences of possible actions, or failure to act, undertaken by some political actor [McAdam et al. 2001, 95]). Indeed, as Wright argues, "the strategists in al-Qaeda felt encircled . . . they read this latest development as a direct assault: Americans already controlled the Persian Gulf, and now they were using the excuse of the famine in Somalia to occupy the Horn of Africa" (2006, 170). Moreover, the involvement of Pakistani, Egyptian, and Saudi contingents in the fighting against Somali rebel forces (most notably *al-Ittihad al-Islami*—Islamic Unity), unquestionably aggravated threat perception among AQ and other STJM leaders regarding the likely negative consequences a failure to act would bear on their grand scheme of establishing a pan-Islamic Shari'a state. As noted, however, alarmed by these developments and deeply resenting the Arab regimes' active backing and involvement in the US-led "New World Order," AQ's reaction to Operation Restore Hope (December 1992 to May 1993) was not qualitatively different from its previous mode of contention; nor was the involvement of the small group of AQ activists welcomed by the majority of the rebel forces.

The extent of AQ activists' involvement in Somalia during the first half of 1993 is unclear. Yet the Saudi authorities, faced with pressure from Egypt, Pakistan,[13] and Yemen to restrain the Sudan-based AQ, and alarmed by the intensification of domestic Salafi-led opposition, overreacted and,

13. Pakistani authorities were already acting against Afghan Arabs and other militants in the country during 1992 and with greater intensity, most likely, following the May 1993 death of Pakistani soldiers in Somalia by Somali rebels.

beginning in May 1993, engaged in arrests of the Sahwa protesters and militant as well as radical Islamist activists (Dekmejian 1994; Hegghammer 2010). Even though bin Laden and other Islamist activists in the Kingdom had only indirect links with the Sahwa leaders, they highly respected and supported their aims. Bin Laden himself was specifically influenced by their activity and frequently quoted their ideas during his public speeches (Fandy 1999, 189). In fact, following the Saudi decision to revoke his citizenship in early April 1994, bin Laden declared AQ's support of some of the Sahwa leaders who were forced into exile in London after forming the Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights in May 1993. The Committee directly attacked the authorities on the issue of human rights violations and managed to garner considerable international criticism (Dekmejian 1994, 641). The wave of arrests of the Islamic opposition Sahwa activists (which would reach a new peak between September 1994 and summer of 1995—see below) was a clear step of outbidding on the part of the Saudi authorities.

AQ's countermove took place several months later, introducing a meaningful shift in strategy. First in September and then in October 1993, Islamic Unity forces with the financial backing and active involvement of AQ activists initiated attacks on US forces in Mogadishu, resulting in the death of 18 soldiers (Gunaratna 2002, 155; Harmony Project 2007). While both operations were aimed strictly against security targets, it was the first time that AQ was directly involved in proactive violent operations against US targets. It was seen as a justified response to the US's arrest in June 1993 of Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, the spiritual leader of the EIG (Kohlmann 2004), for his suspected role in the February 1993 World Trade Center bombing.[14]

Between late 1993 and mid 1996 outbidding shifted to higher gears, leading to an increase in the salience of threat attribution and boundary control on the part of STJM organizations in general and of AQ in particular, resulting in the broadening of targets of violence and expansion of the territorial scope of violent operations. With reports coming in from the CIA that bin Laden was funding and transporting weapons to the Egyptian EIG and EIJ (Coll 2004), both the Saudi and the Egyptian authorities, despite clear difference in the extent and severity of the challenge posed by Islamist opposition to their respective bases of power, began to collaborate in an attempt to eliminate what they perceived as a central, similar source of their domestic problems. In February 1994 a

14. And, most probably, also a response to US State Department decision to designate Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism in August 1993.

small group of *takfiri*[15] activists attacked the Ansar al-Sunnah mosque in Khartoum, and then proceeded to storm bin Laden's villa. Their target hit lists included bin Laden, Hassan al-Turabi, and two leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood.[16] The assassination attempt was unsuccessful and the Saudis admitted their interest in sending a warning to bin Laden (Wright 2006, 193), yet the attempt had the unintended consequence of further promoting the convergence of forces between bin Laden's AQ and Zawahiri's EIJ (also known as al-Jihad), a meaningful process to which we return below.

In Egypt, the authorities overreacted not only by responding with harsh policies (amending the penal code and the law and increasingly relying on military courts with total disregard of judicial standards) against both EIG and EIJ radicals, and against whomever seemed to support them, whether implicitly and explicitly (Kienle 1998; Weaver 1999). In response, Zawahiri's EIJ not only began to initiate suicide bombing but also, in a June 1995 meeting of the Organization of African Unity in Ethiopia, cooperated with the EIG in an attempt to assassinate President Mubarak. The decision to assassinate Mubarak was made during a meeting of STJM leaders held in Khartoum in mid-1994. Although there is disagreement over the precise role of bin Laden's AQ in this decision, there is sufficient evidence that points to the involvement of AQ activists in carrying out the attempt (Gunaratna 2002, 38; Scheuer 2006, 153).

The assassination attempt brought about an even more lethal response of the Egyptian *Mukhabarat* (the general intelligence service), further intensifying the all-out war that was taking place between Islamist activists and the security forces that exerted disproportionate violence in an indiscriminate manner. The brutality of repression included torturing to death, eliminating suspects, house burning, humiliations, and collective punishments (i.e., entire families and at times entire neighborhoods), and led to a broadening perception among the targeted population that the police were acting on a basis of their own agenda, one based on revenge and hatred of Islamists in general (Malthaner 2011, 124–125). So brutal and sweeping was the repression that the government often found itself being forced to defend accusations made by civil and legal rights groups. At least

15. The term *takfir* (excommunication) refers to the act of accusing a Muslim of abandoning Islam and becoming an infidel or an apostate, a potentially violent doctrine according to which Muslims are labeled as infidels unless proven otherwise. Some takfiris sought the creation of pure Islamic communities even if this meant temporarily migrating and living in exile (*hijra*), while others turned to indiscriminate violence, as was the case with the media-labeled *al-Takfir wa'l Hijra* group in 1970s Egypt (Sageman 2004; Ashour 2009).

16. *Pan African News Agency*, March 12, 1994.

on one known occasion, in August 1993, a civilian security court ruled as inadmissible confessions that had been extracted under the "ugliest forms of torture" by the *Mukhabarat* against 24 Islamist activists.[17] Several weeks after the assassination attempt against President Mubarak, the *Mukhabarat* took a major step further and decided on the brutal use of children in an attempt to capture or kill Zawahiri (Wright 2006, 185, 215). When Zawahiri and his activists in Khartoum captured two teenagers sent by the *Mukhabarat* with a suitcase bomb and instructions to place it in the office where the organization leadership was supposed to meet, Zawahiri decreed them to be executed, an act that was videotaped and distributed in Egypt.

In Saudi Arabia a toughening of repressive measures (i.e., banning of freedom of expression) led to several days of protesting in Buraydah and Riyadh during mid-September 1994. This, in turn, prompted an almost one-year crackdown on Sahwa leaders and top activists. In a communiqué issued from his London-based Advice and Reform Committee office shortly after the initiation of the arrests, bin Laden vehemently attacked the regime's ongoing attempts to suppress the Sahwa preachers, attempts that were perceived as an imminent threat to the genuine Islamic faith and practices (Fandy 1999, 186). As it reads, "After the Saudi regime conducted an insane campaign over the last few weeks aimed at striking and distorting da'wah, and arresting and imprisoning preachers and sheikhs . . . [it] recently formed a committee of harm to achieve these ends . . . [its] mission is the destruction of the true Islam and its da'wah."[18] The repression of the Sahwa leaders was unquestionably threat inducing, as many lingered in prison, where the use of torture was growing (Hegghammer 2010, 70). Furthermore, of those arrested were Islamist militants and Arab Afghans, some of whom, like Abdulla al-Hudhayf (a Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights activist who would be executed in November 1995—see below), became part of a network of activists with links to AQ via its London-based Advice and Reform Committee office.

Threat attribution continued to operate, interacting with boundary control, most markedly following unexpected developments in the Arab

17. Report by the United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, Egypt: Information on the Islamic Fundamentalist group al-Gama'a al-Islamiya, August 25, 1998, EGY98001.nyc, available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3df09ec64.html (accessed October 12, 2013).

18. Communiqué # 10, October 15, 1994, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Harmony-and-Disharmony.pdf (retrieved April 15, 2012).

Peninsula.[19] Following two rounds of the Iraqi military provocations on Kuwait's border in mid 1990s, the United States intensified its pressure on the Saudi authorities to approve expansion of its military presence in the region. Despite the refusal of the Saudis, the United States broadened its military presence throughout most of the Arab Peninsula states, including Bahrain, Katar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, adding to its existing presence within the Peninsula (Ottway 2008,114). For AQ leaders, the Saudi refusal to the new US security plan for the Gulf was seen as insignificant within the overall US–Saudi "special relationship"; what mattered more was that, in the eyes of the AQ leaders, the Saudi authorities had become a mouthpiece of the United States, to the point of siding with its support of Russia and the loans granted to it from the World Bank and the IMF, despite its brutal crackdown on Muslim Chechens (McFaul 2003).[20]

AQ's attribution of threat reached new peaks (and salience in shaping outbidding) in summer 1995, following the massacre of thousands of Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica in mid-July 1995, for which the United States and the UN were seen as responsible (Peña 2005). During August 1995, bin Laden issued two meaningful communiqués. In the first, entitled "An Open Message to King Fahd" and issued on August 3, bin Laden conjured up a series of historic examples (e.g., the support for the secular PLO despite its crackdown on the Islamic forces in Occupied Palestine) as proof that "if Islamic causes conflict with Western interests, you [the Saudi King] have always stood up to support the Western interests at the expense of the people with Islamic causes." Whereas the Open Message also contained a warning to the King that "if the ruler apostatizes then the whole nation must go against him," the second communiqué, issued August 11, directly addressing the Srebrenica massacre, was more severe, drawing a meaningful link between the US/UN's role in the massacre and the internal policy of repression of the Muslim opposition in Bosnia. As it reads,

> How are we going to believe the regime when it says it will support Islam and the Muslims in Bosnia, when the best of scholars, the preachers of the nation . . . remain in the prisons of this regime? When the citizens of the country

19. But also, albeit to a lesser degree, threat attribution followed the Russian invasion of Chechnya in early 1995. The Chechen front saw only belated and fairly symbolic involvement of AQ, partly because it was under the control of Ibn al-Khattab, who, as will be discussed later, managed to build his own basis of power in the Caucasus, independent of AQ.

20. See Communiqué # 13, February 12, 1995, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/ wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Harmony-and-Disharmony.pdf (retrieved April 15, 2012).

> tried to respond to the disaster of their Bosnian brethren, the regime . . . prohibited the travel of several independent leadership personalities that had influence and effectiveness in purchasing arms for the mujahidin in Bosnia . . . in response to pressure from the Western nations that did not want the arms to reach the Muslims in Bosnia.

The issuing of the August 11 communiqué took place on the same day as the authorities decided to send an unequivocal warning to bin Laden with the execution of Abdulla al-Hudhayf, which made it unlikely that the references in the communiqué to the imprisoned preachers related to the execution. Nonetheless it was clear that the act, as well as the complete crackdown on Sahwa leaders in September 1995 (Ottaway 2008), outraged the entire community of Arab Afghans inside and outside the kingdom who, realizing that "lines were crossed," called for revenge. According to Hegghammer, "the news of his [Hudhayf's] death was received with outrage in the Islamist community, because the prevailing interpretation was that he had been tortured to death by vengeful security officers, a suspicion that is probably not unfounded, for his body was never returned to his family" (2010, 72). It soon became clear, however, that lines were crossed not only in Saudi Arabia and not only on the part of Arab regimes.

On November 13, 1995, AQ raised the stakes, taking an active part in the bombing of the Saudi National Guard building in downtown Riyadh. As noted, AQ's involvement took the form of a shadowy organization called the Islamic Movement for Change, which included activists from other STJM organizations, a small organization of Libyan activists (Tigers of the Gulf), and a group of Iran-sponsored Shi'ite radicals in the Kingdom (Hizbollah's Ansar Allah). The Saudi security forces responded heavily to the bombing, initiating yet another round of mass arrests and harsh interrogations that involved extensive use of torture. AQ's countermove did not take long to appear, this time selecting more consciously and intentionally an obvious American target. Whereas in the first bombing of November 1995 the target symbolized the deepening resentment toward the Saudi–US "special relationship," the bombing initiated by the Islamic Movement for Change, of the US barracks in Khobar on June 25, 1996, was aimed exclusively against a US target, resulting in the death of 19 Americans. According to Hegghammer, the Saudi response of mass arrests following the Khobar incident was estimated by the thousands and included Sunni and Shi'ite activists (2010, 74). These events made it clear that the United States was taking on a central role in outbidding dynamics, with additional expressions of threat attribution and boundary control gaining more salience in the process.

From the Near Enemy to the Far Enemy

The United States played a significant role in the unfolding outbidding dynamics. What began as formalization of international extraditions in early 1995, following a presidential executive order that extended the reach of the FBI outside US borders and allowed it to work alongside the CIA, developed into what later became known as the Extraordinary Rendition Program. According to Jane Mayer (2008, 109), the program essentially meant a mechanism of outsourcing of repression, based on Arab regimes' collaboration:

> Terrorism suspects all over Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East were abducted by unidentified, and thus unaccountable, hooded or masked American agents and forced onto planes . . . the aircrafts, which were flown by pilots with false identities and registered to a series of dummy American corporations, had clearance to land at U.S. and allied bases in places as far-flung as Greenland . . . upon arriving in foreign countries, rendered suspects simply vanished. Detainees were not provided with lawyers . . . rarely charged with crimes . . . only a fraction of these cases have fully surfaced . . . it is clear that torture was omnipresent.

Beginning in mid-1995, Extraordinary Renditions gradually turned into a full-scale operation, carried out in Syria, Uganda, Afghanistan, Italy, Jordan, Croatia, and Albania, with Egypt ranking first in its collaboration with the CIA (Mayer 2008, 113). Disappearances of STJM leadership figures began in September 1995, with the Egyptian intelligence involvement in the abduction of EIG leaders in Croatia, and the disappearances later extended to other locales and figures. In many, if not all, of these secretive operations, international and domestic legal standards and laws were simply disregarded or circumvented, with both local and CIA operatives paying little heed to human rights for the sake of security.[21]

Two months after the Croatia abduction, EIJ raised the stakes and initiated a suicide attack on the Egyptian embassy in Pakistan, completely destroying the building, killing 16 people and injuring 60. In Sudan, pressure on AQ heightened once the CIA collected sufficient evidence of bin Laden's efforts to build his own private multinational army in mid-1995. The tightening of surveillance, which bin Laden found out about from his Sudanese intelligence interlocutors, prompted AQ to counteract and to

21. Higgins and Cooper, "CIA-Backed Team Used Brutal Means to Break Up Terrorist Cell in Albania," *The Wall Street Journal*, November 20, 2001.

threaten an attack on the CIA station chief Cofer Black, a threat that did not materialize only because the Sudanese government intervened (Coll 2004, 271). The perception of threat attributed to the CIA repressive campaign in particular, and the US policy in general, continued to deepen. In October 1995, following almost two years of arrest and trial in the United States, Sheikh Abdel-Rahman was convicted and then sentenced for life imprisonment in the United States, a move that reverberated through and outraged the STJM community. What hit bin Laden more close to home, however, was the international campaign orchestrated by the United States that was aimed at pressuring Sudan to expel bin Laden in March 1996, following Sudan's refusal to collaborate with the CIA on bin Laden's rendition.

Following the June 1996 Khobar bombing, it became clear that the rhetoric of the August 1996 *fatwa* was increasingly to be translated into more lethal tactics. In the wake of additional expression of boundary control, manifested in the Russian invasion of Tajikistan in early 1996 in response to the re-escalation of hostilities, an invasion that was again met with a fairly faint response of the United States toward the Russian moves, it soon became clear that the United States did not settle for an engagement strategy vis-à-vis the Taliban regime. As noted, between 1997 and 1998 a relentless campaign aimed at pressuring the Taliban to extradite bin Laden was carried out, spearheaded primarily by the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, a campaign of which bin Laden was aware (Coll 2004). For these regimes, it was abundantly clear that AQ had become the central driving force behind some of the violent operations they experienced.

Although the Taliban regime evaded these pressures, attribution of threat on the part of the Afghan-based STJM leaders was unquestionably high. Responding to such threat, AQ carried out an attempt to bomb the US consulate in Jidda in January 1998, which would result in arrests of hundreds of AQ activists in the Kingdom (Hegghammer 2010, 74). Taking the spiral to a higher level, threat perception on the part of AQ leaders precipitated the issuing of the February 1998 *fatwa*, signed by bin Laden, Zawahiri, and other leaders of STJM. Leaving no room for ambiguity, this *fatwa* decreed the ruling for every individual Muslim to kill the Americans and their allies, civilian and military, wherever and whenever possible.

Even though the immediate months following the publication of the 1998 *fatwa* saw little if any violent operations, the CIA intensified extraordinary renditions, such as the kidnappings of STJM activists (Zawahiri's brother included) in Azerbaijan and Albania in July 1998. On August 4, 1998, Zawahiri publicly promised revenge for these actions, warning the

United States that its "message has been received and that the response, which we hope they will read carefully, is being prepared" (Mayer 2008, 114). Three days later, on August 7, 1998, EIJ's message was delivered in the form of twin suicide bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The attack on the embassies was clearly a meaningful step of outbidding on the part of AQ, expressing a willingness to engage in collateral political violence, with the death of innocent Muslims seen as unavoidable sacrifice.

Amidst additional continuous instances of boundary control and threat attribution (e.g., the Russian invasion of Chechnya in August 1999, and FBI submitting an indictment against bin Laden and his associates in late 1998), outbidding between AQ and the US reached its full height. Less than three weeks after the bombing of the embassies, the Clinton Administration ordered the launching of missile strikes against targets in Sudan and, most meaningfully, against AQ's camps in Afghanistan in late August 1998. In response, AQ's jihad campaign was redirected against US forces on US soil. As discussed below, the February 1998 *fatwa*, while generating deep tension and discord among the Afghanistan-based STJM representatives and their respective local branches, was also indicative of a meaningful convergence of forces within the broader movement—the World Islamic Front, which not only broke away from the movement's local organizational bases, but also engaged in global jihad. It is the analysis of competition for power among the various movement organizations, operable as early as the late stages of the Afghan jihad yet gradually becoming highly consequential in the progression of radicalization, to which we now turn.

COMPETITION FOR POWER: WHICH JIHADIST CARAVAN TO JOIN?

The joint experience of the Afghan War and the shared Soviet enemy alleviated many key differences among the various groups and organizations regarding leadership sources of authority, relation to non-Arab Muslims, and national affiliations. Moreover, the exigencies of the prolonged fighting, most notably the chronic need for financial resources and arms, assisted in containing these and other sources of tension. Leaders of the movement went to great lengths to address a variety of issues regarding religious approval, including the neglect of the Palestinian struggle and reliance on US assistance.[22] However, with signs of meaningful

22. See, for example, *al-Jihad*, issues: 28 (March 1987), 34 (September 1987), 39 (February 1988).

achievements—most notably the completion of the Soviet withdrawal in February 1989—disagreements and points of friction quickly resurfaced. Compounded by newly emerging sources of tension and discord, the movement eventually experienced competition for power, which reached its most critical expression in early 1998 with the splintering of the World Islamic Front. The formation of the World Islamic Front was indicative of an organizational development through which leaders and top activists from various existing organizations converged at the margins of the broader movement and introduced a meaningful ideological and tactical transformation, labeled global jihadism. Precipitated by *resource depletion*, the operation of competition for power also triggered *brokerage* and *category formation* and eventually fueled and expanded on two central jihadist strands: resistive international jihad and violent local jihad.[23]

The conceptualization of the idea of AQ and its embryonic formation in August 1988 was no coincidence. With brewing evidence of rifts and infighting between Afghan mujahedin and Afghan Arabs as well as among the latter's respective groupings following the beginning of the Soviet withdrawal in May 1988, AQ's formation was a conscious attempt to generate some degree of consensus over the future of jihad. To be sure, while the need for funds and volunteers continued to be a central concern (Tawil 2011), *resource depletion* (an environmental sub-mechanism defined as a decrease in the capacity of people to engage in contention [McAdam et al. 2001, 25]) operated at low levels. Indeed, at this point in time there was no significant drop in flow of funds, with financial support continuing to pour in from the United States and Saudi Arabia as well as from personal funds (e.g., bin Laden's). Similarly, the flow of volunteers was of no particular concern at this time, as the final stages of the war witnessed a significant rise in the number of volunteers arriving at Afghanistan to join the struggle against the pro-communist regime (Sageman 2004; Hegghammer 2010).

While the range of agreements reached in the August 1988 meeting and in the subsequent recruitment meeting of spring 1989 was substantial, it

23. We exclude *takfiri* elements for they do not constitute a distinct political thread or, during the time period under study, organizational form. Also excluded are mainstream Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or Jordan, who for the most part and period under study (i.e., post-Afghan jihad) did not challenge their respective political systems through violent means; when they did, in other places, it was essentially irredentist (e.g., the Muslim Brotherhood/Hamas in the West Bank and Gaza Strip). For a comprehensive and useful treatment of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, see Wickham (2002). On the low priority given by AQ to the Israeli-Palestinian issue during most of the time period under examination, see Schweitzer and Shay (2003).

also reflected the much broader and deeper range of disagreements. In and of itself, the August 1988 meeting was already challenging a previous attempt by Abdullah Azzam to form AQ *al-Sulbah* (the solid base) as an attempt to cope, for example, with brewing signs of enmity and fighting between the Arab Afghans and the Afghan Mujahidin, and with the lack of faith (*jahiliyya*) prevalent in Islamic societies on the other.[24] According to Wright, members of the new organization, AQ *al-Askariya* (the military base), agreed on the importance of continuing pedagogical activity among the youth, yet stressed the importance of separating the Afghan Arabs from the Afghan mujahedin. Moreover, during the second recruitment meeting of spring 1989, it was agreed that AQ would seek to "establish the truth, get rid of evil, and establish an Islamic nation. This would be accomplished through education and military training, as well as coordinating and supporting jihad movements around the world. The group would be led by a commander who is impartial, resolute, trustworthy, patient, and just" (2006, 133, 142).

However, while these plans appeared to be well laid out, critical outstanding questions remained: what shape would jihad take, and who was the enemy? Answers to these and other questions varied considerably, resulting in deep tension and at times animosity and infighting among the various jihadist groupings. Shortly after the defeat of the pro-communist regime in Jalalabad in the spring of 1989, intense debates emerged regarding how and to what end the Arab Afghan network of volunteers should be utilized. These debates were compounded by the first signs of a meaningful drop in financial resources, as for most Arab regimes the Soviet withdrawal also meant a drastic decrease in support for the jihad project (Sela and Fitchette 2014).

Not surprisingly, these debates essentially revolved over control of the *Makhtab al-Khadamat* and, by extension, bin Laden's personal financial resources (Lacroix 2008). Azzam, still a leading religious theoretician of jihad, wanted the network activists to operate as an Islamic "rapid reaction force," available to intervene wherever Muslims were perceived to be threatened (e.g., Palestine, Kashmir, Philippines). Reflecting his personal background as a member of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, Azzam's jihad, while transnational in orientation and thus compatible with bin Laden's vision, was essentially defensive and as a means for redeeming land considered to be part of *dar al-Islam* (i.e., irredentist—Katzman 2005; Gerges 2005; Sela and Fitchette 2014). Violence, according to this vision, was context-sensitive and unequivocally forbidden to be directed at other Muslims. In

24. *Al-Jihad*, 41, April 1988, p. 4.

striking contrast to Azzam's concept of jihad, Zawahiri's concept of jihad was inherently violently offensive. Reflecting Zawahiri's (and others) background in the active Egyptian groups, the Arab Afghan volunteers should be dispatched to their home countries with the mission of toppling their respective non-Muslim rulers and their oppressive regimes.

Standing between the two jihadist veterans, Azzam and Zawahiri, bin Laden's vision of jihad was the least articulated. Bin Laden was disenchanted by the Palestinian-oriented irredentist strand á la Azzam. While he was closer to the more ambitious and proactive jihadist strand á la Zawahiri, bin Laden nevertheless remained ambivalent about the use of proactive violence, and rejected the idea of attacking Arab regimes. It was (and still is) unclear if bin Laden and/or Zawahiri were behind Azzam's death in November 1989[25]; nevertheless, as time progressed it became abundantly clear that measures were being taken to marginalize Azzam, which included, inter alia, accusing him of being an American spy.

Following the institution of the pro-communist, Najibullah regime, in 1989, and the dispersal of the different jihadist organizations, each attempting to implement their own respective vision, competition for power became most emphatically expressed. EIG and EIJ leaders and activists, for example,[26] unable to go back to Egypt for fear of prosecution, at first remained in Pakistan and then settled in Yemen, from where they initiated a lethal campaign against the Mubarak regime. Whereas the EIG sought to mobilize the masses for armed resistance, the EIJ sought a violent coup carried out by a faction called Vanguard of Conquest (Sageman 2004; Ashour 2009). Each organization acted independently, loyal to its own version of jihad, undercutting the other's strategy and goals. The EIG campaign of violence which, beginning in late 1989–1990, reached the lethal level of indiscriminate violence, brought about a wave of harsh crackdown by the Egyptian security forces against both organizations (Hafez and Wiktorowicz 2004), with EIJ reaching the verge of operational and financial breakdown. Moreover, at least with respect to the EIJ, tension between the Egypt-based and Yemen-based branches reached critical heights in 1991, when Zawahiri overpowered the imprisoned leader of the Egyptian-based EIJ and became the central leader in charge of the remnants of the organization (Sageman 2004, 41).

25. While some suggest that Zawahiri and his EIJ activists as well as bin Laden were involved, others suggest that it was connected to the US-Saudi-Pakistan's determination to rein in Azzam's unsettling version of jihad (Esposito 2002; Sela and Fitchette 2014). There is no concrete evidence to support either version.

26. For a useful summery of the Algerians' experience and the formation of the GIA, see Tawil (2011) and Hafez (2004).

Many proponents of the more defensive and irredentist vision of jihad á la Azzam, whose religious rulings regarding the duty of joining jihad continued to mobilize an ever-growing number of volunteers arriving in Afghanistan even after his death, stayed on to fight the pro-communist regime. With the fall of Najibullah's regime in 1992 these Arab Afghans, comprising multitudes of nationalities, searched for additional jihadist fronts and found them, for example, in Bosnia and Tajikistan. Others sought to implement Azzam's jihadist vision in their respective locales, returning to join the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines or the Pakistani organization *Lashkar-e-Taiba* (Army of the Righteous) that operated mostly in Kashmir.

Bin Laden, at the time already a key leading figure of the recently formed AQ, returned to Saudi Arabia and, as discussed, tried to influence the authorities to continue their support for pan-Islamic goals, among other things through utilizing the Afghan Arab network of volunteers for the promotion of jihad in a more transnational manner (i.e., beyond defined conflict zones and above national/regional affiliations). The failure to accomplish this precipitated bin Laden's involvement in Yemen against the pro-communist regime during the early 1990s on the one hand, and his support for those STJM organizations who engaged in jihad in Kashmir or the Philippines, on the other. Moreover, for a short while, bin Laden was using his personal funds to also try and rally other STJM organizations around AQ's jihadist caravan, attempting to rein in the Algerian, Egyptian, and Bosnian organizations. Yet these attempts also proved unsuccessful; Algerian and Egyptian organizations, perhaps the two biggest national groupings in AQ, went through intense radicalization, a process that also produced, inter alia, the first expressions of global jihad. Whereas the GIA shifted some of its attacks against France (e.g., the hijacking of an Air France jet in December 1994 and the series of attacks in France from July to October 1995), EIG leaders were closely linked to the World Trade Center bombing of early 1993.

As each organization became preoccupied with turf battles vis-à-vis other jihadist organizations in its own respective locale and also became involved in heavy and costly confrontation with local authorities, resource depletion gained salience in shaping competition for power. This development became more pronounced when bin Laden's AQ faced its own setback in terms of operational and financial capacities. Bin Laden's relocation to Sudan in the early summer of 1992 unquestionably hampered AQ's mobilizing structure in the Kingdom, resulting in the costly need to rebuild an alternative one in Sudan, a process that also involved substantial investments in the country's infrastructure. Even more critical in this

respect was the Saudi authorities' decision to sever bin Laden's access to the rest of his family's financial resources in early 1994.

With each local organization continuing to pursue its own preferred goal and engaging in costly operations, differences of opinion regarding strategy and tactics sharpened. In the face of increasingly diluting resources, bin Laden began requiring his staff to work in his Sudanese companies in order to raise money to sustain daily expenses, as well as asking activists to fund operations carried out outside Sudan (Sageman 2004, 43). But it was more than just the rank-and-file of AQ that "felt the heat" of the worsening financial difficulties. Bin Laden had begun using his money to try and advance his own jihadist caravan, strengthening AQ's ranks either by disapproving certain STJM organizations' operations or pressuring others to change their strategy and goals. Between 1993 and 1995 an instructive process began to unfold by which financial support was withheld from various STJM locally based organizations, while financial assistance was provided to salvage bankrupted STJM Afghanistan-based organizations or to support those organizations that followed or favored AQ more closely. An example of the former process regarded the GIA, where in late 1992 resources were cut off following the deterioration of the struggle into an indiscriminate bloodshed of violence aimed against Muslims and non-Muslims alike, resulting in bad publicity for the pan-Islamic project (Wright 2006, 190). AQ's continuous support for Zawahiri's EIJ provides an example of the latter process. In 1993, in the context of the Vanguard of Conquest trial in Egypt and the close-to-ruins EIJ powerbase, most of the organization members went on the AQ payroll and relocated to Sudan (Wright 2006, 185).[27]

Despite consistent attempts by bin Laden to persuade Zawahiri to moderate his tactics and goals, given their costs in terms of sinking Muslim public opinion, Zawahiri nevertheless continued with his grand scheme to topple Mubarak's regime. During the second half of 1993 EIJ initiated two attacks, one against the minister of interior in August and the other against the prime minister in November, employing suicide tactics for the first time and generating harsh public reaction against the organization (Gerges 2005; Wright 2006). One could plausibly argue that had this continued to be the situation, bin Laden would have threatened to stop bankrolling the EIJ entirely. Yet by this time it had already become clear that the Sudanese exile, under al-Turabi's auspices, operated as brokerage and, in the process, activated first expressions of category formation.

27. But it also shifted support from Abu Sayyaf Group to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front after the former began degenerating into a criminal group (Sageman 2004, 44).

Amidst intensifying competition for power, expatriate STJM leaders and top-rank activists began perceiving themselves as sharing a boundary, distinguishing them from their states and societies as well as from their respective local organizations. The gradual gathering of leaders and top-rank activists from the various movement organizations in Khartoum[28] was consequential in two interrelated ways. First, it witnessed the operation of *brokerage*—a relational sub-mechanism defined as the production of a new connection between previously unconnected or weakly connected sites (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 215). Indeed, via al-Turabi's own pan-Islamic project (i.e., the Popular Arab and Islamic Congress[29]), expatriate STJM leaders became exposed to and gradually involved in interaction with Shi'ite leaders, including Hezbollah and members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and Intelligence forces. Moreover, the Sudanese refuge in general and the Popular Arab and Islamic Congress in particular provided an opportunity and a space for interaction on a frequent basis, exchanging ideas and expanding their acquaintance circle with other STJM leaders and activists, such as Jordanians, Tunisians, Palestinians, and Syrians.

This kind of convergence with non-Sunni radical organizations (to which we return below in discussing movement–counter-movement dynamics) expressed another equally important consequence of the Sudanese experience. That is to say, it triggered *category formation*—a cognitive sub-mechanism defined as the creation of a set of sites sharing a boundary distinguishing all of them and relating all of them to at least one set of sites visibly excluded by the boundary (McAdam et al. 2001, 316). As argued by Sageman (2004), the more detached from their local organizational bases STJM leaders became, the more they began perceiving themselves as expatriates, distinguished from their original organizations and having a distinct action strategy, enemy, and goals—"they became members of an 'imagined community,' not on the basis of a nation . . . but on a 'virtual,' sectarian basis" (p. 148–149; see also Roy 2004).

This process, coalescing with the evolution of global jihad, was nonetheless gradual; while beginning to gain prominence during the later stages of the Sudanese exile, it would only materialize along with the salience of the shared sense of identity during the Afghan exile. Throughout

28. For a treatment of a similar, although more limited in scope and of lesser significance, experience taking place in London, see Tawil (2011, Chapter 7).

29. This project was formed in 1991, following the Gulf War, as an alternative to the Saudi-initiated Organization of Islamic Conference (Burr and Collins 2003).

the Sudanese exile and even during the Afghan one, some global jihadists still attempted to attract supporters amongst their respective publics. For example, Gerges (2005, 125) identifies that one of the major reasons for Zawahiri's alignment with bin Laden's global jihadist caravan related to his growing recognition that targeting the far enemy—most notably, the United States—would garner high public returns on his investment by mobilizing the *ummah*. We return to this point when analyzing movement–general public interaction below.

The operation of category formation reflected deepening tensions and disagreements among the various STJM organizations, established a divide between global jihadists and local jihadists, and demonstrated an inverse relation of convergence and divergence. A telling example in this regard is brought by Camille Tawil, in his discussion of the tense relationship between the Algerian-based GIA and the Sudanese-based STJM leaders. After the former was suspected of killing Libyan activists who went to Algeria to support the struggle, Sudanese-based GIA and other STJM leaders in Sudan asserted themselves as the sole representative of Algeria's jihadists and initiated a merger with other Algerian rival organizations. In response, Algerian-based GIA leaders sent envoys to Khartoum in late 1995 to threaten AQ that anyone who would offer help to other organizations in Algeria would be killed (2011, 96).

The expulsion of AQ from Sudan, following an increase in independent initiatives of violent attacks from the country throughout 1995 and the resulting heavy international pressure on Bashir and al-Turabi, was not only detrimental financially, stripping bin Laden of most of his financial assets, but was also damaging in terms of a meaningful drop in organizational membership. While many members were told the organization could no longer support them, others decided to stay behind and to abandon the jihad venture all together; it is estimated that no more than 150 followers and their families joined bin Laden in returning to Afghanistan in 1996 (Sageman 2004, 45). Trying to rebuild his organization under the unpredictable Taliban regime, using some of his connections from the Afghan War experience,[30] bin Laden engaged in systematic efforts to attract new members even among jihadist forces and organizations previously belittled as irredentists (e.g., the central-Asian-based

30. We are referring to the Haqqani tribal network, an Afghan and Pakistani insurgent group, a resourceful and influential network based in Southeast Afghanistan. The network was not only influential in raising the issue of jihad as an individual duty, even prior to Azzam, but also in facilitating rapprochement between AQ and the Taliban. For a comprehensive treatment, see Rassler and Brown (2011).

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Ibn al-Khattab's powerful base in Chechnya).[31]

These efforts yielded little success at first. While about a dozen former jihadists from Tajikistan joined AQ in late 1996 and early 1997 (Hegghammer 2010), al-Khattab refused to do the same, and many potential Saudi recruits were behind bars. Moreover, in mid-1997 AQ faced a major series of unexpected setbacks to its operational capacity. First in Egypt and in Algeria and then in Libya, three central STJM local organizations either lowered arms and entered into negotiations with the authorities (the Egyptian EIG and GIA, and Algarian Islamic Salvation Army, the GIA's opponent) or practically collapsed and fled oversees, as was the case with the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (Tawil 2011, 139).

Of these areas, Egypt would experience the most ferocious competition for power between the internal and external leadership cores. Several months after EIG's unilateral ceasefire proposal that, most meaningfully, was supported by several EIJ leaders, the outside EIG leadership, actively backed by AQ and EIJ, initiated the Luxor massacre of November 1997, in an attempt to sabotage the proposal. The attempt to violently force the hand of the imprisoned leaders of the locally based EIG and EIJ did not succeed, nor did the hope that the attack would lead the authorities to overreact and thus be perceived as barbaric by the public. The brutal and indiscriminate nature of the attack not only failed to push Egyptian authorities to overreact, but it also appalled the Egyptian public. The local leadership core of the EIG and EIJ remained loyal to the proposal, receiving the important endorsement of the imprisoned Sheikh Abdul Rahman (Sageman 2004; Gerges 2005).

