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MIGRANTS' POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN EXCLUSIONARY CONTEXTS

From Subcultures to Radicalization

Katia Pilati

Migrants' Political Participation in Exclusionary Contexts

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

MIGRANTS' POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN EXCLUSIONARY CONTEXTS.
FROM SUBCULTURES TO RADICALIZATION

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Equal Opportunities) and by the Conference of Italian University Rectors (UNAR-CRUI). Hence, I am grateful to the UNAR-CRUI committee for the prize my work was awarded, and for the possibility to publish part of those ideas in this new book.

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Political Context and Organizations

Abstract: *This introductory chapter illustrates the main research question behind this book: what are the alternative modalities of facing political exclusion of migrant groups in Europe? In this chapter, Pilati introduces her study on the political exclusion of three migrant groups, Filipinos, Egyptians and Ecuadorians in Milan, a city characterized by a moderately closed political context of migrant integration compared to other cities in Europe. In this chapter Pilati articulates the main hypothesis, arguing that the effect of an exclusionary context on political engagement is moderated by the level and type of organizational engagement and of organizational networks. Differences in these dimensions are likely to lead to different modalities of facing political exclusion.*

Keywords: closed political context; Ecuadorians; Egyptians; Filipinos; immigration; Italy; Milan; organizational engagement; organizational networks; political exclusion

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1.1 Introduction

Political participation is at the center of the concept of the democratic state (Barnes et al. 1979: 28). Therefore, political exclusion of any subgroup of the population is dangerous for democracy. The political exclusion from activities such as voting, political contacts and taking part in demonstrations as well as the lack of collective actions threatens the equal protection and representation of groups' interests, hinders the ability to take part in public affairs, lowers governments' legitimacies, the acceptance of a democratic form of government, and the sense of collective responsibility and civic duty (Desposato & Norrander 2009; Heath, Fisher, Rosenblatt, Sanders & Sobolewska 2013: 3). The political exclusion of any segment of the population deserves thoughtful analysis, but political exclusion of individuals of migrant origin in Europe is particularly pertinent given the constantly increasing inflow of the foreign population to most European countries (Salt & Almeida 2006). The literature has so far highlighted that migrants' political exclusion is particularly significant in closed political contexts, that is, in those contexts like Switzerland, Hungary or Italy that pose severe cultural and structural constraints on migrant integration. This results from the limited individual and collective rights granted to migrants (Ireland 1994; Koopmans & Statham 2000; Koopmans, Statham, Giugni & Passy 2005; Cinalli & Giugni 2011). Stating that a constraining political context to immigration leads to political exclusion may sound obvious, at least for anyone familiar with the conditions that many migrants experience in Italy (Calavita 2005). Italy is a country where migrants working in tomato, strawberry and grape plantations in the southern regions of Campania, Apulia and Sicily are paid €2, 50 per hour and work 10 hour days, thus earning a maximum €25–30 per day, in extremely harsh conditions.[1] Italy is a country that witnessed racial insults directed towards Italy's first black minister Cécile Kashetu Kyenge in July 2013 when she was the Minister for Integration in the 2013–2014 Letta Cabinet. The insults came from Calderoli, a former minister and a member of the anti-immigration party Northern League. It is also a country where the freedom of religious faith clashes with common practices deeply embedded in a predominantly Catholic culture. As a Moroccan Muslim woman living in Brussels once told me in 2010: "I left Italy to move to Brussels after 8 years of residence in Villafranca, a village in the nearby of Verona, because my daughter had started to come home singing church

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songs learned in a public kindergarten, despite the fact that I had recurrently asked the teacher to avoid practices related to Catholic religion in the presence of my daughter."[2] Italy is also a country where several politicians are under investigation for bid rigging for the management of Europe's biggest reception center for refugees and asylum seekers in Mineo, Sicily, where migrants first arrive.

Such examples provide some snapshots of Italy's overall multifaceted exclusionary context, both at the structural and at the cultural level, a context that prevents migrants from accessing mainstream social and political networks and power, shaping significant asymmetries between migrants and natives (Ambrosini 2013: 143). Backing these examples, there is solid evidence going in the same direction (Ambrosini & Abbatecola 2002; Reyneri 1998, 2004a, 2004b; Saraceno, Sartor & Sciortino 2013; Campomori & Caponio 2015): in fact, most migrants in Italy are employed in the most demeaning and menial jobs, and the foreign-born population is more likely to be overqualified in Italy than in other European countries (FRA 2011: 42). Italy has amongst the highest levels of racial discrimination: Eurobarometer survey data collected in 2008 shows that Italy has the lowest percentages of people feeling comfortable with having a neighbor from a different ethnic origin than their own (FRA 2011: 62).

Patterns of exclusion, segregation, inequalities and racism are certainly not exclusive to Italy and are present in other European countries. While I am writing this book, in summer 2015, European countries are debating over policies to adopt in order to deal with the increasing migrant flows. Just to cite a few examples, in Ventimiglia, a city on the Italian-French border, the French police are systematically expelling migrants who pass the Italian-French border, trying to reach Northern European countries. The French police are justifying their repressive actions through existing laws on refugee status. At the same time, Hungary is building a wall to keep arriving migrants away from Serbia. Migrants are targeting the Eurotunnel railway tunnel from Calais trying to reach the UK despite the deaths of several people since June 2015. In this environment of hostility towards migration which is common to European countries, Italy does however represent amongst one of the closest political contexts towards immigration (Cinalli & Giugni 2011).[3]

The current evidence on political exclusion of migrants in Italy and in other closed political contexts is substantial (Eggert & Giugni 2010; Pilati 2010; Gonzalez-Ferrer 2011; Morales & Pilati 2011). Extant literature

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shows that political exclusion is especially evident in political contexts characterized by an ethnic view of citizenship. In countries where the principle of *jus sanguinis* prevails over other requirements for acquiring citizenship, most migrants without the citizenship of the countries where they settle are foreigners (Koopmans & Statham 2000; Koopmans et al. 2005). In such contexts, segregating practices in terms of having access to the representative and the participatory dimensions of politics are structured, first of all, at the institutional level by excluding foreign migrants from voting at the national and, often, at the local level. Migrants living in countries with ethnic conceptions of citizenship or closed political opportunity structures (POS) such as Switzerland also have significantly lower opportunities to mobilize in the political sphere through protest activities in comparison to those residing in countries with a more open POS like Great Britain and France (Ireland 1994; Koopmans et al. 2005: 78–79; Bloemraad 2006: 684; Gonzalez-Ferrer 2011). Closed political contexts exclude migrants through a number of constraints related to those resources necessary to mobilize people, inter-alia, lower access to upward mobility, lower political legitimation, and hinder the capacity to share broad collective identities based on cross-cutting ties.

However, there are also reasons to believe that a closed political context may not be the only reason underneath political exclusion. In addition to the institutional context of reception, the literature has shown a multiplicity of other factors that need to be taken into account in order to understand patterns of political engagement.[4] Next to the institutional constraints or opportunities, scholars have shown the crucial role of organizational structures, an element which may somehow counterbalance the institutional dimension. Although most migrants in Italy are foreigners without active or passive voting rights, and they occupy the lowest levels of socio-economic positions and experience high levels of discrimination, they may lean on organizational resources enabling them to overcome institutional constraints, and to sustain their engagement in various types of political activities. Resources derived from organizational engagement and organizational structures are indeed extremely helpful for individual engagement in political activities and collective actions (Diani 2015).[5] Therefore, whilst institutional constraints may prevent migrants from political inclusion, there are factors which may enable migrant actors to find ways to cope with such constraints. Empirical studies have shown that the local structure of migrant organizations in closed political contexts tends to lack strength. Organizations

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tend to be weakly engaged in political activities, and to be marginalized compared to native organizations (Pilati 2012; Eggert 2014; Eggert & Pilati 2014). Moreover, migrants show lower levels of organizational engagement than natives (Voicu & Comşa 2014). As a result, in closed political contexts both institutional constraints and a weak organizational structure tend to contribute to the marginalization of migrants from political activities. While equal opportunities to access and participate in the political sphere is a normative and shared condition of all citizens of a state, this is not true for many migrants living in an exclusionary context such as Italy.

In this framework, research on possible alternative modalities used by migrants from different ethnic groups to deal with an exclusionary context remains scant. This book aims to fill this gap. This research leaves aside the extremely harsh conditions experienced by many migrants in Southern Italy (Pugliese 2013), focusing instead on one of the most economically wealthy and prosperous cities in Europe, Milan. Despite this, Milan and its surrounding region, Lombardy, can still be considered one of the most exclusionary contexts for migrants' integration in Europe (Ambrosini 2013). The book examines organizational engagement and political engagement of Filipinos, Egyptians and Ecuadorians, three major ethnic communities in Milan. In addition, it takes into account the organizational networks and the political engagement of migrant organizations. By combining insights from analyses of individual and organizational data the book demonstrates that political exclusion is not experienced equally by Filipino, Egyptian and Ecuadorian migrants. Certainly, political exclusion is common to the three groups: results show that political engagement is extremely low among migrants of all the three groups examined, both compared to migrants in other European cities and compared to natives in Milan. On closer examination, however, migrant groups end up displaying different modalities to cope with being excluded: political marginalization may engender the ethnic social closure of migrant groups into political subcultures characterized by social closure towards the majority as well as towards other migrant groups; it may lead to externally-driven participation, in particular, to modalities of reaching the political sphere by engaging in political actions by linking to mainstream actors; or it may create cultures of opposition leading to the radicalization of the *repertoires of actions*. Thus, the main research questions addressed in the book are the following: What are the possible consequences of an exclusionary context on migrants' modalities of political involvement? How does the

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effect of different organizational structures and levels as well as types of organizational engagement combine with constraints of an exclusionary context? Under what conditions does an exclusionary context lead to the emergence of political subcultures and dynamics of social closure? When and how does it instead lead to participation, including the most contentious forms of participation such as protests?

I argue that the effect of an exclusionary context on political engagement is moderated by the intermediate level of organizations. Following a neo-Tocquevillian approach, I build on studies that relate civic associational activity to outcomes such as an increased likelihood of participating in various types of political activities (Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1995; in the migration literature see Berger et al. 2004; Jacobs, Phalet & Swyngedouw 2004; Tillie 2004; Togeby 2004; Wong, Lien & Conway 2005; Barreto, Manzano, Ramirez & Rim 2009; Hochschild & Mollenkopf 2009; Aleksynska 2011; Morales & Pilati 2011; Strömblad & Adman 2011; Strömblad, Myrberg & Bengtsson 2011; Heath et al. 2013). In addition to these accounts, however, I conceive organizations, in particular, organizational networks and the resources they deploy for political engagement, as strictly intertwined with state institutions (Kesler & Bloemraad 2010; de Graauw, Gleeson & Bloemraad 2013; Eggert & Pilati 2014). I therefore expect that the type of organizational affiliations and organizational structures will moderate the relationship between a closed political context and political engagement. Considering both individual affiliations within organizations and networks among organizations, I argue that exclusionary contexts affect different patterns of exclusion from the political sphere, therefore leading to political subcultures, native-driven political engagement or forms of radicalization depending on the specific individual and organizational ties built by migrant actors.