The period that followed the Luxor carnage witnessed a deepening rift between the local and outside leadership cores of the EIG and the EIJ, with the lines previously drawn regarding strategy, tactics, and goals becoming sharper and clearer. In February 1998 bin Laden and Zawahiri officially splintered from the broader movement, creating the World Islamic Front as an instrument for the realization of the *fatwa* they published that declared a war of jihad against Crusaders and Jews.[32] In addition to bin Laden and Zawahiri, the signatories on the *fatwa* included representatives of EIG (Ahmed Taha), the Pakistani Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan (Sheikh Mir Hamzah), and the leader of the Bangladeshi Harket-ul-Ansar (Fazlul Rahman). The publication of the *fatwa* unearthed the

31. Only after the August 1999 defeat to the Russian forces would al-Khattab seek assistance from the Taliban and AQ (Wilhelmsen 2004; Gerges 2005).

32. Within this framework, the title "al-Qaeda" was openly used for the first time.

deepening divide within the broad STJ movement. Taha and Zawahiri were harshly criticized for acting independently without consulting their respective organizations or adhering to their explicit agenda. Zawahiri barely managed to survive an internal rebellion and a drop in membership that resulted from his lack of consultation with his organization and from his siding with bin Laden, and Taha was not only forced by the EIG's council to withdraw his support but was also removed from his role as chair of the organization consultative (*shura*) council.

Understanding the increased salience of resource depletion in gearing up competition for power requires taking into consideration the influence of category formation, the operation of which gained distinctive salience following the expulsion from Sudan. The Afghan exile separated AQ and other STJM leaders and activists who gradually gathered there from their respective local bases,[33] prolonging their expatriate experience and, in the process, galvanizing their collective identity as belonging to a distinguishable category, physically as well as perceptually (Roy 2004; Sageman 2004). This process was by no means straightforward or swift. On the side of the expatriates it required a theological stamp of approval regarding both the non-Arab Afghans in general and the Taliban in particular, which was provided by the Syrian activist Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, at the time one of the most important AQ theoreticians (Tawil 2011, 146). The Taliban certainly did not facilitate the production of a new connection between previously unconnected or weakly connected sites. Initially, Taliban leaders were highly suspicious of AQ's arrival in Afghanistan and sought advice regarding what to do with bin Laden from the Saudis, who told the Taliban leaders to keep a hold of bin Laden and keep him quiet (Wright 2006, 226). As we have noted, things changed drastically following the series of internal and external challenges the Taliban faced that, in the process, also led Mullah Omar and the other Taliban leaders to adopt the role of a proactive broker vis-à-vis the various Afghan-based STJM expatriates, encouraging them to rally around bin Laden's AQ (Tawil 2011).

Of equal importance, many of these Afghan expatriates began perceiving their encapsulated sanctuary in the country as a religiously infused experience, relying on Afghan *ulema* and distinguishing themselves from other Muslims by following and practicing Islamic faith as interpreted in its purest form (i.e., emulating the prophet's *hijra*). A telling example in this regard is found in a speech made by bin Laden on the

33. Including from London, where the 1998 bombing of US embassies resulted in a wave of arrests by the British security forces (Tawil 2011, Chapter 7).

importance of *hijra* and the Islamic State (i.e., Afghanistan), given sometime during the first half of 2000,[34] stating:

> The link that holds Muslims together . . . is the bond of Iman,[35] which is the strongest bond . . . [S]o it's incumbent on all the Muslims to ignore these borders and boundaries, which the kuffar have laid down between Muslim lands . . . [A]fter the all world was sunken in darkness of kufr . . . a lamp emerged, a shining lamp in this darkness and that lamp is Afghanistan . . . [A]llah has blessed Afghanistan . . . the only country in the world today that has the Shari'ah. Therefore, it is compulsory upon all the Muslims . . . to help Afghanistan and to make hijra to this land.

This viewpoint of Afghanistan, to be sure, was not shared by all; nor was the growing notion and practice of using Afghanistan as a "safe-base" from which to initiate attacks on the United States, an aspect that became a source of tension among the Afghan-based STJM leaders. Moreover, and to a greater extent, the assimilation with an internationally isolated and contemptuous Taliban patron and the series of attacks carried out during the run-up to the Millennium and throughout 2000, intensified tension further between the Afghan-based leadership core and the locally based ones. As we demonstrate below, this process also involved meaningful changes most notably in relational dynamics between AQ, Shi'ite forces, and Muslims in general.

* * *

As central as those foregoing arenas and mechanisms were in the radicalization of AQ, the progression of the process was also influenced by the relational dynamics unfolding in other arenas of interaction. The first arena regards the interaction between STJM organizations and their respective publics, as well as the Sunni Muslim population at large, in which the mechanism dissociation was most central; the other is that between the STJM and the Shi'a counter-movement, in which the relational

34. "Supporters of Shariah Website Publishes Bin Ladin 'Speech,'" June 22, 2002. See "Compilation of Usama Bin Ladin Statements 1994–January 2004, FBIS Report, January 2004, pp. 137–142". For similar calls by Zawahiri, see: Higgins and Cullison (2002, 9).

35. According to El-Najjar (2007), Iman refers to a level of faith higher than observing the five major obligations of Islam. Iman requires a belief in Allah, His angels, His books, His messengers, the Last Day, and in divine destiny, both the good and the evil thereof. A person reaching Iman (a Mu'men) also believes in Al-Qada wal Qadar, or divine destiny, both the good and the evil thereof.

dynamics were captured most centrally by the mechanism object shift. As will be demonstrated, during the time period under study there was no developing dissociation between the Afghan-based leadership core and the Sunni Muslim population they claimed to represent, and yet it did develop at the various locales and therefore deserves discussion. Object shift, too, though present as early as the late stage of the Afghan jihad, operated at a low level and had no distinctive influence on the radicalization of AQ; but it did become more consequential during the stepped-up phase of the process and played an important role in its progression, in conjunction with the other relational mechanisms.

DISSOCIATION: THE STRUGGLE OVER THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF THE *UMMAH*

The tension that existed between the pan-Islamic project in general, and the STJM in particular regarding the national and the transnational dimensions and levels of operation, combined to produce a two-level arena of movement-general public relational dynamics. The first level arena pertains to the various movement organizations and their relations with their respective publics; the second level arena pertains to the relational dynamics between the outside leadership core and the broad community of Sunni Muslim believers (the *ummah*). Needless to say, the two levels were interrelated and, as discussed, experienced increasingly deepening competition for power. Yet, in the context of analyzing the operation of dissociation and its consequentiality on radicalization, the linkage between the two levels had a particularly meaningful quality.

Essentially forced out (or kept away) from their respective societies and organizational local bases, the outside leadership core became deeply concerned and preoccupied with maintaining its support among Muslim populations. During most of the time period under study there were attempts by the outside leadership core to pursue a more holistic encompassing view, advocating a transnational perspective and attempting to mobilize the support of the general *ummah*. To be sure, there were occasional tensions among the different nationalities as a result of favoring one over the other when it came to role and status assignments. Mutual distrust, contempt, or ill will between Arabs and non-Arabic ethnic groupings or between Sunni and Shi'ite activists also kept surfacing in the various jihad fronts (e.g., Afghanistan and Bosnia) as well. Nonetheless, with the exception of souring Sunni-Shi'ite relations in the context of the struggle over Afghanistan (to which we return subsequently), the mobilization attempts

were largely successful, and as late as 1999–2000 thousands of Sunni activists from various countries were trying to get into jihad fronts.

The importance attributed to maintaining the sympathy and support of the Muslim masses and to increasing recruitment efforts via local supporters and mobilizing agents[36] possessed both ideological and instrumental values. As the major proponent of global jihad, AQ gradually came to agreement on the notion that fighting the United States would be the key leverage for toppling the corrupted "apostate" Arab rulers/regimes and, by extension, for the promotion of the Caliphate. Given the dependency of many of these regimes on the United States, they gradually began to be seen as insignificant puppets, and it was assumed that once the United States would be defeated and expelled from the region its local clients' impotence, corruption, and apostasy would be exposed and they would fall like ripened fruits (Gerges 2005, 149; Pedahzur 2005, 102). Regarding the significance and influence of this perception, it is noteworthy that throughout the time period under investigation AQ did not initiate any deliberate, direct violence against Sunni Muslim populations.[37] It is only when the grand strategy and goal failed to bear the expected fruits, as was most notably the case in the post-September 11, 2001 period, that we saw dissociation gradually developing, resulting in indiscriminate violence perpetrated against Sunni Muslims.

Local Dissociation: The Case of the EIG

We nonetheless observed dissociation developing and becoming consequential in the radicalization process of several STJM organizations operating in their respective localities. Of those major organizations that were deeply embedded in their social environments and had significant community-based infrastructures of mobilization, the EIG provides a particularly instructive case.[38] Unlike the Egyptian Islamic Jihad's model of violent coup carried out by a small, dedicated vanguard operating clandestinely,

36. This also involved utilizing both old and new media techniques, as well as incorporating previously relatively undervalued irredentist jihad fronts, such as Palestine.

37. It must nevertheless be pointed out that as part of AQ's advanced stage of radicalization during the late 1990s, willingness to consider Muslim casualties as an unavoidable sacrifice in inflicting harms on the infidels did exist. For such reasoning provided by Bin Laden, see the *ABC News* interview by John Miller, December 24, 1998 (FBIS Collection).

38. An analysis of similar dynamics in the case of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group predecessor (the Islamic Jihad Group in Libya) is provided in Tawil (2011) and Hafez (2004).

the EIG favored grassroots mobilization, carried out through open and direct engagement with the population, as the basis for a mass-based armed insurgency. The dynamics between the movement and the general public in the radicalization of the EIG became most apparent during the second cycle of the organization's contentious campaign between the late 1980s and mid 1990s (Fandy 1994; Hafez and Wiktorowicz 2004; Meijer 2009; Malthaner 2011). Amidst deepening competition with EIJ, intensification of outbidding dynamics, and worsening upward spirals of political opportunities vis-à-vis Mubarak's regime, dissociation gained salience in influencing the progression of radicalization. Dissociation in the case of the EIG was constituted by *evolution*, *resentment*, and *withdrawal*—with the first of these activated by dissociation dynamics and the latter two triggered and jointly exerting their influence in gearing dissociation further.

In late 1990 the EIG had already decided to form a clandestine armed wing with its own independent leadership that was completely separated from the Group's da'wa wing, hence it was separated from its constituents and supporters. According to Hafez and Wiktorowicz (2004) the formation of the armed wing reflected a meaningful shift in the Group's action strategy; in fact, clandestine activity had previously been unequivocally rejected as an un-Islamic and politically unsound activity (Hafez and Wiktorowicz 2004, 72). The increased intensity and ferocity of clashes with security forces exposed EIG's constituents and supporters to heavy pressure exerted by both warring parties, resulting in a transformation of the relationships between the movement and its social networks, from voluntary collaboration to coercive. Intensifying police pressure, which included collective measures such as curfews, closures on movement-controlled areas, and depriving EIG of its mosques and informal associations (Hafez and Wiktorowicz 2004, 78) pushed EIG activists to engage in more aggressive interactions with its constituents. The enforced separation of the Group from its social bases precipitated the operation of *evolution*—a relational sub-mechanism, defined as a shift of social movement toward increasing demands of moral conduct regarding what is right and wrong on its constituency.

Although the EIG had regulated and demanded from its constituency a moral conduct based on the Islamic concept of *hisba* (i.e., commanding right and forbidding wrong) since its early stage of activism, these demands nonetheless became more aggressive, all-encompassing, and uncompromising. If previously a fairly clear separation between "putting things right with the hand is the prerogative of political authorities, with the tongue of scholars and in (or with) the heart for the common people" (Meijer 2009, 191) was maintained, the intensification of the struggle led

Group leaders to try and usurp the right to exert *hisba* by force and by religious ruling from both the state and the *ulema* (Meijer 2009, 205).

As a result, activists sought to establish physical and moral spaces where they engaged in actual enforcement of *hisba* (e.g., separation of sexes in public places and banning music recitals and film screening), employing rigid and violent measures against whoever refused to obey. The Group's urge to assert its moral demands and authority was translated into more aggressive coercion, leading to the dramatic broadening of categories of people upon whom *hisba* was enforced. This included labeling those who had previously been movement sympathizers as collaborators and targeting them accordingly. On December 10, 1993, for example, EIG activists threw dynamite and fired automatic weapons at the Helwan city movie houses, killing one policeman and injuring six civilians.[39]

With increasing reliance on aggressive measures of *hisba*, the operation of evolution triggered *resentment* (a cognitive sub-mechanism, defined as disapproval of social movements' agenda, perceived as unfair and offensive on the part of its constituents). Evidence of disapproval of and objection to the organization's agenda and tactics on the part of the population mounted and became apparent even among those who supported the Group's agenda and goals. As one supporter stated, "Basically I agree with them, but I refuse some of their ways of behaviour. [. . .] The water pipe, for example, they say that it is forbidden, but I say that it is not recommended, but allowed; they condemn wedding ceremonies with dance and music [. . .] and that is indispensable for us" (Haenni 2005—cited in: Malthaner 2011, 129). This sentiment would continue to develop, gradually encompassing even those areas where the movement had strong support or de facto controlled, as was the case in Imbaba, a Cairo suburb, where the Group went as far as declaring the "Islamic Republic of Imbaba" in July 1992.

But the heightening police pressure and the Group's own intensifying demands, as well as the aggressiveness with which they were enforced, also triggered *withdrawal* (a relational sub-mechanism, defined as a decline in the support of individuals or groups toward movement activities and goals). Instances of sympathizers withdrawing their support, refusing to collaborate with the Group, and at times even collaborating with the police, grew. Malthaner (2011) captures this shift, noting that while at first repressive police measures seemed to strengthen support for the Group, later, around 1993, things began to change. This was the result of a combination of restraint on the part of the police and the more coercive and

39. *AP News*, December 10, 1993.

violent acts of "prohibiting the evil" on the part of Group activists, involving not only severe beatings but also acid attacks and other atrocities.

By 1996 it became clear that the Group bases of operation and support were significantly shrinking. Arrests of leaders, activists, and supporters were estimated by the thousands, and many of the movement activists sought refuge in deserted places throughout the south of Egypt, while other, unconfined leaders fled to Afghanistan. With broadening cycles of withdrawal on the one hand and the acute need for secrecy among those who remained in Egypt and went underground on the other, instances of coercively enforcing non-collaboration with the police by killing informants and indiscriminately terrorizing local communities increased exponentially.

But it was not only dissociation that influenced the stepping up of radicalization; object shift, too, operating between the movement and its counter-movement, had its own distinctive influence on the process that, due to the transnational features of the Shi'ite counter-movement, was not limited to the local level of operation.

OBJECT SHIFT: THE ENEMY OF OUR ENEMY IS OUR ALLY

Expecting Shi'ite Muslims in general and Iran in particular to play the role of the STJM counter-movement is almost warranted. This relates, inter alia, to the age-old schism between the Sunna and Shi'a denominations in Islamic history, which at times has outweighed animosity and rivalry between Muslims and non-Muslims (Bengio and Litvak 2011). More specific to our discussion, it also relates to hegemonic tendencies and power struggles among regimes in the Middle East. In the wake of declining pan-Arabism during the 1970s, Saudi Arabia's claim for leadership of pan-Islam was challenged by the 1979 Iranian revolution—the "nemesis" of Saudi's Wahhabism—prompting a rise of "anti-Shi'ism" sentiments that intensified after a series of Shi'ite revolts against Saudi authorities throughout the 1980s (Roy and Volk 1998; Steinberg 2009).[40]

Yet contentious interactions with Shi'ite Muslims became consequential in propelling AQ's radicalization in the context of the operation of the three central mechanisms (most notably upward spirals of political opportunities), with Iran becoming an object of claims and discontent and Shi'ite forces in Afghanistan an object of violent attacks. Engagement in

40. On the inherent tension between Salafism as a religious doctrine and Wahhabism as a politically embodied program, see Part 1 of Meijer's edited volume (2009).

categorical violence against Shi'ites reached its peak during the post-9/11 period (following Iran's support of the US war against the Taliban and the struggle between Sunni and Shi'ite forces in Iraq), which is beyond the scope of this study.[41] Nonetheless, the changing nature of interaction between Sunnis and Shi'ites had a distinctive influence on the intensification of AQ's radicalization, expressed already in the active participation of AQ's forces in the August 1998 Taliban-led brutal massacre of Shi'ite Muslims in Mazar-i-Shariff.

Even though the Iranian revolution inspired STJM leaders and activists who were impressed by the overall achievements of the larger Shi'ite community in the region and treated the Iranian case as a model to follow (Hatina 2012), Sunni-Shi'ite relations soured following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Whereas the early stages of the Afghan jihad witnessed calls for uniting Muslim forces, and Sunni and Shi'ite Arab Afghans trained and fought alongside each other, with their sacrifices equally glorified as martyrdom, Iran's deepening involvement in post-war Afghan politics and the fact that it sided with Afghan Shi'ite-Hazare warlords led to a resurfacing of tension.

Nonetheless, prior to 1997–1998 and AQ's high level of integration with the Taliban regime there is little evidence to suggest that Shi'ite Muslims were treated as the object of claims or attacks, whether in full or in part. A useful, albeit indirect, measure of object shift is offered by an analysis of AQ's published texts (N = 119) according to how central leading figures and mid-rank activists of AQ perceived themselves (i.e., "who we are"). The results of this analysis, presented in Figure 5.2, suggest that prior to 1998 there was no distinction made between Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims.

While maintaining a watchful eye on Iranian involvement in Afghanistan and on Shi'ite Muslims, STJM leaders in general tried to put aside theological/ideological differences. In addition to the theological elements of Salafism, which stressed transnationalism irrespective of culture, race, and color, and thus accommodated rapport with Shi'ites (Gunaratna 2002; Meijer 2009), it was the mutual recognition and identification on the part of both Sunni and Shi'ite activists as sharing sufficiently similar experience, and the facilitating brokerage role of al-Turabi in this regard that explain the lack of object shift.

As aforementioned, al-Turabi's Popular Arab and Islamic Congress was instrumental in bringing together Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims on a more

41. While declaring categorical violence against Christians and Jews took place as early as 1998, these declarations gradually became inclusive of other religious and/or ethno-national groups such as the Hindu population in Kashmir in July 2000.



Figure 5.2:
AQ's "Collective We" over Time[42]
Authors' data, compiled mainly from: FBIS Report: Compilation of Usama Bin Ladin Statements 1994–January 2004; Kepel and Milelli's *Al Qaeda in Its Own Words*; Combating Terrorism Center at West Point Harmony Program; and *Al-Jihad* journal.

regular basis. Through the Congress's periodic gatherings as well as other ad hoc meetings, al-Turabi enabled STJM leaders to meet and interact with Shi'ite leaders, including Hezbollah and members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and Intelligence forces, thereby alleviating prior suspicions on the part of the former. These gatherings, which also involved Islamic Jihad and Hamas delegates, facilitated not only an exchange of ideas and tactics, but also the development of a sense of sharing a similar enemy and, in the process, plans for joint activities and operations (Bodansky 1995; Byman 2012). During 1995, collaboration between AQ and Hezbollah, most notably, took root in a serious fashion. Referring to these meetings, Burr and Collins (2003) argue that "it was not isolated or discrete incidents but the components of a major Islamic offensive, directed against moderate Middle East regimes . . . many conferees used the meetings to launch inflammatory diatribes against tyranny, imperialism, the west, and the 'Great Satan' [the United States]" (p. 167–168). These developments put in context the bombing in Saudi Arabia against symbols of US–Saudi "special relationships" in November 1995, but also the Khobar bombing of June 1996, carried out by the Islamic Movement for

42. All texts were coded after a pilot round and four Inter-Coder Reliability rounds to reach an 80 percent level of agreement. In cases where there were several definitional elements of the "collective we" (e.g., Arabs, pan-Islamists—of which there were only few cases and mostly those were in connection with either Muslims or Sunni Muslims), coding was based on centrality and gravity.

Change, comprising Sunni and Shi'ite activists. Indeed, the Khobar bombing took place just several days after a meeting had taken place in Teheran in which AQ members participated, and which was meant to coordinate activities of various organizations.[43]

But just as the lack of object shift was facilitated by al-Turabi's brokerage role of establishing *cross*-boundary ties and connections and reinforcing attribution of similarity, the development of object shift was also facilitated by *brokerage*, with the Taliban gradually fostering *within*-boundary ties and connections. In the process, the Taliban's brokerage triggered *boundary activation* (a cognitive sub-mechanism, defined as the increase in the salience of "us–them" distinction separating two political actors [Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 215]) between Sunni-Muslims and Shi'ite-Muslims.

The process, however, was by no means inevitable. As discussed, AQ's move to Afghanistan was not entirely welcomed by the Taliban forces, who were engaged in lethal fighting against other Afghan warlords; leaders of AQ, too, were not only suspicious of the unknown Taliban, but also critical of their religious injunctions and practices (Tawil 2011). Following the August 1996 *fatwa* from Jalalabad (at the time not yet under the Taliban's control), Taliban leaders, who sought international recognition, were divided over what to do with the defiant bin Laden. Attempting to placate, AQ leaders made efforts to gain strategic political positioning through financial support and military training, as well as integration with the Taliban army. What further facilitated the process was related, firstly, to the increased support the Afghan warlords (primarily Shi'ite mujahidin forces) received from Russia, India, and Iran, which was aimed at defeating the Taliban (Christia 2012). Additionally, mounting enthusiasm and support for the Taliban in Saudi Arabia together with the new pan-Islamic causes in Chechnya and the situation in Kosovo resulted in an increase of not only anti-Shi'ism, but also anti-Westernism.[44]

While in early 1997 AQ leaders were still interested in seeing a united Taliban-Iran front against the United States,[45] the heavy losses of Taliban-AQ

43. "Iran Bomb Tie Feared," *Daily News*, June 30, 1996.

44. For a useful summary of domestic Saudi developments, see Hegghammer (2010, 83–98). For a detailed analysis of the alliances and re-alliances among the numerous groups and parties in Afghanistan between 1992 and 1998, see Christia (2012, Chapter 3).

45. AQ leaders maintained this interest in seeing a united Taliban-Iran front while still critical of Iran for what they considered futile support for the incorrigible warmongers; they indicated they were hopeful that the "misunderstanding that emerged between Iran and Taliban . . . would improve." See interview with Bin Ladin by Hamid Mir, March 1997 (FBIS collection).

forces to Iranian-supported Shi'ite forces in Mazar-i-Shariff, in May 1997, clearly marked out the battle lines between the parties. Beginning in the summer of 1997 the Taliban rulers, with the active support and advice of AQ leaders, engaged in a gradual yet systematic campaign of ethno-religious cleansing. This cleansing campaign was aimed at other religious and ethno-national groups such as Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Buddhists, and later against foreign officials (e.g., UN and other international NGO personnel). Yet it became clear that the Shi'ite-Hazare population, increasingly perceived as non-Muslim, was the top target.

Tension mounted most distinctly following the Taliban's decision to shut down the Iranian embassy in Kabul in June 1997. In response to the Iranian's decision to concentrate military forces on the Iran-Afghan border, the Taliban imposed an indefinite food blockade on the Shi'ite population in the Hazarajat region (Shay 2002; Griffin 2003; Gutman 2008). However, these and other developments were no more than a prelude to what would come next, indicative of the growing salience and consequentiality of boundary activation in shaping object shift. On August 7, 1998 (the same day of the embassy bombings in Africa), Taliban, AQ, and Sunni Pakistani radicals raided the city of Mazar-i-Shariff and indiscriminately slaughtered thousands of Shi'ite activists and civilians, capturing the Iranian consulate and killing eleven diplomats in the process (Karmon 2007).[46] While AQ's active involvement in the carnage may well be attributed to its leaders' attempt to consolidate the organization's political standing under the Taliban rule (the overlap with the embassies bombing was certainly no coincidence [Gutman 2008]), it was nevertheless indicative of a meaningful further step in AQ's radicalization, whereby religious and ethno-nationalist affiliations became a legitimizing feature in targeting entire categories of people with violence.

BRINGING IT ALL TOGETHER

Starting from a nascent and fairly abstract idea to form an organization that would maintain the momentum of jihad as a means to further the vision of pan-Islam, AQ went on to not only take on a concrete shape, but also to progress through a process of radicalization expressed in carrying out indiscriminate and brutal violent operations against Muslim and

46. Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan: The Massacre in Mazar-i-Sharif, November 1, 1998, C1007, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/45c9a4b52.html (accessed February 15, 2013).

non-Muslim targets, inside and outside the *ummah* world. As with the radicalization of EOKA and the BR, the process of radicalization AQ went through was not deterministic, nor was it linear; in terms of strategy, tactics, and goals, but also in terms of rivals and allies, the progression of the process was eventful, contextual, conjunctural, and, most significantly, relational.

Indeed, as the foregoing analysis has demonstrated, AQ radicalization was driven most consequentially by patterns of relational dynamics, captured most centrally by mechanisms, unfolding in each arena of interaction analyzed. Similar to the radicalization processes EOKA and the BR underwent, we saw how these relational dynamics were critical in influencing the salience, hence consequentiality, of cognitive forces and environmental stimuli on the process. We also saw how the two less central relational mechanisms (dissociation and object shift), exerted their influence, hence consequentiality in conjunction with the prior operation of the three central relational mechanisms (upward spirals of political opportunities, outbidding, and competition for power), inducing their respective influence once radicalization was already significantly underway.

* * *

But so much for similarities among our three episodes; as also demonstrated, in each episode similar mechanisms were constituted by different compositions of sub-mechanisms. This important aspect of dissimilarity stems from the particular set of initial conditions of each episode, which is inclusive of, but not limited to, the territorial scale and scope of the movement operation and the level of contentious engagement between the movement and the authorities that are the object of its claims. In chapter 6, which follows, we address this and other differences in greater length. In doing so, we examine in detail: (1) the combined influence of the various mechanisms/arenas of interaction on the progression of the process of radicalization; (2) the variation in the relative weight of each in each episode; (3) the different sequences formed by the concatenation of the mechanisms, namely, the specific path radicalization takes in each episode; and also (4) the different level of radicalization or severity of political violence across the episodes.

CHAPTER 6

Processes of Radicalization: Dissimilarities in Similarities

The explanatory comparative framework developed in this volume suggests that processes of radicalization are characterized and driven most centrally, albeit not exclusively, by a given set of relational mechanisms emerging from a given set of arenas of interaction, and that this holds in varied settings. The preceding three chapters demonstrated in detail how this happened in episodes of radicalization distinguished from each other by marked differences in initial conditions. In spite of these differences relational mechanisms operated in a robust and consequential manner across the processes of radicalization undergone by the Brigate Rosse (BR), the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA), and al-Qaeda (AQ). At this stage, our treatment of radicalization in comparative perspective takes a complementary, albeit different direction: if up until now we have established similarities in dissimilarities, the following discussion moves to flesh out aspects of dissimilarities in the development and progression of radicalization.

By now, readers should be familiar with one important aspect of dissimilarities: the particular, episode-specific sets of underlying mechanisms constituting each mechanism. But there are more aspects of dissimilarities, the sources of which are found not only in the unique initial conditions of each episode but also in the relational, conjunctural, and contingent nature of processes of radicalization. In what follows, we refer to our three primary episodes and to additional episodes in order to discuss how these sources of dissimilarity play out in:

- Forming the episode-specific composition of sub-mechanisms constituting the mechanisms, which we call *particularities of radicalization*;

- Assigning greater weight or gravity to one or more mechanisms in the process or in a certain stage thereof, which we call *modalities of radicalization*;
- Shaping the way the mechanisms concatenate to form a particular sequence, which we call *varieties of radicalization*; and
- Influencing the differences in the severity and lethality of political violence among the episodes, which we call *degrees of radicalization*.

Marked by radicalization's relational and processual requirements, these forms of dissimilarity open a novel route to the comparative analysis of radicalization. Yet, by taking this route to comparative analysis, we do not deem as irrelevant elements from more traditional modes of analysis. Thus, as much as we reject the focus on the search for the root causes of radicalization—the "why" question—, we recognize that the initial conditions of any given episode do inform the dynamics of the process, though certainly not in a deterministic manner. The full exploration of *how* and *when* radicalization progresses, therefore, must be sensitive to initial conditions and to how they play out in each episode. However, initial conditions are complicated forces and so should not be seen as forming a simple closed set or as producing a simple determined solution (Goldstone 1998, 841). After all, the temporal delineation of any given episode of contentious politics entails a certain level of arbitrariness with regard to the episode's beginning and, by extension, to specification of initial conditions. On this issue, rather than regressing back in history for the sake of tracing the origins of an episode, one can focus on the accumulated history at the point in time in which an episode is said to begin. The facets and specificities of accumulated history most pertinent to the development of the episode can be considered initial conditions.

With these observations in mind, the present task is to delineate simplified sets of initial conditions in the service of process-sensitive comparative analysis. We have already referred to one set of initial conditions in the introductory chapter of this study: the politico-territorial level of engagement—a notion that guided our selection of episodes. In addition to this, we see two more sets of initial conditions as being particularly relevant. Thus, the three sets of initial conditions are:

- *Politico-territorial level of engagement*—referring to the scale and scope of contentious interactions, particularly at the interface among movements, states, and societies;
- *Social boundaries*—referring to objectified forms of social differences, identities, and cleavages that bind and bound individuals and groups

based on class, race, religion, ethnicity, or ideology (or any other enduring material or non-material category) (Lamont and Molnár 2002; Tilly 2007);
- *Political style*—referring to formal and informal communicative and interactive sets of practices, conventions, and conducts of government (Hariman 1995) as it applies to dealing with and responding to domestic popular claim-making.

These three sets of initial conditions are not peculiar. They stand for "case characteristics" that are well established in comparative politics and political sociology. Adopting them here, however, does not mean a regress to logics of comparative analysis different than our own. Specifically, unlike the logic that considers cases as such and then adopts a "most different" or a "most similar" logic for their comparison, we maintain that the comparison of processes demands the ability to compare similarities and difference at once. This follows precisely the premise that processes of radicalization, being open-ended and multifaceted, are irreducible to simple characteristics. Thus our main argument that processes of radicalization unfold by way of relational mechanisms is not a stand-alone line of investigation but rather one that needs to be combined with the search for divergent elements that concurrently unfold in these processes. Indeed, more than establishing universal inferences, our relational-oriented comparative approach seeks to establish entry points for more nuanced observations.

Recognizing the importance of these initial conditions enables us to remain loyal to the historical specificities of our episodes despite the abstraction required for their comparison. Attention to initial conditions therefore allows us to contextualize the analysis of the particularities, modalities, varieties, and degrees of radicalization with regard to these episodes. Below we develop this comparative agenda, but in addition to returning to our three main episodes for a systematic comparative analysis, we also build succinct analyses of three additional episodes. These episodes pertain respectively to the Weather Underground (at the national level of engagement), the Irish Republican Army (at the intra-national level of engagement), and the Insurrectional Anarchists (at the transnational level of engagement). While not designed to back up global inferences, which we do not aim to make, these complementary episodes allow us to propose that the relevance of our relational approach goes beyond our three main episodes. Inasmuch as our short analyses below help explain radicalization in these additional episodes, our explanatory comparative framework gains credibility.

PARTICULARITIES OF RADICALIZATION

The first set of dissimilarities that we examine refers to the varied sets of sub-mechanisms constituting the five standard mechanisms. While the preceding chapters aptly discussed sub-mechanisms, here we reflect on them more analytically and comparatively. Table 6.1 compiles the sub-mechanisms we have identified in the analysis of our primary episodes of radicalization. That analysis made no pretense of exhausting all relevant sub-mechanisms constituting the mechanisms of the processes, but did treat the most central ones among them. Comparing these singled-out sub-mechanisms with each other reveals striking differences in the composition of the given mechanisms across the three episodes. These

Table 6.1. SUB-MECHANISM DIVERSITY ACROSS EPISODES

Arenas and Mechanisms / Episodes and Sub-Mechanisms	Sub-Mechanisms: Red Brigades (1969–1978)	Sub-Mechanisms: EOKA (1945–1959)	Sub-Mechanisms: Al-Qaeda (1984–2001)
Between Movement and Political Environment / Upward Spirals of Political Opportunities	Threat attribution; Boundary activation; Opportunity attribution	Diffusion; Brokerage; Certification	Internalization; Decertification; Uprooting
Between Movement Activists and Security Forces / Outbidding	Provocation; Repression by proxy; De-legitimization	Legitimization; Attribution of similarity	Boundary control; Threat attribution
Between Movement Actors / Competition for Power	Disillusionment; Emulation	Boundary formation; Marginalization	Resource depletion; (out-group) Brokerage; Category formation
Between Movement and Public / Dissociation	Decertification; Encapsulation	Marginalization; Social appropriation	——*
Between Movement and Counter-Movement / Object Shift	Vigilantism; Retaliation	Polarization; Boundary activation	(in-group) Brokerage; Boundary activation

* As noted in chapter 5, before the September 11, 2001 attacks there was no dissociation developing between AQ and the larger Sunni population. However, dissociation developed in the period following 9/11, a development that we discuss briefly in the next chapter.

differences relate in particular to the initial conditions featured in each episode. Thus taking into consideration the differences among our three episodes in terms of the politico-territorial level of engagement among the movements and their respective authorities and societies helps explain a great deal of this idiosyncrasy.

Consider first the episode of the BR. While transnationalism was an integral feature of the BR's socio-revolutionary agenda and ideological outlook (e.g., ideological affinity with Marxist-Leninist revolutionary organizations worldwide in the 1960s and 1970s and rejection of the state's international system of alliance), it was more of a background factor with little role to play in the actual dynamics of contention. Indeed, the BR's claims and attacks were directed almost exclusively against the Italian state, challenging the authority and legitimacy of institutional political forces but without raising similar challenge to pre-existing state-society boundaries. It should be recalled that, through their radical forms of action, the BR leaders sought to give voice to the needs of the working class in the face of what they considered to be the state's betrayal of this. In the view of the Left-wing militant groups, the Italian state had deviated from the resistance struggle against the fascist regime of the mid-1940s. As they thought that the state's malfunctioning, weaknesses, and fascist roots were conditions rendering it unable to give voice to working class needs, the BR leaders claimed to represent the Leftist sub-culture in Italy.

On the one hand, the fact that the BR episode unfolded at the national level of engagement, with the political establishment and state authorities seen as the prime target of grievance and discontent, helps explain the role of attribution of threat and attribution of opportunity (respectively, shared definition concerning *negative* or *positive* consequences of possible actions, or failure to act) in the operation of upward spirals of political opportunities. Indeed, leaders and activists of many of those organizations that were part of the Italian Extra-Parliamentary Left movement immediately interpreted specific state policies as either ripe conditions for intensifying the struggle against the state or as further undermining the movement goals. Thus, for example, the Italian government's declaration in 1972 of its intention to cancel some of the reforms, which had been welcomed by the students' and workers' organizations, immediately became a major inducement of tension and threat for the movement.

On the other hand, and in connection with the unique political style of the Italian polity (discussed below), the particular politico-territorial level of engagement of the BR episode also helps explain the presence of vigilantism (self-initiated provisional law-and-order activities by a non-state actor) on both sides of the political spectrum as a constituent

sub-mechanism of object shift. Growing evidence that the government was unwilling and, even when willingness existed, hardly able to act against Right-wing radical organizations' violence, pushed Left-wing organizations to counteract and to engage in vigilante and paramilitary operations as a strategy of self-defense. Further alarmed by this development and harshly criticizing state authorities for not showing a tougher hand, Right-wing organizations in turn formed their own militias to counter the "communist threat."

In the episode of EOKA, expectedly, the particular nature of the politico-territorial level of engagement gave rise to a different set of submechanisms. Here, three states—the UK, Greece, and Turkey—became part of the political contention over the Cypriot Greek nationalist goal of union with Greece (enosis), while the international community was, to one extent or another, the background to the contention, especially via the promotion of the universal principle of self-determination. It was not a contention that exclusively concerned the state within which violence eventually erupted (as with the episode of the BR), nor was it a contestation that was transnational in essence (as with the episode of AQ), even though the Enosis movement tried to attract regional and/or international attention and to capitalize on it. But what was crucial in addition to the number of state actors involved was that the movement did not dispute the constitutions, social realities, or other fundamental characteristics of these states; it merely sought to transfer sovereignty over a certain area from one state to another. Thus, regarding upward spirals of political opportunities, which unfolded amidst the configuration of the pertinent states and international institutions, brokerage (the connection of previously unconnected sites) and certification (the validation of a SMO by external authority) reflected relational changes in this configuration. These changes, more specifically, meant the alteration of the movement organizations' relations with the political elite in the state of Greece and, through it, with the UN General Assembly. Diffusion (the spread of ideas and practices), too, reflected this configuration, this time by indicating broader and prior changes in the movement's political environment, namely the spread of frames exalting liberalism and the self-determination of peoples—that is, frames supportive of the Cypriot Greeks' grievances.