1.2 The object of study

I focus on migrants' political engagement looking at specific behavioral dimensions. My aim is to understand the degree to which migrants are able to reach the political sphere, either individually or through activities enacted by migrant organizations. More broadly, my goal is to investigate to what extent migrants are able to make their voices heard, to defend their identities and interests, to claim rights, to participate in

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decision making processes, and to potentially influence policy making. Differently from traditional approaches in political science literature, which consider attitudes as a crucial dimensions of political engagement, I pay less attention to them. Therefore, I do not delve into migrants' patterns of intentions, the attachments they develop towards Italian politics, nor to their interests towards Italian politics. These attitudes are, however, crucial for the development of the predispositions to act, and in affecting the ways migrants eventually engage in the political sphere. Therefore, this study will consider interests towards Italian politics when discussing factors affecting political behaviors.

This study unfolds at two levels, individual and organizational. At the individual level, I look at individual political engagement in different types of activities. I also examine how engagement in different types of organizations affects political activities. At the organizational level, I look at organizational networks and at organizational political activities.

When I examine individual political engagement, I focus on activities relating to political objects or actors, or those aiming to change or to resist a change to the status quo (see van Deth 2014 for a discussion on the definition of political participation). In this framework, I do not analyze voting patterns because most migrants in Italy, including Milan, are excluded from this major institutional channel of participation. I, therefore, focus on extra-electoral activities, considering both moderated forms of activities such as contacting politicians or media for political reasons, referred to as conventional actions, and unconventional and more contentious forms of political engagement like taking part in public demonstrations or going on strike (Milbrath and Goel 1977[1965]; Barnes et al. 1979). The definition of the types of political activities which are considered unconventional may change (Barnes et al. 1979: 45). In addition, the distinction between conventional and unconventional political activities may not be entirely appropriate for the migrant population. In fact, migrants lack the legitimization as political actors and it may be equally costly for migrants to go on strikes and to contact political representatives. However, the distinction is still important as engagement in conventional rather than in protest activities entails different forms of commitment. Protest activities usually provide critical skills which enable individuals to be able to contest the rules of the existing and dominant political system more explicitly. They are also more likely to constitute a threat to the political status quo (Barnes

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et al. 1979: 31; Melucci 1996). In contrast, conventional political acts imply less radical changes in favor of more moderated, legitimized and accepted changes. Protest participation, for instance, joining a street demonstration, is even more costly for migrants who lack citizenship, and only have a temporary stay permit. Therefore, concerning disenfranchised populations such as migrants, it is especially significant to know under which conditions migrants can access conventional politics or protests. I provide another distinction when examining political engagement, between immigration-related activities and mainstream activities (Pilati & Morales forthcoming). Immigration-related activities include activities focused on ethnic agendas such as public demonstrations against refugees' arrivals to Italian cities, while mainstream activities include any action regarding the broader population, such as, for example, the request of improvement of social services. This allows me to understand whether the political representation of migrants in the political sphere reflects specific ethnic and immigrant agendas or cross-ethnic and mainstream issues (Heath et al. 2013).

I also examine civic engagement, despite there being no consensus about how to conceptualize and measure this concept (see also Alexander, Barraket, Lewis & Considine 2012: 48). In accordance with many empirical studies, I understand civic engagement as individual involvement in different types of voluntary organizations (in the migration literature see, inter-alia van Londen, Phalet & Hagendoorn 2007; Voicu & Şerban 2012). Thus, I do not conceive civic engagement to equate to political engagement as individuals may join, for instance, a religious association in order to satisfy some spiritual needs and enjoy individual benefits that do not go beyond the personal scope. Likewise, an individual may join a sport club for health-related individual benefits and personal well-being. This type of engagement does not, therefore, necessarily aspire towards a broader social or political change, neither does it address political institutions as political engagement does. Therefore, according to this perspective, engagement in voluntary organizations is not necessarily engagement in actions in which participants coordinate interaction around a mission of improving common life, and there is not necessarily a collective effort at problem solving (Lichterman & Eliasoph 2014: 809).

While civic engagement does not equate to political engagement, there are two main rationales for examining it. First, civic engagement itself can provide us with much information on the way migrants are

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eventually included in the societies where they settle. For example, it tells us the way migrants participate in the community by engaging in organizations with different objectives and that are active in different types of activities, including charity, religious organizations, trade unions, humanitarian organizations. In addition, it informs us about the way migrants socialize with co-ethnics and natives in formal groups, whether migrants organize along ethnic bases, or along cross-cutting ethnic ties. Second, there is a long tradition arguing that civic engagement fosters political engagement. Under this framework, I delve into the analysis of different types of organizational engagement in terms of ethnic composition of organizations, and in terms of the sector, where different skills or virtues can emerge (Lichterman & Eliasoph 2014: 813), to examine their impact on different types of political activities (Verba et al. 1995).

I integrate the individual level analysis with the analysis at the organizational level. Understanding both the individual and the meso-level dimensions of organizations helps me to identify different modalities of coping with an exclusionary context which single level analyses cannot highlight. For instance, political participation by migrants affiliated with ethnic organizations, which are themselves mostly isolated from other organizations, may turn out to be extremely different from the type of political participation by migrants affiliated with ethnic organizations which are instead strongly embedded in the organizational field. In fact, the latter are likely to endow migrants with different types of resources useful for political participation than the former.

Next to individual processes of individual civic and political engagement, I, therefore, pay specific attention to the organizational level and examine those organizations that are mainly composed of migrants. Organizations are among the main social groups available to individuals to collectively claim their interests, identities, needs and rights, as they are major mobilizing structures of collective political mobilization (Diani 2015). Therefore, the analysis of the degree to which migrant organizations engage in the political sphere integrates the analysis of individual political engagement. Political activities by organizations may include both lobbying activities that organizations may engage in such as writing letters to authorities as well as engagement in more contentious forms of collective actions.

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Drawing on studies arguing that the positions of organizations in the overall organizational network is likely to affect the chances that migrant organizations themselves have to reach out to the political sphere, in addition to organizational political activities, I look at organizational networks. The analysis of organizational networks is relevant for two reasons: on the one hand, it is in itself significant as the study of the configuration of organizational ties can illustrate the social integration of migrant communities, and clarify, inter-alia, the emergence of inter-organizational structures of domination and cooperation, along with the lines of segmentation within civic networks (Diani 2015: 13). On the other hand, networks are crucial resources for political engagement by organizations. The organizational networks I examine focus on the different relationships between the migrant organizations interviewed and other native and migrant organizations. Hence, differences in the organizational networks formed by the ethnic communities provide important information on chances for migrant organizations to get involved in the political sphere (Eggert & Pilati 2014).[6]

1.3 The empirical study

The aforementioned issues are examined by looking at three major communities, Filipinos, Egyptians and Ecuadorians in the city of Milan as most of the migrants are concentrated in the Municipality of Milan rather than in the proximities and the closest suburbs (ISTAT 2005: 193–194).[7] Despite this study's focus on Milan, patterns highlighted in this city are likely generalizable to other urban settings in Italy. In fact, political exclusion is principally affected by national constraints. As a consequence, although there may be differences in the local context and in the mechanisms of participation which provide more resources to migrant communities in other Italian cities (Kosic & Triandafyllidou 2005; Ponzo 2008), past evidence shows a supremacy of the national level over the local level exists. In this regard, Koopmans (2004) shows that the modalities of how local incorporation occurs are indeed largely determined by national repertoires of citizenship and integration policies.

Historically, Italy has not privileged the presence of any specific ethnic group or nationality and patterns of immigration to Italy are characterised by the presence of a wide variety of ethnic groups. Likewise, heterogeneous immigration flows have been observed in

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major Italian cities like Milan which, after Rome, has the second biggest foreign population in Italy. In 2005, 12.55 percent of the total resident population were foreign residents.[8] This represented a higher percentage compared to the average percentage of foreigners who resided in Italy and made up 4.1 percent of the total resident population on the 1st of January 2005.

While Italy encountered immigration much later than countries with a long history of immigration such as Great Britain, many migrant groups have now been settled for more than 40 years, given that they arrived in Italy back in the seventies like Filipinos and Egyptians. Ecuadorians, on the other hand are a group coming from the most recent wave of migration to Italy. They have reached a considerable number only after 2000.[9] Filipinos, Egyptians and Ecuadorians are among the 5 largest communities in Milan. Data collected in 2004 up to 2009 show they represented around 35 percent of all foreigners residing in the city. In particular, the widest group among the foreign population residing in Milan is Filipinos, accounting for 15.8 percent in 2008. Egyptians represented 13 percent, and Ecuadorians 6.7 percent in 2008 (Municipality of Milan 2009: 5-9).

In this study I focus on the political integration of Egyptians, Filipinos and Ecuadorians using data collected between 2005 and 2007. Specifically, the book brings together empirical evidence from two main data sources, one collected at the micro level between the end of 2006 and early 2007 and another collected at the organizational level in 2005. Data have been collected through two surveys: a population survey of 900 migrants consisting of comparable random samples of 300 Filipinos, 300 Egyptians and 300 Ecuadorians, and a control group of 300 natives. The organizational survey focuses on 46 migrant organizations in Milan, consisting of the most visible migrant organizations operating in Milan, including Filipino-based, Egyptian-based and Ecuadorian-based organizations.[10] The individual sample analyzed in this book is slightly smaller than the sample collected originally. In particular, I dropped the few cases of second generations and the undocumented component. With particular reference to the latter, for the object of my analysis, undocumented migrants may have lower levels of participation in activities such as contacting politicians or engagement in native-based associations which could, therefore, underestimate levels of engagement of the broader migrant population and bias the final results further lowering the findings related to engagement in political activities at the individual level.[11]

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1.4 Organization of the book

The book is organized in 7 chapters: this first introductory chapter, Chapters 2–5 and the concluding chapter. Chapters 2–4 are devoted to the individual level analysis of political engagement. Chapter 2 discusses theories on migrants' political participation combining classical theories of political participation with those focusing on migrants' political participation. This chapter examines both individual characteristics, which may affect natives and migrants' political engagement (inter-alia socio-economic status, network resources), as well as factors specifically related to the immigration process. In addition, it discusses the effects of the political context where migrants settle, conferring on the specific characteristics of the political context in Italy and Milan. Chapter 3 delves into the empirical analysis and describes migrants' patterns of civic and political engagement in Milan. How do levels and types of organizational and political engagement in Milan differ from those in other cities? Are there differences between levels and types of civic and political engagement across migrant groups and between migrants and natives in Milan? The comparison of patterns of civic and political engagement by migrants across European cities and across groups in Milan is illustrated by discussing migrants' engagement in different types of organizations: first, in terms of the sector in which migrants are engaged, distinguishing between service-delivery and political organizations, and more specific types of organizations (i.e. sport clubs, charity organizations, trade unions); second, in terms of the ethnic composition, distinguishing engagement in native, ethnic and pan-immigrant organizations. In turn, political engagement is analyzed by examining patterns of engagement in four types of political activities: immigration-related conventional and protest activities, mainstream conventional and protest activities.[12]

Chapter 4 discusses the crucial role of engagement in organizations for political participation more systematically. Does individual engagement in different types of organizations affect different forms of political engagement in which migrants in Milan are involved? And, does the effect change across migrant groups in Milan?