Additionally, the episode-specific features of the politico-territorial level of engagement also informed the particular composition of object shift. Pertaining to the action of the mainland Turkish and Cypriot Turkish political leaderships, as well as the action of the UK leadership, this mechanism was underpinned by dynamics that mirrored the dynamics underpinning upward spirals of political opportunities. However, in our

analysis the emphasis was placed on the movement's reaction to the strategic moves of these actors, rather than on how these actors formulated their strategies. The sub-mechanisms constituting object shift, therefore, had a local flavor. But it was local flavor squarely fitting pre-existing social boundaries (see below), prompting polarization (increase in ideological distance between two sides) between the political actors in support and in opposition to enosis, as well as boundary activation (increase in salience of us–them distinctions) between the Greek and Turkish islanders.

Compared with the radicalization of the BR and EOKA, radicalization in the episode of AQ unfolded within a politico-territorial level of engagement that, in essence and in accordance with the vision of pan-Islam, transcended state and societal boundaries at the regional level (writ large), yet was bounded by, and demarcated in opposition to, non-Muslim states and societies. As "rooted pan-Islamists," to paraphrase Tarrow's (2005, 28, 40) notion of transnational activists, Salafi jihadists were strongly attached to their specific national contexts and built on local resources and opportunities, yet made claims on authorities and institutions outside their local/regional setting and engaged in contentious political activities that involved them in transnational networks of identities, contacts, and conflicts. Indeed, most Salafi activists that went to Afghanistan to fight off the Soviets acted in the name of pan-Islam, following the Quranic notion of the *ummah*, and fostered transnational identities and ties, yet without losing their particular ethno-national affiliation. Moreover, to varying degrees many of those activists enjoyed the resources and backing of their local authorities, who, in their stead and for their own set of interests, sought to promote and externalize the pan-Islamic project. These particularities help explain the role of boundary control (defending from encroachment by outsiders) as a central sub-mechanism of outbidding. Additionally, once the convergence of interests and values between the institutional and popular pan-Islamic forces disintegrated, with the former forces malleable, at times keen to external, non-Muslim influence and intervention—we observed internalization (migration of international pressures into domestic politics) playing a role as a central sub-mechanism of upward spirals of political opportunities. Thus, whereas in the BR episode outside influence had little if any effect on the process of radicalization, and in the EOKA episode it was in fact welcomed and desired, in the episode of AQ it was highly distrustful to begin with. Outside intervention, in this episode, reached the level of outright rejection, so much so that any attempt at influence and intervention, even when invited by local authorities, became threat inducing (i.e., threat attribution) and warranted action against both local and external authorities.

In all three episodes, however, the particular composition of the mechanisms' constituent sub-mechanisms was not exclusively a reflection of the politico-territorial level of engagement but, relatedly, was informed by pre-existing social boundaries as well as by political style. Pre-existing social boundaries and political style unquestionably informed the particular composition of mechanisms in the AQ episode. Always infused with social and nationalist threads—hence the labeling of the STJM and AQ as a "neofundamentalist" (Roy 2004) or "revivalist" (Peleg 2006) movement—Salafism developed into a fulcrum, a doctrine of political liberation defining Muslims vis-à-vis non-Muslims while trumping other boundaries at the in-group level. It is of significance, especially when compared with the EOKA episode, that throughout the bulk of the AQ radicalization process the mechanism object shift had little if any influence. In fact, object shift operated in reverse through attribution of similarity (identification of another political actor as falling within the same category as your own), as a result, inter alia, of both Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims' identification of their situations as being sufficiently similar to justify common action. But Salafism as a fundamentalist non-institutionalized religious doctrine, embodied defiance and challenge not only (and expectedly so) to secular Arab and non-Arab regimes, but also to those Muslim regimes and rulers seen as apostates for failing to follow and practice authentic Islamic injunctions or for collaborating with infidels to the detriment of Muslims.

Taken together, it is possible to understand, firstly, why even following the divergence of interests and values between pan-Islamist forces from above and from below, boundary activation had no comparable role to play in upward spirals of political opportunities as in the BR episode. The developing transnational Salafi-driven agenda made it so that even in the post-Afghan jihad and despite mounting evidence of the Saudi Royal Family turning its back on the pan-Islamic cause, it was internalization that constituted upward spirals of political opportunities more centrally. Secondly, regarding political style, we can also understand why decertification (removal by authority of their validation and recognition of a SMO) and uprooting (displacement of a person or a group from native or habitual surroundings against their will) played such a central role in the operation of this mechanism. In many of the Muslim states and societies, autocratic and authoritarian regime features were indissolubly connected with and based on clientelism and a patrimonial-like political style of rule, which extended to cover all aspects of life, inclusive of, although certainly not limited to, theological matters. Capriciousness and arbitrariness were the norms in dealing with domestic

defiance and dissent; a given actor's political standing and strategic positioning was based on its ties and connections with the ruling elite and the latter's recognition and approval of its performances and claims more than anything else. As such, the weakening strategic positioning of bin Laden and AQ during the early 1990s in Saudi Arabia entailed growing instances of decertification of the Salafi-driven pan-Islamic claims on the part of the Royal Family, which eventuated in the King's decision to rebuff and undermine the Salafi tide through, inter alia, privileging other competing Islamic streams, such as Sufism (Dekmejian 1994).[1] The King also put constraints on collective action by gradually excluding bin Laden from the tribal-like political establishment to the point of instructing him to leave the Kingdom and, later, to disowning him and instructing his family to follow suit.

The EOKA episode presents no exception to the proposition that social boundaries and political style inform the particular composition of the various mechanisms. In Cyprus, the most relevant social boundaries followed ethno-nationalist categories—hence the role of Greeks, Turks, and British as such. The contention over enosis followed these boundaries and, more particularly, resonated with the fact that the British rule was resented by the Greeks but not by the Turks. Variations existed with regard to Cypriots' attachment to these ethno-nationalist categories and nationalist positions; nevertheless, what is striking is that ethno-nationalist self-identifications and corresponding differential attitudes toward colonial rule were central and set, precisely because these elements were part of social organization and politicization. Thus during the period under investigation—the 1940s and 1950s—Cypriot Greek support for enosis and Cypriot Turkish opposition to it seemed all but given. While the development of the Enosis movement strategy, as indeed the development of the movement itself, was open-ended, the initial conditions relating to social boundaries gave the movement rich resources, such as the operation of boundary activation and polarization vis-à-vis the Turkish population on the island.

Closely related to how social boundaries informed the composition of mechanisms was the political style of the colonial ruler, which was shaped by the absence of a sizable British settler community on the island and of

1. It is worth pointing out that at least in Egypt and Algeria, the social boundary between Islamism and secularism informed upward spirals of political opportunities, with long-lasting suppression of Islamic forces and, often, the banning of such forces from the political system. This boundary also informed the general mechanism outbidding, giving rise to unjust, arbitrary, and disproportionate brutality against Muslims on the part of the mostly secular special security forces.

prior historical links between the UK and Cyprus. During the relatively short time in which the island was under British rule, the rulers failed to create a political class of Cypriot Greeks to be positioned between themselves and their subjects, one that would do their bidding in general as well as with regard to the nationalist questions. Under these conditions, the legitimacy of colonial rule among the Cypriot Greeks was thin, if existing at all, while their (and the Cypriot Turk's) civil liberties and political freedoms were precarious and uncertain for the future. As seen, Cypriot Greek nationalism had been challenging the legitimacy of colonial rule from the beginning of the rule, and as early as 1932 the UK government met the challenge with authoritarianism. At the same time, however, British colonial rule in general claimed to be of a liberal type, and this position, along with the legacy of the Second World War, created a tendency among British politicians—at least those belonging in the Labor Party—to search for a middle way between colonial rule by consent and colonial rule by force and coercion.

This political style, along with the pre-existing social boundaries, had bearing on the composition of outbidding. For one, these two elements made it likely that the colonial response to the violence perpetrated by the movement would be forceful, even though leaving a window open for a political compromise. For another, they allowed the movement leeway as it engaged in outbidding. The constitutive sub-mechanisms of outbidding, accordingly, reflected the movement's ability to harness support and resources from the Greek inhabitants based not only on their deep resentment of the counter-insurgency but also, and more fundamentally, on the ethno-national categories separating them from both the British and the Turks. Hence the ability of EOKA to present itself as the heir to the social movement's Right-wing organizations—the sub-mechanism attribution of similarity—was important and particularly aided EOKA to gain acceptance among the Cypriot Greeks—the sub-mechanism legitimization (the creation of favorable and resonating impressions about a SMO and its actions) (see Table 6.4 below for an illustration of this).

In the contentious scene of 1960s–1970s Italy, a socio-political boundary separating those who bestowed legitimacy to the state and those who withheld legitimacy from the state loomed large—even though Right-wing and Left-wing Italians belonged, for their own different reasons, in the latter category. This "legitimacy boundary" became particularly salient once the wave of protest during the late 1960s spread throughout the country and was met with resolute repression. At the same point in time, it was functional to the reactivation of the long-standing boundary

between Left and Right organizations, engendering not only vigilantism but also retaliation as two central sub-mechanisms of object shift.

Yet, the ability of Right-wing militant organizations to act freely against Left-wing activists was just as well an indication of the political style of the Italian state in dealing with domestic challenges. Not quite fully breaking away from its authoritarian fascist past (i.e., heavy centralization, bureaucratization, and continuing reliance on the 1930 notorious, highly inclusive criminal code for capital punishment—the Rocco Code [Pavone 1974]), the style of the Italian post–World War II political establishment in dealing with the Leftist mobilization remained centered on law and order intervention (Della Porta and Reiter 2003). An indication of such continuity is found in the fact that, as Ferraresi writes, "of the sixty-four first-class prefects, sixty-two had served under the fascist regime, and so had all the 241 deputy prefects, the 135 *questori* (provincial chiefs of the state police), and the 139 deputy chiefs" (1995, 18). It is not surprising, therefore, that outbidding in the BR episode involved such high degree of reliance on "dirty war"-like style of policing through repression-by-proxy (informal outsourcing by state actors to non-state actors of law-and-order activities), which further activated delegitimization (the creation of negative and resonating impressions about a SMO and its actions).

Finally, the deepening of the social boundary regarding the legitimization of the state also had an important impact on the intensification of a pre-existing yet dormant ideological divide within the Italian Left, between maximalists and reformists. Confronted by the threat of an authoritarian shift, the reformist Left, represented at this stage mainly by the Italian Communist Party (PCI), worked to consolidate the Italian institutions, progressively abandoning the Extra-Parliamentary Left movement and proposing the "historical compromise" (i.e., decertification). Maximalist organizations, already disillusioned by any kind of state reform and infuriated by the PCI initiative, considered the political conditions at the time ripe for revolutionary change and, accordingly, pushed for an escalation of the struggle as a means for unraveling the "fascist" nature of the state.

The Particularities of the BR in Comparative Perspective: The Weather Underground

In addition to comparing episodes that differ in initial conditions and yet reveal instructive relational similarities, each of the three primary

episodes employed in this study is representative of other episodes based on one or more sets of initial condition. Considering the particularities of the BR episode, it is therefore possible to draw parallels between it and other episodes that bear resemblance, most notably, in terms of the politico-territorial level of engagement. Of these episodes, the radicalization of the Weather Underground in the United States offers an instructive comparison. As with other episodes unfolding at the national level of engagement (e.g., the German-based Red Army Faction or the Peruvian-based Shining Path), claims raised by the BR and the Weathermen have tended to accept the pre-existing state-society boundaries and sought to make changes within them.

Initially active within the New Left–led Students for Democratic Society (SDS), which was formed during the early 1960s and was fully committed to nonviolent ideology and action strategy, a small group of activists went through an intense process of radicalization and formed a splinter group that became known as the Weather Underground Organization. This process involved, first, the formation of a distinct Action Faction grouping within SDS that called for confrontational, direct action. Later, amidst the escalation of the war in Vietnam and the intensification of the struggle as part of the broader coalition of forces known as the Antiwar movement, members of Action Faction and other radical activists from another organization called Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM) forcefully took over SDS during its June 1969 annual convention. Soon after, Bernardine Dohrn, Bill Ayers, Mark Rudd, and others, dissatisfied with RYM's position regarding the importance of students as a potential revolutionary force, parted company, adopted the name Weathermen, and went underground, beginning in 1970. The Weather Underground Organization, numbering a few dozen ideologically committed activists, was therefore created and, between late 1969 and 1977, initiated a series of violent operations against property and representatives of the US political establishment and security forces. These operations also included several instances of selective violence against properties of companies seen as supporting government policies (e.g., the bombing of ITT headquarters buildings in New York and Rome, in September 1971).

Despite apparent differences between the Italian and US episodes (e.g., lack of fascist history, salience of racial politics, a fairly weak history of class-labor struggle, and the emerging US role in capitalist-driven global imperialism, to name only a few), the operation of upward spirals of political opportunities and outbidding, most notably, reveal telling similarities in terms of their respective sub-mechanisms.

Considering upward spirals of political opportunities, the episode of the Weathermen reveals the operation of the three sub-mechanisms we saw in the episode of BR: boundary activation, threat attribution, and opportunity attribution—albeit in different temporal order (i.e., attribution of threat precipitating boundary activation). With the development of "red-scare" and cold war politics, conservative tendencies within the Democratic Party,[2] and the escalation of the war efforts in Southeast Asia following the Gulf of Tonkin incidents of 1964, pre-existing boundaries between old-Left and new-Left forces sharpened. In the process, new-Left organizations' resentment toward and alienation from the state in general, and the political system in particular significantly deepened, convincing growing numbers of activists of the inefficacy of nonviolent tactics. For SDS new-Left activists the entire US system lost legitimacy; for them this was the consequence of mounting evidence indicating that the US administration had veered from its professed values of liberal participatory democracy, become detached from public control, and was engaged in what was seen as a systematic campaign of brutal racial discrimination, repression, and exploitation of non-white people (internationally and domestically) (Steigerwald 1995; Sprinzak 1998; Zwerman et al. 2000; Varon 2004).

In this context and as the Weathermen's preference for violence gradually developed, specific policies and statements by government officials rendered attribution of threat and, later, attribution of opportunity more central. It was no coincidence that the weathermen members' decision to take over SDS during the June 1969 convention, declaring old-guard SDSers and other moderate organizations illegitimate, took place in the wake of Nixon's policy of "Men Out, Machines In" with regard to the Southeast Asia front and the expansion of the war efforts to eastern Cambodia and Laos in March 1969. It was also no coincidence that the first Communiqué of the Weathermen, titled "A Declaration of a State of War" (against the US government), was issued on May 21, 1970, soon after the Kent State University killing, when troops of the Ohio National Guard used excessive force and shot to death four unarmed protestors and wounded nine others during an on-campus rally against the Cambodian campaign on May 4 (Sale 1973). Enraged by the White House officials' attempts to justify the measures taken by the National Guard, yet also

2. We are referring most particularly to the failure of SDS activists to have the Mississippi delegation disqualified for its discriminatory practices during the 1964 Democratic Party National Convention, which was held in Atlantic City, and their simultaneous failure to have the alternative Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party elected.

encouraged by mounting public concerns, Weathermen members decided to take their struggle to a higher level. As the Declaration reads:[3]

> This is Bernardine Dohrn. I'm going to read a DECLARATION OF A STATE OF WAR. . . . Ever since SDS became revolutionary, we've been trying to show how it is possible to overcome the frustration and impotence that comes from trying to reform the system. . . . Revolutionary violence is the only way. . . . We will never live peaceably under this system.

The increase in the use of excessive and unjustified force (the Kent State killing was not the only one) reflected a process whereby attitudes and perceptions of unworthiness and contempt vis-à-vis antiwar protesters on the part of police forces and other law-and-order agencies began to unfold.[4] It was indicative of outbidding dynamics that seemed to have acquired their own momentum, leading to broadening public and political concerns over the brutality of security forces and forcing Nixon to establish a President's commission.

It should be stressed that antiwar activists, in general, and SDSers, more particularly, were not systematically targeted by Right-wing radicals (e.g., White Supremacist organizations). Unlike the Italian episode therefore, where repression by proxy operated, the particularities of the US episode yielded no collusion between the Right wing and the state against New Left activists—though, of course, repression by proxy did take place against black militants and Civil Rights movement activists (McAdam 1999; Luders 2010), and some Black Panthers did put pressure on the Weathermen for support. Repression by proxy absent, we nonetheless observed similarities in terms of provocation and de-legitimization, as two central sub-mechanisms of outbidding.

Outbidding, while clearly influenced by the demeaning and polarizing rhetoric of Nixon and other White House and Republican Party officials, was not one-sided; security forces were unquestionably influenced by antiwar activists' direct action operations and *provocation*

3. SDS/Weather Underground Document Archive, http://www.antiauthoritarian.net/sds_wuo/.

4. The Scranton Commission established by Nixon in June 1970, shortly after another campus killing at Jackson State University, on May 14, concluded in its report that the shootings were unjustified and that "no order to fire was given . . . there was inadequate fire control discipline on Blanket Hill" (The President's Commission Report on Campus Unrest, 1970, 289). Interestingly, the report, in its Recommendation section, states: "We strongly urge public officials at all levels of government to recognize that their public statements can either heal or divide" (p. 10).

(acts initiated by one actor with the intention of inciting the response of another actor); examples of provocation include the organization of "free universities," public burning of draft cards, and so forth, and, even more so, by the radicalism of small factions within and outside SDS who explicitly advocated and employed violence (e.g., the "Motherfuckers," the "Crazies," and the Black Panther Party, respectively) (Daniels 1974).

Even though SDSers and other antiwar leaders and activists were not systematically targeted by Right-wing radicals, with either the implicit or explicit backing of the security forces, they certainly were not completely spared of "dirty war"-like repression style. In addition to facing brute repression of street protest, they became the subject of covert repressive operations. In particular, this followed the decision by the US administration to expand the FBI-led COINTELPRO covert operations to include antiwar organizations and SDS members. The administration's aim was to expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize the activities of these movements and their leaders, in addition to redefining the CIA charter to "uncover foreign influence behind domestic unrest" (operation CHAOS). In the face of systematic harassment, public stigmatizing, surveillance, incrimination, restriction of movement, and infiltration by informants and agent-provocateurs (Gamson 1990; Cunningham 2003), de-legitimization of law-and-order and intelligence agents among Weathermen members became widespread, and such agents were dehumanized, depersonalized, and portrayed as "pigs," "dogs," or "Nazis" (Sprinzak 1998). From this perspective, and much like the BR episode, it is not surprising that violent attacks against police and intelligence property and agents constituted a considerable portion of Weathermen operations.

* * *

Any systematic and comprehensive discussion of dissimilarities in similarities must also address two additional sources of variation across our primary episodes: differences in the gravity of mechanisms, to which we now turn, and differences in how the mechanisms concatenate to form particular paths or sequences of radicalization, which will be the topic of the subsequent part. As with the foregoing, the discussion of both of these additional sources of dissimilarities takes into consideration not only the set of initial conditions, but also the actual dynamics of contention in each episode.

MODALITIES OF RADICALIZATION

How do differences in the set of initial conditions help us make sense of variations in the gravity of mechanisms across the three episodes of radicalization?[5] The politico-territorial level of engagement, social boundaries, and political style may well inform the relative weight of a mechanism and thus its consequentiality in the process of radicalization. But it is usually the case that the actual dynamics of contentious episodes and alterations in patterns of relations among the numerous actors and parties involved, both directly and indirectly, may bring about changes in this regard, such that in a given phase of the radicalization process we will observe an increase in the consequentiality of another mechanism.

Our three episodes of radicalization reveal meaningful differences in this regard. As shown in Figure 6.1, the mechanism outbidding was the most consequential mechanism during the early phase of radicalization (positioned in the inner circle) in both the BR and AQ episodes, whereas in the episode of EOKA upward spirals of political opportunities assumed a similar role in this phase. During the later phase of radicalization (positioned in the outer circle), following the onset of political violence, competition for power took a greater relative weight in stepping up the radicalization of AQ, outbidding played a similar role in the episode of EOKA, and upward spirals of political opportunities were the most significant in this regard in the episode of BR.

In the Italian episode, the dominant social boundary regarding the legitimization of the state and the unique political style combined to render outbidding (the mechanism indicating the increase of stakes for each side in a struggle for control) most consequential to the radicalization of the BR in the early phase of the process. It was not only the fact that students and workers' peaceful protest activity was met with disproportional and indiscriminate police force. It was also the insidious and Machiavellian style with which the security services tried to curb the popular unrest by raising the level of threat so as to induce public demand for law and order. Backed by several sections of the security service, whose attitudes toward Left-wing claims and agenda were equally negative, Right-wing radical organizations planted bombs in public conveyances and public places without any warning, as was the case with the Piazza Fontana bomb explosion

5. High gravity or consequentiality of a given mechanism/arena of interaction in the early phase of radicalization does not have to correspond to the mechanism/arena of interaction that initiates the process. We relate to this in discussing varieties of radicalization.



Figure 6.1:
Variation in Mechanisms' Gravity across Episodes

in Milan, on December 12, 1969, which killed 17 civilians and injured more than 80. For the Extra-Parliamentary Left movement the Piazza Fontana bombing acted as a proof of the malevolent duplicity of the Italian government. Indeed, the continuation, even intensification of repression generated a shared perception of futile and ineffectual tactics and justified the shift to violence as a means for literally defending the movement and its constituents, mainly inside the factories of the North of Italy (BR, "Autointervista," 9/1971).

Outbidding, to be sure, continued to operate throughout the entire process of radicalization, even though with reduced intensity between 1976 and 1978. However, it further gained salience only when its operation combined with the upward spirals of political opportunities (the mechanism indicating the weakening of the movement's strategic political positioning), which, during the stepped-up radicalization phase, became the mechanism that had greater relative weight. In fact, it was the accumulated process of imposing new threats and constraints on the extra-parliamentary Left

organizations that prompted the shift of strategy from "defensive" violence to "offensive" and, then, from the factories to the streets. This "double-shift" was most apparent following 1972, in the context of the Center-Right government's failure to restore public order which, from the point of view of Left-wing radical organizations, was perceived as a state-devised counter-revolutionary move for defending the status quo. But at the same time, as we will see in the section on varieties of radicalization, dissociation (the increase in social distance between a SMO, on the one hand, and its constituency and third parties, on the other) was working in conjunction with the upward spirals of political opportunity resultant from PCI's important shift toward strategic compromise.

While the mechanism outbidding was consequential in the Cypriot episode too, this happened only in the episode's stepped-up radicalization phase, after the onset of the campaign of violence by EOKA in 1955. During the early, nonviolent phase of the process, it was upward spirals of political opportunities that had a greater relative weight. Given the three sets of initial conditions described above, it is to be expected expected that relational dynamics unfolding in the movement–political environment arena of interaction played a particularly important role. Specifically, changes in the political environment shaped the constraints, possibilities and threats the movement faced and made possible a strategy that built on pre-existing identities and socio-political fault lines—both inside and outside the island. At the same time, these conditions enabled a strategy of shifting political contention between the movement and the state away from a two-party relationship and toward a web of relationships among several international actors. The postwar context challenging colonialism worldwide and the British resolute resistance to the prospect of decolonizing Cyprus, therefore, played a particularly important role in bringing about the decisions to set up EOKA and to allow it to pursue a campaign of violence for the sake of internationalizing the claim for enosis. Outbidding between the movement and the colonial authorities in Cyprus hardly existed in this early period. Even though the threat to return to the colonial suppression experienced in the 1930s did not dissipate, the actual contact between movement members and the authorities showed no pattern of contention buildup. It is characteristic of this that before 1955, law and order was maintained by a police force largely comprised of Cypriot Greeks.

The movement strategy, of course, eventually became one of provoking outbidding, and EOKA was the vehicle for that. And so this mechanism drove radicalization in the post-1955 phase, with newly arrived

British troops, rather than the Cypriot Greek policemen, carrying out the counter-insurgency campaign. What needs to be underlined here, however, is that the consequentiality of upward spirals of political opportunities was also expressed in this stepped-up phase, as this mechanism concatenated with the operation of object shift (the mechanism referring to change in a SMO's object of claims and target of attacks). In particular, object shift presented a threat to the Enosis movement, as partition of Cyprus appeared possible. It was, therefore, another development that stemmed out of the initial conditions discussed here, in which the tactics of the two governments opposing the movement (i.e., the UK and Turkish governments) forced the movement to react.

Outbidding gained the greatest gravity and consequentiality in the years between 1956 and 1958, when the insurgency and the counter-insurgency were in full swing. Upward spirals of political opportunities, to be sure, remained relevant in these years too, since the movement conceived violence as events for the world to see. But at the same time, outbidding acquired a measure of independence from the arena between the movement and its political environment. The reason for this was not so much EOKA's organizational autonomy, considerable though it was, as it was the failure of the movement and the UK government in 1956 to reach a negotiated settlement. Thus in the period between the spring of 1956 and the summer of 1958 each side put faith in violence, believing it would bring it advantages.

Given this, the episode of EOKA stands in contrast to the other two episodes we analyze in that, with respect to the conduct of the state, it exhibited a relative congruence between high-level political decisions and security forces practices on the ground. This was not a perfect congruence, and mild discrepancies can in fact be found on two levels: between London and Nicosia and between Nicosia and the field. Thus, on the one hand, there were some decisions about the counter-insurgency taken by the colonial authorities in Cyprus with which the UK government in London might have disagreed; this was especially the case when the government was questioned in the House of Parliament by the opposition over particularly harsh counter-insurgency practices. On the other hand, there were mild discrepancies between colonial-level decisions regarding the counter-insurgency and the actual execution of counter-insurgency in the field; these were typically instances when soldiers broke discipline during operations, resulting in indiscriminate or particularly brutal application of violence. Still, all in all, those who decided, planned, and applied the counter-insurgency were on the same page. What facilitated this congruence

most particularly, beyond the UK's long tradition in colonial affairs, was the fact that London made one of its foremost generals the Governor of Cyprus, delegating to him powers that it could hardly question subsequently (for an extended and insightful analysis of this particular point, as well as other related points, see Holland [1998]).

Similar to the BR episode, outbidding also took on greater weight in the progression of AQ radicalization during the early phase of the process, although in this episode such was the case for different reasons and with different manifestations. Given the politico-territorial level of engagement the STJM was involved in and the nature and scope of the Salafi-driven pan-Islamic agenda, as promoted by those organizations that embraced a more proactive strand of transnational jihad following the Soviet withdrawal, the operation of outbidding went beyond contention-repression interactions at one or another local setting. In fact, outbidding dynamics were closely linked with, indeed heavily shaped by, similar action-counteraction between AQ and non-Muslim forces locally present. Indeed, repression against Islamist activists at the various local settings acquired meaning, became threat inducing, and prompted action in the context of ever-greater encroachments of foreign forces throughout Muslim countries, and even more so when Arab/Muslim rulers cooperated with these increasingly perceived acts of incursion. We observed this dynamic as early as 1993 in Somalia, where this dynamic produced a shift in AQ's mode of contention from mostly defensive and resistive to involvement in proactive guerrilla attacks on US forces in Mogadishu. Then, in the context of developing coordinated, direct repression of STJM leaders and activists by both US and Arab/Islamic regimes' security forces, we saw radicalization shifting to higher gears with a series of lethal violent operations against both, as was most notably the case during late 1995 in reaction not only to the Srebrenica massacre but also to the extraordinary rendition operations.

The dynamics of contention, however, infused the mechanism competition for power (deepening of tension and rift, and increase in mutually undercutting activities among SMOs within a movement over strategy, tactics, and goals) with greater consequentiality to the process, most notably during the stepped-up radicalization phase. In this episode too, this is not to say that competition for power had no influence on the process during the earlier phase, as argued by Gerges (2005), or that once it became more salient, outbidding as well as other mechanisms had stopped exerting their own distinctive influences, a most meaningful interplay and reciprocal influence to which we turn below. As discussed in

chapter 5, competition for power had been a constant feature of the movement internal dynamics, frequently generating rifts and infighting and, in conjunction with the operations of upward spirals of political opportunities and outbidding, occasionally found expression in acts of political violence aimed at non-movement targets. These intra-movement dynamics, however, remained bounded within local settings and tended to characterize relationships among two or more movements operating within the same country or among organizational members or factions of the same movement (e.g., the EIG and EIJ in Egypt and the Yemen Islamic Jihad, respectively). Throughout the first half of the 1990s there hardly was any infighting unfolding between different movement branches of the broader STJM, such as mutual attacks between the Yemen Islamic Jihad and the EIJ. In addition to the fact that an overarching global jihad vision and action strategy was not even conceived of (and certainly not bound to develop—as discussed in the subsequent chapter), it was just as well the vastly spread feature of the broader STJM that enabled competition for power to remain mostly rhetorical. This sharply contrasted with competition for control and influence over the same geographical space, limited resources and supporters, and, inevitably, higher levels of friction that characterized the Egyptian or Algerian scenes, for example, and which acted as a catalyst for growing instances of mutual infliction of violence, including lethal variants of political violence.

This situation changed drastically when many STJM leaders and top-rank activists were forced into exile and looked for alternative secure refuges, the availability of which became increasingly limited, along with other shrinking resources, as a result, inter alia, of the tightening of coordinated repression. Moreover, with the developing shift of the struggle from the "near enemy" to the "far enemy" and the consolidation of the transnational jihad conception and action strategy, we also saw deepening of competition for power between the local and global jihadists, operating most centrally through category formation. It is in this context of becoming "rootless pan-Islamists," most notably during 1996–1997 in Afghanistan, and alarmed by what seemed to be a trend of local jihadists lowering arms that explained the attempt of the Afghan-based leadership to sabotage the cease-fire initiative in Egypt by employing the brutal, indiscriminate carnage in Luxor 1997. Concomitantly, in the context of deepening competition for power within the same geographical Afghan space between Shi'ite-Hazare and the Taliban-led Sunni populations, under whose aegis the Afghan-based AQ leadership managed to reestablish a relatively secure base, we saw yet one more shift in tactics, this time engagement in categorical political violence.

AQ Modalities of Radicalization in Comparative Perspective: Insurrectional Anarchism

Backtracking more than a century to nineteenth-century Europe, we find revealing similarities in the modalities of radicalization of AQ and the Insurrectional Anarchists. Needless to say, many differences exist between the movements in which AQ and the Insurrectional Anarchists respectively belonged: the International Socialist/Labor movement differed from the STJM in terms of modes of mobilization and organization, ideologies, motivations, claims and aspired goals.[6] Nevertheless, and as a growing body of works have demonstrated (Gelvin 2008; Jensen 2008, 2009; Kassel 2009; Stott 2010), there is a reasonable basis for comparison in terms of the dynamics of both movements' contention.

Although the International Socialist/Labor movement developed before the 1860s and operated long after the fin de siècle, it is commonly agreed that its most important episode of activism took place during the last four decades of the century, with the First International of 1864 marking a turning point in the movement consolidation. And although the movement had bases of support and operation outside continental Europe, its main locus of operations was the continent—still the "capital of world civilization" (Anderson 2005; Sedlmaier 2007). It was during that time period that those sources of grievances and discontent of the movement—coercive capitalist-based state consolidation, imposed nationalism, and intensive institution and expansion of direct rule (Tilly 1992)—reached their most developed stage and manifestations. But the most important fact for our discussion here was the split within the movement in this period and the radicalization of the splintered organization—the Insurrectional Anarchists (hereinafter: Insurrectionalist).[7]

Represented by several leading figures and ideologues (e.g., Mikhail Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin, Errico Malatesta, Johann Most, Emma Goldman) and forming a distinct, albeit diversified, revolutionary school of thought within the International Socialist/Labor movement, anarchist leaders and activists, especially the Insurrectionalists, gradually went through a

6. As will be discussed below, the continuing availability of relatively safe bases for insurrectional anarchist activity and the fact that with few exceptions during the early stage of their operation insurrectional anarchists did not wish to become a mass movement, helps explain why dissociation had little role to play in their radicalization process. To the best of our knowledge, there was no counter-movement to either the International Socialist/Labor Movement or the Anarchists.

7. As distinguished, for example, from the individualist anarchism with its focus on artistic expression or the mass-oriented anarcho-syndicalism with its focus on labor unions' direct action (see Van der Walt and Schmidt 2009, Chapter 4).

process of radicalization. Unlike other organizations of the broader movement that held ideologies justifying the use of violence, or for whom violence could be tactically necessary, Insurrectionalists pursued violence as a strategy of contention. The development of the Insurrectionalists' strategy away from a predominantly nonviolent mode of contention and toward a violent one—featuring selective, collateral, and, occasionally, categorical violence—was a gradual and relational process. The crescendo of the process took place most blatantly during the 1890s in France, Spain, and Italy (and also Portugal, although to a much lesser extent), a decade notoriously labeled the "decade of the bomb."[8]

Partly informed by the politico-territorial level of engagement and political style of authorities in dealing with domestic opposition, and partly by the actual dynamics of contention, outbidding played the most critical and consequential role in the progression of the process, not only (and like AQ) in the early phase of radicalization, but also in the stepped-up phase. The horizontal and class-based organizing of the anarchists in general and the Insurrectionalists in particular epitomized the notion of rooted cosmopolitanism. Indeed, more full and broad than the cosmopolitanism of the STJM, this rooted cosmopolitanism allowed the movement to transcend state and societal boundaries and to make claims on authorities and institutions outside local/regional settings.

With regard to the Insurrectionalists, consistent with their unequivocal distaste for any authoritative, hierarchical form of relationships and capitalizing on newly available means of communication (e.g., the telegraph), leading figures and activists developed and maintained a loosely structured, de-centralized network of organization through which they engaged in contentious political activities that involved them in transnational networks of identities, contacts, and conflicts. Also similar to the global jihadists, in many of the locales in which Insurrectionalists operated they eventually experienced brute and systematic repression, overt as well as covert Machiavellian policing styles, which were backed by, yet at times surpassed, draconian policies that left little if any space for action or prospects for goal attainment (Laqueur 1987, 133–136).[9] Indeed,

8. Insurrectional-anarchist political violence continued into the twentieth century with more operations initiated in other parts of the world. Here, we limit our focus given that the severest expression of the process had taken place already during the 1890s in mainland Europe. For useful treatments of later stages and other loci, see Avrich (1988), Van der Walt and Schmidt (2009), and Jensen (2014).

9. An exception in this regard, although a temporary one limited only to some relative space of action, relates to Spain during Sagasta's terms as prime minister, especially during his fourth term, from 1885–to 1890. On this development and its influence of colony-based Anarchism, see Anderson (2005).

during the specific time period examined here, thousands of activists and supporters were implicated and incarcerated, many tortured and executed, and still many others expelled. Those expelled found refuge in countries where some space of action still existed, such as the UK and, to a lesser degree, the United States.

Similarities notwithstanding, it should be stressed that the radicalization of the Insurrectionalists unfolded in a time when there was no international regime (Krasner 1983; Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1997) comparable to that of the time period during which AQ took shape and operated. Relatedly, throughout the time period under examination, it was not only that the "first world" was deeply polarized, with European states engaged in intense competition, but also that non-continental powers, including the UK, tended to embrace a non-interventionist policy vis-à-vis Europe. As such, despite the gradually developing "blocked political opportunities" situation they faced in many European countries, Insurrectionalist leaders and activists still had available relatively secured bases of operation and followers, and did not face the same level of spatial contraction as did AQ. In the face of criticism raised by several leading anarchists over the use of selective and collateral violence during the late 1880s and early 1890s and the loss of public support, such a spatial contraction could have resulted in intense competition for power had some local branches lowered their arms and engaged in cease-fire agreements with authorities. Although states like the UK, Switzerland, and even the United States (especially after the 1886 Haymarket tragedy) did end up adopting several laws prohibiting the use of explosives and limiting immigration of anti-government entry seekers, they were still significantly more tolerant of organized labor activism. In fact, the UK and Switzerland not only tended to fend off pressures imposed on them to crack down more harshly on anarchists, but they also refused to fully collaborate with other states when it came to multilateral anti-anarchist initiatives (e.g., the 1898 Anti-Anarchist Rome Conference).

With these differences in mind, we can begin to understand why outbidding was so consequential in the radicalization of the Insurrectionalists, with upward spirals of political opportunities and, although to a much less considerable extent, competition for power influenced by (more than influencing) contention-repression dynamics. This pattern was apparent as early as 1872. In the wake of the bold, locally driven initiative and institution of a socialistic government in Paris (the Paris Commune) between March and May of 1871, and the brutal crackdown, massacre, and imprisonment of thousands of communards by the French military forces in Versailles (apparently with Germany's approval), harsh and more

stringent laws were passed that ruled out all possibilities of organizing on the Left (Anderson 2005, 68). Appalled by the fate of Parisian communards, pre-existing tensions reached a critical level during the 1872 Congress of the First International, held in Hague, with demands voiced by anarchist representatives to follow the Parisian Insurrectional model and initiate their own communes throughout Europe. There is little doubt that the fate of the Paris Commune inflated the intense debate and mutual exchange of accusations, most notably between Marxists and Bakuninists and was a major catalyst for the final split between the two camps and the expulsion of Bakunin from the First International.