Chapter 5 is devoted to the organizational-level analysis. This chapter presents data on migrant organizational networks in Milan and engagement of migrant organizations in different types of activities. How do migrant organizations link with other migrant and native organizations?

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Are migrant organizations integrated in the broader organizational field? Do migrant organizations cluster around ethnic groups or do they build cross-cutting alliances? How do migrant organizations engage in the political sphere?

The concluding chapter rounds off the empirical findings drawing on the analyses at the individual level and at the organizational level in order to identify different models of political integration by migrant communities settled in an exclusionary context. This chapter highlights three possible modalities migrants may deploy when facing contextual constraints: subcultural participation, externally-driven participation and the radicalization of political activities.

Finally, a methodological appendix will discuss in detail the methodological issues related to the empirical analysis.

Notes

1 In July 2015, a Sudanese worker died while working in a tomato plantation under exploitative conditions. This is not a situation specific to migrants (Ferrero & Perocco 2011: 73). Many native women work in similar conditions getting up at 3 am in order to travel on buses organized by "caporali" to reach the plantations and work under equally extreme and exploitative labor conditions.

2 Villafranca is a village close to Verona, in the Northern Padania, the area which is the fortress of Northern League, an anti-immigration party. The extract is not part of a structured interview process but of informal talks during my stay in Brussels between 2009 and 2011.

3 Cinalli and Giugni's study (2011) focuses on the local level but many indicators are collected at the national level. Therefore, their conclusions can also be applied more broadly to Italy.

4 To avoid redundancy in the use of terms, in the manuscript I indistinctively refer to political integration, inclusion, engagement, involvement, participation, at times behavior and mobilization. For a discussion of these concepts see Morales (2011).

5 The organizational structure is defined as the organizational bases and mechanisms serving to collect and use the resources for political mobilization (Rucht 1996: 186).

6 I indistinctively use groups and communities although these two sociological categories imply the presence of a shared ethnic identity among members which I do not examine in this research.

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7 The selection of the city and the three groups also responded to some common criteria of selection defined within the LOCALMULTIDEM project for comparative purposes (Palacios & Morales 2013).

8 Throughout the book I present statistics referring to the year closest to the period when the data I analyse was collected, that is, between 2005 and 2007. While I study migrants, the available official statistics concern foreigners. Statistics are in fact collected according to the citizenship held by individuals. Given that most migrants are foreigners because of an ethnic conception of citizenship, I think it is nonetheless reasonable to briefly present statistics on foreigners. Percentages derived from official statistics are, however, grossly underestimated. The data on the presence of foreigners in Milan only considers resident foreigners without taking into account that the presence of foreigners is much broader given that it also includes foreigners who are temporarily present or have an irregular status.

9 In the seven years between 1996 and 2003, Ecuador has sent approximately one third of its active population, of which most arrived to the US and Spain. While before 1998 there were very few Ecuadorians in Europe, between 2000 and 2001 around 10 per cent of the active population migrated to Spain and Italy (Queirolo Palmas 2004: 321).

10 Further information on the surveys are reported in the Methodological Appendix A1.

11 For specific studies of mobilization of undocumented migrants see Chimienti (2011) and Monforte and Dufour (2011).

12 As I am interested in the political integration of migrants in the residence countries, I only focus on political activities oriented to Milan and Italy, excluding to analyze political engagement undertaken in the country of residence and oriented towards the country of origin which may be referred to as transnational political involvement. Readers interested in patterns of political transnational activities by migrants in European cities can refer to Morales and Morariu (2001), Morales and Pilati (2014).

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2
A Multifaceted Exclusionary Context in Milan

Abstract: *In this chapter Pilati discusses factors affecting migrants' political participation. The author highlights classical theories of political participation stressing conditions which may equally affect natives and migrants. These include migrants' socio-economic status, network resources with a particular focus on organizations, and factors related to processes of assimilation into the residence country and the immigration process. In addition, Pilati investigates the impact of a closed political context on political engagement by illustrating the cultural and structural constraints of a closed political context. In particular, she explores these dimensions by illustrating the case in Milan.*

Keywords: civic voluntarism model; immigration; political opportunity structure approach; SES model; theories on political participation

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Political exclusion may rest on different reasons, e.g. on abstention as a free choice. However, it may also be based on an unequal distribution of resources which are necessary to mobilize people into politics (Heath et al. 2013: 2–7). Along this line, asymmetries in migrants' political engagement rest on different individual interests and political attitudes, different socio-economic resources and different factors related to the immigration process. The lack of cognitive skills may, for instance, hinder the motivation necessary to engage in political action (Heath et al. 2013: 183). Attitudes such as substantial interest in politics, beliefs in the efficacy of political actions, or high levels of social and institutional trust may also all significantly increase individuals' likelihood to get involved in civic and political actions. Political asymmetries may also depend on various constraints and opportunities provided by the context, i.e. the neighborhoods, cities and countries where migrants settle. Contextual opportunities related to the possibility for migrants to get organized, for instance, public funds available for ethnic organizations, can affect the way migrants engage in political activities through the resources organizations can provide them.

In the following paragraphs, I will first look at the individual characteristics and contextual factors which scholars consider to be crucial for affecting migrant political participation.[1] Secondly, by focusing on contextual characteristics, I will investigate the exclusionary context in Milan.

2.1 Individual resources

Factors affecting migrant participation in the political sphere can be synthetically categorized into: socio-economic resources, immigration-related resources, network-related resources, and contextual factors. The SES (socio-economic status) model focuses on education, income, and occupational class as the most significant factors affecting political engagement (Verba & Nie 1972). The socio-economic status affects various forms of electoral participation like contacting elected representatives or participating in campaigns, as well as non-electoral participation like protesting (Brady et al. 1995). This model has so far resulted in one of the most powerful perspectives for explaining the stratification and the inequalities related to political engagement both in mainstream literature and in the specific literature addressing migrants (Tam Cho 1999;

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Maxwell 2010; Aleksynska 2011; de Rooij 2012; Gonzalez-Ferrer 2011; Morales & Pilati 2011; Heath et al. 2013; Voicu & Comșa 2014). According to this approach, individuals with a high socio-economic profile show both higher levels of participation and higher heterogeneity in the forms of participation undertaken (Verba & Nie 1972). Education is thought to reduce the costs associated with political participation through increased cognitive skills, and through more gratification received from participation. Jobs provide skills and avenues for political discussion, and widen the social networks.

Specific studies in migration literature show that characteristics related to education, income and occupation are also crucial for migrants' engagement in political activities. However, these scholars have also argued that such resources can only partially account for migrants' political integration (Tam Cho 1999; de Rooij 2012). As a matter of fact, migrants' chances to participate are also affected by a peculiar set of resources and characteristics related to the process of immigration itself. First, participation tends to be reduced if the process of assimilation among migrants is limited (Uhlaner, Cain & Kiewiet 1989; Ramakrishnan 2005; Morales & Pilati 2011). Uhlaner, Cain and Kiewiet (1989) find that migrant voting is influenced by the duration of migrant stay in the United States. De Rooij (2012: 465) also finds that the length of stay significantly contributes to the explanation for differing patterns of political participation between migrants and the majority. Accordingly, the theory of exposure holds that the more exposure to the settlement country, the more migrants adapt (White, Nevitte, Blais, Gidengil & Fournier 2008: 269) and therefore have better chances to become engaged in mainstream politics. Political engagement also depends on migrants' ability to speak the host country language (Ramakrishnan 2005). People who lack fluency in the host country language are inevitably going to be restricted in their access to information about the country of residence politics (Tam Cho 1999; Heath et al. 2013: 41). Therefore, they may have more difficulty in accessing mainstream organizations and mainstream politics. Lack of citizenship has also been found to be a major barrier to participation (Leal 2002). Because of a lower recognition of Islam in Europe (Bleich 2009), being Muslim may lower participatory opportunities. In turn, experiences of discrimination may also affect participation (Rim 2009). In particular, discrimination experiences affect identity dynamics and may trigger a reactive form of mobilization based on shared concerns of being

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part of a minority group (Okamoto & Ebert 2010). Finally, civic and political engagement may also depend on the ethnic groups studied: findings in the US largely acknowledge that racial differences endure, as Latinos generally have the lowest levels of participation among migrants in many political activities (De la Garza 2004; Ramakrishnan & Espenshade 2001; Ramakrishnan 2005).

2.1.1 Linking civic and political engagement: the role of network resources for political engagement

In addition to the aforementioned individual characteristics, scholars have emphasized the impact of individuals' network resources as powerful predictors of political engagement. Network resources are linked to individuals' ties, membership and participation in formal and informal groups, including voluntary organizations. Notably, the civic voluntarism model (CVM) explored organizations, together with workplaces and places of worship, as intermediate mobilizing structures between actors' socio-economic positions and their political engagement (Verba et al. 1995). The emphasis on the role of organizations draws on de Tocqueville's discussion on associations in the United States who argued that the affiliations to formal groups sustained the democratic process, for the possibility of the minority to oppose the majority (de Tocqueville 1961[12th ed]: 287–296). From a resources perspective, the civic voluntarism model is a specification of the socio-economic status (SES) model. Individuals' affiliations to formal and structured groups, but also interpersonal links and informal social groups, are crucial resources in facilitating political recruitment and participation. Factors affecting political participation are deeply rooted in social institutions such as the family, school, work, voluntary associations and churches (Verba & Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1995: 513; Brady, Verba & Schlozman 1995). In particular, organizations make it possible to accumulate resources such as civic competencies or "civic skills": that is, communicative and organizational abilities needed in order to use other kinds of resources, in particular time and money efficiently in political life (Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1995: 271, 304). Generally, belonging to groups enables ameliorating the knowledge and the capacities which facilitate the access, recruitment, and participation in the political sphere (Verba et al. 1995; McAdam 1982). "Organizations are agents of socializations where citizens learn the codes of conduct with respect to public

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behavior, commitment and responsibility, [...] people learn to trust each other and to care about social issues and public affairs" (van Londen, Phalet & Hagendoorn 2007: 1202). Links created within associations generate reciprocal expectations encouraging participation. They also allow the passage of information as well as the expression of shared identities, ideologies, and feelings of belonging to a group, especially useful for collective actions (McClurg 2003; Diani & McAdam 2003; Melucci 1982). Likewise, the literature on social capital has also largely discussed the different kinds of resources deriving from relationships and groups, for instance, the creation of solidarity, trust and shared norms (Putnam 1993, 2007).