Between 1873 and 1877, during which time the term "anarchism" became fully publicized and Insurrectionalists continued independently with their own St. Imier International in Switzerland, a series of attempts to implement the Insurrectional model was made.[10] As chronicled by Jensen, "a spontaneous peasant revolt in southern Spain failed in 1873, an uprising in the Romagna led by Bakunin himself fizzled in 1874 and an expedition led by the anarchists Malatesta and Cafiero to revolutionize the peasants of southern Italy failed in 1877" (2004, 123). Authorities in those and other states responded heavily and resolutely to what was increasingly considered a cross-national specter, instituting sweeping laws and authorizing security forces to engage in indiscriminate repression against the entire socialist milieu/labor movement.

By late 1872, the International Socialist/Labor Movement was outlawed in France, and both Spain and Italy followed suit. In Germany, in 1878, Chancellor Bismarck, capitalizing on two failed attempts to assassinate Emperor Wilhelm by individuals who were influenced by anarchist ideas and guided by local activists, implemented a state of siege in Berlin, which was immediately followed by massive arrests and convictions. Moreover, in October of that same year, Bismarck managed to pass anti-Socialist legislation and in fact to dissolve the Reichstag and, via new election, to form a more conservative one. In the wave of violent suppression and repression of the entire labor movement in Germany, any socialist was immediately criminalized and treated accordingly; Reichstag members were not exempted, such as Johann Most, who fled to London (Miller 1995).

Insurrectionalist counter-moves did not take too long to appear. During the late 1870s calls were made by Insurrectionalist ideologues to engage in proactive confrontational and violent acts. By July 1881, however, the

10. So complete was the rift between the two camps that when in 1889 the Second International was founded in Paris, anarchists were not even invited.

conception of "propaganda by the deed"—using illegal and violent acts (though not necessarily involving civilian casualties) in order to promote socialist principles and make more effective propaganda than thousands of pamphlets—was officially accepted as the policy of the Insurrectionalists. Already deeply alarmed, and even more so following the publicity of the July 1881 decision, authorities overreacted with undercover operations of anarchist cells and sweeping arrests and expulsions, even before the first "propaganda by the deed" act was attempted (yet failed) in October 1881 by a French anarchist activist against a certain bourgeoisie gentleman he met by chance (Jensen 2004, 130). This act, it should be stressed, was neither planned nor guided by any one of the Insurrectionalist leading figures, some of whom spoke out explicitly against what they saw as terrorist violence; yet it did reflect the deepening enmity on the part of Insurrectional activists and supporters vis-à-vis anyone who represented the enemy or identified with it. Moreover, it was indicative of inflammatory extreme rhetoric that was increasingly gaining weight and prevalence, according to which theretofore restrictions and barriers were off. As was most markedly advocated in Johann Most's newly formed doctrine of "anarchist vengeance" in his published articles in the journal *Freiheit*, be it through the use of the dagger, the rifle, or dynamite, Insurrectionalists should initiate violent attacks against monarchs and other tyrannical rulers, as well as against other "individuals of significance," and no area should be off limits; anarchists, like the proletariat, must have no fatherland (Miller 1995).

In Germany, France, Spain, Austria, Switzerland, Italy, and other European countries, acts of political violence ensued. When activists and supporters faced major setbacks with their bases of operation severely undermined, as was the case in Germany in mid-1880s, they fled to other nearby countries where they either initiated their own attacks against local targets or joined other Insurrectionalist organizations' operations. To counteract this development, during the 1880s European rulers began passing anti-freedom of expression laws that were specifically designed to curb "propaganda by the deed" operations. When these measures proved futile, European rulers began to form bilateral agreements, especially between police forces. These efforts built on previous unilateral creations of international policing networks, which were secretive, in some places monstrous in size, and often in competition with or in opposition to the general police force. Indeed, it was not exceptional that in Germany, Austria, Russia, and elsewhere secret police agents, for material gains and political agendas, used informants and infiltrators to instigate act of anarchist violence (Laqueur 1987, 134).

Efforts at bilateral cooperation became more intensive and systematic during the 1890s, following the most intensive series of Insurrectionalist violence, which at that time also included several instances of categorical violence. With consolidating agreements regarding extradition, immigration, and exchange of information between countries (e.g., Germany and Austria, Italy and Argentina), Insurrectional anarchist activists, many of whom operated underground and were persecuted by secret police forces, took their struggle to the next level. Most notably between 1892 and 1895, Insurrectionalists in France, Spain, and Italy initiated a series of violent operations not only against members of the authorities and security forces, or against individuals of significance; this time they were more willing to engage in collateral violence and in some cases (although only a few) began to treat the entire bourgeoisie as a legitimate target, regardless of whether or not bourgeois individuals were involved in contention (Sedlmaier 2007; Jensen 2009).

In sum, either as a result of initial conditions or the dynamics of contention (though usually a combination of both), episodes of radicalization also feature dissimilarities in the relative weight of one or more mechanisms and in different phases of the process. Speaking about the higher or lower relative weight of a given mechanism does not mean, as we have made sure to stress and demonstrate, that other mechanisms play no role. A full exploration of this dynamism and how it produces varying paths of radicalization is the focus of the next part.

VARIETIES OF RADICALIZATION

In using the term varieties of radicalization, we mean the episode-specific way the mechanisms interact to form a particular sequence in the path of radicalization. As our explanatory framework (chapter 2) suggests, while each mechanism exerts its own influence on radicalization, it is the combined influence of all mechanisms that best captures the dynamics of the process. Thus, each mechanism *influences* and is *influenced by* the other mechanisms and it is this combined influence that best captures the progression of radicalization. Here, too, the set of initial conditions of each episode and the actual dynamics of contention both play out in producing specific concatenations of the mechanisms. In analyzing how mechanisms reinforced each other in their operation, we return to an unfinished aspect from the analysis of each episode provided in previous chapters, where the interplay among the mechanisms was demonstrated only cursorily. In this section we discuss the dissimilarities found in the radicalization path

of each episode and, as done above, provide illustrative evidence from another episode, this time the IRA in Ireland and the United Kingdom.

How did the mechanisms in the BR episode concatenate to form a distinct path of radicalization? Outbidding was not only one of the most consequential mechanisms, but also the one from which the process began to unfold (see Table 6.2). Protest by Left-wing activists had already started in 1967 and, though predominately nonviolent, it was provocative and gradually became widespread. In sharp contrast to previous years, when police handling of protest and Left-wing popular challenges could be said to be softer and relatively tolerant, the unprecedented scope of the protest and, more importantly, increasingly louder and alarming Right-wing voices from within the political system brought about a shift in policing style. Indeed, from 1969 onward, Left-wing activism was met by not only violent and indiscriminate police repression meant to suppress the "red" challenge but also by Right-wing indiscriminate violence, with ever-greater signs of acquiescence on the part of Centrist and Rightist political forces,.

This process reached critical heights in 1972, following the rise to power of the Center-Right coalition. This, in turn, further sharpened Left-wing organizations' shared perception of de-legitimization vis-à-vis state institutions and forces of law and order. Outbidding thereby intensified, with Left-wing activists becoming more confrontational and, in the process, gradually employing violence against police forces, factory-related targets, and Right-wing organizations. With widespread Left-wing activists' belief that security forces were not only turning a blind eye to

Table 6.2. RADICALIZATION PATH IN THE BR EPISODE



Mechanisms are ordered sequentially. No background denotes absence/disappearance of sub-mechanism's operation; light gray background denotes operation of sub-mechanism at low level; dark gray denotes sub-mechanism's operation at high level; appearance of sub-mechanism in the course of contention denotes triggering constitutive relationship with mechanism

Right-wing, neo-fascist violence but also, in fact, enabling it, object shift also operated through the creation of Right-wing and Left-wing vigilante organizations and acts of retaliation, which fed on each other and acquired a distinct dynamic that persisted throughout the process.

Subsequently, the mechanism upward spirals of political opportunities gained momentum in exerting its own influence in the process of radicalization. In the face of political changes (e.g., the fall of the Center-Left coalition in the national elections of 1972) that were perceived by some Left-wing militants as a threat and by others as an opportunity, boundary activation between those who struggled for change from within the system and those who sought a complete destruction of the system surfaced with ever-more intensity. With mounting evidence that the reformist-led institutional Left was not only continuing its traditional disowning of any autonomous political force to its left (Della Porta 1996) but was also making considerable strides toward acceptance of the state (e.g., the PCI providing a security net for the coalition following 1976), and, worse still, was withdrawing recognition and support from the Extra-Parliamentary Left movement, BR leaders and activists further intensified their struggle and fueled outbidding in the process.

Whereas the input of object shift and upward spirals of political opportunities further fueled outbidding, we observed competition for power shifting to higher gears in the early to mid-1970s and pushing radicalization even further. Mobilization among the ranks of the Extra-Parliamentary Left declined as disillusionment grew, following the intensification of outbidding in conditions of prolonged underground experience and diminishing resources. But this led committed Leftists to renew their engagement with violent contention and, from 1976 onward, to lead an intense campaign of violence. Concurrently, as the BR was emerging as a leader in violence, the Leftist constituency was distancing itself from it. Moreover, once the BR was beginning to engage in selective violence in 1977, such development further deepened the movement's sense of disillusionment and, in turn, operated closely with encapsulation as a sub-mechanism of dissociation. Dissociation, however, gained momentum only by the end of the process, when, together with the input of other mechanisms, it was constituted by decertification as well as encapsulation.

What was the specific sequence of radicalization in the episode of AQ? Needless to say, deepening contradictions between newly developing possibilities and constraints, as well as threats in terms of both collective action and realization of pan-Islamic goals, all of which were unfolding during and shortly following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, were central to setting the process in motion (see Table 6.3). This was mostly related to the

Table 6.3. RADICALIZATION PATH IN AQ EPISODE



Mechanisms are ordered sequentially. No background denotes absence/disappearance of sub-mechanism's operation; light gray background denotes operation of sub-mechanism at low level; dark gray denotes sub-mechanism's operation at high level; appearance of sub-mechanism in the course of contention denotes triggering constitutive relationship with mechanism

nature and scope of the pan-Islamic cause, which was transnational in essence and involved attempts to engage Muslims throughout the House of Islam, above and beyond pre-existing state-society boundaries and ethnonational affiliations. Encouraged by their recent accomplishment vis-à-vis the non-Muslim invader and seeking to keep the momentum of the Afghan jihad as a means to further the pan-Islamic cause, even those Arab Afghans who were not inherently anti-regime in their agendas nonetheless experienced newly imposed constraints and threats by their local authorities. As was most notably and meaningfully the case in Saudi Arabia, with the Royal Family being put on the defensive in the face of growing signs of atomizing its religious authority and criticizing its foreign and domestic policies, we observed not only decertification and internalization operating in higher degrees but also, as a reaction to more defiant and daring activities on the part of bin Laden and his AQ associates, uprooting.

But if upward spirals of political opportunities were central to setting radicalization in motion, as convincingly demonstrated by Hegghammer (2010), this mechanism's influence was not the most consequential to the process. Moreover, it was the way that upward spirals of political opportunities influenced and, more meaningfully, were influenced by outbidding dynamics that pushed radicalization forward. It is difficult to understand the shift of AQ strategy to proactive political violence and, moreover, inclusion of collateral and indiscriminate violence as part of its tactics without taking into consideration the series of recurring deployments and interventions of foreign forces throughout Muslim-populated countries and the active backing of these interventions by Arab rulers.

These interventions went beyond attempts to influence domestic policies of Muslim-populated countries and developed further to include acts of actual incursion as well as repression against both local Muslim forces and, increasingly so, AQ activists and supporters. With deepening perception of threat and operations meant to defend the House of Islam from outside encroachments, in which the United States began to be seen as the ultimate responsible power even when not directly and physically involved (threat attribution), we observed intensification of outbidding and an initial shift in AQ's perceived primary enemy from the "near enemy" (i.e., Arab rulers) to the "far enemy"—most centrally the United States.

The intensification of outbidding, as noted, worked closely with upward spirals of political opportunities, embodying and concretizing the weakening of AQ's strategic positioning and political leverage in the region. But it also brought to the surface, with greater intensity, the underlying tension and discord among the various movement organizations regarding strategy, tactics, and goals. In the context of an acute need for resources, partly the result of uprooting, decertification, and heavy expenses associated with boundary control operations, tensions sharpened and culminated not only in the activation of identity and ethno-national boundaries, but also in infighting and, in some cases, rifts between local and global jihadists. Competition for power, we now know, reached its full height when growing numbers of local jihadists began to lower their arms, independently of AQ. This process unfolded precisely when AQ-led global jihadists were experiencing an all-time low in strategic positioning and political leverage in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan and, amidst intensifying outbidding dynamics, were eagerly trying to reestablish strategic positioning for themselves. This explains not only the willingness to initiate the first incident of indiscriminate violence in Luxor, in late 1997, but also the breaking away of the Afghan-based AQ in early 1998 (the World Islamic Front) and, shortly after, the involvement in the Taliban-led brutal operation of categorical violence against Shi'ite Muslims in Afghanistan in early August 1998.

Finally, the episode of Enosis-EOKA featured its own sequence. First, spirals of political opportunities that turned from downward to upward in their operation were important in precipitating the turn to violence and then, following the initiation of violence by EOKA in 1955, outbidding gained center stage in driving radicalization. Present in the early phase were also the mechanisms competition for power and dissociation, doing their part to enable the movement's turn to violence. Spirals of political opportunities connected the movement to a political environment that extended well beyond the confines of the island, hence the constituent sub-mechanisms brokerage and certification, working in tandem, reflected this trans-local

quality; by contrast, competition for power and dissociation were local mechanisms. Nevertheless, all three mechanisms combined to shape the strategic positioning of the movement.

Furthermore, in the period of violence the role of the Turkish Cypriot counter-movement, along with the support given to it by the Turkish government and the space given to it by the colonial administration, set object shift earnestly in motion; boundary activation between Cypriot Greeks and Turks and the polarization of their respective nationalist ideologies and claims—two sub-mechanisms constituting object shift as well as influencing each other—clearly flourished in the context of violence. As Table 6.4 shows, in this period, and especially during 1958, object shift concatenated with upward political opportunities spirals as it presented the movement with an acute threat to its goal attainment. Accordingly, the two mechanisms combined to further radicalization by introducing ethnic clashes along the ongoing insurgency and counter-insurgency.

Hence, the operation of the mechanism object shift, like the operation of outbidding, was skewed during the course of the radicalization process, essentially operating after the onset of violence and actually gaining momentum as violence progressed. But object shift and the resultant threat to the movement did not bring about a long-lasting increase in outbidding between the movement and the authorities (the insurgency and counter-insurgency), though some increase transpired during 1958. In fact, the political compromise that ended the episode of contention over enosis was worked out by the governments of Turkey and Greece during the closing

Table 6.4. RADICALIZATION PATH IN THE EOKA EPISODE



Mechanisms are ordered sequentially. No background denotes absence/disappearance of sub-mechanism's operation; light gray background denotes operation of sub-mechanism at low level; dark gray denotes sub-mechanism's operation at high level; appearance of sub-mechanism in the course of contention denotes triggering constitutive relationship with mechanism

months of 1958, at the aftermath of the intense violence of the summer of that year, and the Enosis movement leadership accepted it under the weight of the threat of partition. Finally, competition for power and dissociation maintained a role in the stepped-up phase, now enabling the continuation of violence. Of these two mechanisms, perhaps dissociation was the most consequential, and it is worth noting that it interacted with outbidding. That is, the more outbidding intensified, the less the leadership of EOKA was constrained by the movement constituent groups, which in turn allowed EOKA more tactical leeway in pursuing its campaign of violence.

The EOKA Radicalization Path in Comparative Perspective: The Irish Republican Army

As an example of an ethno-nationalist social movement, EOKA can be compared with a long list of other movements that experienced radicalization. However, the episode of the Republican movement in Northern Ireland in the period between 1965 and 1972 is particularly apt for this purpose, as it pivots on a claim similar to the enosis claim, that is, to transfer sovereignty over a certain area from one state to another. Thus in this episode not only do we have a movement making a claim in the name of a nation and a counter-movement making a counter-claim in the name of a different nation; we have also critical interrelations transcending the borders of a single state. Like the EOKA episode, therefore, the Republican movement is an instance of an ethno-nationalist movement having transnational dimensions but mostly developing at what we term the *intra*-national level of engagement.[11] Nonetheless, as discussed below, the historical specificities of each episode differ, most particularly in terms of political style (i.e., in Northern Ireland there was liberal democracy, at least in form, while in Cyprus there was colonial autocracy) and social boundaries (i.e., the social divisions in Northern Ireland had a history of armed conflict, unlike in Cyprus). These differences informed the specific sequence of radicalization of actors within the Republican movement, particularly the IRA and the Provisional IRA.

When the Irish Free State[12] was created in 1922, it did not include the entire island of Ireland. While the vast majority of the island's population

11. For useful treatments of the transnational dimensions in the Republican movement during the twentieth century see Maney (2001), and for earlier periods see Hanagan (1998).

12. The Irish Free State had dominion status within the British Commonwealth of Nations and was therefore not fully sovereign, though having almost complete autonomy. A new constitution in 1937 changed the name of the state into Ireland (Eire) and in 1948 an act by the Irish parliament (Dail) declared the state a fully sovereign republic.

had been Catholic and pro-independence (at least during the last years of the period under the union), in the northeastern part of the island almost two-thirds of the population had been Protestant and so much in favor of the union with the UK (hence the term unionists) that they had threatened civil war to defend it (Smithey 2011). The creation of the Irish Free State, therefore, arrived with the compromise that Northern Ireland would remain part of the UK. The new political setup in Northern Ireland entailed devolved powers, with the local parliament, known as Stormont, having jurisdiction over most internal matters. Through this formally, procedurally democratic setup, the Protestant majority was able to marginalize the Catholic minority through gerrymandering and other measures, following a strategy that, as Ruane and Todd describe, was "unambiguously and unashamedly sectarian" (1996, 121).

Meanwhile, a movement claiming Irish unification maintained an existence in both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, but was marginalized in each setting. The most militant faction of this Republican movement claimed to be the heir of the Republican insurrectionists of 1919–1923 and maintained their name, Irish Republican Army (IRA). This clandestine organization emerged in the scene especially in the period between 1956 and 1962, when it waged a guerilla campaign at British targets, mostly at the border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Members of the leadership of the IRA subsequently considered the "border campaign," as this series of clashes became known, to be a failure, particularly as it failed to gather popular support. This led to the emergence of a new IRA leadership in the early 1960s, comprised of Marxists Cathal Goulding, Tomas MacGiolla, and Sean Garland. These leaders decided to broaden the appeal of the Republican movement by keeping in reserve the use of violent means of contention and by embracing social and economic issues. As their aim was a united, independent, and socialist Irish Republic, their strategy developed in two parallel directions: to win unionist working-class support by exposing the discriminatory separation of Northern Irish workers, and to promote gradualist-reformist grassroots social agitation pivoting on civil rights. But it should be stressed that calling for civil rights was for them a tactical part of a revolutionary strategy. Left-wing Republican thinking at the time held the system to be "irreformable" and unable to survive without systematic discrimination. Asking for civil rights would therefore expose the system, making its demise and Irish unification more likely.[13]

13. Wolfe Tone Society, *Tuairisc*, No. 6, June 1966.

Spirals of political opportunities in the 1960s benefited the Republican movement's new strategy, at least by way of new possibilities for collective action. An expanding London-funded welfare state in the preceding decades had by the 1960s built up the London-Stormont relations and thereby reduced Northern Ireland's political isolation. This, along with the growth of the mass media, led liberal politics in the UK to become a framework of comparison for Northern Ireland politics, making starker the imbalance of power between Protestants and Catholics (Bew, Gibbon, and Patterson 2002; Bosi 2008). Furthermore, the civil rights movement in the United States presented an example to emulate in Northern Ireland, while Irish-Americans as well as other international organizations supported the movement and further raised questions on the Northern Ireland political system inside and outside the UK (Maney 2000).

In this context, a movement formed in Northern Ireland calling for reforms in the political systems in the name of civil rights. This Civil Rights movement sought to create a coalition across the Catholic-Protestant boundary, and, indeed, in the period between 1965 and 1968 it managed to do so: under its umbrella there were constructive Nationalist reformers, socialist-republicans, liberals, trade unionists, communists, "New Left" activists, and, during the early phase, even some progressive unionists (Purdie 1990). For the Republican movement, the Civil Rights movement offered a platform to engage in popular politics against the Stormont status quo, and from early on Republican leaders were part of the Civil Rights movement formation.

But while spirals of political opportunities moved downward to allow the new, Marxist IRA leadership to reorient the Republican movement with the aim of reviving it, this did not happen readily. These leaders were still under the watch of the "Traditionalist Republicans," even though many among the latter distanced themselves from the organization (Patterson 1997). The mechanism of downward spirals of political opportunities, therefore, operated in conjunction with the mechanism competition for power. As long as IRA's participation in the Civil Rights movement seemed promising, the Marxist leadership could keep the "Traditionalist Republicans" marginalized and their preference for military action out of the organization's strategy.

This is a set of dynamics that contrasts with the episode of EOKA. As the early phase of the Cypriot episode the balance of downward and upward spirals of political opportunities gradually tipped toward the latter, fueling the radicalization of the movement's strategy, whereas in Northern Ireland, initially, upward spirals were maintained, giving impetus to moderate activism; and while competition for power within the

Enosis movement meant the marginalization of the movement's moderate Left, it was the militants who were marginalized in the Republican movement. Although all this implies that the Republican movement was moving away from radicalization, that was not the case, as it, too, ultimately radicalized. Outbidding, object shift, and an upsurge of competition for power were the factors that, above all else, triggered its turn to violence.

Outbidding emerged from the arena between the Civil Rights movement and the Northern Ireland security apparatus, initially, and between the nationalist working-class ghettos and the British Army subsequently. The Stormont political establishment opposed the Civil Rights movement and initially yielded nothing to its demands. The Civil Rights movement met this political challenge with increasing street activism. Thus in late 1968, marches, sit-ins, and the occupation of various sites were taking place, mostly in Belfast and Derry (Londonderry). The security authorities, in turn, confronted street activism with harsh policing, often resulting in activists' bodily harm (O'Dochartaigh 2005; Bosi 2006). Amidst this outbidding, the opposing sides found allies. On the one hand, anti-partitionist organizations of the Irish Diaspora and European Leftists organizations took the side of the Civil Rights movement;[14] on the other hand, the Protestant counter-movement did take to the streets in order to show its opposition to the goal of ending the island's partition—a goal which it perceived to be the Civil Rights movement's ulterior motive.

By early 1969 the counter-movement became particularly active and frequently clashed with Catholic organizations, with the Northern Ireland police at times giving cover to violence perpetrated by Protestant radical (Loyalist) organizations. This development was shifting the object of contention: whereas the bulk of the conflict was initially one between the Civil Rights movement and the authorities over non-sectarian demands, now it was becoming a sectarian clash (Bosi 2006; DeFazio 2014). But at this stage the government in London stepped in. Fearing that the sectarian clashes would lead to civil war, it sent British troops to Northern Ireland, in the summer of 1969.

However, the presence of the British troops and the preceding violence caused the renewal of competition for power within the IRA. The deposed leadership of the organization actively opposed the non-militaristic approach

14. Support for the Civil Rights movement in countries with a sizable Irish Diaspora often took the form of street demonstrations. This sort of transnational mobilization tended to interpret the movement as anti-partitionist. Indicative of this is that the Irish flag was often featured in street demonstrations outside Northern Ireland, while the movement in Northern Ireland was careful to avoid such a display—at least in the period before 1969. On this, see in particular Maney (2000).

of the current leadership, an approach that in their view had left Catholic neighborhoods defenseless. In December 1969 this opposition led to the splintering from within the Republican movement. The Provisional IRA (PIRA) was therefore formed by "Traditionalist Republicans" and young northern Nationalists, with the Marxist Republican leaders rebranding their remaining organization as the Official IRA (English 2003).

While the British troops gave initial protection to the Catholic population, they also engaged in a series of wide-ranging and indiscriminate security initiatives that alienated the general Catholic population. These actions included a two-day curfew and house-to-house search in the Catholic Falls Road area of Belfast in July, 1970, and the arrest and internment without trial of 350 Catholics in August 1971. For many Republicans the presence and conduct of the British troops were proof of collusion between Stormont and London to subjugate the Catholic population. Some of them went as far as to think that violence against British targets was the only way forward (White 1989). As it turned out, this was an assessment made within both the PIRA and the Official IRA. Thus in late 1970 the Official IRA followed the example of the PIRA to start a campaign of violence, going against its formal non-sectarian, non-militaristic, and gradualist-reformist policies. However, part of the violence perpetrated by the Official IRA was aimed at the PIRA, and as the latter responded in kind a full-scale feud ensued. But in this period it was PIRA's campaign that was the most lethal, as it was not only intense but also aimed at wide-ranging targets. In fact, the organization employed categorical and indiscriminate violence, mostly by way of bombings, in 1970 and early 1971, before including, later in 1971, a systematic, organized campaign against British military targets.

The armed conflict between the Official and Provisional IRA ended in May 1972, when the former declared a ceasefire vis-à-vis both British forces and PIRA (English 2003). PIRA was thereby able to lead the violent campaign in the name of Republicanism, despite competitive claims made by several other very small Republican armed organizations withstanding. PIRA carried its campaign of violence in earnest along an outbidding pattern with the security apparatus; 1972 was in fact the most deadly year ever for PIRA violence, claiming the lives of 208 people. The fact that this was a time of increased tension among the population sustained outbidding. Further misconduct by British troops took place in this period, culminating in the events in Derry in January, 1972, known as Bloody Sunday, where British soldiers killed fourteen unarmed protesters and injured about a dozen more. Expectedly, Catholic antipathy toward the British troops and government deepened, and polarization between the

Catholic and Protestant populations increased; members of the two communities respectively moved closer than before to Republican and Loyalist positions. In this context, the PIRA was able to recruit effectively and built the infrastructure for a campaign of violence that was to last for three decades (O'Dochartaigh 2005).

In sum, the episode of P/IRA featured its own sequence: first, downward spirals, while producing competition for power, nevertheless contained contention; then, outbidding gained prominence and, coalescing with upward spirals of political opportunities, opened the way for object shift which, in turn, intensified competition for power. In the episode of EOKA, as seen, the sequence was somewhat different: spirals of political opportunities, favorable at first to the movement's strategic positioning, soon turned upwardly and became the main vehicle precipitating violence, with outbidding and object shift becoming important subsequently. This underscores the fact that the radicalization of EOKA was initially driven by the movement strategy, before the movement faced the consequences of this strategy in the stepped up phase; whereas radicalization in the P/IRA episode was driven by a movement strategy that adapted to initiatives taken at various times by other actors within and outside the movement.

* * *

Processes of radicalization, as we have demonstrated throughout, reveal noticeable dissimilarities in the specific composition of sub-mechanisms that constitute each mechanism, the relative weight of mechanisms in different phases of the process, and the specific sequence of radicalization. But there is one more aspect of dissimilarity, which is perhaps most evident and to which we alluded in the introduction of this study. This aspect concerns variation in the lethality of political violence employed by the BR, EOKA, and AQ.

DEGREES OF RADICALIZATION

Despite undeniable differences in the militancy and susceptibility to violence, based on cultural templates, historical precedents, or existence of radical organizations within the same movements, it would be fair to say that the contentious repertoire of the SMOs on which this study pivots was predominantly nonviolent in early stages of contention. And yet, in the actual unfolding dynamics of contention, Ethnarchy/EOKA, and AQ did radicalize and consequently employed political violence as a predominant

feature in their struggles. The radicalization of all three organizations differed, nonetheless, not only in its sequence and the varied salience or consequentiality of specific mechanisms, but also in the forms of violence employed. As elaborated in the introductory chapter, distinguishing among different forms of violence sheds light on the degree of severity of violence. The severity of violence regards not merely the number of casualties but, more importantly for the qualitative analysis of radicalization, whether violence moves beyond state actors and security forces to include the harm of civilian targets in a selective, collateral, categorical, or indiscriminate way.

Without any supposition that engagement in violence precludes other nonviolent activity, that the shift from one degree of severity to another is linear or irreversible, or that these levels of violence cannot co-exist, comparing across the episodes/organizations reveals meaningful differences. Whereas all three SMOs eventually engaged in political violence, it is instructive that each reached different degrees of radicalization. Specifically, as can be seen in Table 6.5, the BR's tactics included selective violence, with only one instance of categorical violence; EOKA's tactics included selective and categorical violence; and, AQ's tactics included collateral, categorical, and indiscriminate violence, yet no selective violence.[15]

How can we explain these differences in degrees of radicalization? Are these variations merely the result of ideological differences and permutations

Table 6.5. DEGREE OF RADICALIZATION IN THREE EPISODES

Degree / Episode	BR	EOKA	AQ
Selective Violence	The injury of Vittorio Bruno (June 1977)	Porakos assassination (January 1956)	
Collateral Violence			US embassies bombing (August 1998)
Categorical Violence		Prichard assassination (January 1957)	Mazar-a-Sharif carnage (August 1998)
Indiscriminate Violence			Luxor carnage (November 1997)

15. This excludes, of course, local jihadist organizations that operated independently of AQ or local groups and movements, such as EIG and EIJ, prior to the joining of some of their leaders and key-activists to AQ.

or differences in environmental stimuli, operating independently of relational dynamics? In what follows, we demonstrate that these variations are better accounted for when these cognitive and environmental forces are examined in the context of relational patterns unfolding within the various interactive arenas.

Despite their social encapsulation and high ideological commitment, the members of the BR were willing to employ selective violence but not higher degrees of political violence. Thus, in addition to initiating acts of violence against state actors and property, BR leaders eventually broadened their targets to include non-state actors/property. Among the victims of the organization's attacks in this stepped-up campaign of violence were moguls, journalists, intellectuals, and trade unionists who were deemed enemy due to their general perceived or actual behavior and roles within the class struggle. Although disruptive acts and other instances of bodily exclusion and restriction occurred early on (e.g., holding the manager of the Siet-Siemens captive for 30 minutes in March 1972), it was only from 1977 onward, once competition for power and dissociation operated in higher intensity, that instances of selective violence began.

Solely focusing on cognitive mechanisms or on environmental mechanisms would offer little help in explaining the lack of shift to a higher degree of radicalization by BR leaders and top-rank activists. Specifically, a sole focus on ideology offers little help precisely because just as the ideology of the BR went through meaningful adaptation to legitimize the use of political violence and selective violence (ideational elements absent during the early phase of radicalization), such a transmutation could have continued to develop in the heat of contention. Environmentally, too, BR leaders and activists were exposed to ample incentives and opportunities that could potentially have unleashed aggressive propensities, as was the case when a bomb planted by Right-wing radicals exploded during a trade union march in 1974 in Brescia, killing 8 demonstrators and injuring 102. Indeed, calls for engagement in more lethal and, arguably, more effective tactics were made in response to this attack. It seems likely that these calls were behind the violent reaction to the Brescia massacre, when activists from the Venice column killed two members of the Movimento Sociale Italiano (a neo-fascist party) in Padua 1974, marking the first, yet only, instance of categorical violence by the BR. Not surprisingly, the BR leadership made efforts to present the killing as a "workplace accident" and in claiming responsibility for the killing stressed that the central aim of their struggle remained an attack on the state rather than killing Right-wing militants, as the following excerpt

from a leaflet sent by the BR to the Italian national journal *Corriere della Sera* makes clear:

> Christian Democracy and Taviani wanted this massacre [strage di Brescia] so that they could resolve the sharp contradictions opened up within their ranks by the clear defeat of the referendum and the "Sossi case" . . . [and] more generally, to re-launch the NeoGaullist plan with "special laws" to maintain public order. The eight comrades murdered in Brescia cannot be wiped out of the consciousness of the proletariat with the wipe of a sponge. Their death represents a decisive stage in the class war, both because for the first time the Christian Democratic powers have through their fascist hired assassins unleashed savage terrorism directly against the working class and its organizations, and also because after Brescia the revolutionary forces are just in responding to fascist barbarity with the armed justice of the proletariat. . . . Those who continue to struggle against fascism, seeing it as an autonomous political force which can be defeated in isolation without involving the state which produces it, are off the mark.[16]

Indeed, when ideological and environmental mechanisms are examined in the context of relational dynamics, it is possible to make better sense of why the BR episode has not featured a higher lethality of political violence. Reconnecting with the particularities of the Italian case (i.e., the Left versus Right social boundary), BR leaders sought to maintain its Left-wing popular basis of support by, inter alia, distinguishing their tactics from those of Right-wing radical organizations, who went as far as initiating categorical and indiscriminate violence. The leadership of the BR did not want to appear in the eyes of its constituency as committed to the same type of violence produced by the fascists (Della Porta 2013). This goes a long way in explaining the self-imposed restraints, which included, for example, meticulous preparations in selecting targets and, to prevent the Padua incident from reoccurring, well-thought-of considerations regarding the activists who would carry out the attacks. In this episode, the selection of targets progressively shifted from the factories to the political realm, as part of the struggle that the BR launched against the Italian state, which was seen as the main protector of the capitalists.

Moving on to the episode of EOKA, it must be noted at the outset that research on EOKA violence is rare. Nonetheless, existing accounts are puzzled about why EOKA recruits, many of whom were devout Christians, perpetrated the wide-ranging violence that they did. Many among these

16. BR, "Guerra ai Fascisti," June/1974.

accounts typically evoke nationalism as the key to understand the Enosis movement in general and, thereby, the movement's violent tactics in particular. But as a blanket reply to the "why" question of violence, nationalism ultimately answers little. It is telling that authors with opposing political sympathies evoke nationalism to explain EOKA violence, hence respectively evoking "nationalist fanaticism"[17] and "self-sacrifice for the national ideals."[18] While nationalism is obviously relevant, therefore, its specific relevance requires the examination of its many ramifications. Our relational analysis, stemming from asking "how" and "when" questions about radicalization, enables that; it allows us precisely to integrate nationalism's various manifestations into the analysis of violent tactics and to develop a better picture of the degrees of radicalization.

But it is only in basic terms that one can talk about changes in the degree of radicalization during the EOKA campaign. As the analysis of chapter 4 demonstrated, the campaign featured a wide-ranging repertoire of action. The acts of violence included not only attacks on military targets but also instances of collateral, selective, and, unlike the BR episode, categorical violence. Yet, as the chapter explained, clear-cut patterns regarding the progression among these acts did not exist.

Consider first the instances of collateral violence. The earliest collateral killing occurred less than three months into the campaign (in June 21, 1955), when an EOKA time bomb placed at a Nicosia central police station killed a Cypriot Greek bystander (*Elevtheria*, June 22, 1955). Though an early-on incident, this killing was not the beginning of a pattern. Instances of collateral violence were not frequent during the whole span of the campaign, which means that this form of violence cannot be said to characterize EOKA's degree of radicalization. Together with the absence of indiscriminate violence, the uncommonness of collateral violence implies no increasing disregard by EOKA of Cypriot Greek life in general. This was a behavior connected to nationalism, but the connection is better understood within the relationship between EOKA and its broad constituency, which included the Enosis movement. That is, given that EOKA claimed that the goal of enosis was one espoused by all Cypriot Greeks and

17. Those evoking nationalist fanaticism attribute it above all to Georgios Grivas, EOKA's leader, with some early British authors going as far as to sketch Grivas's alleged perverse personality (Barker 1959; Byford-Jones 1959).

18. The literature evoking self-sacrifice is voluminous, authored mostly by Cypriot Greeks, some of whom EOKA veterans; an early example is Grivas's own memoir (1961, 1965). This literature, however, typically eschews references to the acts of violence that do not project self-sacrifice, such as assassinations, acts of intimidation, and so on.

that EOKA itself championed that goal, it was imperative for it to show a general respect for Cypriot Greek life lest it undermine its own ideology and alienate its constituency. The inclusiveness of the nationalist ideology, in other words, framed a movement-constituency relationship that constrained EOKA tactics.

The instances of selective violence tell a different story. The first instance of fatal selective violence (i.e., against a non-member of the state apparatus) occurred in January 7, 1956, when masked EOKA men assassinated Savvas Porakos, a Cypriot Greek owner of a small hotel (*Cyprus Mail*, January 8, 1956). This marked the beginning of a developing patterned indeed. The number of victims of selective violence was high during the campaign, indicating EOKA's ongoing attempts at social control. Here a rough pattern transpired: the number of assassinations of Cypriot Greek civilians was high in 1958 (about 96) and more so in 1956 (about 109), matching the two periods of intensified clashes with the colonial armed forces. This may indicate EOKA's efforts to maintain operational capacity through the elimination of presumed traitors, as well as an early-stage effort to discipline Greek Cypriots and a later-stage effort to intimidate Leftists' re-entrance into national politics. Operational concerns in the phase of outbidding, therefore, were coupled with dynamics of competition for power in the intra-movement arena of interaction. EOKA addressed the strain selective violence might have caused with the movement constituency by branding its victims as traitors to the national struggle, hence individuals who placed themselves outside the nation.

On its part, categorical violence presents no discernible pattern across time, at least when the thirty-one or so assassinations of British civilians are considered. This means that EOKA engaged in this sort of tactic even at times when it was under pressure by the counter-insurgency; for example, one such assassination, that of Herbert Prichard, a civil engineer working for a British firm on the island, took place in January 9, 1957, during a period when the security forces had engaged in a particularly intense wave of operations (*Elevtheria*, January 10, 1957). Regarding the periods of intense counter-insurgency, therefore, such assassinations can be taken to reveal both EOKA's resort to easy targets and EOKA's intended signaling that the organization maintained the ability to inflict harm and to answer violence with violence. This sort of categorical violence, therefore, must be understood through the dynamics of outbidding and particularly the harsh counter-insurgency. No matter what else it achieved, the heavy-handed application of counter-insurgency allowed legitimacy space for EOKA and thereby some moral license for anti-British categorical violence.

In this episode of radicalization, of course, we also saw ethnic violence. In particular, the cycle of ethnic violence of the summer of 1958 was very lethal and characterized by categorical violence along the categories Greek and Turk. It is important to recall, however, that this was a short cycle initiated by mainland and Cypriot Turkish actors, and therefore did not present the continuation of pre-existing EOKA strategy. So, while EOKA's long-standing aim was in fact to keep the Cypriot Turks out of its operations, the Cypriot Turkish underground engaged in categorical violence against Cypriot Greeks, to which EOKA replied in kind to one extent or another. But here too, even though categorical violence is sometimes linked to ideological explanations in the literature, the strategy of both sides was calculated to serve specific political aims: for the Turkish side to promote object shift and for the Greek side to avoid it.

Lastly, as with the BR and EOKA episodes, members of AQ have had ample ideological justifications and environmental incentives to inflict damage and harm on individuals and groups that were not an inherent part of the political establishment and forces of security they deemed responsible for their grievances and discontent. Similarities are found also in the fact that while some of these ideational and behavioral forces, exerting their respective influences via cognitive and environmental mechanisms, were present and operating early on in the episode, others were introduced in the actual dynamics of contention. Regarding the STJM/AQ episode in particular, de-contextualizing the operation of cognitive and environmental mechanisms without taking into account the complex web of relational dynamics makes it difficult to make sense of the degree of radicalization AQ's tactics featured. For example, why was it that the United States turned out to be AQ's primary enemy and target of indiscriminate violence and not the Soviet Union/Russia or other Western forces, despite the existence of ideological justifications and environmental stimuli early on in the organization's development? Moreover, why was it that prior to 1998 we saw no instances of categorical violence against Shi'ite Muslims or other Islamic denominations despite the history of animosity among these religious streams, and then a major shift to the contrary. Here too, as we have demonstrated, a sole reliance on Salafism, as an Islamic doctrine that facilitates cross-denominational cooperation, provided only part of the explanation.

Finally, the absence of selective violence and the presence of collateral violence in AQ's repertoire, with respect to Sunni Muslims, is revealing. *Takfiri* worldviews, as discussed in chapter 5, were present among some Arab Afghans in general, and among some of the forefathers of AQ in

particular, as early as the Afghan jihad, and yet became salient only in the context of relational dynamics. Nonetheless, the presence of collateral violence and the absence selective violence is puzzling. At least part of the explanation (though certainly a central one) is found in the nature of the arena of interaction between leaders and activists of AQ and Muslim societies, as captured and developed through dissociation. Specifically, throughout the time period under study there was no dissociation developing between AQ and Sunni societies. In fact, drawing on lessons from the experiences of the Algerian GIA and the Egyptian Islamic Group and Islamic Jihad, leaders of AQ considered Muslim support essential and valuable and, as noted, took caution to avoid alienating Sunni publics through engagement in selective violence against public figures or suspected collaborators.

However, from 1995 to 1996 and again in 1998, AQ was directly involved in several violent operations that resulted inadvertently in the death of Sunni Muslims. The fact that ideological and theological injunctions were issued by AQ leaders must be seen and understood in light of meaningful relational dynamics that precipitated these operations. Indeed, this time period, it is worth noting, coincided first with the further uprooting and forceful distancing of AQ from Sudan to Afghanistan. Second, it coincided with the development of category formation on the part of AQ leaders as expatriate global jihadists, and, third, with a significant drop of resources, inclusive of new recruits to the AQ caravan. But it just as well coincided with the intensification and broadening of repression on the part of Arab regimes and the United States, in which context leaders of AQ relied on religious interpretation that considered Muslim casualties as an unavoidable sacrifice when inflicting harm on the infidels.

Collateral violence, to be sure, is not the same as selective violence; the latter tactic involves the proactive and intentional killing of people, and it is noteworthy that it continued to constitute no part of AQ's repertoire even during that time period. This is not to say that AQ's refraining from selective violence was inevitable; had Sunni population in a delimited territory where AQ operated and struggled for control and influence turned their back to the organization, with individuals being perceived or actually occupying a role in support of the United States, leaders of the organization might have employed selective violence. This, as demonstrated, was not the case. From late 1998 onward, partly as a result of renewed encroachments and incursions (i.e., Kosovo in early 1999 and Chechnya in August 1999), and partly as a result of relaxation of repression in Saudi Arabia, which involved the release of many imprisoned Islamist activists

(radical and militant alike), as well as the popularity the Taliban enjoyed in the Kingdom, AQ popularity was on a dramatic rise, expressed in dozens of new recruits pouring into Afghanistan.

DISSIMILARITIES IN SIMILARITIES: CONCLUDING REMARKS

The preceding three chapters demonstrated how similarities by way of the same set of operative mechanisms exist in episodes of radicalization that are distinguished from each other by different initial conditions. The present chapter has moved that analysis of similarities to the next step, elaborating on dissimilarities in similarities. Particularly, it developed a discussion of what we termed the particularities, modalities, and varieties of radicalization. As the discussion made clear, each one of the relational mechanisms we have proposed operated differently across the three episodes: each was constituted by different sets of sub-mechanisms, carried different relative weight, and combined differently with other mechanisms. These sources of diversity generated sets of dissimilarities in our episodes that, as seen, connect to the initial conditions characterizing each episode. Building on this line of analysis, furthermore, the chapter discussed also what we term the degrees of radicalization, hence using a relational perspective to compare and account for variations in the form of violence across the episodes.

Consequently, our discussion of the particularities, modalities, and varieties of radicalization makes advancements for comparative inquiry on two fronts. On the one hand, it delineates the processual parameters along which episodes of radicalization are expected to vary and, on the other, it shows how these processual parameters may relate to such non-processual elements as various initial conditions. Our comparative framework, in other words, through the entry points of the relational mechanisms and the processual parameters they entail invites knowledge stemming from more traditional ways of comparison.

But if our approach makes room for traditional elements of comparative logic, it holds its own ground with respect to the generalizibility of its findings. The processual logic is not about discovering general laws, and our empirical investigations are not meant to feed induction to that effect. Neither aspiring to universal findings nor confined to idiographic description, the comparison of processes of radicalization we advance holds a sensible middle ground. Our mechanism-based research strategy and comparative design fall within this orientation, since they are at once claims to generalization and frameworks for further research. Our empirical investigations

fall within this orientation as well. Neither the analysis of our three main episodes of radicalization nor the analysis of the additional episodes in this chapter is meant to prove the soundness of a general law-like theory of radicalization. What these analyses are meant to do is to give credence to our approach—an approach combining a rich set of concepts and sophisticated empirical analysis for the purpose of proposing contextual causal analogies.

Thus, for example, when we engaged in a discussion of the Weather Underground episode, we examined and assessed commonalities between it and the BR episode in terms of sub-mechanism–based particularities and showed how the respective initial conditions of the two episodes informed the comparison. But we did not claim that the sub-mechanisms were reducible to the initial conditions. Our aim in that part of the book—as in other parts of this book—has been to bring rich yet conceptually disciplined analysis to the broader discussion of radicalization.

It is in the same comparative spirit that we now turn to the next chapter of the book. Chapter 7 asks whether processes of radicalization are irreversible, and replies in the negative with the support of ample empirical evidence. The question is an important one to ask on epistemological and, by extension, theoretical grounds. This is partly so because the search for the answer calls attention to episodes of non-radicalization, which is to say episodes of contention where radicalization was a distinct yet unrealized possibility. The logic here, to be sure, has a traditional comparativist ring to it, for it alludes to the caution against selection on the dependent variable. Yet our logic is based squarely on process-sensitive analysis and comparison. If processes of radicalization are open-ended and can be analyzed through relational analysis, then the same analysis ought to be able to specify those turning points in the processes where radicalization could have derailed. By the same token, a similar relational analysis must be able to show the development of a potentially yet unrealized process of radicalization. It is to this treatment of the questions of de-radicalization and non-radicalization that we now turn.

CHAPTER 7

Radicalization in Reverse and Non-Radicalization

In the preceding chapters we have explained the radicalization process in several episodes of contentious politics through the analysis of relational mechanisms, their constitution, and their interaction. But if we have established the importance of relational mechanisms in explaining radicalization, we have not fully demonstrated it. There are two tasks left to accomplish in order to further substantiate our explanatory comparative framework and, in the process, to bring our line of argument a full circle. The first task regards considering junctures in the process of radicalization in each of our primary episodes where possibilities for putting a brake on, or for reversing the process existed. This kind of task takes us to the realm of a historical counterfactual ("what if") type of explanation (Griffin 1993) and "path dependency" mode of historical analysis (Aminzade 1992; Mahoney 2000). A path-dependent mode of investigation seeks to identify critical actions, choices, and events at any given historical moment and explores those paths not taken. For a counterfactual explanation to be plausible, then, it must posit historical alternatives in the particular historical context. The identification of these untaken paths must regard concrete alternatives at specific situations and junctures; this is a task that is sensitive to the particularities of events, actors, and immediate contexts, and must be based on a combination of theoretical and historical knowledge (Griffin 1993, 1102). Put differently, if our contention that radicalization is not deterministic holds, it is necessary to show that in particular contexts or historical stages there were forgone possibilities for different relational patterns that could have, if taken, altered the process, either by slowing it down or halting it altogether.

The second task at hand addresses the question "Are all opposition movements destined to radicalize during episodes of contention?" To tackle this question, it is important to select and to analyze not only episodes of political contention that end up in radicalization, as we have done so far, but also to bring evidence from episodes of political contention in which there was little violence, which is to say that the predominant mode of social movement contention remained nonviolent. Following the relational logic we have established so far, we argue that such episodes often feature the reverse operation of the three relational mechanisms and their interaction. Thus, for example, while we have focused on the operation of competition for power between two or more actors within a movement, it is possible that in other episodes of social movement contention the mechanism *consensus mobilization* operates; this is a mechanism that, to borrow from Klandermans, refers to the achievement of legitimacy among movement organizations regarding action strategy, means, and goals (1988, 178). Similarly, the reverse mechanism of upward spirals of political opportunities is *downward spirals of political opportunities* (defined as new possibilities for collective action or realization of the movement goals as a result of improvement of its political bargaining positioning vis-à-vis the political establishment); and, the reverse mechanism of outbidding is *underbidding* (defined as attempts between movement leaders and agents of law and order to reach an understanding regarding scale and scope of contention, whether tacitly or explicitly).

However, in arguing for the centrality of the reverse mechanisms in episodes of non-radicalization or in possibilities for de-radicalization, we do not mean that the reverse mechanisms are the only path to non-radicalized contention. A brake on radicalization may be the result of forces unrelated to these mechanisms and the arenas of interaction in which they operate. For example, a sudden, unexpected disaster may cause a movement to reassess its violent strategy. But given that the arenas we examine form a comprehensive set of webs around movements, we maintain that once factors external to these arenas become pertinent, they tend to become ramified in these arenas. Thus factors initially exogenous to the mechanisms we study may become articulated with the mechanism in the course of contention.

If until now we have relied on the three episodes/SMOs that differ in terms of their initial conditions and dynamics of contention and yet reveal similarities in terms of the eventual outcome, the task at hand requires a shift to a "most similar-different outcome" method of investigation. The challenge to meet in this respect is to provide sufficient evidence from more delimited periods of social movement contention in which, despite structural

similarities to our three main episodes, we observed non-radicalization. Moreover, we are called to demonstrate that despite prevalent cognitive and environmental mechanisms, radicalization was impeded as a result of the joint and separate operations of relational reverse mechanisms as they operate in their corresponding arenas of interaction. In proceeding with this agenda, we also pay attention to two related yet fairly distinct areas of scholarship, the counter-terrorism and disengagement from political violence studies, offering critical evaluation of them in light of our approach and analysis.

FORGONE POSSIBILITIES OF DE-RADICALIZATION

We have argued in the introduction that a major, persisting problem in the literature on political violence regards the tendency to focus mainly or solely on the radical organization itself. Accordingly, it is presumed that the problem of violence is rooted in some qualities intrinsic to or developed by the "group at risk," be they violence-prone ideologies, aggressive propensities, or motivations that become autonomous forces in response to or under certain environmental stimuli and conditions. We do not reject the contention that these forces and qualities play a role in processes of radicalization; as we have shown, environmental and cognitive mechanisms contributed to the strategy formation of EOKA, BR, and AQ. What we do reject is the tendency to treat relational dynamics as an epiphenomenon of these forces or, more problematically, to focus on and analyze them as if they operate apart from, and develop independently of, relational dynamics.

Works that follow either approach miss the mark in a twofold manner: first, they seem to neglect the fact that the vast majority of opposition movements, if not all, did not engage in violence from the outset of their contentious campaign; second, the consequentiality attributed to dispositions and ideas is so high in these works that instances or stages in the process of radicalization where these forces do not shape behavior are often overlooked. One major resultant fallacy concerns what may be called "backward inference" of the salience of either force (i.e., the targeting of Italian moguls by BR activists was not a matter of *if*, but a matter of *when*); this kind of post factum line of argument makes it impossible to assess the causal efficacy of a sequence of events.

Once processes of radicalization are treated as a progression, as a possible result of the complex web of relations contingent on the actions and choices taken by the variety of actors and parties involved in contention,

it is possible to identify those forgone possibilities for de-radicalization. In what follows, we discuss several such forgone possibilities as they relate to our main episodes.

De-Radicalizing al-Qaeda

The fact that the idea of AQ was conceptualized as early as August 1988 and that the first recruitment meeting took place shortly afterward meant little in organizational, ideological, and operational terms. Other than the general idea of promoting the Caliphate, agreeing that the network of Arab volunteers should be utilized to this end, and that the network would be led by an exemplary leader (and bin Laden was neither the obvious nor the first choice), those meetings accomplished little else. Indeed, participants in those meetings, who formed a kind of a micro-cosmos of the broader STJM by way of their affiliations with pre-existing organizations, had everything *but* a grand scheme—one based on an agreed-upon notion regarding the nature and scope of the conflict at hand, the target of contention, political goals, and the strategy and tactics to be employed for realization of those goals. And while it is beyond doubt that the Afghan jihad prompted the development of a shared pan-Islamic sentiment among the movement organizations, its aftermath nonetheless witnessed no sustained coordinated effort of contention on the basis of shared interests, values, beliefs and solidarity, either by the movement as a whole or by members of the newly formed AQ.

As we have demonstrated, STJM leaders and top-rank activists went their separate ways to realize their preferred agendas and goals in their respective locales, and some went through intense radicalization, the progression of which, in the main, had little to do with bin Laden's AQ. In the case of some of these organizations, notwithstanding their violence-prone ideologies and their susceptibility to changes in their social surroundings, we also observed attempts at de-radicalization. Based on scholarly accounts and news reports, Table 7.1 summarizes several attempts at de-radicalization, which took place before September 11, 2001.

What characterized these attempts and, to a considerable extent, contributed to their relative success or failure related, firstly, to the fact that they were reciprocal. That is to say, these attempts involved the leadership of the movement organization and the authorities and reflected some degree of willingness on both sides to engage in such an undertaking. Secondly, the relative success or failure of these attempts seemed to be related to the combined operation of two or more relational mechanisms and their respective reverse mechanisms. Unlike the initiative of Hizbul Mujahideen,

Table 7.1. A SAMPLE OF STJM DE-RADICALIZATION UNDERTAKINGS

Yemen Islamic Jihad	June 1994	Leaders of the organization are rewarded by President Ali Abdullah Salih for their assistance in the Northern Yemen forces' victory over the Southern forces of the Yemeni Socialist Party during the May–July 1994 civil war. Yemen Islamic Jihad leaders are invited to join the Yemen Congress Party following the unification of Yemen, yet their request to be recruited to the army and be given appropriate ranks is rejected by the government due to objections by heads of the army. Following the rejection, a deep rift within the organization develops, leading to a split and resulting in an organization called Aden-Abyan Islamic Army.*
Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG)	July 1997	The historical EIG leaders imprisoned in Egypt issue a unilateral ceasefire statement, which is gradually endorsed by other middle-rank leaders and key activists in Egypt (but also abroad) as well as EIJ imprisoned leaders. This leads to a softening of repressive policy and adoption of selective policing measures, culminating in initiation of interaction and coordination of activities between the historical leadership and state authorities (Meijer 2009; Della Porta 2013).
Islamic Salvation Army (Algeria)	September 1997	In the wake of a reconciliation policy of President Zéroual, Islamic Salvation Army leaders enter into negotiations with the deputy-head of the military intelligence. Other radical organizations join the initiative, including several GIA militias; these organizations are granted amnesties following the election of President Boutflika in 1999. The majority of GIA factions reject the initiative, many of which are eradicated, while others form the Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat (Ashour 2009).

(*continued*)

Table 7.1. (CONTINUED)

Hizbul Mujahideen (Kashmir)	July 2000	Announcement of ceasefire of three months in order to enter into negotiations with the Indian government, amidst vocal condemnation by other Kashmiri-based organizations, leading to the expulsion of the organization from the United Jihad Council and, in early August, the massacre of 100 Hindus, which was initiated by Lashkar e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, and AQ. On August 8, the organization cancels the ceasefire, claiming that India's refusal to allow Pakistan to be a part of the negotiations is unacceptable.**

* Information on the Yemen Islamic Jihad initiative was obtained from: *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (January 6, 1997); *Business Line* (October 23, 2000); *The New York Times* (November 26, 2000); *The Independent* (January 7, 1999).
** Information on the Hizbul Mujahideen case was obtained from: *The Independent* (July 28, 2000); *Hamilton Spectator* (July 28, 2000); *The New York Times* (August 1, 2000, and August 10, 2000), and *The Straits Times* (August 4, 2000).

which was independent of the other Kashmiri organizations and saw only a half-hearted willingness on the part of the Indian authorities (i.e., a lack of consensus mobilization and downward political opportunities spirals), the case of the EIG is instructive; it involved the gradual development of all three reverse mechanisms, which not only facilitated association vis-à-vis the Egyptian public, but was robust enough to withstand the spoiler attempt by the already splintered Afghan-based Zawahiri EIJ and other high-rank EIG activists (e.g., the Luxor massacre of late 1997).[1]

There are, however, two elements missing from Table 7.1. First, there were other attempts at putting a brake on violence that failed either because they were one-sided (i.e., lack of response by one party to the initiative of the other), or because they developed in one arena of interaction with no equivalent complementary developments in other arenas (i.e., developing consensus mobilization yet lacking underbidding or the other way around).[2] But most conspicuously absent from the list is AQ, with

1. Although Zawahiri knew about the developing initiative, it seems he and other EIJ members in Afghanistan learned about the actual proposal from newspaper reports.

2. See Ashour (2009, Chapter 5) for a list of several notable attempts in the case of the EIG. Regarding EIJ, we know of one instance of suspension of attacks in Egypt, which was instructed by Zawahiri in an internal correspondence (Brown 2011, 113; Gerges 2005, 129), most likely in late summer 1995, following his expulsion from Sudan. Whether the Egyptian security forces knew about it is unknown.

neither type of development unfolding throughout the time period under investigation.

Why did AQ leaders not follow or capitalize on the de-radicalization trend that seemed to be developing during mid-1997? More broadly, was the lack of any de-radicalization attempt on the part of bin Laden's AQ indicative of an ideological fixation on the United States and other Western countries as the primary enemy of Islam? On the face of it, the lack of any such undertaking on the part of AQ and the "spoiler" role it took in some of the other initiatives lends support to the most often-repeated line of argument, the one that posits revolutionary global Salafism as key to shaping the anti-West/US motivations, strategy, and goals of the organization. According to this argument, the 9/11 attacks were a foretold chronicle, whereby with the fall of the communist regime of the Soviet Union, AQ leaders turned their sights on the United States as the main international thief of Muslim oil wealth, occupier of the holy land, and embodiment of corrupt Western values (Harmony Project 2007, 5). The driving power behind the radicalization of AQ was rooted in the compelling power of a violence-prone anti-Western religious worldview, masterminded early on by a driven man and his close associates, who were obsessed with attacking the United States, and whose plans would be carried out by their top-rank activists (see, for example: Reeve 1999; Esposito 2002; Gunaratna 2002; Schweitzer and Shay 2003; The 9/11 Commission Report 2004; Cottee 2005; Scheuer 2006).

However, from a relational perspective, it is important to stress that the experience of AQ leaders differed significantly from the experience of other movement organizations. Unlike the locally based STJM organizations that were deeply embedded in their respective social and political environments—engaged in daily interactions with their repressors as well as with their pool of potential allies and supporters and forced to face an ever-greater disparity between their ideological visions and souring realities (Ashour 2009; Meijer 2009; Della Porta 2013)—the experience of AQ leaders and activists differed most significantly. In contrast to the development and experience of organizations like the EIG, EIJ, and the Algerian Islamic Salvation Army, the organizational consolidation of AQ took place in exile, away from most of its leaders and top-rank activists' respective socio-political settings. Seeking to mobilize local supporters and trying to avoid alienating them from afar, as was the case with AQ's public campaigning from London, is not the same as interacting with them on a daily basis. As argued by Sageman (2004), the exile in Sudan played a critical role in this respect, prompting a process by which members of the AQ network became more linked to each other than to their respective local

constituents; "They become embedded in a socially disembedded network, which, precisely because of its lack of any anchor to any society, is free to follow abstract and apocalyptic notions of a global war between good and evil" (p. 151). The fact that by late 1997, members of AQ, already deeply committed ideologically, became embedded in and integrated within a regime (the Taliban's) that ultimately not only allowed them to preserve their revolutionary worldview and radical mode of contention, but also, in fact, allowed them to solidify their ideology and action strategy, further validates Sageman's point.

The point to be stressed is that even if these anti-Western worldviews were present early on in any coherent fashion, which is questionable to say the least, they developed and gained salience in the context of relational dynamics unfolding in the various arenas of interaction among the actors and parties involved. Strategic thinking, tactics, and goals do not take place in a vacuum, unfolding between two or more disconnected actors, but emerge and evolve in relation to the other's presence, choices, and actions, as well as in relation to events.

The results of a systematic analysis of AQ's published writings, declarations, correspondences, and interviews (N = 119) between 1988 and June 2001, mostly by bin Laden (but also by Azzam, Zawahiri, and several AQ high-rank activists), according to the question "who is treated as the *primary* enemy" (Figure 7.1)[3], offer no support for the ideational line of



Figure 7.1:
AQ's Primary Enemy over Time

3. For information on coding and sample of materials, see chapter 5.

argument regarding AQ radicalization. Keeping in mind that the amount of written material per year is mostly indicative of the availability of these materials, which tended to be covert during the early 1990s, there nonetheless are two points worth noting. The first is that up until 1994 AQ leaders had no clear enemy, a pattern that reinforces the argument that with the exception of the Yemen front during 1990–1991, AQ leaders had no clear agenda and strategy (Tawil 2011, 26). The second thing to note regards the role occupied by the United States. Depicting the United States as the primary enemy takes place, first, in 1988, accused of leading international pressure to prevent the Afghan jihad from seizing it fruits and, second, in 1991 as part of a coalition of Western powers (coded as "combination") depriving the Mujahedeen of their rightful role as defenders of Muslims. In the context of Operation Restore Hope in Somalia of 1993, the United States seems to capture the role of the main enemy, yet loses it to Arab regimes during 1994 and 1995, and regains it and steadily so, either solely or in combination with other primary enemies (e.g., Jews), from 1996 onward. This mixed pattern is also found in Cragin's (2008) qualitative analysis of AQ-related documents, arguing that the evolution of AQ's strategic thinking did not progress linearly, but rather changed back-and-forth during the mid-1990s.

In and of itself, the diversity in AQ's perceived primary enemy before 1994 and the fluctuation in the centrality attributed to the United States as a prime enemy of Islam suggest that there was little if any inherent or fixed anti-United States thread in the ideology of its leaders and key activists. The AQ leaders' strategic thinking still was in a nascent stage and responsive to unfolding events and developments, even in the wake of the Gulf War and the attacks on US troops in Mogadishu of September and October 1993. A telling example of this is found in a letter sent from Pakistan, by a certain activist named Hassan, to the Khartoum-based leadership, in May 1994.[4] After congratulating his comrades on their victory, Hassan moves on to warn against overrating it, and he reflects critically on AQ's lack of strategic thinking and vision. As it reads:

> America did not enter the Somali arena with a clear vision of the objectives of its presence . . . Clinton was motivated by election considerations and a personal inclination toward Flamboyance. . . . [He] believed the falsehood that he was the leader of the most powerful country in the world. These are

4. This is the third letter from a series of five, known as the "Letters to the Africa Corps" (retrieved from: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-five-letters-to-the-african-corps-english-translation [July 17, 2013]).

> not just my words. Rather, this is the considered opinion of many inside America and abroad. . . . [Regarding our beloved Corps . . .] it is true that it took part in achieving a brilliant victory over the Americans, but that was not part of its original objectives. It was an anomaly made imperative by subsequent events. . . . [C]onsider this well, my dear friends. You went to work in the heartland, yet got involved in the southern flank where you achieved a brilliant victory that could only have been achieved on the flank. Meanwhile, the sick heartland remains ailing and suffering. You went to Somalia to assist the Somali Salafia in its fight against Somali communism. The nature of the battle changed suddenly to an all-out Islamic battle against international infidelity. What happened? The West was defeated and fled Somalia, leaving pockets of the armies of infidelity and apostasy under the banner of the American United Nations.

In the context of the present discussion, this quote is revealing for three reasons. First, it suggests that involvement in attacks against the US forces in Somalia was not an integral part of AQ's objectives in the Horn of Africa, but rather an emergent, essentially tactical response to unfolding events. Despite all their intensive efforts at broadening the Sudanese-based foothold in the region, the Africa Corps failed sourly to gain the collaboration of Somali rebel forces and to mobilize them around the flag of Salafi-oriented pan-Islam. Whatever the significance of their role in training and financing Somali forces was, their influence on the latter's strategy and decision-making (e.g., the attack on the Pakistani peacekeepers in June 1993) was marginal at best.

Closely related, the second reason for the importance of this quote regards the attentiveness of AQ leaders and top-rank activists to domestic US politics, as well as US regional and international policies. As reflected in the above quote and in other letters to the Africa Corps, AQ leaders were fully aware of the domestic US political debates over the appropriate policy in Somalia. Specifically, they were alarmed by, and reacted to, the Clinton Administration's breaking away from Bush's policy, which, following Desert Storm, had changed to direct involvement only in places where vital US interests were compromised; in other places, where US interests were not at stake, Bush's policy was a willingness to contribute peacekeeping forces following a peace settlement agreed on by the warring parties, but not to send forces under other circumstances (Bolton 1994; Sloan 1994). In mid-1993, President Clinton embraced a more assertive and comprehensive US foreign policy in Somalia, translated into a shift from protecting relief channels that could avert mass starvation to the use of force on behalf of the U.N. mission and involvement in the civil war. But it

soon became clear that the United State also gradually took on a more active, at times leading role in pressuring states to act against local Islamist forces (e.g., Sudan and Pakistan).[5] For AQ leaders and activists, the United States' expansionism was threatening precisely because it assumed an ever-greater central role in leading other Western powers (contemptuously labeled "Knights of the Cross") in walking into the vacuum created by the increasingly weakening Russia in Asia, in some cases, and turning a blind eye to its brutality against Muslims in others.

Lastly, it seems that despite the increased attention to, and alertness by, the US moves in Africa during 1993, AQ leaders were at this point in time more concerned by, and preoccupied with, Arab rulers, the "near enemy." This is consistent with the results from the analysis presented in Figure 7.1, where following depiction of the United States as the primary enemy in 1993, the vast majority of the written material during 1994–1995 attributes this role to the "near enemy"—apostate Arab regimes and rulers in the heartland. In addition to the fact of the US pulling out of Somalia in late spring 1994, it was also the heavy crackdown on STJM and other Islamist activists in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, to name only a few places, which was at its height during this time period and rested increasingly on collaborations among these regimes to that end, that explain this trend.

Needless to say, not all AQ leaders and high-rank activists shared the opinions expressed in the above-cited letter. But the fact there was neither one single voice, nor an action strategy of offensive violence (be it selective or, even worse, indiscriminate[6]), and certainly no fixed enemy at that stage in the organization's operational development is telling. The US policy shift in Somalia was unquestionably prompted by the attack on the Pakistani peacekeeping force, but its sources were found in the World Trade Center bombing of February 1993 which, among other things, led the administration to overreact not only in Somalia.[7] On AQ's part, the

5. At that time there was no explicit reference to AQ or bin Laden, only to Iranian, Palestinian, Algerian, and Egyptian extremists located in Khartoum, and to certain Saudi financers. It is only from the 1995 State Department Patterns of Global Terrorism report that explicit reference to bin Laden begins to appear (Burke 2003).

6. In fact, the only mode of contention for which consensus existed was defensive guerrilla-like activity, labeled "counter-penetration and urban deterrence operations." This and other related war/guerrilla-like operations and activities were compiled in the *Encyclopedia of the Afghan Jihad* (a.k.a. Declaration of Jihad against the Country's Tyrants), which was first published in 1996.

7. According to the 1993 Patterns of Global Terrorism report, although there was no conclusive evidence linking the Government of Sudan to any specific terrorist incident during the year, 5 of the 15 suspects arrested that summer, following the World Trade Center bomb plot, were Sudanese citizens (April 1994, 25).

involvement in General Aideed's forces' attacks on US troops in September and October 1993 was indeed an "anomaly," prompted by the US's arrest of Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman in June 1993, the spiritual leader of the EIG, for his alleged role in the World Trade Center bombing, and to US State Department decision to designate Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism in August 1993. Nonetheless, as Bergen (2001) indicates, a deadlier plan to bomb the US embassy in Saudi Arabia was rejected because of the danger of killing civilians.

Slightly over two years later, on November 13, 1995, in Saudi Arabia, this plan materialized, with the Somalia experience influencing subsequent AQ leader's choices and decisions, as well as their interpretation to specific events. Even though the US role in Bosnia was far more limited than in Somalia, reflecting a policy re-shift on the part of the Clinton Administration, it nonetheless had major repercussions on AQ's strategic assessment and, by extension, mode of contention. Despite the considerably more limited US role in Bosnia and the fact that Serbs were receiving active support from Russia, the United States was nonetheless perceived as responsible for the slaughtering of Muslims, and was seen as being willing to sacrifice the lives of Muslims for the sake of global interests. As we have noted in chapter 5, AQ leaders saw the United States and the UN as directly responsible for the events of mid-July 1995 in Srebrenica and viewed Arab rulers as collaborating with the United States in repressing Muslims, domestically and regionally. In striking contrast to the Bosnian and Chechen fronts in 1995, the United States increased intervention in the Middle East and the Gulf states, which included expansion of its forces and coincided with the introduction of a more obtrusive policy of repression against STJM activists in collaboration with Arab regimes, all combined to render the United States as the primary enemy and the "heartland" as the major front of struggle.

De-Radicalizing EOKA

The episode of radicalization in Cyprus is characterized by two well-delineated phases, namely, the period featuring EOKA's campaign of violence and the period preceding it. In each phase, the contention between the Enosis movement and the UK government (including its colonial arm in Cyprus) could have derailed key SMOs from their radicalization path at different junctures. Four such junctures stand out, two in each phase. In all four of them, the counterfactual developments were ramified into more than a single relational mechanism/arena.

The first juncture at which it is possible to identify a forgone possibility for de-radicalization regards the attempt by the UK in 1947–1948 to introduce a constitution granting the Cypriots limited self-government. The relational arena between the movement and its political environment was in a state of flux in the aftermath of the Second World War, and this made it difficult for the movement to form a clear strategy in the face of the colonial initiative and more broadly. But it was of great consequence that this situation was mediated in the intra-movement arena, for the mechanism competition for power emerged to be crucial at this juncture.

The 1947–1948 colonial initiative was rejected in the course of a few weeks by the Enosis movement leadership, first by the movement's Right-wing leadership and then by its Left-wing leadership. The Right, to be sure, had long adopted the rhetoric of enosis-and-only-enosis, thus projecting an intransigence which, one would think, doomed the British initiative to failure from the outset. Such deterministic reading of the situation would not be warranted, however. The leadership of the Right, in fact, comprised doves as well as hawks, and the former did not shy away from offering their moderate views in the media. Indeed, it took some time before the Right-wing leadership decided to reject the British initiative, and the arena within the Enosis movement crucially shaped this decision. This was an arena featuring acute competition for power between the Right and the Left, in which the Right was threatened by the Left's swift rise in prominence. This period, one may recall, followed the municipal elections of 1946, the first elections on the island in more than a decade, in which the newly organized Left outperformed the Right, while in Greece a civil war between communists and nationalists was waging. A Left-wing participant in those events, the labor union leader Andreas Fantis, described to us the intra-movement contention in stark terms.[8] He went as far as to suggest, albeit by way of a hypothesis, that the Right was initially inclined to deliberate with the British government representatives but changed its mind when, and because, the Left accepted the colonial invitation for deliberations. Fantis's interpretation fits the general pattern of interaction at the intra-movement arena as analyzed in chapter 4, corroborating the conclusion that at this historical juncture a distrustful Right treated these developments as a turf battle with the Left.

The unfolding competition for power, then, stood in the way of de-radicalization at this juncture, despite the common anti-colonial goals of the Right and the Left. Had the Right seen the emergence of the Left as less threatening, it would have perhaps pursued further and more earnestly

8. Personal interview (February 2009).

the Left-initiated meetings between Leftist leaders and the Ethnarchy that occurred after the elections of 1946 and before the colonial proposals for a constitution; but these meetings ultimately took place only a few times in 1946 and 1947, producing no sustained cooperation or coordination between the two sides (Minutes of the Council of Ethnarchy of Cyprus 1946 and 1947). The Right's choice to maintain competition at this juncture, rather than to coordinate, was underpinned by complicated dynamics, as seen. But these dynamics entailed no inevitability. It is fair to suggest that if the Right had performed better than the Left in the municipal elections of 1946, it might have been less averse to the idea of building relations with the Left. Alternatively, a similar reverse mechanism of competition of power could have materialized had the British colonial initiative been repeated after the municipal elections of 1949. Such initiative at this point in time would have found a Right that was less threatened than before not only because it had just outperformed the Left in the elections, but also because the communists in Greece had just lost the civil war.

The second outstanding juncture presenting possibilities for deradicalization in the pre-violence phase pertains to the decisions to set up EOKA and to give it the green light for action. Obviously, these two decisions were critical turning points in the radicalization process, and so different turns taken would have certainly yielded different and potentially less radical outcomes. Dynamics in the arena between the movement and its political environment played a pivotal role at this juncture, and so, if the spirals of political opportunity had shifted downwardly (rather than upwardly as they in fact did), the course of radicalization would have plausibly been much different.

The decisions to set up the organization that became EOKA, as well as the decision to start using violence, were not necessarily likely, let alone predetermined. It must be recalled that the option of violence hinged on the support, or at least the acquiescence, of the Greek government of the day, when any Greek government in this period was disinclined to have an aggressive policy toward its political patron, the UK. Yet Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus and Prime Minister Papagos of Greece decided together in 1952 to set up an armed organization. As argued in chapter 4, the dissociation of the movement leadership and of Makarios most particularly from other movement organizations and constituencies facilitated this decision by the archbishop. Of course this does not explain either Makarios's or Papagos's personal decision. But what is important to clarify about this is that the two men's decisions did not necessarily express a preference for violence. That is, it may well be the case that they expected that

political progress would prevent the commencement of a campaign of violence. In fact, the record suggests that the preference for violence in the early 1950s belonged only to a small circle of nationalists—mainland Greeks as well as Cypriot Greeks—who brought pressure on Papagos and Makarios (Kranidiotis 1981, 55–57).