In the specific literature on immigration, many studies have discussed the role of organizational resources for migrants' political engagement as well, and most of them have highlighted the positive role of civic institutions in fostering migrants' political engagement, both in the US and in Europe (Togeby 2004; Berger et al. 2004; Wong 2006; van Londen, Phalet & Hagendoorn 2007; Ramakrishnan & Bloemraad 2008; Mollenkopf & Hochschild 2009; Morales & Pilati 2011).[2]

This evidence has also been supported by findings from urban studies on local participation and ethnic diversity (Small 2006; Tran, Graif, Jones, Small & Winship 2013). This research has shown that in diverse migrant neighborhoods which are faced with linguistic and cultural barriers in accessing services, migrants rely more heavily on local organizations for support and information, and that local social ties and organizing increase the community's collective capacity to mitigate the effect of neighborhood disadvantage on participation.

2.2 Contextual opportunities

In addition to the individual characteristics that I have discussed, participation chances can also be shaped by several characteristics of the political contexts of the countries where migrants settle. Studies show that European countries and cities where levels of political engagement of migrants are relatively high tend to privilege those policies and laws which facilitate migrant integration (Morales & Giugni 2011). This is done through providing easy access to political and socio-economic individual rights, as well as to collective rights, recognizing the specific cultural traits of the different ethnic groups. Studies have delved into

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the impact of several contextual dimensions, broadly addressed as the political opportunity structures (POS), which are considered crucial for migrant political mobilization (Ireland 1994; Koopmans et al. 2005: 78–79; Bloemraad 2006: 684). Having the right to vote is, for instance, often dependent upon the citizenship held by individuals. In addition, for most migrants living in countries privileging an ethnic conception of citizenship, like Switzerland, Italy and Hungary, access to citizenship for most migrants who are not descendants from natives depends upon several years of residence in the country of settlement, and citizenship laws substantially hinder both electoral and non-electoral participation.[3] Often voting rights are not allowed at the local level either, like in Milan. Scholars explaining migrants' mobilization argue that closed political opportunity structures characterizing ethnic citizenship regimes lower migrants' opportunities of advancing collective claims and affect the issues characterizing migrants' claims (Koopmans & Statham 2000; Koopmans et al. 2005). Similar dampening effects have been analyzed at the individual level (Cinalli & Giugni 2011). In addition to the impact of citizenship regimes, scholars have considered the role of other contextual dimensions on political engagement, by examining the residence regimes (Gonzalez-Ferrer 2011), anti-discrimination legislations (Ebert & Okamoto 2013: 22), local threats (Okamoto & Ebert 2010), public opinion (Just & Anderson 2014), and political cultures (Voicu & Şerban 2012). According to Ebert and Okamoto (2013: 22), weak anti-discrimination legislation acts as an institutional threat, creating an unwelcoming climate for migrants who are less likely to trust the host countries' institutions, therefore affecting their chances to participate. A high share of radical right and anti-immigrant parties in the electoral vote may behave like an institutional threat as well. The presence of xenophobic radical right parties seems to cause an increase in racism and xenophobia due to the influence on people's frame of thought (Rydgren 2003). At the local level, Garbaye (2002; 2004) demonstrates that local party politics and the organization of local government on electoral representation of ethnic minorities are of primary importance for ethnic minorities' representation and political configurations of local parties have a very significant impact on political representations of ethnic minorities in electoral competitions, and influence differences among the cities. Garbaye focuses on the argument that the importance of the national political contexts needs to be operationalized in relation to local political dynamics if they are to have explanatory value for patterns of participation (Garbaye

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2002: 557). Most of these studies show the negative consequences of a closed political context on migrants' political engagement. Conversely, some studies in the US show a positive effect of a closed political context on political engagement. Group boundaries constructed through local threats and segregation seem to facilitate collective action thanks to the development of a shared minority status based on race, ethnicity, citizenship, and potentially also on language among migrants (Okamoto & Ebert 2010). Ramakrishnan (2005: 116–143) shows that factors related to political threats played a great role in increasing Latino migrant voting participation in the US during the 1990s. Reactive participation in rallies across the United States has been also documented among Latinos in response to HR4437, which increased penalties on undocumented migrants (Barreto, Manzano, Ramirez & Rim 2009).

Two main mechanisms are at work in the relationship between contextual dimensions and migrants' political participation. One mechanism concerns the amount of resources allocated to migrants. Previous studies indicate, for instance, that contexts characterized by ethnic conceptions of citizenship limit access of foreign-born people to a number of resources (Koopmans et al. 2005). While various rights, such as access to basic social services (i.e. urgency care) are equally granted to natives and migrants across most European countries, access to other resources extensively vary. For instance, access to employment and the type of occupation are widely different for natives and for migrants. In most of the European countries studied, with the exception of the UK where public authorities are even encouraged to promote equality and may target particular minority groups, including foreigners, there are legal limitations in accessing labor market positions in the public sector (Sainsbury 2006). In addition to a differential amount of resources, different political contexts may affect political engagement through changes related to native and migrant attitudes, strategies of social closure, discrimination and in-group solidarities. Pehrson, Vignoles and Brown (2009: 33) find that "identification with a culturally defined nation implies opposition to immigration more strongly than identification with a nation defined by shared citizenship." In line with this hypothesis, the European Social Survey 2004 data shows that the perceived threat related to immigration as having negative consequences for the country as a place to live is higher in Italy and Hungary than in the other countries observed (Pichler 2010: 452). In such contexts, characterized by high institutional constraints,

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migrants seem less likely to trust the government and other local authorities, therefore having less chances of participating in the political sphere (Ebert & Okamoto 2013: 22). Salient boundaries between natives and migrants characterizing closed political contexts may also facilitate the polarization among populations (Tilly 2003: 21). "Political alliances are more likely to be formed between co-ethnics than between individuals on opposite sides of a boundary" (Wimmer 2008: 976). In addition, "where power differentials between individuals of different ethnic backgrounds are high, degrees of social closure are also high" (Cornell and Hartman 1998, ch. 6 in Wimmer 2008: 1002). Therefore, strategies of social closure to outsiders may be reflected both in diffused attitudes and practices of discrimination by natives, as well as in the development of in-group solidarities among migrants, which may all have consequences on migrants' chances to participate.

2.3 Locating the political context of migrants' reception of Milan from a European perspective

Laws and policies of European countries regulating migration converge on many issues. For instance, the preference provided to migrants who are linked through marriage or family ties to natives, usually providing an easier access to permit to stay, is a common practice among EU countries. Nonetheless, past scholarship has provided important evidence on significant differences between European countries with regard to laws and policies affecting individual and collective rights of migrants in the host countries (Koopmans et al. 2005; Morales & Giugni 2011; Cinalli & Giugni 2011). As mentioned, laws and policies affecting the individual rights of migrants show diverse regulations around access to citizenship, but also to different types of residence and work permits, have different legal frameworks regulating employment rights, and differ along the rights and policies for protecting individuals against discrimination. Laws and policies also vary along a second dimension, regulating migrants' collective rights. This dimension refers, for instance, to the opportunities granted to profess one's own religion, those regulating migrant access to group-specific or ethnic media, or to provisions provided to obtain education in their own language. Figure 2.1 shows how the openness and closure of the political context of European cities varies depending on the levels of individual and collective rights granted to migrants (Morales & Giugni 2011).[4]

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

FIGURE 2.1 *The political context of European cities related to immigration*

Note: BAR=Barcelona, BUD=Budapest; GEN=Geneva; LON=London; LYO=Lyon; MAD=Madrid; MIL=Milan; STO=Stockholm; ZUR=Zurich.

Depending on the degree of implementation of the specific laws and policies regulating individual and collective rights, scholars distinguish between "open" and "closed" political contexts, also referred to as political opportunity structures (POS). As mentioned, open POS grant more individual and collective rights, and more likely favor migrants' integration, while closed POS reduce, limit, and pose severe and significant constraints on migrants' integration. Looking at Figure 2.1, regardless of the specific contextual dimension examined, European cities tend to be identified as either an open or closed POS. The most closed cities for migrant integration are the Swiss cities, Zurich and Geneva, Budapest,

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and Milan. Another set of cities leans, in sharp contrast, towards open POS, and includes Stockholm, Lyon and London along with the Spanish cities (see also Cinalli & Giugni 2011 for an in-depth discussion from a comparative perspective).

This picture confirms past evidence of a closed POS for the Swiss cities, a very open POS in Stockholm, an open POS in terms of collective rights in London characterizing a multicultural context, and an open POS in terms of individual rights characterizing the assimilationist context of France (Ireland 1994; Koopmans & Statham 2000; Koopmans et al. 2005). Countries relatively new to immigration have been less systematically classified (see however Cinalli & Giugni 2011). Looking at Figure 2.1, Milan (and Budapest) can definitely be classified as close to the exclusionary models, especially with regard to group rights, while, in contrast, the Spanish cities tend to lean towards a more open POS.

2.4 An exclusionary national and local context for migrants in Milan

Past studies have defined the Italian citizenship regime as "legal familism". Indeed, Italian citizenship is easily accessible only to migrants with links to Italians based on familial descendance (Zincone 2006a, 2006b). Founded on the rule of *jus sanguinis*, the acquisition of citizenship in Italy is based on an ethnic conception of citizenship which means that people whose parents have the Italian *status civitatis* automatically become Italian citizens and any person whose mother or father has Italian citizenship acquires it regardless of their country of birth.[5] In addition, foreigners who are married to Italians acquire citizenship after 6 months of legal residence in Italy, or after 3 years of marriage if the residence is abroad.[6] In contrast the acquisition of citizenship by residence is a long process for most migrants since non-EU foreigners need to have been legally residing in Italy for at least 10 years. In this framework, difficulties in accessing citizenship also concern individuals who have not migrated but whose background is of migrant origin, that is, second generations, that is, people born in Italy with two foreign parents. According to the 1992 citizenship law, second generations cannot request Italian citizenship before the age of 18. This is extremely different from those countries where second and third generations can acquire the citizenship of the

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country where they were born and reside, like in Great Britain where, at birth, children acquire citizenship if at least one parent legally resides in the country (*jus soli*).

As a consequence of such rules, naturalization rates in Italy are still very low among migrants compared to many other European countries. Along with Switzerland, Italy occupies the bottom position on the scale of naturalization rates. Whereas in 2006, the acquisition of citizenship was the highest in France and in the UK, exceeding 140,000 acquisitions in both countries, in Italy, the number of acquisitions was lower than 20,000 (EUROSTAT 2008).