Given this, it is likely that the Greek prime minister in particular thought that allowing the formation of an armed organization would buy him time to pursue the settlement of the Cyprus question directly with the UK government. One needs to remember that Papagos had long been a champion of Anglo-American geostrategic policy in the region: he was the field marshal who led the Greek Army first against the Axis (service for which the UK government had decorated him) and then against the communists in the civil war. As he assumed the Greek premiership in November 1952, accordingly, he felt that he had clout with the UK government regarding the issue of Cyprus as well as more generally. It is this efficacy with which he viewed his position that likely led him to accept the creation of an armed organization, a tactical move probably sustained by the belief that he would have the course of both diplomacy and radicalization under control. This turning point, therefore, was born not simply out of Papagos's nationalism, as some historians imply, but out of his relationship with the British political establishment. (Below it will be explained that the British government on its part did not appreciate properly the pressure the Enosis movement brought on Papagos.)

A Greek prime minister viewing the British link with lesser efficacy, therefore, might have rejected outright any prospect for violence. This counterfactual is supported by the actual stand of Papagos's immediate predecessors, Sophocles Venizelos and Nikolaos Plastiras, who strongly signaled to the Enosis movement that the Greek government's role as the movement's broker in the international community was not unconditional (Kranidiotis 1981, 52–54). In 1952, therefore, Papagos's role in the creation of EOKA was important precisely because he was in a position to halt the course of violence by reversing, or threatening to reverse, the submechanism brokerage.[9]

Further, between 1952 and 1955, the period from the decision to form EOKA to the onset of the EOKA campaign, several factors could have combined differently to stop the outbreak of violence. Most obviously, constructive diplomacy between Papagos and the UK government would have served

9. Papagos's decertification of the movement would have been a more radical move, and, because of this, the threat to decertification would have not been particularly credible.

this purpose, and Papagos indeed approached the matter constructively. He suggested a ten-year timetable before any actual union of Cyprus with Greece and supported the pre-existing idea that the UK retain sovereign military bases in Cyprus after the union. But the British, facing geostrategic challenges in the Middle East as a result of the rise of Gamal Nasser in Egypt, rejected any compromise over Cyprus's colonial status, and exchanges in December 1953 between Papagos and the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, made this point clear to the prime minister (Kranidiotis 1981, 65–66). Meanwhile, Papagos had left the door open to the Enosis movement's strategy, which was the internationalization of the dispute via the UN. After experiencing British intransigence in bilateral diplomacy, he sponsored a motion on Cyprus at the 1954 UN General Assembly meeting. This effort turned out to be abortive, but some diplomatic success for the Greek Cypriot side at the UN, even though resented by the British, would potentially have led the movement to postpone, or even cancel, the outbreak of violence. In other words, increased downward spirals in political opportunity at this juncture—either through the Anglo-Greco relationship or the UN—would have been consequential with respect to radicalization.

As mentioned above, forgone possibilities for de-radicalization also existed during the violent phase of the radicalization process. One outstanding possibility was the diplomatic negotiations that took place between Governor Harding and Archbishop Makarios in late 1955 and early 1956. Both sides brought goodwill to the negotiating table, as indicated by the seven meetings between the two men and the many more meetings between their chief assistants. However, the two sides differed in terms of their respective underlying authority structures, and this difference was crucial for the outcome of the negotiations. Important here, therefore, was not only the movement security forces arena but also the movement-constituency and the movement–political environment arenas.

On the British side, a formal hierarchy was firmly in place, running from the Governor to the Colonial Office to the Office of the Prime Minister. This enabled the formulation, albeit gradually, of a British bottom line in the negotiations. This bottom line had moved considerably from the British position in 1948, though ironically it had come to resemble the rejected offer by Papagos from 1953; now, in early 1956, the UK government was ready to accept that the Cypriots had the right to self-determination and that they could exercise it (effectively achieving union with Greece) in the course of a few years, contingent on developments in British Middle East policy (this was amidst the buildup to the Suez Crisis).

On the side of the Enosis movement, by contrast, no clear hierarchy was in place, even when only the Right is considered. As explained in

chapter 4, there was considerable dissociation between Makarios and other movement leaders (and their constituencies). The archbishop had therefore been delegated authority during the negotiations and was able to consult only selectively with the Ethnarchy on the progress of the negotiations (Kranidiotis 1987, 24, 42). Thus, while bypassing the Ethnarchy as a body allowed Makarios distance from some intransigent members of the Ethnarchy, most notably the Bishop of Kerynia, it also prevented the formulation of collective responsibility with the input of moderate Ethnarchy members.

Actors beyond Ethnarchy were also important at this stage, of course. Chief among them was EOKA, or more precisely, its leader, Georgios Grivas. During the last stages of the negotiations, Makarios and Grivas met to discuss the British offer, only for Grivas to reject it as a ploy (Grivas 1961). Makarios then invited the Greek government—the other important actor in this affair—to take joint responsibility with him in the event of the acceptance of the British offer, since such backing would have preempted a strong reaction from the Enosis movement hardliners. The government in Greece at the time, however, was transitional (filling in after Papagos's recent death) and in the midst of an electoral campaign in which it was accused of lacking in patriotic resolve. Thus it rebuffed Makarios's invitation to take a lead in the acceptance of a compromise in Cyprus (Kranidiotis 1987). As a result, Makarios rejected the British final position, even though it was one that conceded much of what he had demanded during the negotiations. In other words, having built an extraordinary positioning of responsibility for himself, Makarios rejected the British offer out of fear of responsibility. Had dissociation not worked so effectively to isolate him, and had the political environment included an efficacious Greek government at this point, the movement and the state could have agreed on a compromise.

The second outstanding instance of de-radicalization during the violent phase of the radicalization process stemmed from the ceasefire that EOKA entered in spring 1957. The arena between the movement and the security forces was crucial here, as underbidding had already been developing for a while. As will be seen, however, the intensification of object shift at this time prevented a sustained pattern of de-radicalization, particularly as object shift was articulated into the British strategy at the level of both politics and counter-insurgency.

In mid-March 1957, Grivas announced that EOKA would suspend its operations if the British government ended Makarios's exile. The EOKA leader had been under pressure from the Greek government to make such a gesture, but the organization's own need to recuperate and reorganize

after an intense spell of counter-insurgency operations might also have been a factor in his decision. The UK government, at any rate, subsequently released Makarios from the Seychelles, his secluded place of exile, but forbade him entry to Cyprus, and so he went to Athens. A little later in time, London replaced Field Marshal Harding, who was seen by the Cypriot Greeks as a ruthless champion of the counter-insurgency, with a civilian governor. The new governor, taking up his duties while EOKA still refrained from action, relaxed some of the security measures and embarked on a public relations campaign through visits to various localities on the island.

This chain of developments, therefore, presented not only temporary de-radicalization by way of reduction of violence, but also an opportunity for a compromise, since the British could have negotiated once again with Makarios as he reconnected with his Cypriot associates and the Greek government. It was an opportunity borne out of changes in the arena between the movement and the security authorities and the arena between the movement and its political environment. But the opportunity remained unrealized, at least in the immediate horizon, because the British government made no approach to Makarios. By that time its views on how to tackle the conflict on the island had changed, prioritizing the pursuit of object shift through the active involvement of Cypriot and mainland Turks—a resort to the old colonial tactic of divide and rule. The end of the conflict took place in early 1959 and, as will be explained later in the chapter, it was an inadvertent consequence of object shift. But the end of the conflict was not achieved before another wave of violence, involving both ethnic groups as well as the British, took a heavy toll on human life.

De-Radicalizing the Red Brigades

As with works on EOKA and AQ, the dominant explanations of the radicalization of the BR tend to promote either a cognitive or an environmental line of explanation.[10] Embracing a cognitive line of explanation for the radicalization of the BR, some scholars point to the allegedly compelling power of the eschatological logic of the Marxist ideology as adapted by BR members (Orsini 2009), while others argue for the influence of the violence-prone, deep cultural forces of the tradition of struggle on the Italian Left (Bravo 1982; Drake 2003). Yet other scholars stress the influence

10. Notable exceptions are the works by Della Porta (1990, 1995, 2009 and, most explicitly, 2013).

of personal traits, predispositions, and autonomy of motives of Left-wing activists, micro-conditions that are said to be the products of macro-developments, such as the systemic malfunctioning of the Italian regime (Acquaviava 1979; Bonanate 1979) or the interrupted modernization of the country (Ferrarotti 1978; Statera 1983).

These types of explanations, therefore, aim to address the *why* question of radicalization by focusing on cognitive and, occasionally, environmental factors. In so doing, however, they overlook the fact that strategy and tactics do not develop in vacuum. When cultural, dispositional, or ideational forces acquire a distinct role in shaping behavior, they usually do so in the context of deteriorating relations in various arenas of interaction. By limiting their attention to the *why* question, these works obscure a deeper understanding of not only how the BR radicalized but also of how it could have de-radicalized.

It is the nuanced relational reading of the BR radicalization that best enables the analysis of the forgone possibilities for de-radicalization. The possibility for a brake on violence existed at different junctures in the course of radicalization, with varied likelihood, and the analysis of each of these junctures must consider all pertinent relational arenas of interaction. Here we do so with regard to one—arguably the most—outstanding juncture: the immediate aftermath of the intense and wide-scale security forces operations of April and early May 1972. This is the time when most BR members were imprisoned as a result of an unprecedented wave of repression against the organization in particular, but also against the movement at large. Less than ten active members of the organization were still free, four of whom were the most prominent leading figures of the organization at that particular stage. At this juncture, then, the BR clearly faced a profound crisis in terms of operational capacity. But the organization was also at a crossroads with regard to its future steps. As will be seen, this critical juncture in the organization's development cannot be fully appreciated by the investigator who focuses on the ideology and commitment of the BR members or on environmental factors that shape behavior.

It is therefore important that, with most activists locked behind bars, those who remained free abstained from any confrontational and violent operations for a period of six months, and in fact settled for armed robberies, which were aimed at provision of basic necessities. This mode of action contrasted with the previous period, when the organization engaged in ongoing violent operations inside the factories of the Milan area, seeking to promote its revolutionary agenda. Yet this six-month period cannot be seen simply as a time of recuperation. It was not merely a time when the organization was building its operational capacities, as one might expect.

The eventual emergence of the BR as the leading organization of the revolutionary, radical Left was more complicated than that.

In the aftermath of the heavy crackdown, for a three-week period those who remained free went through a serious process of reassessing their situation and debated whether to continue, and indeed intensify, the armed struggle or whether to bring it to an end. A powerful illustration of this internal dilemma during this critical juncture is found in the words of Renato Curcio, a former BR leader who participated in this reassessment process. In his autobiography, written 20 years later (1993), Curcio recounts the situation he and his comrades were facing. As he reveals:

> The situation was quite dark, Feltrinelli was dead. The Gap practically disappeared, routed. Fellows of the French Nouvelle Resistance, Andreas Baader, Ulrike Meinhof and other Dutch militants of the RAF almost all arrested. A reasonable evaluation urged us to think that the experience of the armed struggle in Europe was more of a failure and there only remained to pull the oars in the boat, as long as we had time. (p. 77–78)

The fact that remnants of the BR eventually decided to reorganize in a far more rigid and determined manner and to intensify their struggle is staggering. On the face of it, it might give credence to those who promote an ideational line of explanation or an environmental one. That is to say, it could be argued that members of the organization were so compellingly driven by their ideology, which turned out to be the only prism of interpretation, validation, and justification, that stepping up their struggle was warranted. Concomitantly, one could argue that at this all-time-low stage certain leading figures that had a penchant for violence took charge in leading the organization to further radicalize their tactics. Indeed, it is reasonable to ask why the BR leaders decided to remain in Italy and to intensify their struggle, instead of going into exile as other Italian Left-wing radicals had done.

A relational, path-dependent reading of this juncture, however, allows for a richer and more powerful explanation. Such a reading would suggest that the actions taken by the BR members did not follow the only sensible options available to them, and therefore were not inevitable. In fact, the decision to step up their struggle was shaped by the choices and actions taken by the other parties and actors involved in the contentious episode, which require attentiveness to patterns of relational dynamics that were unfolding in the various arenas of interaction.

To begin with, it is important to stress that in terms of *intra*-movement dynamics, levels of competition for power were fairly low in spring of

1972. It is true that tension and discord characterized the relationships among the various movement organizations from day one, and that in the context of the decreased mass mobilization following the "hot autumn" of 1969 expressions of disillusionment began to surface. Yet, it is equally true that in 1971–1972, organizations of the Left-wing movement had still more reasons to converge than to diverge. At this point none of the organizations of the Extra-Parliamentary Left movement were operating in full clandestinity; their leaders and activists were still participating "openly" in public activities along with other movement organizations. This unquestionably lessened tension and discord and facilitated some degree of coordination. So did the fact that these SMOs perceived the extreme Right as a common enemy, which was an experience that at the time alleviated tension and put off the full and open rift that developed soon afterward. One must recall that between late 1969 and into the days of the election campaign of 1972, Right-wing violence was raging, with outrageous killings of Left-wing activists accompanying the campaign (Panvini 2009). Indeed, as Della Porta (1995) points out, "repression was perceived as directed against the Left, so the Old Left and the trade unions sided with the social movements in denouncing state repression and fascist aggression" (p. 61). The fact that the PCI was willing to join forces with the small Left-wing party, the *Partito Socialista Italiano di Unità Proletaria* (Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity) is one indication of such a development.

While intra-movement dynamics carried the potential for moderation and for tipping the balance in favor of putting a brake on violence, the separate and combined influence of developments in the arena between the movement and the political environment and the arena between the movement and the security forces forestalled the materialization of this potential. The May 7, 1972, elections turned out to be particularly meaningful in this regard, demonstrating the deepening contrast between the potential for a strong strategic political positioning for the movement, both in terms of collective action and goal attainment, and the eventual opposite outcomes: the formation of a Center-Right ruling coalition that soon revealed its readiness not only to block political changes but, more importantly, to overturn previously accomplished ones.

While the exclusion of the Left from the corridors of power after a decade of Center-Left government was important on its own right, its improbability made it all the more meaningful. That the Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity and other small Left-wing parties did poorly in the elections should not obscure the fact that, even during this highly contentious time, self-proclaimed militant organizations were still trying to

promote their goals from within the system and that they still considered the two main Left-wing parties as their institutional political allies. All in all the PCI and the PSI tended to maintain their power share in both houses. Even though the post-Fascist Right-wing party (the Movimento Sociale Italiano) doubled its size, the party still accounted for only some 8.6 percent of the total electorate (Grindrod 1972). Realistically, then, the Center-Right coalition that was ultimately formed was not the only option that leaders of the DC had in order to secure a stable government for Giulio Andreotti. Indeed, neither the Movimento Sociale Italiano nor the PCI were going to be invited to join a coalition; this was a given for the PCI, despite winning a relatively large share of votes on a statist and constitutional platform, due to the long-standing outright rejection of the communists by the Italian political system (the *Conventio ad Excludentum*). Yet, either out of political shortsightedness or petty politics (or a combination of both) among the players involved, the PSI suffered from the same fate as the PCI and was excluded from the coalition in favor of the Centrist Social Democratic Party and the Right-wing Italian Liberal Party. Despite ample and clear expressions of its willingness to join the coalition, the PSI was accused by DC leaders of refusing to treat the PCI as "untouchable"; explicit statements that their leniency would not go so far as to accept the communists in government, and that it was meant to secure PCI votes in parliament and facilitate collaboration with them in local and regional administrations, did little to appease the DC.[11]

Thus the May 1972 general elections, during one of the most turbulent periods in Italian politics, eventually resulted in the rise of a Center-Right coalition for the first time in 10 years. As discussed in chapter 3, these were times characterized by intensifying mutual violence between Right-wing and Left-wing forces, with the former enjoying high levels of support from the security forces, who were subjected to very little political and judicial control. In this context it is important to note that the timing of the wave of police crackdowns on Left-wing militant organizations was perceived as calculated. The wave of repression began a few weeks before the general elections and ended during the first week of the coalition-formation negotiations. In and of itself, and based on a long interventionist tradition of "playing politics" on the part of the Italian security forces, the wide-scale crackdown operation amounted to nothing new; given the drift in public opinion toward the right, the timing of the operation could

11. Ironically, something close to this took shape a year-and-a-half later, in the form of the "historical compromise" between the PCI and the DC, by which time radical new-Left groups, including the BR, were already operating underground and engaging in high level of political violence.

be said to be indicative of the police norm of sensing "which way the wind is blowing" during times of political transition (dell Porta and Reiter 1998, 26). But in the context of many Left-wing militants' heightened fears that the neo-fascist violence was supported by intelligence service agents and that a fascist coup d'état was imminent, all Leftists (and perhaps others too) believed that the crackdown was a deliberate, conspiratorially timed onslaught on the Left.[12] Events such as the mysterious death of the young Left-wing activist, Franco Serantini, in police custody in Pisa during the closing hours of the elections campaign, only added credence to this belief (Clark and Irving 1972, 205).

At this juncture of the BR radicalization process, therefore, one can sketch a counterfactual: given that before May 1972 the BR was not yet fully clandestine and its mode of contention was mostly defensive, it is plausible to hold that if it had not been for the harsh repression of the movement that was fully embraced by the new Center-Right government, the idea of putting a brake on violence might have had greater resonance among the leading BR members. The actual course of events took a different turn, of course. In the context of perpetuating security forces–backed Right-wing violence,[13] and broadening perception that the newly formed government set the conditions conducive for such an onslaught (i.e., the *Stragismo*), BR members—who at the time found refuge in a farmhouse in nearby Lodi, a small town located in the northern part of Italy—reached the critical decision to renew, in fact intensify, the armed struggle. What further facilitated the critical decision and made BR leaders feel vindicated about it related in part to the positive reactions to the killing of a police officer shortly after the end of the police crackdown, most probably by a *Lotta Continua* (Continuous Struggle) activist, a response that percolated throughout the Extra-Parliamentary Left movement. But of greater consequentiality in a context that came to be perceived as favorable for realization of the armed struggle (Curcio 1993, 78), underground members of the BR were approached by other militant activists and encouraged to reorganize and expand their base of operation outside Milan in order to

12. Della Porta's Life History interview-based data is perhaps the most comprehensive and insightful indication of this shared perception among Left-wing radicals at the time. See, especially, Della Porta (1992; 1995, Chapter 6).

13. It should be noted that following the May 1972 crackdown, security-forces repression against Left-wing activists significantly lessened. It is telling, however, that Italian security forces engaged in no effort and took no initiative whatsoever to establish any agreement or tacit understanding with Left-wing radicals, which led many to perceive the lessening of repression as part of an insidiously devised strategy to shape public opinion in favor of the political Right, a fact that only infuriated the Left.

lead the struggle and to strengthen the militant's voice and standing within the movement. What made this context appear favorable for the realization of the armed struggle was related of course to the electoral failure and the continuation of Right-wing violence. But it was also related to deepening competition for power, which was expressed, among other things, in the PCI's accusation of the social movement organizations of the electoral failure and the mounting tension and rift within the Extra-Parliamentary Left movement over the issue of the necessity to engage in more effectual tactics of contention, namely, political violence.

DE-RADICALIZATION: THE RELATIONAL DEFICIT OF COUNTER-TERRORISM AND DISENGAGEMENT STUDIES

The preceding analyses of the forgone possibilities for de-radicalization deepen the understanding of the radicalization of AQ, EOKA, and the BR. They show that once a relational mode of analysis is adopted it becomes clearer that the potential for de-radicalization is intrinsic to the three unfolding processes of radicalization. But this lesson goes beyond the three episodes at hand. Indeed, any given process of radicalization may slow down (resulting in a decrease of political violence), cease, or reverse. This is not a new realization, of course. The broader scholarship on political violence has not been oblivious to this realization, and specialized areas have in fact formed around it. Counter-terrorism studies and, more recently, studies of the disengagement from political violence are perhaps the two specialized areas in the field that stand out the most. Yet, it is our observation that our relational approach of radicalization offers nuance and comprehensiveness that are seldom found in the literature on disengagement and are practically absent in the literature on counter-terrorism.[14] Indeed, the main difference between our approach and the other two bodies of work regards focus: whereas our approach searches for possibilities for de-radicalization in the entire progression of radicalization, the other approaches investigate the possibility for ending violence by focusing on radicalization only after it reaches high levels of intensity and lethality. We turn our attention to these two areas of scholarship, treating them

14. Where one does find a thin and instrumental, method-based relationalism in counter-terrorism studies is in the reliance on social network techniques for identifying ties and contacts among members, cells, or even organizations of broad terrorist networks, often to enhance state/security forces' knowledge of certain influential "nodes," network characteristics, and sources of resilience. See, for example, Krebs (2002), Pedahzur and Perliger (2006), Jackson (2006).

separately, even though we recognize that there is some overlap between them. After reviewing and providing illustrations from the literature, we offer related critical insights extracted from our approach. These critical insights are based on the episodes analyzed as well as on illustrative evidence from subsequent historical developments in these episodes.

The literature on counter-terrorism is clearly premised on outright bias, namely the wish to offer guidelines to certain government policies, rather than to advance unfettered academic knowledge. Political ends are what orient these studies, and "combating terrorism" and "war on terrorism" are but two of the many value-laden formulations used by military experts, "homeland security" advisors, and academics for that purpose. Having said this, however, one can still ponder on the analytical utility of these studies vis-à-vis the question of de-radicalization.

At the risk of oversimplifying a truly vast literature, we find that the knowledge offered by these studies remains handicapped by their policy orientation. For what lies at the heart of this approach is the development of "best response" policies, practices, or tools to the threat posed by such "radical groups" as EOKA, the BR, and AQ *after* they earnestly engage in violence. Its focus, in other words, is on the use of violence on the part of the "group at risk" rather than on the relational contexts that precipitate, sustain, and potentially reduce violence and counter-violence. That the literature tends to overvalue the role of the "radical group's" ideology and the mindset of "terrorists" only narrows further its analytical utility. This is so because striving for a change in ideology is usually deemed impractical, so the efforts to deplete the "terrorist group" of its operational capabilities (e.g., undermining its social support and divesting it of its political utility and raison d'être) appear to be the only practical means in the policy path toward de-radicalization (Stern 2003; Bloom 2005; Ganor 2005b; Pape 2005; Abrahms 2008; Mendelsohn 2009).

A representative illustration of such reasoning is found in a recent policy-oriented report authored by the Counter-Terrorism Center experts at West Point, titled *Al-Qaida's (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa* (2007). It focuses on the presence of AQ and its affiliated global jihadist groups and supporters in Somalia and Kenya, utilizing in its analysis a wealth of information and intimate knowledge. But while narrow in its empirical focus, the report aims at broader statements and is meant to be applicable to other loci and "terrorist groups." It therefore offers a useful glimpse into the assumptions and logic that characterize much of the literature.

The report, which is based on cost-benefit and demand-supply logic and models drawn from labor economics that are applied to explain AQ's interest in the Horn of Africa, extracts an impressive set of nuanced policy

recommendations meant to guide a more efficient and effective combating terrorism policy for the United States and other Western governments, as well as for local authorities in the Horn of Africa (2007, 64–72). Specifically, the report includes two sets of recommendations: that which is related to weak states (e.g., Kenya—but also Sudan, Yemen, pre-9/11 Afghanistan, Northern Ireland) and that which applies to failed states (e.g., Somalia—but also post-2003 Iraq, and post-9/11 Afghanistan). We do not intend to cover and relate to all recommendations; for our purpose, it would suffice to relate to those recommendations that deal directly and explicitly with two aspects that feature prominently in the report, and which echo aspects in our approach: social isolation and political exclusion.

While concluding with a recommendation to prioritize efforts in weak states (over failed ones), given that local authorities may provide a more conducive and protective environment for terrorists, the report nonetheless offers recommendations for isolating terrorists socially as well as politically in both types of states. Thus, in failed states, this can be accomplished through publicizing AQ leaders' disrespect of local Muslims' life and through working with and empowering non-jihadist local leaders who exhibit potential to provide good governance. To buttress these efforts, the report warns against large-scale intervention and the hunting of AQ activists without joint efforts with those local leaders. In weak states, it is also deemed important to limit and concentrate Western efforts in areas permissive to terrorist activities, to selectively aid disaffected populations in order to earn goodwill and legitimacy for the central government (thereby increasing the price terrorists need to pay to buy local assistance and acquiescence), and, finally, to promote greater pluralism and participation in political process among populations and groups that are potential terrorist adherents.

Let us evaluate the recommendation regarding social isolation, first. Nowhere in the report (and this can be said to hold in many other counterterrorism studies that look for best-response policies) is there recognition of the fact that leaders and activists from member organizations of the broader opposition movement are forced out of their local setting, at times finding refuge in other countries. It is usually the case that oppressive policies and repressive measures on the part of local rulers and authorities that seek to undermine movement organizations' bases of support and extend to distancing and uprooting leaders and activists end up, instead, engendering their radicalization. As the analysis of AQ and the BR has demonstrated—and this could easily be broadened to refer to other movement organizations—neither was violent in its tactical repertoire from the outset, despite the presence of ideologies legitimizing the use of

violence and other radical organizations within the broader movement. The more distanced and detached these organizations became (a dynamic process we have analyzed through the mechanism dissociation), the more militant they became, and the more violent they turned out to be in their means of contention. The point to be stressed is that attempts to continue isolating radical organizations from society on the part of outside forces, whether independently or together with local forces, would lead to a deeper sense of the siege mentality and would be likely to step up radicalization to additional extremes. It is at this stage of radicalization when the mechanism dissociation in the arena between the movement and the general public assumes greater salience and consequentiality in shaping the process.

AQ and the BR post-episode developments offer further support for the argument regarding the influence of higher levels of isolation on the part of the radical organization on its willingness to intensify its violent tactics. The tightening grip on AQ by the United States and its ally forces, beginning in November 2001, was a development with wide-ranging consequences. The "war on terror" and particularly the operation against "states harboring terrorists" gave a devastating blow to AQ and the Taliban, but also led, in addition to a series of suicide bombings in countries whose governments supported the United States, to two broader developments. First, the US invasion of Afghanistan brought about the unity among the Afghan-based ranks that bin Laden had chronically failed to achieve previously, as well as among AQ and many local Salafi organizations throughout the House of Islam. Organizations in Turkey, Morocco, Algeria, and Iraq, for example, that had had little contact with AQ and had not previously been influenced by AQ, began to join forces after facing the brunt of repression by their respective governments as a result of pressure exerted by the United States (Pedahzur 2005; Tawil 2011). Second, the shrinking of AQ's menu of choices for secure bases saw meaningful critical variations in the organization's violent tactics. Struggling to maintain some degree of control and influence in those remaining territories and facing opposition from local non-Sunni forces as well as decreasing support on the part of Sunni Muslims, AQ leaders in Iraq, for example, adopted a *takfiri* worldview in its fullest expression. They directed it indiscriminately not only against non-Muslims, non-Arab Muslims (e.g., Kurds), and non-Sunnis (Shi'ites and Sufis), but also, and increasingly so, collaterally and selectively, against Sunni Muslims for showing support of the US forces and the newly elected government (Hafez 2007).

Regarding the BR, we observed a similar development during the late 1970s. The intensification of the Italian security force crackdown against the bases of operation and social bases of support of Left-wing radical

cells, which was fully backed by the political system's repressive "emergency policies," actually brought about further radicalization (Della Porta 1995). There is no question that the intensifying repression brought about a significant drop of resources and isolation on the part of the BR; but at the same time it prompted BR members to shore up their organizational integrity and to continue their armed struggle most resiliently. Indeed, the more deeply and continuingly isolated members of the BR became, the more intense their violent operations became (Bosi 2013). It is astounding that the number of BR attacks in the period between 1977 and 1979 was four times the number of BR attacks in the much longer period between 1970 and 1976. What is more, the reliance on selective violence intensified too, this time directed against Left-wing activists as well as others. This included not only the killing, in 1979, of PCI activist Guido Rossa, for disclosing information to the police on BR supporters distributing the organization's propaganda leaflets in factories, but also other acts of violence against Left-wing activists.

In addition to the issue of an organization's relations with its constituency and third parties, there is a second major issue in which our approach differs from that found in the counter-terrorism literature. This regards the issue of political exclusion of violent activists and organizations through limited outside intervention. This, as the aforementioned report states, was a recommendation aiming at the empowerment of those non-jihadist local leaders who exhibited a potential to provide good governance and, in weak states, greater pluralism and participation in political process among populations who were considered potential adherents of "terrorism." Clearly, the sensitivity of the authors of the report to the issue of outside intervention is understandable, given the debacles into which the United States and other Western forces had engaged in during the preceding two decades. Our analysis suggests, however, that the preoccupation of the report's authors in particular, and the counter-terrorism literature in general, with degrees and forms of outside intervention (Pape 2005; Mendelsohn 2009) misses the mark, especially given the implication that the locally based good governance and pluralistic political process excluded those "terrorist groups" present.

What our analysis reveals is that outside intervention, which may certainly be in and of itself alarming and aggravating, presents no likely turning point toward radicalization. Given this, the report's preoccupation with scope or scale of such intervention contributes little to our understanding of de-radicalization. The consequences of external intervention, in other words, are mediated by relational dynamics between the movement and the political environment, and this creates diverse possibilities. Here it is

possible to suggest three general scenarios involving outside intervention. First, as long as the movement has some political standing, outside intervention and pressure that clash with the movement agenda and goals may well be resented and perceived as a threat, yet without necessarily being translated into radicalization of tactics on the movement organization's part. Second, in those cases where a movement has weak or no strategic political positioning vis-à-vis authorities, it may well seek outside intervention itself in order to pressure local government as a means to achieve or improve such political positioning. Third, when the movement is systematically excluded from the political system, outside intervention that threatens the movement agenda and goals may push radicalization forward.

Support for the first scenario is found in the episode of BR. As demonstrated in chapter 3, the Extra-Parliamentary Leftist resentment of US attempts to influence Italian policies and the government openness to such attempts was prevalent in the early stages of contention and was in fact a central issue in the Extra-Parliamentary Leftist agenda. Yet, and consistent with the third scenario, radicalization of movement organizations began to unfold most markedly in the context of developing political constraints and threats on the movement's strategic positioning, which seriously weakened and inhibited its possibilities for goal attainment and space of collective action. This operation of upward spirals of political opportunities, as we have seen, took place most significantly in the context of the creation of the Center-Right coalition government following the 1972 elections.

Support for the second scenario is found in the analysis of the episode of EOKA and of the events that concluded the episode. As we have seen, attracting international intervention was the grand strategy of the Enosis movement from the beginning. This remained so in the face of an intransigent British government that, in 1958, used the mounting tension and clashes between Cypriot Greeks and Cypriot Turks to further its divide-and-rule policy. EOKA and other movement leaders at this stage still sought support from potential international allies at the UN and elsewhere. And sure enough, it was outside intervention that ultimately played a central role in ending the conflict, or at least the episode involving the UK.[15] But this happened in spite, not because, of the position of the

15. Once the independent Republic of Cyprus was established, it became the scene of renewed conflict over enosis with Greece and division of the island. The conflict led to ethnic clashes on the island in 1963–1964, to the introduction of a UN peacekeeping force at that time, and to subsequent further clashes. Ever since, what exact shape the government of the island might take has been a matter of dispute, with the UN still involved (Demetriou 2014).

UK, the party that pursued counter-insurgency in the name of the legal status quo. The centers of power behind this crucial intervention were the US and NATO. From their point of view the British strategy of divide and rule selfishly endangered the military alliance, and so they encouraged the Greek and Turkish governments (alliance members) to reach between themselves a compromise over Cyprus. This they eventually did during the closing months of 1958. Their agreement that Cyprus become an independent state was therefore presented first to the UK government and later to the movement and the counter-movement. The UK government was outmaneuvered through this and had little option but to accept the compromise—after securing military bases on the island for itself (Holland 1998). As the support of Greece was a prerequisite for the claim of enosis, the Enosis movement could hardly oppose the compromise once Greece supported it. We saw in detail earlier how the connection between the movement's Right-wing organizations and the government of Greece marked the relational arena between the movement and its political environment. We can now see also that the sub-mechanisms certification and brokerage played a pivotal role in this arena not only with respect to the movement radicalization but also with respect to the movement de-radicalization. Additionally, a point worth stressing is that in the episodes of EOKA and the BR, both processes involved other arenas/mechanisms operating in conjunction with the relational dynamics unfolding between the movement and its political environment. Regarding EOKA, it is important that the gaining of strategic positioning was accompanied by an effort to reverse the operation of object shift that, during the late 1950s, was closely linked to upward spirals of political opportunities in its operation and that influenced radicalization.

Highlighting the limitations of counter-terrorism studies does not mean that de-radicalization is never achieved through one side stifling the other; but short of extreme cases of governmental willingness to engage in total annihilation of members of the radical organization, it is typically the case that even such a one-sided approach would end up involving some concessive measures and gestures vis-à-vis members of the targeted organizations—a combination of repression and facilitation. This mixed response on the part of authorities, but also a willingness to consider and accommodate intentions expressed by radical organizations' leaders to lower arms and leave political violence behind, is an important feature of the disengagement literature, which echoes other works that can be grouped together within this body of work (e.g., Crenshaw 1991; LaFree and Miller 2008; Ashour 2009; Cronin 2009; Jackson et al. 2009; Dugan and Chenoweth 2012; Kissane 2012; Dudouet 2013; Schmid 2013).

Drawing on insights from criminology, social-psychology, and organizational studies regarding *exit* from religious cults, criminal youth gangs, racist groups, and other fairly cohesive organizations, scholars in this body of work are more concerned with academic knowledge and, not surprisingly, move beyond a sole focus on state's best response and policy to counter "terrorism." The main tenets are developed and demonstrated in Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan's (2009) edited volume *Leaving Terrorism Behind*, where they build on their own respective past work as well as others to provide a comprehensive array of evidence from a variety of case studies. Unlike the counter-terrorism literature, disengagement scholars do not deem striving for a change in cognition and ideologies as impractical aspects of de-radicalization, and indeed reject the presupposition that holding revolutionary views necessarily will predict expressions of actual radical behavior. Their approach is also more sensitive to those motivations and causes that pushed movement organizations to engage in political violence to begin with. The recognition, furthermore, that a change in ideological worldview does not always mean a brake on violent behavior and that leaving the radical organization does not necessarily imply a change in revolutionary worldviews leads disengagement scholars to recognize the importance of relationship between authorities and radicals as well as between the latter and their familial or tribal ties.

Thus, for example, one of the most intriguing analyses offered by contributors to the aforementioned volume is of Yemen's Committee for Dialogue. This refers to an initiative that began in late August 2002 following President Ali Abdullah Saleh's declared intention of the need to start talking to incarcerated and detained violent activists, and lasted continuingly for three years (Boucek et al. 2009). There, the committee for dialogue involved a series of meetings between government representatives and detainees and prisoners. The mutual cognitive ground for the dialogue rested on the Qur'an and the Sunnah, given the centrality of the idea that the prophet himself favored dialogue even with enemies of Islam. Participants in the program were assured release pending their renouncement of violence, the signing of a document testifying their good intention, their family and tribal members vouching for them, and one year of probation.

The disengagement literature, it should be stressed, advances our understanding of de-radicalization. Nonetheless, and reconnecting with the above analyses of radicalization and de-radicalization, we identify a lack of sufficient recognition of the multiplicity of relational arenas and mechanisms and the importance of examining their mutual reinforcement. Specifically, perhaps due to the concept of rehabilitation that guides works in this tradition, the primary attention is given to incentives

offered by authorities to either incarcerated or underground leaders and activists and the importance of rehabilitation through familial/tribal reincorporation interaction. And while this rationalist reasoning is understandable given the importance of establishing some initial token of goodwill between hostile parties and after a prolonged period of mutual infliction of lethal violence, even those works that embrace a relational reasoning when analyzing this arena of interaction tend to do so in a narrow manner. As a result, relational dynamics in other arenas of interaction, whose influence can be reinforcing or undermining and in certain phases of the process of radicalization may have more or less gravity, receive little if any attention. Those few works that do relate to the reinforcing influence of other arenas nevertheless tend to neglect the role of relational dynamics and to rely on variable-based analysis (e.g., positing the presence/absence of charismatic spiritual leaders as one of several critical factors (Ashour 2009; Rashwan 2009)). But as will be showed in our analysis of the Gaza Pullout below, reference to a leader's charisma means little if it is not analyzed through the webs of relations that allow for authority and influence to emerge (e.g., the presence of Jewish settler rabbis in contentious activities).

The value of analyzing the interplay of various relational mechanisms stemming from various arenas of interaction can be demonstrated with references to one of the favorable empirical foci of the disengagement literature, the aforementioned Yemen's Committee for Dialogue. The main promise and indeed relative success of the Yemen initiative was not found in the incentives offered to the incarcerated jihadi leaders and activists, and their willingness to participate in the initiative was not the result of cost-benefit calculations or recognition that their struggle had failed or was no longer efficacious or justified (i.e., there were abundant of preexisting and newly developing causes, such as the war in Iraq). Rather, the relative success of the Yemen initiative was found in the formation of relational infrastructure and practices of contact, dialogue, and negotiation between President Saleh's representatives and incarcerated jihadists, which facilitated a process of ideological revision on the part of the latter.

Nonetheless, by 2005, as a result of no reinforcing relational dynamics in other arenas of interaction, the initiative collapsed. Not only did it fail to enjoy the support of many political parties and religious scholars (including that of President Saleh, whose support decreased significantly following the onset of the war in Iraq and the intensification of US pressure), but it also faced strong opposition from security agencies and bodies who continued to heavily repress jihadi organizations and activists in the country (ICPVTR Report 2010). But perhaps the most significant element

in undermining the initiative was the intense competition for power between moderate forces in the country and radical forces outside the country, the sources of which dated back to the first half of the 1990s leading, among other things, to the split and formation of the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (see Table 7.1). This relational aspect, which, at that time, had a central role in the process of radicalization undergone by the Yemenite branch of the STJM, was no part of the initiative and, expectedly, was translated into numerous attempts at thwarting the initiative.

The analysis of the de-radicalization efforts in Italy during the 1980s illustrates our point further. Alongside selective incentives offered to incarcerated activists (e.g., reduction in sentences and better prison conditions) first for repenter activists who collaborated with the authorities (*Pentiti* Law of 1980) and then for those who have declared their exit from the underground organizations (*Dissociazione* Law of 1986), we also saw mutually reinforcing developments taking place in two central arenas of interaction in the radicalization of the BR. These developments included, first, a police reform that was passed and contributed to a more selective style of social control (Della Porta and Reiter 2003). Second, it included relational developments in the most consequential mechanism/arena of interaction (i.e., upward spirals of political opportunities in the movement–political environment arena), mainly regarding a less exclusive and anti-Left-wing social movement approach on the part of the PCI (Della Porta 1995; Tarrow 2012) and following which the Italian state initiatives began to bear fruit.

If the first part of this chapter has demonstrated the utility of our relational approach for identifying realistic yet forgone possibilities for de-radicalization, and if the foregoing analysis has demonstrated how a nuanced and comprehensive relational mode of analysis expands on the counter-terrorism and disengagement studies, there still remains the question of non-radicalization. In order to complete the case for our theory, then, we now turn to demonstrating how a relational approach enhances our understanding of radicalization through making sense of episodes of non-radicalization.

NON-RADICALIZATION IN THREE EPISODES OF CONTENTION

Social movements are not destined to experience radicalization during episodes of contention. For a rounded understanding of our subject matter, therefore, attention must be placed not only on junctures in processes of radicalization where the potential for de-radicalization exists, as has been

done above, but also on episodes of contention where radicalization does not develop. These are what we call episodes of non-radicalization. In the remainder of this chapter we turn our attention to episodes of non-radicalization that, in terms of initial conditions, mirror the episodes of radicalization we analyzed. Specifically, we examine the Jewish settler episode of contention against the Gaza Pullout of 2005 (the national level of engagement), the Catalan nationalist contention during the mid 1970s (the *intra*-national level of engagement), and the European Social Forum inaugural convention and contentious gathering against the war in Iraq, in Florence of November 2002 (the transnational level of engagement). As will be seen, the dynamics of contention in these episodes featured mechanisms that steered the movements away from violence, and these mechanisms were the reverse of some of the mechanisms that pushed radicalization forward in the episodes examined earlier in the book. Prominent among these mechanisms were *consensus mobilization* in the arena within the movement (the reverse of competition for power), *underbidding* in the arena between the movement and the state security forces (the reverse of outbidding), and *downward spirals of political opportunities* in the arena between the movement and its political environment (the reverse of upward spirals of political opportunities).

The Gaza Pullout (2004–2005): "Containing the Militants"

In light of the rich history of radicalization undergone by religiously driven organizations of the Jewish settlement movement, and amidst the still raging Palestinian Intifada, it was not surprising that analysts, journalists, and scholars predicted high levels of violence during the movement struggle against what became known as the Disengagement Plan (Zertal and Eldar 2004; Tsfati and Cohen 2005; Keshev Report 2006). After decades of relentless struggle for the renewal and expansion of Jewish presence in the territories occupied during the June 1967 war (West Bank, Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula, East Jerusalem, Golan Heights—hereinafter: Territories),[16] the movement was facing the gravest threat to its agenda and goals: the evacuation of 21 Gaza Strip settlements (8,600 residents), and additional evacuation of 680 settlers from four West Bank settlements. Indeed, in contrast to the previous challenges and threats the movement had faced throughout its history of contention, the Disengagement Plan entailed actual evacuation of settlements and complete withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.

16. The first settlement attempt was made as early as September 1967, several weeks after war's end.

Despite the unprecedented inroads the movement has paved into the heart of the Israeli political system, society, and military and despite the undeniable standing and influence it has gained over the years (Peleg 2002; Pedahzur 2012), its history of settlement-driven contention has included ample manifestations of radicalization. Whenever the government endorsed a policy of restricting settlement activity or territorial compromise, the movement experienced intense internal factionalism and, at times, splintering of radical factions that engaged in violent activities against Palestinian and Israeli targets. Such splintering occurred with the formation of the Jewish Underground in the context of the peace talks in Camp David (1978–1979), the violent campaign against Israeli Left-wing intellectuals initiated by the Sikarikin underground organization during the first intifada (1987–1992) and, later, with the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin in late 1995 in the context of the Oslo Accords.

Early signs of the intention to engage in "painful compromises" with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were made throughout 2003. Yet it was only on February 2, 2004, that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon exposed the full scope of his unilateral disengagement policy, which prompted settler organizations to gear up their protest activity (Roth 2005; Tsur 2006). Under the leadership of the two dominant organizations of the broader movement, the YESHA Council[17] and the newly-formed Action Committee of Gaza Strip settlements (GSAC), the protest campaign quickly turned into the most intensive, wide-ranging, sustained episode of contention in the history of the Israeli state. Relying on an impressive reservoir of resources and allies within both the general public and the political system, the movement managed to mobilize tens of thousands of activists and supporters to initiate a wide range of institutional and extra-institutional protest events. These included, for example, the initiation of legislative motions and votes of no confidence, street rallies and marches, mounting of barricades, court appeals, and conscientious objections.

Despite the movement's noteworthy achievements and displays of nationwide support, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon not only remained in power, but also managed to form a resilient ruling coalition that dominated the Israeli parliament (*Knesset*) and brought about the implementation of the Plan. With mounting tension and growing instances of disobedience inside the military once it became clear it would be responsible for the actual conduct of the evacuation, broadening public support

17. YESHA is an acronym for Yehuda, Shomron, and Aza (Hebrew for Judea, Samaria, and Gaza), a formal representative forum, founded in the late 1970s, comprising all heads of local and regional councils.

of the Plan, the intensifying level of Palestinian attacks, and inflated militant rhetoric on the part of movement's spiritual leaders as well as its field leaders, the likelihood of outright violence was undoubtedly high. Nonetheless, the 18-month-long episode of contention as well as the actual evacuation in summer 2005 witnessed only a handful of violent incidents, which begs the question: Why was there so little political violence in the Gaza Pullout struggle?

By far the most dominant line of explanation of the predominantly nonviolent struggle against the Gaza Pullout points to the centrality of an integrationist approach among both West Bank and Gaza Strip settlers. True, many settlers held fundamentalist, even messianic and revolutionary, religious worldviews that tolerated illegitimate as well as illegal behavior, even if this involved social segregation (Weisburd and Vinitzky, 1984). However, the majority of the settler population considered the state, its institutions, and Israeli Jews as sacred. Therefore, remaining connected to the Israeli-Jewish polity and society was an inseparable part of their identity such that in the final analysis settling in the hearts of the public was more important than settling territories. What reinforced the dominance of the integrationist approach related to the "sensitivity and tolerance" approach on the part of the government and heads of the military and police (Weisburd and Lernau 2006; Sheleg 2007; Hirsch-Hoefler, Helperin, Kaneti-Nisim 2008). While this line of argument has merits, it nevertheless falls short of explaining *how* exactly the tension between the two sets of values and norms was established and maintained. This is especially so *when* chances to stop the plan were diminishing as well as in light of continuing, at times intensifying, Palestinian attacks, either in the form of violent operations or rocket firings on the settler population.

What impeded radicalization throughout the episode of contention against the Gaza Pullout was related, most centrally, to the ability of the central movement organizations to mobilize consensus over goals, strategy, and tactics. Initially, consensus mobilization was formed based on YESHA and GSAC's mutual understanding regarding the perverse effects engagement in violence could have on their social standing. To sustain this, and while recognizing the differences between them in terms of preferable strategy and tactics, a division of labor was established early on. Accordingly, YESHA tended to act in the political arena vis-à-vis politicians, whereas GSAC mostly engaged in educational and message-dissemination activities vis-à-vis the public, in order to alleviate as well as to prevent the increase of the deeply rooted religious-secular boundary of intense antagonism that had formed over the years between the two publics in post-1967 Israel (Dalsheim 2011). Thus, while YESHA was responsible for lobbying

and initiating votes of no-confidence and other legislative motions, GSAC was behind the "human chain" campaign of mid-July 2004, which brought together tens of thousands of people holding hands, stretching along ninety kilometers from the Gaza Strip to the Western Wall. Moreover, an important developing practice involved periodic joint meetings for the purpose of coordination, in addition to making sure that representatives would be present at each other's respective solo meetings.

Of greater importance and consequentiality were efforts to sustain consensus mobilization vis-à-vis militant organizations that were part of the broad movement. Recognizing the perilous violent potential of organizations like the Jewish National Front, whose leaders had a past record of violence not only against Palestinian but also Israeli targets, YESHA and GSAC systematically acted to contain them. This was achieved through, inter alia, harnessing the support of the spiritual leadership. Fully aware of the authority of rabbinical religious interpretations and rulings amongst the settler public, both organizations constantly made sure to consult and get the approval of moderate and militant rabbis alike for each decision made, as well as to ask them to be physically present at protest events. When tens of thousands of activists marched toward the Gaza Strip in July 2005 with the declared intent of breaking into the quarantined settlements, it was the presence and cooperation of some of the most revered rabbis with leaders from all organizations, moderate and militant alike, that turned out to be decisive in preventing political violence. After a short exchange between leaders of the movement and heads of the army and the police, the aggrieved crowd quietly turned back and marched into a nearby town. It took an additional several days of pickets, public prayers, vigils, and provocative attempts to break through the fence before the crowd eventually complied with the police order and left the site.

The ability to minimize competition for power was complemented by clear and strictly kept "rules of engagement" developed jointly between heads of the Israeli military and police and the movement leadership core early on in the struggle regarding the legitimate mode of protest and the expected police response. At times, underbidding extended to assisting the leadership to maintain their status vis-à-vis their public through allowing greater leeway in protest activity, as a way to "let off steam" and, in the process, to discipline contention. Three years after the Pullout, Police General Commissioner at the time, Moshe Karadi, admitted in an interview to a local settler news agency that "it was impossible to carry out the pullout in a peaceful manner without establishing relationships with leaders of the settlers." In addition to countless meetings between heads of the security forces and between them and settler public representatives,

Karadi went on to reveal, "there also were informal meetings with the local leaders . . . at times we allowed blocking main traffic routes as we realized their need to express their indignation" (*Arutz 7,* 10/17/2008—translation by authors). Heads of the military followed suit in their attempts to prevent outbidding; above and beyond the decades-long convergence of interests, special service frameworks, and arrangements between the military and the settler population (Levy, 2009), high-ranked military officers engaged in dialogue and exchange of information with YESHA and GSAC. At times they stepped in to fill in the void, once a disconnect developed between governmental officials and settler leaders, as was the case several weeks before the actual pullout. Moreover, to alleviate the tension on the part of settler soldiers and officers, Chief of General Staff Haloutz instructed the military echelon to relieve settler soldiers of their duties (i.e., to participate in the evacuation) on an individual basis without penalizing them (Levy 2007; Haloutz 2010).

The developing break between leaders of GSAC and the government should not be seen as representing the overall relational patterns and practices in the arena between the movement and the political environment. Although the very fact of initiating and making progress with the Disengagement Plan constituted an unprecedented threat to the movement agenda, its strategic positioning and ability to exert political leverage and input remained fairly strong. Throughout the episode the operation of downward spirals of political opportunities was expressed through constant available possibilities for both collective action and goal attainment and was translated to the ability on the part of the movement leadership to generate a series of significant achievements most efficaciously. The fact that in May 2004 the movement managed to get the majority of Likud Party members to vote against the Plan, to successfully pressure cabinet ministers to resign from office in June 2004, and to form a majority in the Knesset to vote on a "public referendum act" in late March 2005 for the first time in the history of the state—are all indicative of a strong strategic, bargaining positioning. But the operation of downward spirals of political opportunities was also expressed not just through Prime Minister Sharon's reinforcing the idea that all Israelis are part of one nation and that "sensitivity and tolerance" are necessary, but also, and more importantly, his developing of relational practices. Following the advice of his strategic advisors, Prime Minister Sharon maintained a kind of "open door" policy, namely, systematic and constant attempts to seek contact and dialogue with the movement leadership. Lieberman, then chairperson of the YESHA Council, when interviewed by one of the authors of this volume, gave the following answer when asked about this "open door"

policy. "At the end it proved futile, but, definitely, there was ongoing dialogue between us and the government. Don't forget this is not a war between enemies, but one that is waged 'inside the house'. . . Sharon was constantly talking with us; at times he was the one who initiated these talks . . . of course there were countless meetings."[18]

Struggling for Catalonia (1974–1978): "Convergence to the Center"

The Catalan nationalist movement has certainly caught the attention of scholars. The moderation that characterized it stands in such striking contrast to the radicalization of the Basque nationalist movement that intrigued scholars variously made the comparison between the two movements (Conversi 1993, 1997; Mastrovito 1993; Johnston 1995; Diez-Medrano 1994, 1995; Della Calle and Miley 2008). The radicalization of the Basque nationalist movement developed through ETA, an organization positioned at the fringe of politics and thus resembling the BR more than EOKA. This juxtaposition among ETA, EOKA, and the BR raises two questions for the present inquiry into the Catalan nationalist movement, particularly the contentious episode from 1974 to 1978. Why did the Catalan nationalist movement's leading SMOs remain moderate, unlike the case with the EOKA episode? And why did not one or more of the fringe organizations at the movement's periphery develop campaigns of violence, as in the case with the BR episode (and ETA)?

We maintain that the answer to both questions is to be found primarily in the arena within the movement and the arena between the movement and its constituency. In these arenas, the mechanisms consensus mobilization and association—the reverse mechanisms of competition for power and dissociation, respectively—operated in ways that both fostered moderation within the general movement and curtailed any inclination by fringe organizations to develop campaigns of violence. An additional role in this non-radicalization episode, furthermore, was played by dynamics in the arena between the movement and its political environment. For the moderate SMOs in particular, these dynamics amounted to downward spirals of political opportunity.

The development of Catalan identity was a centuries-long process. The development of a Catalan nationalist movement, however, is typically traced back only to the nineteenth century. The episode that developed during Franco's dictatorship is often termed the second reincarnation of

18. Personal interview (February 2009).

the movement, a "repeat" of a late-nineteenth-century episode. Both episodes were based on similar initial conditions. Catalonia had a distinct history and language, and this resulted in a clear-cut Catalan-Spanish boundary compounding various markers of distinction, including the geographical one. Likewise, Catalan grievances had a long existence. The people of the region had for centuries experienced political exclusion, less explicitly in the two periods of Republican polity and more explicitly in the periods of autocratic rule (Mastrovito 1993). The political exclusion was felt most particularly by the Catalan middle class, which historically had been larger and wealthier than its counterparts in other regions of Spain (save for the Basque countries).

Given this historical background, the legitimacy of the Spanish state was under question both in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Catalonia. In the twentieth century the deficit of state legitimacy increased following the collapse of the Second Republic in 1939, after the Republican forces lost to Franco's nationalist rebels in the civil war (1936–1939). Franco's regime (1939–1975) was therefore resented by many in Catalonia both because it was "foreign" and because it was authoritarian. That the regime met the challenge to its legitimacy with a systematic and brutal campaign of repression in Catalonia, incriminating various expressions of Catalan nationalism and creating scores of political prisoners, only fed Catalan grievances (Mastrovito 1993).

While the repression of Catalan nationalism peaked during the early years of the Franco dictatorship, the Catalan nationalist movement peaked in the 1970s. To a large extent, this trend related to the development of free market policies by the regime in the 1960s and 1970s. Thus, having moved out of its initial international isolation, the regime was interested in attracting foreign investment and tourism. Due to international pressure and a desire not to antagonize the Catalan financial and industrial elite, the regime relaxed its repression and inadvertently created space for Catalan activism. Responding to downward spirals of political opportunity, the movement was therefore developing momentum.

The activism of the movement involved both ad hoc networks and established organizations. A generation of Catalans who had not experienced the brutal repression of the post-civil-war years was becoming politically active, and the causes it rallied around were primarily cultural ones. In the 1960s most movement activism was oriented toward claims about protecting and asserting Catalan culture and identity, above all the Catalan language (Conversi 1990, 1993). In one facet of such activism, a bourgeoning network of singers engaged in a campaign to sing and promote prohibited Catalan songs, an act of defiance that became popular as

the 1960s progressed. In another facet, a campaign developed to promote the teaching of Catalan culture in schools.

By the end of the 1960s, however, more specific claims about Catalan autonomy were being added to the ongoing cultural claims. At the beginning of the 1970s, there formed the so-called Assembly of Catalonia, an underground network connecting various culture and religious groups, political parties, and labor unions. Through events and other outlets, this network raised various claims, including the reestablishment of the short-lived political autonomy granted to Catalonia in 1932. This sort of activism culminated after the death of Franco in 1975, at a time when the question about the new Spanish polity was still undecided. Thus in September 1977 Barcelona experienced a million-strong demonstration in support of regional autonomy. "Hailed as the biggest demonstration in postwar Europe," as Conversi writes, the event "gave an unmistakable signal to Madrid that the time for dismantling the unitary state had come" (1997, 142).

During the 1970s, in short, a dialectic was underway between the making of claims for cultural freedoms and political autonomy, on the one hand, and the taking of a relatively lenient posture by the regime, on the other. But the movement did not resort to violence on behalf of its claims. To understand why this was so, it is necessary to examine the movement composition and the movement relations with Catalan society, while not losing sight of the movement's political environment.

Consensus mobilization was achieved and sustained in this period, as it was formed, on the one hand, around cultural claims that were popular and uncontroversial in Catalonia and, on the other, around political autonomy claims that were voiced gradually and in pace with downward spirals of political opportunities. Regarding the claim for regional autonomy, it must be underscored that it was moderate, had a history of success (e.g., in 1937), and therefore carried realistic attainment prospects. In the mid-1970s in particular, as the death of Franco was anticipated, a wide range of Catalans fostered realistic hopes that regional autonomy would be a feature of the democratic new polity, and these hopes of course peaked after Franco's death. Given this downward spiral of political opportunity, it would have been a counter-productive strategy indeed to radicalize the movement's tactics in pursuit of autonomy, especially since it was clear from Left-wing activism across the country that the policing of protest remained tight, though not as heavy-handed as before (Jaime-Jimenez and Reinares 1998). At the same time, however, consensus mobilization was also achieved because it was propped up by a movement infrastructure conducive to collaboration. In this regard, the mechanism concatenated

with the mechanism association. As will be explained below, the two mechanisms concatenated with downward spirals of political opportunities to account also for the fact that a claim for secession was not championed by the main SMOs.

As Johnston argues, during the post-civil-war period informal linkages existed in Catalonia among wide-ranging groups and individuals with nationalist predispositions, which resulted in their influencing each other and forming a subculture of opposition (Johnston 1991, 1995). These linkages, often cross-generational, cut across various sections in society and lasted into the 1960s and 1970s. The participants of the movement, accordingly, were variously ramified and interconnected in society. Thus, complementing the school education activism mentioned above, various university student organizations developed campaigns in the early 1960s promoting not only Catalan culture but also the cause of political prisoners. Also, writers and poets, complementing the singers mentioned above, engaged in acts of defiance via the use of the Catalan language. Furthermore, the Catholic Church in Catalonia also contributed to the movement, even though not keen on the autonomy claim. In addition to many Catalan clergymen individually promoting nationalism in quotidian fashion, some Church institutions assumed overt nationalist roles, as when the important Abbey of Montserrat published its texts in Catalan in the 1970s. Similarly nationalistic were the inclinations of the petit bourgeoisie, and in fact the attachment to Catalan identity was positively correlated with the level of education (Moreno et. al, 2007). But it is noteworthy that the grand bourgeoisie were not too different. Even though keeping a distance from the autonomy claim, through the Franco years the grand bourgeoisie maintained their tradition of promoting cultural nationalism, via their leverage in Madrid and otherwise (Johnston 1995).

All this, in short, goes to show not only a convergence toward cultural claims, but also that the operation of consensus mobilization prevented the expansion of these claims to include maximalist political positions. However, not everyone in Catalonia was equally under the pull of consensus mobilization. Due to the force of their ideology, the Leftist parties, which were clandestine and often led by people in exile, could not have been as affected by the informal networks as the mainstream, middle class movement participants were. Still, the cadres of these parties were also connected to the complicated fabric of society—tellingly, Johnston (1991) examines activists who were well connected both to Marxist organizations and the Catholic Church—and this reality had an effect on Leftist strategy formation. More importantly, these parties had an additional incentive to develop a logic similar to that of the main SMOs, that

is, a reasoning that was sensitive to potential allies in the rest of Spain. In order to attract such allies, the main SMOs asked not simply for Catalan autonomy but for more comprehensive autonomy of Spanish regions. In a parallel fashion, most Leftist parties, including Marxist and communist parties, were determined not to isolate the numerous non-Catalan working-class residents of Catalonia; they were in fact wary of repeating what happened in the nineteenth-century episode of the nationalist movement, when immigrant workers alienated from the movement became militant anarchists. Most Leftist parties, therefore, kept a distance from secession and, by and large, from militant activism.

A handful of fringe organizations inclined to radicalism were also present, most particularly the Socialist Party of National Liberation (*Partit Socialista d'Alliberament Nacional dels Paisos Catalans*). But the opportunity of a group such as this to expand its organization and to have an impact on Catalonian underground politics was limited. One limiting factor was that the Left and the mainstream nationalist movement were respectively populated by many well-established groups. The small fringe organizations could therefore hardly compete with them over potential recruits, when the latter had an array of activism channels from which to choose (Johnston 1995, 243). Furthermore, if an organization was small and resource-poor, to make an impact required a strategy of indiscriminate violence via such facile methods as bombings. To have done so, however, these organizations would almost certainly have found themselves cut off from Catalan society; one only need to remember that the violence by ETA resulted in harsh state counter-violence and suppression in the Basque countries and in the concomitant social marginalization of the organization. Thus the Catalan organizations such as the Socialist Party of National Liberation, no matter how fringe, were comprised by members who valued their linkages in Catalan society and did not want to severe them by adopting radicalization.[19]

The European Social Forum Contentious Inauguration: "Peaceful in Florence"

It is widely accepted by social movement scholars and activists that the first major episode of contention of what became known as the Global

19. A Marxist group, Terra Lliure, started a campaign of violence in 1978. The advent of this violence, however, supports our argument, since Terra Lliure was unable to recruit widely and was unwilling to develop particularly destructive action (the bombs it planted caused one death, in 1987).

Justice movement took place in Seattle, Washington, in 1999.[20] The several days of street protests against the World Trade Organization Ministerial, which took place in Seattle in November and December of that year, was a turning point in a series of activism for global justice that has since marked inter-governmental summits across the world (Smith 2001). Much of this global wave of protest has been organized through regional groups, in so-called regional and local forums.

The inaugural conference of the European Social Forum in Florence (ESF), Italy, in November 2002, was particularly successful. Bringing together tens of thousands of activists from numerous organizations across Europe, the ESF became the occasion of many sessions, seminars, and workshops, as well as street rallies and demonstrations. The immediate background of the gathering was the pending US invasion of Iraq, but the more general background was globalization and its perceived evils: globalized neoliberal policies and the mass exploitation, discrimination, and human rights abuse that came with it. For the ESF, therefore, opposing neoliberal globalization was the first step in creating a world of equality, social rights, and respect for diversity. Not surprisingly the leading slogan in Florence was "against war, racism and neo-liberalism."[21]

Coming after clashes and confrontations between activists and the police during the Seattle and subsequent counter-summits, the most recent and traumatic of which was the bloody anti-G8 demonstrations in Genoa, Italy, in July 2001, the run-up to the Florence gathering was highly tense. Center-Right politicians and many opinion leaders predicted violence and, in order to prevent it, went as far as to propose limitations to the right to demonstrate.[22] But as it turned out, the ESF meeting defied all predictions and proceeded completely without violent incidents. In sharp contrast to the events in Genoa, where one activist was shot dead by a policeman and hundreds on both sides were injured, in the Florentine scene not even a single clash took place. This striking "double contrast"—between the events in Genoa and the events in Florence and, with regard to the latter, between the preceding expectations and the actual outcomes—demands an explanation. How did the contentious gathering in Florence remain peaceful?

20. This section has benefited from the solo and joint publications of Massimiliano Andretta Donatella Della Porta, Lorenzo Mosca, Abby Peterson, and Herbert Reiter, compiled mainly from *Globalization from Below* (2006) and *The Global Justice Movement in Italy* (2007).

21. "Florence Builds a Bridge to a Brave New Social Paradise," John Vidal, *The Guardian*, November 11, 2002, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2002/nov/11/uk.comment (retrieved: December 30, 2013).

22. "Camera: Il Governo riferisce sul prossimo Forum sociale europeo a Firenze," http://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/166814 (accessed December 30, 2013).

One could argue that the different nature of the two episodes, one essentially confrontational (i.e., an anti-G8/capitalist exploitation episode) and the other conventional in type (i.e., civil society-led inaugural convention), made a difference (Glasius 2005). Yet, in the background and during the inaugural convention was the pending invasion to Iraq, which saw intense opposition among Global Justice activists and took shape as a mass-scale antiwar protest, and which could have developed differently. Additionally, one would be tempted to think that it was the shock caused by the Genoa events that prompted actors and parties on all sides to opt for moderation in Florence, presumably having introspectively reassessed their past actions and reactions. Given Italy's longstanding alliance with the United States and its siding with the post-9/11 War on Terror led by Bush and Cheney,[23] all of which certainly made Italy central on global jihadists' target list, one could even argue for a rallying around the Italian government's counter-terrorism policy and respect for the "tenor of the times," to use Iyengar and Kinder's (1987) term (Conway 2003).

While they certainly have some validity, especially in the immediate period following either the events in Genoa or the 9/11 events, these explanations only tell part of the story.[24] To be sure, a certain "change of heart" developed on the side of certain parties and actors; yet the same antecedent events, separately and jointly, led other parties and actors in the opposite direction. Militant organizations, such as the Black Bloc, Anti-Imperialists, and Anarchists, exhibited intensified infuriation and vindictiveness following the Genoa events, and blamed the government for using the "War on Terror" as a pretext for further solidification and intensification of predatory neoliberal policies. However, it should be stressed that little if anything changed between the two contentious gatherings in terms of the ESF's central and largest organizations' commitment to nonviolence, a commitment that was formalized as a "work agreement" as early as 2000 (Reiter 2007, 55). In both episodes, Italian-based organizations, which took the lead in carrying out the events, included Attac, Rete Lilliput (Lilliputian Network), Tute Bianche (White Overalls), CGIL (General Confederation of the Italian Workers), ARCI (Italian Association of Culture and Recreation), and the Network for Global Rights, with religious organizations on their right, and Anti-Imperialist Coalition, Black Bloc, and Anarchists on their left.

23. For a detailed description of Italy's counter-terrorism measures following 9/11 see http://www.esteri.it/MAE/EN/Politica_Estera/Temi_Globali/Lotta_Terrorismo/ (accessed December 19, 2013).

24. This was the case in many other places where movement organizations responded differently to the 9/11 events and the repressive climate that came with it. See Hadden and Tarrow (2007) for an insightful analysis of the US Seattle Coalition.

Little changed, too, on the side of the government, with many political parties (including not only, and obviously Right-wing parties, but also some representatives of Left-wing parties) and other institutional actors opposing the movement. What this side maintained above all was its simplistic perspective: refusing to recognize the movement as a legitimate political subject and portraying it as mainly a source of public disorder. Prime Minister Berlusconi characteristically stated that it was impossible to tell the difference between the Genoa Social Forum and the Black Bloc (Della Porta et al. 2006). Regarding security forces, it is unlikely here, too, that pre-existing stereotypes and negative images of movement activists as troublemakers would change overnight and across the various agencies, covert and overt alike.

The point to be stressed, then, is that even if each side's intention to refrain from violence is taken for granted, what explains the nonviolent outcome in Florence in November of 2002 needs to be derived from the way intentions materialized in wide-raging behavior. Since behavior surrounding an event as complicated as the one in Florence is emergent and interactive, a proper explanation must consider relational dynamics within and between each of the ever-pertinent arenas of interaction that we identify. Much like in the other episodes on non-radicalization examined above, therefore, the lack of violence during the ESF gathering in Florence was related, most centrally, to the mutually reinforcing operations of the reversed relational mechanisms. What needs to be noted here in particular, however, is that due to the transnational features of the "movement of movements" and the scope of its claims and activities, the operation of the reversed relational mechanisms in their respective arenas of interaction involved actors and parties that were not limited to Italy.

The movement as a whole had had political support in Italy and other countries, in and outside Europe, long before the November 2002 gathering in Florence. In addition to the recommendation of the Okinawa G8 Summit of July 2000 that there should be greater involvement of civil society in decision-making processes, there had been also political allies of this stance in parliaments throughout Europe. Green parties and several members of Left parties' militant wings had voiced the movement demands and agenda regarding issues of sustainability and the social effects of neoliberalism, and some of these politicians had even attended previous movement activities and gatherings, including those at Genoa. These sources of support, however, had been mostly symbolic and fairly marginal in terms of political input, granting the movement hardly any standing and bargaining positioning vis-à-vis local "corridors of power." While possibilities for collective action had

been always present, the possibilities for the movement attaining its goals had hardly existed.

The violent events in Genoa precipitated changes in political opportunities for the movement, but they were not immediate and did not affect all parties (Della Porta et al. 2006), nor were they the mere result of more favorable coalitional balance of power. Downward spirals of political opportunities were reflected first in growing recognition by "red" and "green" party members of the value of popular pressure for moving forward with reforms. Although the stance at the time was still one of denying movement organizations and representatives any role in working out answers, there nonetheless was growing appreciation of the movement struggle (facilitated by an important refocusing of several organizations' agendas, as discussed below). This, in turn, was buttressed further by continuing endorsement and support of the movement by green and red party members in several European countries, most notably Germany and France, as well as at the level of EU institutions (e.g., Cohn-Bendit as European MP for the French Green Party). More conducive to dialogue with the movement than before, the new political climate not only empowered those pre-existing receptive voices but also led the previously lukewarm political forces to express willingness to see movement organizations in the capacity of potential consultants for governments and parliaments. In Italy, in particular, the new political climate was manifested clearly. Vigorous debates took place within Left-wing parties and calls for dialogue with local social forums were made. In the context of a marked rise in public support of the movement and its goals, and European-wide opposition on the part of socialist parties to the pending US intervention in Iraq, it was no surprise that contacts and ties between the non-institutional and institutional Left solidified, with many representatives of the latter participating in the demonstrations and marches that accompanied the ESF.

Changes in the relational dynamics between the Italian security services and central movement organizations in the run-up to the ESF gathering, which, before November 2002 had been characterized by no attempts to establish any sort of tacit understanding, also had an influence on the lack of violence in Florence. These changes were the result of several factors, both external and internal to the security forces. Externally, it was the combined influence of demonstrations against the brutality of the Italian police in Genoa throughout Europe, pressure by European leaders on the Italian government to increase its control on law-and-order forces, and calls made by the EU Council for Justice and Home Affairs to engage in dialogue with protestors. Internally, it was the result of the police forces' acknowledgment of an insufficient communication system, an unclear

command structure, and a lack of training and experience in dealing with political demonstrations; they also had a fear of losing public legitimacy. In addition, the Italian police forces were affected by the positive change in the Swedish police's relationship with Swedish Global Justice organizations following the similar violent experience during the EU Summit in Göteborg, in June 2001 (Della Porta et al. 2006, 158; Wahlström 2007).

The months leading to the ESF, then, saw several meaningful developments that facilitated underbidding. Prompted by institutional trends that reflected readiness and actual engagement in negotiation with movement organizers, as well as by recommendations from an Interior Ministry committee (made public a month before the ESF) to train officers in relationship and contact with demonstrators and to strengthen the lines of command, the Italian security forces employed several critical measures along these lines. This included, inter alia, formation of a single operation room directed by local police chief as a way to improve coordination between the various forces and agencies, participating in training courses on how to handle and approach demonstrators, maintaining sufficient distance from marches and demonstrations so to alleviate tension, avoiding restrictions on places for ESF activities, and establishing lines of communication between prefects and organizers (Della Porta et al. 2006: 193–194).

Movement organizers had their own share in establishing and maintaining underbidding. This was not only through their conscious and systematic effort to form consensus among the various movement organizations, but also via their attempts to facilitate rapprochement with institutional and semi-institutional actors (e.g., refocusing its agenda so to align better with Left-wing parties and trade unions, as discussed above) and their more general attentiveness to public opinion. As a result, the central organizations of the ESF made efforts to coordinate activities with the police forces, efforts that found correspondence as ongoing meetings between activists and the police were established. During these meetings, information about planned spoiler attempts by radical organizations was shared and procedures regarding how to act were designed (Della Porta et al. 2006). Regarding the relationship with the other movement organizations, earnest efforts were made by Social Forum organizations (e.g., Attac and the Rete Lilliput) to join forces. These efforts, which took the form of coordination meetings, led to the decision to refrain from provocative forms of action and to avoid any type of threat-inducing clothing materials.[25] But the efforts to mobilize and

25. According to Reiter (2007), in Genoa some civil disobedience groups (called the Disobedients), wore protective materials for their personal safety and at times pushed and shoved their way into "red areas."

sustain consensus also extended to attempts to orchestrate the large demonstrations and marches through forming stewardship services and, most meaningfully, to call on other radical and militant organizations to join forces and walk together on November 9, in the hundreds of thousands march against the pending US intervention in Iraq (Della Porta and Tarrow 2012).

Despite considerable tension and criticism, many of the radical and militant activists joined the march in a peaceful and nonviolent manner, with some anarchists, anti-imperialist, and "disobedient" organizations toeing the line with the moderate ones; those that did not, nonetheless initiated their own alternative marches, which tended to be nonviolent and yet were put under tight police control; and, those few who tried to disrupt and spoil the march (e.g., Black Bloc activists) were immediately stopped by stewards and other activists. As proudly stated by Peter Wahl, a member of Attac-Germany, who participated in the ESF,

> On the side of the demonstrators there was no sign of a "black bloc" of any kind. Other groups which tend toward militancy, such as the so called "Disobediente" . . . and the Tute Bianche, which had stood at the front in the confrontation with the police at the IMF/World Bank meeting in Prague, marched in a disciplined manner with the demonstration . . . [A]fter the confrontations of Prague, Göteborg and above all Genoa, Florence deprives the opposition of the possibility of isolating or at least splitting the antiglobalization movement with the issue of violence.[26]

CONCLUSIONS

The aim of this chapter has been to demonstrate the open-ended nature of processes of radicalization and the possibilities for its analysis. We have accomplished this by pointing to and analyzing forgone possibilities for de-radicalization found in our three main episodes. Given that processes of radicalization are open-ended because of their relational richness and contingency, our effort has been to show possible junctures in the processes in which the operation of mechanisms could have possibly slowed down or ceased, and/or where reverse mechanisms could have plausibly

26. "Seattle, Genoa . . . and Now Florence" (Global Policy Forum, December 12, 2002) (http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/174/30649.html—accessed December 24, 2013, 05:52 PM).

developed and combined to alter the course of radicalization. As analyzed, some of our counterfactual scenarios suggest the possibility of a halt on the radicalization processes at hand, while other scenarios suggest merely their deceleration.