In addition to such national-level constraints for most migrants without ties to Italians, by looking at several local contextual conditions, past studies have also shown the relatively closed POS of Milan compared to other European and Italian cities (Decimo 2003; Caponio 2004; Campomori 2008; Ponzo 2008; Scuzzarello 2015). Focusing on the local contexts of integration, comparative studies between Italian cities have shown the importance of several dimensions at the local level such as the political positions of candidates, the structures and organizations of administrations, and the consolidated models of interaction between the public and private actors in local contexts. Following the Italian 1998 immigration law, several participatory mechanisms of political representation at the local level, such as the possibility to take part in decision making processes or to set up formal consultative boards, have been enacted in several cities (Decimo 2003; Triandafyllidou 2003; Kosic & Triandafyllidou 2005; Caponio 2007; Ponzo 2008; Camozzi 2012; Semprebon 2012; Vitale 2012). However, these possibilities have not been given much attention by Milan's local elite whose city government was led for more than ten years (until May 2011), by a coalition of center-right parties, including anti-immigrant parties like Northern League and Alleanza Nazionale.[7] Going back to 1986, the Municipality of Milan had set up a citizens' consultation board for immigration (Consulta cittadina per l'immigrazione) but this experience soon ended due to the low representativeness and scarce contacts with the foreign communities. Likewise, in 1989, a center for Foreigners (Centro stranieri di Milano) set up in the city to host activities of migrant associations, courses of Italian language for adults and interventions addressing the integration of children and young people into school. However, this initiative also lasted for a few years only (Caponio 2007: 47). The Territorial Council

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for Immigration set up by the Province of Milan in 2000 was also related more to security and public-order issues than to political representation (Dota & Caponio 2001: 319; ASGI-FIERI 2005: 64). As a consequence, immigration policies in Milan have been mainly led by Catholic organizations, given that local government action has primarily focused over the past decades either on emergency plans or on interventions against migrant criminality (Caponio 2004).

In addition to such political constraints, other contextual characteristics in Milan are likely to hinder migrants' political engagement. Migrants in Milan and, more generally in Italy, have limited access, compared to natives, to both the private- and public-work sectors. Non-EU foreign migrant workers in the private sector are regulated by quotas defined every year by the government who establishes the maximum number of foreigners to be employed as full-time, part-time and seasonal workers as well as self-employed. In addition, based on the 2002 Bossi-Fini Italian immigration law, the government emits work permits for employees that are subordinate to work contracts ("contratto di soggiorno per lavoro subordinato").[8] Furthermore, in order to employ foreign workers, employers need to prove that migrants have suitable accommodation and that they are able to finance their return trip to their countries of origin. Ambrosini (2013) provides a detailed analysis of policies of exclusion enacted in Milan and surrounding areas. Next to several of the dimensions already discussed, the author emphasizes the cultural exclusion and opposition to cultural pluralism, including the prohibition to use other languages than Italian on shop signs, or "opposition to the freedom of religion, almost always referring to the Muslim religion: closing of prayer halls, or prohibiting their opening, even though this is motivated by the safety standards of the premises where public events are held, by the intended use of buildings (e.g. in the case of warehouses, industrial sheds and the like), and by problems of public order because of the crowds, etc" (Ambrosini 2013: 145; see also Grillo and Pratt 2002).

Consequences of such exclusionary context on migrants' integration in Milan are transparent. Most migrants living in Italy occupy marginal socio-economic positions, especially in the labor market. Migrants systematically occupy the secondary sectors of the labor market structure and tend to have low-paid and low-status jobs. Large shares of migrant employment is characterized by migrants being hired as cooks, porters, and waiters and, especially for women, domestic workers (Reyneri 2004a, 2004b; Andall 1998) thus producing a strong segmentation of the labor force along ethnic lines

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(Zanfrini 2002; Calavita 2005). Looking more closely at the groups analyzed in Milan, Filipinos are the migrant group with the highest percentage of active population in the labor market in Milan. However, despite Filipinos' high employment rates, Filipinos, primarily composed of females, are largely employed in low paid and often menial jobs like domestic work, household dependent workers, in assistance and care services (Cominelli 2002; Parreñas 2001). Employment in the domestic sector has revealed itself to be initially advantageous for Filipinos given their easy access to jobs. However, in the long run, it has revealed a trap engendering extremely high levels of labor market segregation in low rewarding and low-paid occupations (Lainati 2000; Cominelli 2004; Perra & Pilati 2008; Banfi 2008; Gardiner Barber 2008). In turn, both Egyptians and Ecuadorians have a higher percentage of unemployed individuals. In 2007, only 2.2 percent of Filipinos were unemployed while 7.5 percent of Egyptians and 8.5 percent of Ecuadorians were unemployed (ISMU 2007: 53–54).[9] Among Ecuadorians, showing a predominant female component, most women are also employed in the domestic sector (Queirolo Palmas 2004). As to Egyptians, while they have high unemployment rates, they also show the highest number of individual enterprises in the Province of Milan. Developed in the restaurant, construction and transportation sectors, such enterprises have provided important chances of internal social mobility and career advancement, especially among middle class Egyptians holding high educational degrees (Ambrosini & Abbatecola 2004; Codagnone 2003). Therefore, some opportunities of social mobility have occurred among Egyptians, especially those who arrived early in the seventies and eighties belonging to the middle bourgeoisie with high levels of education (Ambrosini & Abbatecola 2002; Codagnone 2003).

While the socio-economic marginalization of Egyptians, Filipinos and Ecuadorians is severe with an abundance of supporting literature, what are the specific consequences of a closed political context on the patterns of migrants' civic and political engagement? This is what I will discuss in the next chapter.

Notes

1 While the discussion will refer to political engagement, many predictors are common to civic engagement as well (Jacobs, Phalet & Swyngedouw 2004; Eggert & Giugni 2010; de Rooij 2012; Aleksynska 2011).

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2 See Klofstad & Bishin (2014: 296) who, in contrast, argue that there is "no relationship between social ties and campaign participation among immigrant voters once we control for alternative explanations, especially personal resources (income and education), and political assimilation (strength of partisan preferences, and contact with organizations that mobilize voters)."
3 As I will discuss later in the chapter, under ethnic conceptions of citizenship, the acquisition of citizenship of the country of settlement is linked to ethnic ties with natives. In these contexts, the acquisition of citizenship by residence is a long process as it requires 10 years of settlement. Under ethnic conceptions of citizenship there are also demanding rules concerning nationality eligibility for second and third generations (*jus soli*). Therefore, in countries with such citizenship laws migrants remain foreigners for long time.
4 See the Methodological Appendix A2 for the *operationalization* of such variables.
5 The principle of *jus sanguinis* had once enabled Italians, who had massively emigrated in the first half of the 20th century, to maintain or obtain Italian citizenship (Einaudi 2007).
6 Italian Law n° 91, February 5, 1992 – New norms on citizenship.
7 Since June 2011, Milan has been governed by a leftist Mayor, Giuliano Pisapia. This change does not have, however, any effect on the results of this research given that the data used in this study was collected before. In particular, the population survey was undertaken at the end of 2006 and beginning of 2007 and the organizational survey in 2005.
8 The 2002 Bossi-Fini immigration law was passed by a center-right coalition led by Berlusconi and was named after the Ministry for Institutional reforms and devolution, Umberto Bossi and after the Vice-Prime Minister of the Berlusconi Government II, Gianfranco Fini. The former was also founder of the anti-immigrant party Northern League, the latter was also leader of the right party Alleanza Nazionale. The Bossi Fini law is mostly famous for the introduction of serious sanctions, including the repatriation, towards irregular migrant citizens.
9 ISMU estimates are calculated considering a sample which includes the whole migrant population, regardless of the juridical status of individuals.

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3

Comparing Migrants and Natives in Milan, and Migrants in Milan and in Other European Cities

Abstract: *In Chapter 3 Pilati presents an empirical analysis of the consequences of a closed political context in Milan on migrants' civic and political participation. She shows that the levels of migrants' organizational and political engagement in Milan are among the lowest compared to other European cities, and compared to natives in Milan. The author provides a broad investigation on migrants' engagement in various types of organizations. She examines migrants' engagement in organizations active in different sectors, as well as migrants' engagement in different organizations distinguished by the ethnic composition. In addition, she investigates various types of political activities, namely, conventional and unconventional mainstream and immigration-related political activities.*

Keywords: conventional and unconventional participation; immigration-related political engagement; mainstream political engagement; political organizations; service-delivery organizations; trade unions; religious organizations

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Chapter 2 argued that levels of political engagement that migrants experience are a direct consequence of both contextual and individual characteristics like low educational level, a poor knowledge of the language of the country of settlement, or low levels of engagement in organizations. Before moving to the empirical analysis about the individual level factors and particularly organizational affiliations that turn out to be significant for migrants' political engagement in the closed political context of Milan, I provide a broad picture of civic and political engagement by Filipinos, Egyptians and Ecuadorians in Milan. Given that I devote particular attention to the impact of civic engagement on political engagement, I first describe patterns of migrants' engagement in voluntary organizations in Milan. Secondly, I describe individual migrants' levels of political engagement and engagement in different types of political activities.

I use a relative notion of civic and political engagement (see Morales 2011). According to Morales (2011: 29–30) "relative notions of political integration […] take levels of political orientations and behaviours from the majority of the population as the comparative standpoint from which to judge the degree to which a given society has been successful in integrating migrants and their offspring into political life." […] "this understanding of political integration is not necessarily 'assimilationist'. We are not seeking to find identical attitudinal and behavioural patterns between migrant groups and the autochthonous population, as our notion of political integration as inclusion allows for migrants engaging differently in politics as long as this divergence does not entail their political exclusion."

In addition to a comparison of migrants with natives in Milan, I provide a comparison of engagement by migrants in Milan compared to other cities in Europe.[1] Therefore, I first describe the aggregate levels of civic and political engagement of the three migrant groups in Milan vis-à-vis comparable samples of migrants in other European cities (Palacios & Morales 2013). Second, I look more closely at patterns of engagement by Filipinos, Egyptians and Ecuadorians in Milan, by comparing their levels and types of participation in civic and political activities with natives. Through the comparative tool, I aim to assess any exclusionary pattern specifically affecting migrants in Milan compared to migrants in other European cities and natives in Milan.

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3.1 Civic engagement

I examine civic engagement by looking at involvement in voluntary organizations. I study both the levels of participation by migrants in the associational life, in general, and the involvement by migrants in specific types of associations.[2] Table 3.1 shows the percentage of migrants engaged in at least one type of association by comparing data on Milan with other 8 European cities.[3] Levels of civic engagement by migrants in Milan are lower than the average rate of migrants' engagement in any other European city. Barely 25 percent of migrants are engaged in at least one organization in Milan compared to the European average of 33 percent of migrants being involved in at least one organization. After Budapest, where less than 10 percent of migrants are engaged, and London, levels of civic engagement of migrants in Milan are the third lowest of the European cities examined. These scores are in sharp contrast with the extremely high levels of migrant organizational engagement found in Stockholm but also in Lyon. Table 3.1 also shows that levels of migrants' engagement in Milan are extremely low compared to natives in Milan as more than half of the native population is engaged in at least one organization. Natives' rate of engagement in Milan is also higher than the average rate of engagement by natives living in other European cities. Therefore, there seems to be limited access to civic participation, affecting migrants specifically and not the broader population in Milan. This idea is better illustrated by the comparison of migrant-native gaps, defined as "Migrant Participation Rate – Native Participation Rate," in civic engagement across European cities (Table 3.1). As mentioned, London and Budapest show remarkably low levels of civic engagement by migrants. However, this pattern is common for natives as well, making migrant-native gaps almost negligible.[4] In contrast, Italians engage more than twice as frequently as migrants in Milan making gaps in Milan the third highest after Geneva and Zurich. Not unexpectedly, the widest gaps in civic engagement are found in cities which share exclusionary conditions for migrant integration (see Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2). This finding leans towards the hypothesis that patterns of migrants' civic engagement significantly depend on contextual conditions. This is also consistent with studies showing that in multicultural contexts migrants have greater probabilities to join voluntary organizations (Pilati, Myrberg, Morales & Eggert 2014).

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TABLE 3.1 *Levels of civic engagement of migrants in European cities (percentages)*

	BAR	BUD	GEN	LON	LYO	MAD	MIL	STO	ZUR	Total
Immigrants engaged in at least one organization	38.82	8.98	40.65	22.07	52.23	26.06	**24.41**	86.70	30.79	33.21
Natives engaged in at least one organization	55.45	8.12	76.98	24.00	61.13	41.04	**56.00**	94.44	77.74	50.78
GAPS between immigrants and natives	−16.63	0.86	−36.33	−1.93	−8.9	−14.98	**−31.59**	−7.74	−46.95	−17.57

Looking more closely at Milan and at the distribution of organizational affiliations of migrants from different ethnic groups (see Table 3.2), organizational affiliations of Filipinos, Egyptians and Ecuadorians are by far lower than organizational affiliations by Italians across most types of organizations examined. Among Egyptians, engagement in at least one organization is less than one third of the engagement by natives. While all migrant groups on average engage less than natives, there are indeed some major differences among the three migrant groups. Filipinos have the highest percentage of individuals engaged in at least one organization (around 30 percent), that is, they engage almost twice as often as Egyptians. Further differences appear if I take a closer look into the types of organizational affiliations of each group. In doing this, I consider two different typologies of organizations. First, I distinguish associations along the sector in which they are active. I therefore look at migrants' levels of engagement in, for example charity organizations, sport clubs and trade unions. In addition, I distinguish between engagement in two broad types of organizations, namely, service-delivery organizations and political organizations (Morales 2009a; Pilati et al. 2014). This distinction derives from considering mainstream studies on organizations and their activities. While organizational activities are multifaceted, the mainstream literature has usually approached them from one side. As Pilati et al. (2014) argue "social movement scholars have distinguished between social movement organizations depending on how active they are in contentious politics and less institutional forms of actions (see Minkoff 1997); political scientists have classified interest groups based on their lobbying activities and their institutional and conventional forms of political action (see Baumgartner & Leech 1998); while others have

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classified different types of organizations of the non-profit sector (Anheier & Seibel 1990). More rarely have scholars attempted to classify the overall European associational field (Maloney & Rossteutscher 2007)."

Drawing on these studies, the aforementioned distinction between service-delivery and political organizations in the organizational field of immigration can be drawn. As argued by Pilati et al. (2014) service-delivery organizations are more often active in routinized service work, while they rarely or even never engage in protest activities, nor do they mobilize in other forms of political activities (de Graauw et al. 2013: 84). Service-delivery organizations include sport clubs, cultural associations, educational associations and charity associations. They usually constitute free spaces of socialization for their members through activities in the civic realm of action. In many cases, people join these organizations because they want to spend their free time with people sharing common interests and hobbies, and to spend their spare time in recreational activities, or to learn something new. Other organizations in which migrants are involved can be referred to as political organizations. These explicitly pursue political goals, and include, among other things, social movement organizations, trade unions, neighborhood associations, interest groups or political parties (cf. Schofer & Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001). Politically-oriented organizations engage in various forms of political action, i.e. actions promoting a political change or resistance to it, aimed at changing or influencing institutions and policy making (Theiss-Morse & Hibbing 2005; Sampson, MacIndoe, McAdam & Weffer-Elizondo 2005; Granados & Knoke 2005; Voss & Bloemraad 2011). Such organizations are more likely to be involved in all forms of political mobilization, from protest activities to more conventional means of political activities, such as lobbying activities like writing letters to authorities and participating in press conferences or releases.

In addition to the analyses of different types of organizations along the sector in which they are active, I distinguish organizations along the ethnic composition of organizations (Pilati & Morales forthcoming). Therefore, I examine migrants' engagement in: organizations mostly formed by individuals of a single minority ethnic group defined as ethnic organizations; those composed of people from various migrant backgrounds and ethnic origins defined as pan-immigrant organizations; and those mostly composed of natives where migrants are a minority, defined as native organizations.[5]

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As I will discuss in more depth in the following chapter, distinguishing between different types of organizations is crucial for providing a more systematic analysis of the relationship between civic and political engagement, as engagement in different types of organizations may have different effects on political engagement (Herman 2015; Sobolewska, Fisher, Heath & Sanders 2015).

Considering the sector of activities of migrant organizational affiliations, Table 3.2 shows that, on average, migrants tend to engage slightly more often in service-delivery organizations than in political organizations, therefore, in organizations which are not themselves active in political activities but more in recreational or cultural events. Indeed, on average, more than 15 percent of migrants engaged in at least one

TABLE 3.2 *Civic engagement of migrants in Milan by group (percentage of individuals engaged in at least one of the following types of organizations)*

	Italians	Egyptians	Filipinos	Ecuadorians	Total immigrants
Any type of organization	56.00	16.04	29.92	25.73	24.41
TYPES BY SECTOR					
Sports clubs	13.33	3.30	2.65	9.13	5.02
Cultural organizations	14.33	3.77	1.52	3.73	2.93
Humanitarian organizations	19.67	0.94	0.76	1.24	0.98
Religious organizations	6.33	2.83	13.64	6.22	7.95
Educational organizations	4.00	0.47	2.65	3.32	2.23
Youth organizations	2.33	1.89	1.14	0.83	1.26
Organizations for retired people	4.33	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Service-delivery organizations	43.33	8.02	18.18	19.92	15.76
Political parties	3.67	0.47	0.76	0.00	0.42
Trade unions	14.33	6.13	9.47	5.81	7.25
Business organizations	4.33	0.94	0.76	0.83	0.84
Environment organizations	6.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Human rights organizations	2.33	0.47	0.76	0.00	0.42
Immigrant advocacy organizations	0.67	0.47	1.89	1.66	1.39
Ethnic advocacy organizations	–	1.42	3.79	1.66	2.37
Anti-racism organizations	0.67	0.00	0.00	0.41	0.14
Women's organizations	0.67	0.47	0.76	0.83	0.70
Neighborhood organizations	2.33	0.47	1.14	0.41	0.70
Political organizations	27.33	10.38	15.91	9.13	11.99
Other organizations	4.00	0.00	1.14	0.00	0.42
TYPES BY ETHNIC COMPOSITION					
Native organization	52.00	13.21	13.64	12.03	12.97
Pan-immigrant organization	8.67	2.83	1.52	5.39	3.21
Ethnic organization	–	2.83	19.32	10.79	11.58
N	300	212	264	241	717

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service-delivery organization, and only 12 percent engaged in at least one political organization. Comparative studies show that this pattern, of higher levels of engagement in service-delivery than in political organizations, is common to most European cities, with the exclusion of Stockholm where engagement in political organizations prevail (Pilati et al. 2014). Table 3.2 also illustrates that gaps between migrant groups and natives in Milan are wide across most types of organizations examined, with the exclusion of engagement in migrant advocacy organizations, in religious organizations, and women's organizations.[6] Gaps especially concern engagement in service-delivery organizations as natives engaged almost three times more than migrants. In particular, 43.4 percent of Italians, compared to an average of 15.8 percent of migrants engaged in at least one service-delivery organization while 27.3 percent of Italians compared to an average of 12 percent of migrants engaged in at least one political organization.

There are several differences among the three ethnic groups which are important to emphasize as well, both because they enable us to identify different patterns of civic engagement, and especially because they are likely to have substantial consequences on levels and types of political engagement by members of these groups. In particular, Filipinos show the highest levels of engagement in at least one organization, twice that of Egyptians' levels. Filipinos mostly join religious organizations, Ecuadorians engage mostly in sport clubs and Egyptians' highest rate of affiliations is in political organizations, particularly trade unions.

Substantial differences between the three migrant groups also emerge when examining the ethnic composition of organizations in which migrants engage. Filipinos have the highest rate of engagement in ethnic organizations, Egyptians are mostly engaged in native organizations, and Ecuadorians have almost equal levels of engagement in native and in ethnic organizations. Separate analyses also illustrate that 68.2 percent of sport clubs in which Ecuadorians engage are composed of different migrant groups, therefore they are pan-immigrant organizations; 94.4 percent of religious organizations in which Filipinos engage are ethnic organizations, therefore organizations whose members are of Filipino origin. In contrast, most affiliations in political organizations by Egyptians, including trade unions are native-based.

The difference among the migrant groups in the sector and in the ethnic composition of organizational affiliations (with the exclusion

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of levels of engagement in native organizations which are very similar across the three groups) tells us a lot about models of civic integration.

First, of the three groups, Filipinos show the highest levels of engagement in ethnic organizations, the lowest levels of engagement in pan-immigrant organizations, and average levels of engagement in native organizations, mostly trade unions. In general, trade unions provide several services to all migrants. In fact, trade unions represent a high share of migrant organizational affiliations across all three groups. For instance, they provide support and assistance to resolve many job-related questions (Cominelli 2004: 278 ff.).[7] With the exclusion of trade unions which are mostly native-based, Filipinos tend to privilege dynamics of ethnic social bonding, linking Filipino members to their own ethnic origin group, in isolation not only to natives but also to other migrant groups. As I will show in Chapter 5, this pattern is also reflected in the network structures of Filipino organizations which end up being either isolated *tout court* or forming isolated clusters of Filipino organizations detached from native-based organizations and from other migrant organizations. Most Filipino organizations are based on religious identities, mostly around the Catholic religion. Indeed, the development of Filipino organizations has been largely supported by the presence of the Catholic Church, legitimated by the Milanese and the Italian institutions as the main actor meant to address and promote integration of migrants. Studies show the relevant logistical support provided by the Catholic Church and its related institutions to the Filipino community through areas, spaces, and facilities for Filipinos to be able to meet and spend their free time (Cominelli 2004: 278–279). As mentioned in Chapter 2, while these conditions have favored the initial integration of Filipinos, providing support for the difficulties linked to the initial phases of migrants' arrival to Italy, in the long run, it has revealed the negative consequences of the isolation and ethnic segregation of the Filipino community vis-à-vis natives and other migrant groups. As I will discuss in the following chapters these characteristics help us to identify modalities of social integration by Filipinos that can be defined as subcultural participation.

Second, the analysis of Egyptians' organizational affiliations illustrates another modality of civic engagement. Of the three migrant groups examined, Egyptians have the lowest level of organizational engagement, are mostly engaged in native organizations but close to the rate of engagement by members of other migrant groups. They have the lowest rates of affiliations in ethnic organizations and lower rates of engagement

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in pan-immigrant organizations than the average. Most organizational affiliations by Egyptians are in trade unions and, more generally, in political organizations.

Organizational engagement by Egyptians represents one way to build, more or less explicitly, ties with natives rather than reflecting dynamics of ethnic social closure, like it was for Filipinos. As I will discuss in the next chapter, ties with natives, among other things, are significant especially for the participation in the political sphere by the Muslim component.