The logic that sustains such attention to counterfactuals and our relational-laden critical assessment of counter-terrorism and disengagement studies, furthermore, also calls attention to what we refer to as instances of non-radicalization—contentious episodes that produce little or no violence despite the presence of environmental stimuli and violence-prone ideologies. Following our pattern in analyzing the possibility of de-radicalization, our analysis of non-radicalization has pivoted as well on the reverse operation of the mechanisms toward radicalization proposed by our theory. We have therefore demonstrated how the study of relational dynamics through such reverse mechanisms allows a nuanced understanding of how radicalization was impeded in contentious episodes related to the Gaza Pullout, the Catalan nationalist movement, and the European Social Forum gathering in Florence. These three episodes represent respectively instances at the national, intra-national, and transnational levels of engagement and therefore their analyses mirror the analyses of our three main episodes of radicalization.

CHAPTER 8

Conclusion:

The Relational Dynamics of Radicalization

When we set out on our book project we knew that we were not entering an uncharted terrain. The relational and context-sensitive study of radicalization has a lineage and so we knew that we would traverse its terrain with company. Even before the 9/11 airborne attacks, doubtlessly the singular event prompting the proliferation of research on radicalization, there had been available works of kindred spirit to inform our pursuit. There had been, for one, the literature on social movements offering relational analytical tools, including a few works adopting these tools to questions of political violence. There had been, as well, a body of literature produced outside social movement studies that, all the same, developed context-sensitive analyses of radicalization. Yet it is also true that those works developing a context-sensitive, strategic interaction framework constituted a conspicuous minority when compared with the vast body of works that followed ideational or behavioral explanations and tended to focus primarily on what became called the "group at risk." To get a sense of that state of affairs one only needs to browse through some of the top-cited books on political violence at that time, such as *Origins of Terrorism* (1998), edited by Walter Reich—to offer but one pointed example.

The post-9/11 scholarly boom in studying political violence has not erased the pre-existing divide between the dominant works focusing on the "group at risk" and works explaining political violence through its broader, evolving context. While taking different directions, the context-sensitive works, whose number has been growing rapidly, have been characterized by the effort to rethink the dominant paradigms and the

way their focus on the "group at risk" has guided attention to such factors as motives, aggressive propensities, profound grievances, and violence-prone ideologies. Scholars from various social science disciplines have therefore demonstrated how systematically gathered empirical evidence fails to support claims regarding the importance of such factors and have begun instead to stress the strategic, interactive, and contextual aspects of the emergence and intensification of political violence in its various forms and manifestations. What is more, new scholarship on political violence has developed also from within social movement studies as well as the related contentious politics paradigm (SM/CP). These works, too, have criticized the dominant paradigms, counter-proposing a series of more open-ended models and frameworks situating violence in contexts of political contention.[1]

In developing our book, however, we have aspired not simply to bring new empirical analyses to the pre-existing literature, nor merely to provide theoretical refinement at its periphery. Rather, we saw a need for important improvements to the literature, and so our aim has been to make a rounded contribution that would help orient its further development. Accordingly, we conclude this study with a discussion of our distinct contributions to the literature. Four key agendas have guided our study of radicalization and guide as well our final exposition below. They regard the conceptualization, theorization, research, and comparison of radicalization.

CONCEPTUALIZING RADICALIZATION

The field that analyzes political violence has been compartmentalized, even when only the part of it that is critical of the dominant approach is considered. This compartmentalization is rooted in persistent past practices demarcating the various manifestations of political violence. Protest, insurgency, riot, terrorism, civil war, and revolution are some of the central categories that have traditionally guided scholars' understanding of phenomena of political violence. The general assumption is that phenomena under one category, though perhaps similar to phenomena under another category, are essentially distinct; if anything, the tendency has been to create sub-categories, as when insurgencies by Left-wing organizations are distinguished from insurgencies by Right-wing organizations.

1. Indicative of the growing attention to the topic of political violence by scholars within SM/CP is the decision of the editors of *Mobilization* to devote two special issues to the topic, first in 2007 (vol. 12, no. 2), with Albert Bergesen as guest editor, and then in 2012 (vol. 17, no. 1) with Jeff Goodwin as guest editor.

One of the most spiritedly defended categories in the post-9/11 years has been, of course, terrorism. It is ironic, however, that terrorism scholars have been utterly unable to agree on what is the distinguishing characteristic of their subject matter. The large number of definitions of the term "terrorism" in use—over one hundred (Schmid and Jongman 1988; Weinberg et al. 2004)—implies that these scholars hold their subject matter to be sui generis on the basis of divergent characteristics, ranging from those pertaining to political aims to those relating to tactics, to organizational characteristics, to organizational legitimacy, and so on. Not surprisingly, the inability to reach a clear and agreed-upon definition of terrorism has led to conceptual and analytical obstructionism, as predicted by Gibbs (1989) over two decades ago.

But the predilection toward the compartmentalization of phenomena of political violence and of their study has been decreasing. When the emphasis is put on the ways the "various types" of political violence develop, it becomes clear that commonalities can be found. The contentious politics paradigm, championed by Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, was pivotal in establishing the merits of this new orientation. By precisely casting wide-ranging phenomena under a unified framework of analysis, the programmatic aim of this approach has been to derive causal analogies from among these phenomena. Abstracted patterns surrounding political violence are therefore held to be analogous no matter whether the violence is against democracies or dictatorships, uses nineteenth or twenty-first century technologies, or has a reach that is local or global. In other words, the conceptualization of political violence is in this approach centered on encompassing and abstract criteria about the development of violence, rather than on narrowly differentiating criteria such as those based on characteristics of the region or the time period in which violence takes place, on the political or social functions of violence, on the type of the targeted polity, on the organization's ideology, and the like. From this perspective, works that build a theory around the conceptualization of a particular form of violence miss the point, which is to theorize on the development of violence. For example, some scholars argue that categorical violence (or, more generally, what is called political terrorism) necessitates its own theory because this form of violence implies a disconnect between victim and perpetrator, namely, a willingness by the perpetrator to inflict harm on innocent people (Bergesen 2007). By contrast, from the contentious-oriented and process-sensitive perspective embraced and developed here, one may hold categorical violence to be a term allowing for useful distinctions with regard to tactics of contention, but not a category around which a distinct causal

theory should be built outside the field of SM/CP (Tilly 2003, 2005; Goodwin 2006; Maney, McCarthy, and Yukich 2012).

Our approach follows the contentious politics paradigm. But while this paradigm streamlines the conceptualization of political violence, it only hints at a conceptualization of radicalization. We have therefore defined radicalization as a process through which a social movement organization shifts from predominantly non-violent tactics of contention to tactics that include violent means, as well as the subsequent process of contention maintaining and possibly intensifying the newly introduced violence.

This conceptualization serves our interest in understanding the ways in which radicalization develops. This pivots, obviously, on conceiving radicalization as a process, which means as a multifaceted and complex set of interactions unfolding over time and across socio-political circumstances. But by conceptualizing this process in a way that covers both the phase before the earnest onset of violence and the phase following it, we have aimed to bring attention to both the ways in which predominantly non-violent contention radicalizes and the ways in which radicalized contention is sustained and upgraded. Investigating the first phase is important because, as social movements rarely start their existence being violent, it enables a rounded understanding of ranging SMO tactics—and, by implication, it de-essentializes the radical organizations. Investigating the second phase is also important because it enables an understanding of how tactics change within a broader context of contention. Thus, rather than building an inquiry around a specific set of tactics of political violence, as is frequently done in mainstream approaches, our mode of investigation creates the conceptual space to make distinctions among such tactics in connection to the analysis of the broader relational dynamics of the process.

The last point implies that what is particularly puzzling, and therefore worthy of analysis, is not the quantitative progression of violence. Numbers matter of course, and events resulting in damaged property certainly do not have the same significance as events resulting in the death of thousands; but numbers are not the most telling aspect of radicalization (for example, they may mislead one to conclude that radicalization has increased historically along with the development of destructive technology). The qualitative differentiation among tactics of violence is more telling and indeed more puzzling. This is so because it better captures an organization's evolving strategy of contention, which, as already noted, is interactive within the context of broader relational dynamics of contention. But analyzing violence qualitatively does not mean that the task is

free of problems. For one, the qualitative categories of tactics of violence are not always easily distinguished from each other. It is therefore not always easy to pinpoint a category's defining quality and, consequently, to identify an actual event; in fact one may even have difficulty in drawing a firm line between nonviolent and violent tactics—just consider a street demonstration that prevents traffic, which is presumably a nonviolent event, and an act of sabotage that damages a street and likewise prevents traffic, presumably a violent event. Nor is it clear whether tactics of violence should be conceptualized through the intention behind them or through the outcome.

With regard to the last issue, we have opted for an outcome-based notion of violence because we have deemed it not as constricting as the intention-based notion. We therefore acknowledge that we call attention to violence that occasionally may be inadvertent; but at the same time we maintain that even inadvertent violence has a place in the course of the interactive progression of strategy and, more broadly, of the relational development of radicalization. With regard to the various categories of political violence existing in the literature—a pool of categories from which some scholars draw to build their definition of terrorism—, we have opted to pay attention to those that are central in the literature but not particularly problematic conceptually. Thus we have especially considered selective, collateral, categorical, and indiscriminate violence. We have, accordingly, taken these categories to offer a key indication of the degree of radicalization and thus treated their presence and absence as indicators of the upgrading/downgrading of violence. Indeed, without excluding quantitative and other qualitative indicators of violence from our substantive analyses, the attention we have paid to the presence and absence of these four categories of political violence has enriched our understanding of radicalization processes. An overview of the range of tactics in the three episodes of radicalization that we scrutinized offers some indication of this: the repertoire of violent tactics of the Brigate Rosse (BR) preponderantly included violence on state targets, with some instances of selective violence; the repertoire of EOKA included few instances of collateral violence but many instances of selective and categorical violence, as well as violence on state targets; and that of the al-Qaeda (AQ) included, in addition to violence against state targets, collateral, categorical and indiscriminate violence, but not selective violence. As our analyses have explained, these varied repertoires indicate not only variation in material and operational factors, but also variation in relationally understood and relationally explained strategy formation and tactical evolution.

THEORIZING RADICALIZATION

The second item on our agenda has been the development of the overall understanding of the role relational dynamics play in the process of radicalization. As noted above, conceptualizing radicalization as a process opens up the inquiry on the ways radicalization develops. Befitting the "how" and "when" questions of radicalization, this conceptualization has channeled our substantive relational theory of radicalization and, along the way, has allowed us to advance an alternative to the studies offering answers to the "why" question of radicalization. Accordingly, there is meta-theoretical value in our substantive relational treatment of radicalization, one that moves beyond a one-sided focus on the "group at risk."

We already remarked on how the mainstream literature typically seeks to arrive at the root causes of radicalization, priming structural, environmental, or ideational forces, or a combination of them. In this literature attributes of the "group at risk" are given epistemological priority, with the resultant theories privileging such factors as dispositions, propensities, grievances, and ideologies. From our point of view, these root-cause factors may play a part in radicalization and, in a given relational context, may even become effective forces in the development of radicalization; but we also hold that a sole focus on these factors tells only part of the story.

The inadequacy of these ubiquitous factors is seen clearly in instances of political contention where these factors are present but violence is absent or barely existent. But if inadequate to explain such lack of radicalization, these factors cannot be considered at the same time adequate—much less sufficient—to explain radicalization. Just consider the perplexing situations in which "advantaged" organizations that are initially committed to nonviolent means of political contention turn to violent means. Root-cause factors cannot possibly account for both the peaceful and the violent behavior of these organizations. The episode of radicalization in Cyprus over the goal of enosis is a case in point. The Enosis movement was led by bourgeois nationalists who initially were committed to nonviolent political contention and who arguably stood to benefit from a compromise with the British colonial regime, rather than from radicalization. The radicalization that eventually characterized some of them, therefore, cannot be simply attributed to their nationalist ideology, although that root-cause factor goes a long way to explaining their political agenda, goals, and mobilization. Rather, the explanation of their radicalization and that of AQ and the BR as well as the radicalization of other organizations in other contexts (e.g., the Peruvian Shining Path (Palmer 1995), the antimilitaristic militant

activists within the Dutch Peace movement (Klandermans 1997), or the Women's Social and Political Union's struggle for enfranchisement in early twentieth-century Britain (Rosen 2013)) is found in their, and other pertinent actors', webs of changing relations. In other words, what makes a critical difference in the episodes of radicalization is not the mere presence of root causes, but the *relational context* within which root causes may develop, operate, and gain or lose salience. And while those works regarding strategic interaction, which along with us privilege the focus on "how" and "when" of radicalization, advance our understanding in this regard, they nonetheless fall short in fleshing out and demonstrating the operation of those relational drivers that connect interacting parties and actors and shape the forms and functions of their interactions in various phases of the process.

One theoretical value stemming from the relational approach to radicalization, therefore, regards the specification of when and how root-cause factors gain salience in processes of radicalization. The episode-specific explication of this matter opens the way to rich analysis, as chapters 3 to 5 of this volume show. Generalizations, on the other hand, cannot be derived readily, and the in-depth cross-episode comparisons in this book do not provide easy general answers either. With this in mind, however, we find reason to support the broad view that when pre-existing relations connecting actors within or across parties involved in contention deteriorate, the likelihood increases that root-cause factors gain salience in the course of radicalization and that other radical organizations, previously with little or no involvement in the movement organization's contention, join the fray. We have seen this happening, for example, in the episode of AQ when the combined influences of intensified outbidding and weakening strategic political positioning, at both the local and regional levels, not only made pre-existing violence-prone ideologies more attractive for some Salafi organizations, but also engendered an ideological transformation: A Salafi-driven global jihad. These developments increasingly became meaningful in shaping the strategy and tactics of AQ and, in the process, brought about a convergence at the margins of the movement between AQ and Zawahiri's EIJ: the World Islamic Front.

But the aforementioned discussion hints at further theoretical value stemming from the relational approach to radicalization. This approach, for one, enables the exploration of the variable relationship between attitudinal and behavioral elements during episodes of contention, both before and after the turn to violence, the systematic treatment of which is still lacking in works on the topic. Again, sweeping generalizations about it are not warranted. But there is reason to expect that any episode-specific analysis stands to gain from paying attention to it: precisely because social

relations usually embody both action and culture, their analysis via process-tracing allows for sophisticated accounts of how various attitudinal and behavioral elements come together and how they vary over time and across socio-political circumstances or different phases of the process of radicalization. Our relational approach has provided us with the analytical tools not only to problematize the confluence between attitude and behavior, but also to highlight and demonstrate how they sometimes converge and sometimes diverge in a dynamic and processual manner.

In all episodes we have analyzed, relational dynamics were key in shaping attitudinal and behavioral elements, particularly as relational dynamics stemming from different arenas of interaction combined and mutually reinforced each other. Members of the incipient BR, for example, while maintaining a notion of armed struggle early on in their activism, nonetheless tended to settle for conventional and disruptive tactics; it was only in the context of the separate and joint influence of outbidding, object shift, and upward spirals of political opportunities, most centrally, that the conception of armed struggle infused with violent tactics. The episode of the IRA posed no exception in this regard. Despite their violence-prone ideologies and rich history of violence, republican militants refrained from violent tactics during most of the 1960s and, instead, toed the line of the predominantly nonviolent Civil Rights movement. It was only when outbidding and object shift began to develop between civil rights activists, on the one hand, and Northern Ireland police and Loyalists, on the other, that we saw republican violence emerging, including fighting within the republican ranks.

Furthermore, the relational analysis of radicalization processes opens up the way to a comprehensive comparison of radicalization, one that follows the process-tracing logic. While we discuss the comparative aspect of our agenda below, it is necessary to point out here that this type of analysis crucially allows for the identification of critical junctures in the process where possibilities for a brake on violence exist. This follows the premise that radicalization processes, while entailing paths toward violence, are dynamic, emergent, contingent, and open-ended. They are made up of various punctuations in the course of events—moments of mobilization, provocation, tension, and so forth—which can plausibly happen differently precisely because goals, strategy, and tactics develop relationally. The relational analysis of processes of radicalization can therefore advance not only the understanding of how and when they happen but also of the understanding of how and when de-radicalization happens or could have happened in a given context of radicalization. Based on this, it is a small step to take the inquiry in the direction of non-radicalization as

well—that is, to examine processes of political contention where a certain propensity toward radicalization is present but not realized. Indeed, underscoring the importance of such double inquiry, we have devoted a chapter to it (chapter 7), demonstrating how de-radicalization could have developed in our three main episodes of radicalization as well as how organizations in political contention with regard to the Gaza Pullout, the Catalan nationalist movement, and the Social European Forum essentially stayed clear of radicalization.

RESEARCHING RADICALIZATION

As we have been interested in developing a relational theory of radicalization through comparative work, we have found guidance in mechanism-based methodology. This orientation to research provided a way to pursue process-tracing and, particularly through the research program developed by McAdam et al. (2001), to develop comparisons. Yet we have been well aware that this methodology faced challenges, as McAdam et al. (2001)'s work was criticized for lack of clarity at the same time that it was praised for its promising potential. Our third agenda, therefore, has been the clarification and sharpening of this methodology in the context of research on radicalization.

If the radicalization process entails a complicated set of violence-prone social interactions in time, it is imperative to identify those "drivers" that propel it and to trace how and when they exert their influence. Mechanisms refer to patterns with causal efficacy that, while context-derived, recur across different situations. In this capacity they can be used to describe and analyze consequential punctuations in the course of a given radicalization process, a use which renders them prime process-tracing tools. But they are also the means to make causal analogies. Hence mechanisms can be utilized as units of comparison, fixing comparison not around conventional units, such as attributes of groups or of social structures, but around abstracted "process drivers."

This is not the only approach to the notion of mechanism. Alternatively, for many scholars, in political science in particular, mechanism is a notion meant to aid the "unpacking" of the relationship between independent and dependent variables. Here a more positivist epistemology is maintained, aiming at probabilistic, law-like generalizations through the reduction of interactive complexity. Pivoting on the analysis of variables, however, works in this line of research tend to develop a thin understanding of mechanisms as well as of their relational operations. By contrast, the use of

mechanisms as tools for relational analysis of complex processes aims at a richer and more flexible explication of the causal forces at play. Mechanisms, therefore, are used to apprehend, analyze, and reconstruct processual emergence without recourse to extra-processual forces—be they covering laws, micro-foundations of behavior, or the like.

Yet the mechanism-based relational methodology faced epistemological difficulties that critics did not miss to point out. How can one reconcile the fact that similar sets of mechanisms operating across contexts may end up producing differentiated outcomes in these contexts, or the fact that different sets of mechanisms across contexts may end up producing the same outcome? And is it right that a given mechanism may be comprised of different sub-mechanisms in different contexts? What was needed to address these puzzles, it seemed to us, was a careful specification of the connotations of the concept mechanism. Accordingly, we have proposed the following: firstly, that a mechanism is a process featuring constitutive parts and a resultant constituted outcome; secondly, that it is the constituted outcome, rather than the constitutive parts, that recurs in different contexts; and, thirdly, that not all constitutive parts of a mechanism are identifiable and not all identifiable parts need to be recognized in the context of a study. These clarifications not only clarify the notion that given processes (sub-mechanisms) constitute a bigger process (mechanism) that combines with other similarly big processes (mechanisms) to constitute a yet bigger process; they also show that these constitutive relationships at the different levels of mechanism operation are neither uniform nor exhaustive. They are not uniform precisely because a process outcome such as radicalization is constituted across contexts by a variety of mechanisms that, themselves, are constituted by a variety of sub-mechanisms. And, they are not exhaustive because such identified processes (including mechanisms and sub-mechanisms) are not the only causal forces involved in the production of the processual outcomes (at any of the levels).

These clarifications have allowed us to smooth out complicated analyses along a process-tracing pattern pivoting on the identification of mechanisms and sub-mechanisms. Consequently, the analyses offered in this book abundantly demonstrate the epistemological premise of the constitutive relationships noted above. For example, we have found that the mechanism outbidding was one of the constitutive elements of the radicalization process in the episodes of the BR, EOKA, and the AQ. But we also found that in each of these episodes this mechanism was constituted by distinctive sets of sub-mechanisms: by provocation, repression by proxy, and de-legitimization in the episode of the BR; by legitimization

and attribution of similarity in the episode of EOKA; and by boundary control and threat attribution in the episode of AQ. The mechanism outbidding did not exhaust the constitutive forces of the radicalization process in each episode, and neither did the identified sub-mechanisms exhaust the constitutive elements of outbidding. In the episode of EOKA, for instance, outbidding was related to the operational objectives of the combatant sides and with their broader political goals and claims; but the sub-mechanisms legitimization and attribution of similarity played a distinct role in outbidding dynamics, being part of the forces that defined the parameters of EOKA tactics of violence. In the episode of AQ radicalization, too, resource depletion, brokerage, and category formation did not exhaust the sub-mechanisms of competition for power; it is possible to suggest that additional sub-mechanisms such as national-driven boundary activation (i.e., Egyptian versus Saudis) and defection, suggested by others (e.g., Gerges 2005), had an influence too. Yet, because AQ only went fully underground following 9/11 and the Salafi theological worldview that facilitated cross-national convergence, coupled with the development of the US-focused "far-enemy" strategy, these sub-mechanisms had little if any distinct influence on radicalization during the time period under examination and, in fact, were derivative of resource depletion.

The foregoing suggests that it would have been possible to analyze our three episodes through the identification of more or fewer mechanisms and sub-mechanisms than the ones we actually identified. The richness or parsimony of any analysis is a matter open for debate, and had we had more space in this volume perhaps we would have enriched our analyses with the identification of more sub-mechanisms; indeed, we could have even identified sub-sub-mechanisms, which is to say, pursued the analysis of the elements that constituted our identified sub-mechanisms. But in general, the analysis of processes through mechanisms and sub-mechanisms occupies a middle ground between reductionism and idiographic ethnography. This middle ground is suitable for analysis that is rich in empirical detail yet not so over-specified as to impede the comparison of different episodes.

Our contribution to the mechanism-based methodology, moreover, has extended to cover the notion of reverse mechanism—a notion that remains underdeveloped in the literature on political violence (but see Della Porta 2013). The notion is straightforward: for most mechanisms it is possible to conceptualize the reverse mechanisms, that is, mechanisms that produce the opposite outcome. Thus, for example, the mechanism competition for power has consensus mobilization as its reverse. Building on this notion, we have drawn a distinction between reverse mechanism and the discontinuation (or the slowing down) of the operation of a mechanism;

hence consensus mobilization is not the same at the discontinuation of competition for power. It is based on this distinction that we have maintained that the reverse of radicalization is non-radicalization—a process that produces the avoidance of the use of violence and that can be traceable through the operation of the reverse of the mechanisms usually constituting radicalization. Accordingly, non-radicalization is distinct from de-radicalization, the latter referring to the reduction or abandonment of violence at some point in the course of a radicalization process.

It has been through these clarifications that we were able to engage in a lucid empirical examination of not only radicalization but also of de-radicalization and non-radicalization. With regard to non-radicalization, for example, we found that the Catalan nationalist movement steered away from violence partly because the mechanism consensus mobilization operated widely. This mechanism related to dynamics within the various social movement organizations and to the way the membership of these organizations was ramified in the Catalonian middle class and its mainstream socio-political organizations. The arena of interaction within the movement, therefore, featured not only relations geared toward movement objectives but also a rich variety of other relations, both quotidian and extraordinary. This facilitated the building of consensus regarding movement claims and tactics, at the same time that it guarded against the development of extreme claims and radicalized tactics. The mechanism consensus mobilization as operated in the within-movement arena, in short, can be considered the reverse of the mechanism competition for power that can operate in the same arena. Just as the former played its role in the Catalan episode of non-radicalized contention, the latter played its role in the episodes of the BR, EOKA, and the AQ, pushing radicalization forward.

COMPARING RADICALIZATION

The field of SM/CP has produced works that point to the same relational direction regarding the study of radicalization as the one we advocate. But while these works have brought progress to the broader field of political violence studies, the progress has been piecemeal. When everything is taken into consideration, these works have remained timid in the face of the challenge of tackling the question of radicalization comparatively. In light of this, a central component of our agenda has been to take on this challenge through the production of the substantive comparison of radicalization processes.

The works that attempt broad and reflective comparisons of radicalization are few and far in between (e.g., Davenport, Armstrong II, and Lichbach 2006; McCauley and Moskalenko 2011; Della Porta 2013). To be sure, the pleas made by these works about the merits of the comparative method seem to have found broad resonance. It is generally recognized, after all, that comparisons help the transportability of theoretical arguments across different contexts and thereby facilitate cumulative knowledge. Still, SM/CP scholars usually opt to develop case studies rather than comparative studies. This preference is perhaps a reaction against large-N comparative works in political violence studies, especially security studies, which more often than not are based on shallow conceptualizations and correlation-based measures and indicators; this type of scholarship produces results that at best capture only a small fraction of the dynamics and offer little if any in the way of understanding. But while duly guarding against unwarranted quantification, the scholars developing case studies tend to go too far in the other direction. They either tend to become fairly descriptive or to remain limited in terms of broader theoretical concerns and statements.

Moreover, when it has produced comparative, relational, and mechanism-based analyses, the SM/CP field has still come up short of the challenge of comprehensive and nuanced analysis. One limitation in this small body of comparative literature is the tendency to emphasize commonalities across episodes, most notably common mechanisms. This tendency obviously ignores the comparison of dissimilarity, but, less obviously yet no less importantly, it also ignores the combined comparison of similarity and dissimilarity. A second limitation is the tendency to focus on a single relational mechanism without acknowledging the combined influence of several mechanisms. A third limitation, finally, is the tendency to eschew the comparison of episodes of violent contention with episodes of non-violent contention—a particularly remarkable predicament given that most social movement scholars study peaceful social movements and could therefore easily bring their knowledge to the study of radicalization.

In addressing these deficiencies, we cast a wide net from the outset, aiming for an encompassing comparative design and a comprehensive theoretical framework. Our aim has been to have a theoretical framework that captures both similarity and dissimilarity across episodes, and that applies to radicalization, de-radicalization, and non-radicalization alike. It has also been our aim to demonstrate the wide applicability of this framework by selecting episodes of radicalization that range widely according to conventional criteria.

We have proposed that certain sets of contending parties (including actors within parties) and their interactions always have a role to play in the development of radicalization. We have proposed further that these actors' interactions tend to assume a form and direction and, hence, to be characterized by the operation of certain relational mechanisms. Consequently we have argued that the following three arenas of interaction are omnipresent in radicalization processes and that the interactions they entail generate the following mechanisms: the arena between the movement and its political environment, generating the mechanism of upward spirals of political opportunities; the arena between movement leaders and activists, on the one hand, and the security forces, on the other, generating the mechanism outbidding; and the arena within the movement, generating the mechanism competition for power among movement organizations. These three arenas and their corresponding mechanisms capture a wide range of developments pertaining to radicalization and therefore enable rounded empirical investigations. Still, we have further enhanced the comprehensiveness of our framework by considering two additional arenas of interaction and corresponding mechanisms. These are the arena between the movement and its publics, generating the mechanism dissociation, and the arena between the movement and a counter-movement, generating the mechanism object shift. These arenas are not necessarily present in all radicalization episodes, but when they are, the operation of the two corresponding mechanisms can exert an additional, even critical, influence on the course of radicalization, usually in combination with other mechanisms.

In showing that these three-plus-two mechanisms operated effectively in the three episodes of radicalization we have scrutinized, we have shown that our framework captures a widely applicable pattern of the radicalization process. Indeed, since the initial conditions characterizing our episodes differed markedly from each other, our claim on the role of these mechanisms is generalizable beyond our episodes. But our ambition has not been confined to showing a general pattern; it has also aimed at building a more nuanced comparison of cross-episode similarity, one that would unearth the dissimilarity in similarity. This we have done in three distinct ways.

We have elaborated on dissimilarity, first, by theorizing on what we termed the particularities of radicalization. As we had expected the case to be, in each of our episodes different sets of sub-mechanisms constituted the mechanisms. It is this changeable composition of each of the mechanisms that we term particularities of radicalization. But this is not simply a way to admit that historical particularities matter in

radicalization; it is also a way to explore the ways historical particularities can be disciplined theoretically. Thus we have maintained that the particular sub-mechanisms characterizing each of our episodes correspond, to one extent or another, to the initial conditions characterizing these episodes. This insight, too, has a claim to broader applicability, and we have taken an initial step toward broadening our investigation by examining the radicalization process of the Weather Underground. We have found that in this episode, too, there was a certain correspondence between initial conditions and sub-mechanisms, and that several of this episode's sub-mechanisms operated also in the BR episode—the two episodes sharing similar initial conditions, as arguably may be the case with other episodes of radicalization, such as the New Left Student movement and the Japanese Red Army during the 1960s and 1970s (Steinhoff 1989, 2012). It must be pointed out that the match of sub-mechanisms in the two episodes was not perfect, even though in the instance of the mechanism upward spirals of political opportunities, the exact same set of sub-mechanisms operated in both episodes. This imperfect match is not at all surprising, but in fact expected, since initial conditions do not usually possess strong causal efficacy.

A second way in which we have elaborated on dissimilarities has been through what we termed the modalities of radicalization. This builds on the realization that a given mechanism is not likely to carry the same weight in all episodes or even to carry the same weight during the course of a single episode. Different modalities of radicalization thus refer to the varied and potentially changing role mechanisms have in constituting the process of radicalization. We have in fact found considerable divergence among our three episodes in terms of modality of radicalization. Thus the mechanism outbidding was the most consequential mechanism during the early phase of radicalization in both the BR and AQ episodes, whereas in the episode of EOKA the most consequential mechanism in the early phase was upward spirals of political opportunities. During the later phase of radicalization, competition for power took a greater relative weight in stepping up the radicalization of AQ, outbidding played a similar role in the episode of EOKA, and upward spirals of political opportunities in the episode of BR. Like the instance with the particularities of radicalization, the modalities of radicalization acquire fresh theoretical meaning when juxtaposed with the initial conditions characterizing the episodes. We have demonstrated this by comparing the AQ episode with the episode of the Insurrectional Anarchists, two organizations of anti-system and transnational movements. But the connection between initial conditions and the modalities of radicalization—like the connection

between initial conditions and the particularities of radicalization—is informative but not crucial in causal terms.

The third way for elaborating dissimilarities is regarding what we termed varieties of radicalization. By this term we mean the varied ways in which the mechanisms interact to form a particular sequence in the course of radicalization. As we repeatedly noted, while mechanisms may operate discretely to exert influence on the radicalization process, they are likely to influence and be influenced by each other. Thus their combined influence, including that which derives from the timing and sequence of their concatenations, makes up an especially potent force in the radicalization process. For example, in the episode of EOKA, upward spirals of political opportunities were the main precipitator of the turn to violence, with outbidding and object shift gaining center stage subsequently, when violence had set in. But at that later phase the most significant combination of mechanisms became that between object shift and upward spirals of political opportunities, because object shift presented a potent threat for the movement and so further pushed upwardly the movement's political opportunity spirals. For comparison's sake and in the aim of further establishing conditions scope, we have examined another ethno-nationalist contentious episode, the radicalization of the IRA within the Republican movement in Northern Ireland, which saw the rise of the Provisional-IRA. The particular sequence of mechanisms in that radicalization process featured its own sequence: first downward spirals of political opportunities and competition for power opened the way for contained movement activism, and then, most centrally, outbidding gained prominence and opened the way for object shift that, in turn, intensified competition for power. These two episodes demonstrate considerable variety of radicalization, despite certain commonality in initial conditions. While initial conditions may inform the understanding of mechanism sequence, therefore, this is clearly a complexity that is irreducible to sets of initial conditions.

In sum, by situating relational mechanisms in arenas of interaction we have placed dynamics of radicalization in the structural prerequisites of the radicalization process; in this way, we have improved on the mechanism-based literature on radicalization by specifying general conditions of mechanism operations. Further, by theorizing on the particularities, modalities, and varieties of radicalization we have delineated the processual parameters along which episodes of radicalization are expected to configure; in this way we opened up a new way of thinking about radicalization. Also, by showing how initial conditions relate to these parameters, we have connected our theorization to non-processual elements; in

this way we have invited conventional knowledge on radicalization to our processual theorization. Finally, by applying our theoretical framework to the analysis of de-radicalization and non-radicalization, we have demonstrated the framework's rounded logic and comprehensive applicability. Accomplishing this task has the benefit of drawing attention not only to matters of methodological concerns and utilities, but also to matters of broad relevance, such as the comparison of radical to non-radical social movements.

A FINAL NOTE

We cannot close this book without raising a sobering reminder: those instances of radicalization that we have covered here constitute only a fraction of the myriad of episodes past, present, and, we have good reason to believe, future. Indeed, we have only scratched the surface of the universe of social movements worldwide that have experienced radicalization on the part of one or more organizations and have taken different forms of violent contention; just consider the fairly recent development of those Jewish settler splinter groups called the "hilltop youth" and their "price tag" tactics, and the more recent development of a radical Salafi organization called the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant—as two of many other episodes of radicalization and as an indication of the additional transmutations processes of radicalization can take. But we have not tried to cover more episodes. What we have tried to do is to develop a theoretical framework for understanding and comparing processes of radicalization in different time periods and places. The relational organizing principle of our theory and the underpinning of our comparative framework has come to show that as easy as it is to focus on twisted minds, aggressive dispositions and motives, and violence-prone ideologies, the truth remains that just as it takes two to radicalize, it takes two to de-radicalize and two to impede radicalization. But the "tango" metaphor that we allude to is meant to flesh out more than the interaction between two sides; it is meant to epitomize the idea that radicalization is a process that develops out of multiple, complex webs of relational dynamics during contentious politics. Any nuanced and broad understanding must be based on a systematic and process-sensitive analysis of these relational complexities, and how they interact in varied ways with cognitive and environmental forces. Are we demanding too much? The answer to this must consider the complexity of the subject at hand. We maintain that the complexity of processes of radicalization demands nuanced understanding.

APPENDIX:

List of Sub-Mechanisms: Types and Definitions

Sub-Mechanism	Definition	Type
Attribution of Similarity	Identification of another political actor as falling within the same category as your own	Cognitive
Boundary Activation	Increase in the salience of "us–them" distinction separating two political actors	Cognitive
Boundary Control	Defending from encroachment by outsiders	Environmental
Boundary Formation	Creation of "us–them" distinctions between two political actors	Relational
Brokerage (in-group)	Connection of factions and groups on each side of an "us–them" boundary without establishing new connections across the boundary	Relational
Brokerage (out-group)	The production of a new connection between previously unconnected or weakly connected sites	Relational
Category Formation	Creation of a set of sites sharing a boundary distinguishing all of them and relating all of them to at least one set of sites visibly excluded by the boundary	Cognitive
Certification	An external authority's signal of its readiness to recognize and support the existence and claims of a political actor	Relational

Sub-Mechanism	Definition	Type
Decertification	Lack or withdrawal of validation and recognition of actors, their performances, and their claims by external authority	Relational
De-legitimization	Decrease in positive and popularly resonating representations of actors and their actions	Cognitive
Diffusion	The spread of a contentious performance, issue, or interpretive frame from one site to another	Relational
Disillusionment	A decline in the commitment of individuals or political actors to previously sustaining beliefs	Cognitive
Emulation	Deliberate repetition within a given setting of a performance observed in another setting	Relational
Encapsulation	An actor enclosing itself from society	Relational
Evolution	A shift of social movement toward increasing demands of moral conduct regarding what is right and wrong on its constituency	Relational
Internalization	Migration of international pressures and conflicts into domestic politics	Relational
Legitimization	Increase of positive and popularly resonating representations of actors and their actions	Cognitive
Marginalization	Exclusion or distancing of an actor from decision-making	Relational
Opportunity Attribution	The construction of a shared definition concerning the likely positive consequences of possible actions, or failure to act, undertaken by some political actor	Cognitive
Polarization	Increase of ideological distance between political actors or coalitions	Cognitive
Provocation	Acts initiated by one actor with the intention of inciting the response of another actor	Relational
Repression by Proxy	Informal outsourcing by state actors to non-state actors of law-and-order activities	Relational
Resentment	Disapproval of social movements' agenda, perceived as unfair and offensive on the part of its constituents	Cognitive

Sub-Mechanism	Definition	Type
Resource Depletion	Decrease in the capacity of people to engage in contention	Environmental
Retaliation	Reprisal by an actor of wrongs experienced by the actor or members of its constituency	Relational
Social Appropriation	Conversion or incorporation of previously existing non-political groups and networks into political actors	Relational
Threat Attribution	The construction of a shared definition concerning the likely negative consequences of possible actions, or failure to act, undertaken by some political actor	Cognitive
Uprooting	Displacement of a person or a group from native or habitual surroundings against their will	Environmental
Vigilantism	Initiation of provisional law-and-order activities by a non-state actor outside the control of its government and security forces	Relational
Withdrawal	Decline in the support of individuals or groups toward movement activities and goals	Relational

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