Third, Ecuadorians do not show a particular pattern of civic integration in the host country. Looking at organizational engagement by Ecuadorians, Table 3.2 show that most affiliations are in sport clubs. In addition, there are scant differences between levels of engagement in native, and in ethnic organizations with lower levels of engagement in pan-immigrant organizations. However, compared to all three groups, Ecuadorians have the highest percentage of affiliations in pan-immigrant organizations. This result may underpin the presence of a pan-immigrant identity around Latin American values. This suggests that civic engagement among Ecuadorians may become a space where inter-ethnic ties are built separately from natives, but not limited and restricted to their own ethnic group. As shown later in the next chapter, however, engagement in pan-immigrant organizations and, generally, organizational engagement, do not provide significant resources for Ecuadorians to resort to political action.

As anticipated, the aforementioned modalities on civic engagement investigated are likely to have substantial and different consequences on the chances that migrants from the three groups have to reach out to the political sphere. First, migrants have an overall low level of organizational engagement, usually necessary to mobilize resources for political engagement. Organizational resources are therefore fewer than those available to migrants in other European cities, as well as fewer than those available to natives in Italy. As a consequence, migrants are endowed with fewer civic skills, fewer chances to develop identities sustaining political action and fewer social capital, resources which are all significant for political engagement.

Second, for all three migrant groups examined, migrants' engagement is slightly higher in service-delivery organizations than in political organizations, with the exclusion of Egyptians. Therefore, there are fewer chances for migrants to get engaged in political activities in which political organizations are active.

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Third, given that Egyptian, Filipino and Ecuadorian migrants engage in different types of organizations, considering both the sector and the ethnic composition, there are likely to be different mechanisms of mobilization at work which may lead to different effects on levels and types of political engagement.

Before turning to the more systematic analysis of the relationship between civic and political engagement, to which the next chapter will be devoted, I will describe patterns of political engagement in more detail.

3.2 Political engagement

To focus on political activities means to investigate activities relating to political objects or actors, or activities aiming to change or to resist a change in the status quo (van Deth 2014). Political activities include all different types of actions spanning from the most conventional act of voting, to what the literature has addressed as unconventional acts such as, joining street demonstrations, going on strike, activities more broadly identified as protests (Barnes et al. 1979). For migrants, this distinction may not prove as useful as it has been in the mainstream literature. Indeed, for disenfranchised populations such as migrants, none of the acts like voting, political contacting, going on strike or signing a petition may be conventional at all. This is partly due to different political cultures and to the different perceptions of what can be considered conventional. Prior literature, nonetheless, shows the importance of differentiating the types of political activities, as there are different factors affecting different types of political engagement among migrants as well (Morales & Pilati 2011; de Rooij 2012). Because of the ineligibility of most migrants to vote in Milan, I focus on individual engagement in extra-electoral political activities.[8] Examples of extra-electoral activities in the residence country that migrants can engage include contacting media to raise awareness of migrant participation in the host country's elections, involvement in a protest against neighborhood crimes, cuts to subsides, or signing petitions against restrictions on asylum permits.

I focus on overall levels of political engagement as well as on different types of political activities. I use two criteria to distinguish different types of political engagement. First, following the mainstream literature on political behavior, I differentiate between conventional and unconventional participation. Among conventional activities, I combine the

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following measures: contacted a politician, contacted a government or local government official, worked in a political party, worked in a political action group, worn or displayed a badge, sticker or poster, boycotted certain products, deliberately bought certain products for political reasons, donated money to a political organization or group, contacted the media or contacted a lawyer or a judicial body for non-personal reasons. Unconventional participation combines three measures of protest-related actions: signing a petition, participating in public demonstrations, and joining strikes.

Secondly, I advance a second distinction which is unique to migrants' political engagement (Pilati & Morales forthcoming). I differentiate between political involvement concerning specific ethnic and migrant agendas, referred to as immigration-related political activities (Okamoto 2003; Barreto et al. 2009), and political engagement oriented to issues that affect the population at large, referred to as mainstream political activities (Wong et al. 2005; Wong, Ramakrishnan, Lee & Junn 2011; Morales & Pilati 2011; Diaz 2012). Immigration-related activities include campaigning for broadening voting rights for migrants, contacting media to raise attention on refugee integration, wearing a badge against racial discrimination, activities concerning the electoral inclusion of migrants in Milan local elections, or the participation in demonstrations against the Bossi-Fini 2002 law. In turn, mainstream political activities concern migrants' activities and claims for better social services in specific neighborhoods, or public demonstrations against workers' exploitation.

Following these distinctions I end up examining four types of political engagement: mainstream conventional political activities, mainstream protests, immigration-related conventional political activities and immigration-related protests. The investigation of these measures is far from exhaustive. However, they comprise different types of actions which directly affect policy making and government action, and which may, therefore, have an effective leverage on policy making of migrants' host countries. While engagement in any of these types of activities promotes the participatory dimension of democracy, this distinction is crucial as protest activities identify those actions which are more costly and more risky because of their disruptive nature and with a higher likelihood of promoting more radical claims against the dominant status quo. Therefore, migrants are required to have more and different resource to engage in protest actions. Likewise, engagement in immigration-related

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issues indicates that migrants follow their own ethnic and migrant agendas and engage in politics oriented to defend specific ethnic interests and identities (Heath et al. 2013). Each type analyzed indicates whether individuals have engaged in at least one of the items listed for each measure.

In the following descriptions, as was the case for civic engagement, I first consider a comparison of political engagement by migrants in Milan vis-à-vis other European cities, and then examine with more attention the levels of engagement across the three migrant groups in Milan.

Table 3.3 shows levels of engagement by migrants and natives in European cities in at least one political activity. Milan shows among the lowest rates of participation of migrants across all European cities, as only 10 percent of migrants engaged in at least one political action. As it was for civic engagement, this percentage is extremely low compared to Lyon or Stockholm where more than 60 percent of migrants engaged in at least one political action. This level is also very low if I compare it to cities relatively new to immigration like Barcelona, where more than 30 percent of migrants are involved in political actions.

Table 3.3 also shows that migrants' levels of participation in Milan are very low compared to natives' rates, as natives in Milan participate almost six times more than migrants. Looking at migrant – native gaps, defined as "Migrant Participation Rate – Native Participation Rate" (see Desposato & Norrander 2009: 143; Maxwell 2010; Dinesen & Hooghe 2010), after Zurich, Milan shows the second widest gap in engagement in at least one political activity. Therefore, regardless of the fact that institutional constraints related to the lack of citizenship do not directly hinder migrants from participating in these extra-electoral activities, gaps are still extremely wide.

The position of Milan vis-à-vis other European cities does not change much if I consider the four types of political activities separately, namely engagement in conventional immigration-related and mainstream activities and the equivalent protest activities (see Table 3.4). Across all types

TABLE 3.3 *Immigrants' and natives' rates of participation in any political activity, and corresponding gaps across European cities*

	BAR	BUD	GEN	LON	LYO	MAD	MIL	STO	ZUR	Total
Immigrants	36.36	11.38	32.73	10.80	64.04	18.84	**10.04**	70.31	16.02	26.17
Natives	36.63	15.91	77.32	12.67	73.99	41.04	**59.00**	89.51	68.20	49.80
Immigrant-native GAP	−0.27	−4.53	−44.59	−1.87	−9.95	−22.2	**−48.96**	−19.2	−52.18	−23.63

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TABLE 3.4 *Migrant participation in different types of political activities across European cities (percentage)*

	BAR	BUD	GEN	LON	LYO	MAD	MIL	STO	ZUR	Total
Engagement in at least one:										
Mainstream protests	17.03	5.44	12.77	0.46	36.22	8.26	**3.63**	45.13	3.75	12.25
Mainstream conventional activities	19.48	6.45	17.81	3.91	36.48	7.87	**3.35**	59.14	7.76	15.03
Immigration-related protests	3.03	2.02	4.86	4.60	20.47	3.35	**2.93**	6.65	2.88	4.67
Immigration-related conventional activities	11.98	2.91	9.89	4.14	19.16	5.81	**3.49**	5.70	5.38	6.99
N	693	791	556	435	381	775	717	421	799	5,586

of the political sub-items investigated, migrants in Milan are, together with migrants in Budapest, Zurich, and London the individuals showing the lowest levels of political engagement in Europe.

Looking in more depth at patterns of political engagement by Egyptians, Filipinos and Ecuadorians in Milan (Table 3.5), each migrant group examined has, on average, lower levels of political involvement compared to natives regardless of the sub-items of political activities considered. Natives in Milan have even higher levels of engagement in immigration-related activities than migrants. This means that natives engage more than migrants in those actions which expressly and directly relate to the concerns, interest, needs and identities of migrants, for instance, in claims against the lack of refugee protection or against the Bossi-Fini laws.

Overall, findings of this chapter confirm prior studies arguing that a closed political context of migrant integration is likely to engender substantial patterns of participatory exclusion both in civic and in political activities. However, combining insights on civic and political engagement, the chapter also suggests that the consequences of an exclusionary context on single migrant groups are different. Of the three migrant groups, Egyptians show slightly higher levels of political engagement than Filipinos and Ecuadorians. Considering prior patterns of civic engagement, Egyptians show the lowest rates of engagement in associations. However, they also show the highest level of engagement in political activities, especially in protests. These results suggest that Egyptians' higher levels of engagement in political and native-based organizations provide them very important resources for participation. In turn, Filipino and Ecuadorian migrants engaged in at least one action in the

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TABLE 3.5 *Participation in at least one of the following political activities by group in Milan*

	Italians	Egyptians	Filipinos	Ecuadorians
Any political activity	59.00	13.21	8.71	8.71
Mainstream protests	38.67	4.25	3.79	2.90
Mainstream conventional action	38.33	3.77	4.17	2.07
Immigration-related protests	6.67	5.66	0.38	3.32
Immigration-related conventional action	15.33	4.25	2.65	3.73
N	300	212	264	241

12 months prior to the interviews less than Egyptians. Filipinos engaged more in conventional activities and, mainly, in actions addressed towards mainstream issues. However, Filipinos showed the highest levels of organizational engagement and the percentage of individuals engaged in at least one organization was twice than that of Egyptians. Most affiliations of Filipinos were in service-delivery organizations, specifically in religious organizations, and mostly composed of Filipinos. Again, the types of organizational affiliations may prove significant to developing specific patterns of political engagement observed among Filipinos. In fact, most Filipino religious organizations are supported by mainstream Catholic institutions, more prone to transmitting conventional ways of participation (Warren 2009; McAndrew & Voas 2014). In turn, Ecuadorians engaged slightly more in immigration-related actions than in mainstream activities. Engagement in immigration-related actions may be also related to a high number of affiliations by Ecuadorians in pan-immigrant organizations although this relationship will not prove to be statistically significant for Ecuadorians.

Overall this chapter suggests that the characteristics of civic engagement are crucial for defining what type of political activities migrants eventually engage. Filipino ethnic-based and religious organizational affiliations seem to lead to mainstream and conventional levels of participation. In contrast, Egyptians' ties with political organizations, namely native-based political organizations like trade unions are, in turn, associated to higher levels of engagement in political activities especially in immigration-related activities and in protests. In the next chapter, I will delve further into this relationship, unfolding the links between organizational and political engagement.

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Notes

1 For more information on patterns of political participation in European cities see Morales (2011).
2 The details on the operativization of the variables related to civic and political engagement are included in the methodological appendix A2.
3 In each city the survey focused on either two or three different ethnic groups. As this research focuses on Milan I do not dig into the specificities of each group in the cities. For more details on comparative analysis and on single migrant groups in European cities see Morales and Giugni (2011).
4 There are some differences between levels of organizational engagement by the specific ethnic groups within the cities studied which this table does not show. The most remarkable one concerns Ethnic Hungarians in Budapest. The latter show levels of civic and political participation closer to natives compared to other groups studied in Budapest (see Morales & Giugni (2011) for further details).
5 In this research, ethnic organizations are defined as such because individuals share some common external attributes related to the same ethnic origin. I do not refer to a second possible meaning of ethnic organizations, that is, organizations defined as such because members feel part of a common organization based on their shared ethnic origin. Therefore, the definition that is used here refers to an external categorization, and does not necessarily coincide with modalities through which migrants affiliated to ethnic organizations classify, define and identify themselves. In other words, the external categorization of ethnic organizations used in this research does not coincide with modalities through which collective identities develop (see also Melucci 1989), as external attributes defining an aggregate of migrants do not overlap with boundaries of ethnic groups (Barth 1969; Brubaker 2004). According to the definition used, ethnic organizations may be involved in the most diverse set of activities, including claiming workers' rights, focusing on educational access or on women's needs and interests.
6 There is no data on Italians' affiliations in ethnic advocacy organizations. Furthermore, for some types of organizations the lack of engagement by migrants is due to the specific characteristics of the ethnic groups. In particular, a lower average age among migrants makes organizations for retired people practically non-existent among migrants.
7 The active role of trade unions in service delivery suggests that the distinction between service-delivery versus political organizations, that I have employed, is certainly useful to point out some characteristics in the panorama of

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migrant organizational engagement, but needs to be taken with caution when referring to migrants.

8 Less than 5 percent of immigrants voted in the last national elections. The low levels of participation in voting activity among immigrants is mostly due to their non-eligibility either because of age limitations or because of the lack of Italian citizenship of the individuals sampled.

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4

Linking Civic and Political Engagement

Abstract: *In this chapter Pilati discusses more systematically the role of engagement in different types of organizations for migrants' political participation. The author shows that individual engagement in different types of organizations affects different forms of political engagement. In addition, she finds that the results change depending on the ethnic group considered. In particular, Filipinos and Egyptians show two contrasting patterns of engagement. Filipinos are mostly active in conventional political activities which are significantly driven by engagement in religious, mostly ethnic-based organizations. In contrast, the political engagement of Egyptians, especially by the Muslim component, is more likely driven by engagement in political, pan-immigrant and native-based organizations.*

Keywords: Egyptian civic and political engagement; Filipino civic and political engagement; organizations and political engagement

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In this chapter I systematically investigate the relationship between migrant civic and political engagement in Milan. While most studies show that engagement in organizations is significant for political engagement, some studies argue that the impact depends on the type of association in which individuals are involved (Alexander et al. 2012: 43). Studies show that "participation in groups with at least some 'political' component such as environmental groups, consumer advocacy groups, human rights groups or trade unions [...] *is* associated with higher levels of engagement than membership of more non-political groups" (Bowler, Donovan & Hanneman 2003 in Alexander et al. 2012: 45). In the literature on migration, van Londen, Phalet and Hagendoorn (2007: 1213) show that the effect of engagement in client-oriented organizations and in authority-oriented organizations (Kriesi 1996) changes depending on the ethnic group. Specifically, Turks and Moroccans who participate in client-oriented organizations (largely overlapping with what we have referred to as service-delivery organizations), such as sport clubs, and religious associations, are more likely to vote in local elections. Among Turks, however, this effect is mediated by a much stronger effect of participation in authority-oriented organizations, largely overlapping with what we have referred to as political organizations, such as trade unions or social movement organizations. Some studies also focus on the effect of engagement in specific types of organizations. I consider only those studies examining organizations in which Filipinos, Egyptians and Ecuadorians are mostly involved, that is, religious organizations, sport clubs and trade unions. In Brussels, trade union membership made a difference for Moroccans' political engagement (Jacobs et al. 2004) and among Latino immigrant active union members in Los Angeles (Terriquez 2011). As for engagement in sport clubs, studies on the mainstream population show that engagement in sports groups are not linked to higher levels of engagement (Klofstad & Bishin 2014). In turn, studies on the mainstream population in the USA show that "faith-based community organizing has emerged as a powerful vehicle for democratic engagement by faith communities in low-income communities of color, and in American communities more broadly" (Warren 2009: 101). Existing evidence on the impact of engagement in religious organizations on political participation among migrants shows that the effect depends on the religion professed (Eggert & Giugni 2010; Sobolewska et al. 2015; Herman 2015). In the USA, Mora (2013) shows that Catholic churches facilitate political participation among Mexican immigrants. McAndrew

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and Voas (2014: 100) argue that religion may integrate migrants, and others, by reinforcing values promoting social order. Indeed, religious organizations are likely to call for their congregants to care for their community, work for social justice, and participate in the public life of their society. The moral frameworks they imply can provide people of faith with powerful motivations for political action, and "a language and a rich set of stories that help people think about community and public life, and that frame action for a socially just society" (Warren 2009: 103).

The migration literature has also advanced that engagement in different types of organizations in terms of ethnic composition has a different effect on political engagement. Consistently across studies it has been shown that engagement in native, and in pan-immigrant organizations is likely to increase engagement in political activities (Berger et al. 2004). Some studies (Pilati & Morales forthcoming) furthermore show that engagement in native organizations in open POS is not as consequential as in closed POS. The authors suggest that migrants in open POS may not need resources from native organizations to engage in political activities. Individuals of migrant origin in open POS may rely on other resources, like SES resources, to engage in politics. In contrast, in closed POS native organizations become crucial bridging actors between political institutions and individuals of migrant origin (Berger et al. 2004; Barreto et al. 2009; Pilati 2012).

In turn, engagement in ethnic organizations has so far led to different and inconsistent results. Specifically examining the mobilizing role of ethnic organization Pilati and Morales (forthcoming) show that "ethnic organizations are equally important for the political engagement of migrants in the countries of settlement and they never or rarely show a negative association to the various types of political activities examined. More specifically, the integrative role of ethnic and pan-immigrant organizations more consistently concerns immigration-related political activities." In addition, the authors argue that there is a moderating impact of the POS on the effect that engagement in ethnic organizations has on political engagement as the positive and significant effect diminishes or even disappears in closed POS. Furthermore, Togeby shows that the impact of involvement in ethnic organizations for political engagement depends on the ethnic group (Togeby 2004). Engagement in ethnic organizations is also more likely associated with higher levels of engagement of migrants in transnational activities (Guarnizo, Portes & Haller 2003; Portes, Escobar & Arana 2008).

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Following these studies, I focus on the analysis of the effect that engagement of Filipino, Egyptian, and Ecuadorian migrants in different types of organizations has on their political engagement. In this framework, this chapter tries to systematically test what types of organizations among Filipinos, Egyptians and Ecuadorians affect migrant engagement in the different types of political activities examined. In this chapter, I will therefore delve into questions such as: do trade unions, one of the most classical social movement organizations in which most affiliated Egyptians are involved, significantly affect Egyptian political engagement? Does engagement in native-based organizations affect conventional and protest activities equally? And, what about religious ethnic-based organizations in which most Filipinos are engaged? Does engagement in religious organizations equally affect conventional and unconventional behaviors? And does engagement in religious organizations significantly affect engagement of Egyptians and Ecuadorians, regardless of the religion professed?

4.1 Different types of organizations and political action by different ethnic groups

In the empirical analysis which follows, I present a number of models through which I test the effect of engagement in different types of organizations on political activities. The main independent variables looked at are, respectively: engagement in any organization (model 1), engagement in the specific types of organizations considering the main sector or object of activities in which organizations are engaged (model 2), engagement in service-delivery and political organizations (model 2a) and engagement in native, in ethnic and in pan-immigrant organizations (model 3).[1]

In the first set of analyses (Table 4.1), for each ethnic group, I test the effect of the aforementioned independent variables on the individual probability to engage in at least one political action. Therefore, analyses in Table 4.1 are elaborated distinguishing for the Filipino, Ecuadorian, Egyptian and Italian samples. In addition, due to the presence of both Muslims and Copts among Egyptians, analyses have also been performed separately for the Egyptian Muslim component.[2] Due to the elaboration of analyses by group, in these analyses it is not possible to distinguish different types of political activities given the low number of cases.

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TABLE 4.1 *Predictors of engagement in at least one political activity by ethnic group in Milan*

		Egyptians		Muslim Egyptians		Filipinos		Ecuadorians		Italians	
		b	se	b	se	b	se	b	se	b	se
	Gender	0.05	(0.71)	0.19	(0.88)	0.03	(0.55)	1.16*	(0.58)	0.15	(0.27)
	Age	−0.02	(0.03)	−0.02	(0.03)	−0.03	(0.03)	−0.06+	(0.03)	−0.01	(0.01)
	In paid work	0.01	(0.66)	0.19	(0.79)	−0.37	(0.79)	0.26	(0.64)	0.64*	(0.32)
	Highest educational level attained	1.90	(1.27)	0.70	(1.46)	1.82	(1.38)	3.59*	(1.45)	−0.37	(0.68)
	Married	−0.82	(0.60)	−0.07	(0.74)	−0.31	(0.63)	−1.19+	(0.62)	−0.33	(0.27)
	Interests in host country politics	0.91	(0.62)	0.05	(0.69)	−0.27	(0.55)	0.55	(0.61)	0.77*	(0.33)
	Social trust	−0.81	(0.95)	−1.50	(1.07)	−0.72	(1.50)	2.63*	(1.33)	1.03*	(0.49)
	Proportion of years lived in the host country	0.72	(1.43)	2.60	(1.77)	2.27	(1.97)	−2.05	(2.94)		
	Has host country citizenship	0.73	(0.76)	1.01	(0.91)	−0.12	(1.38)	0.83	(1.40)		
	Fluent in the host country language	0.73	(0.61)	0.57	(0.69)	1.62*	(0.69)	1.77**	(0.63)		
	Experienced ethnic discrimination	0.73	(0.54)	1.10+	(0.66)	−0.33	(0.68)	−0.06	(0.61)		
Model 1	Involved in organizations	1.08*	(0.53)	1.48*	(0.66)	2.21***	(0.56)	−0.43	(0.66)	1.34***	(0.27)
Model 2	Involved in religious organizations	2.02+	(1.15)	2.07	(1.68)	2.63***	(0.63)	0.21	(1.02)	1.48*	(0.64)
	Involved in trade unions	0.58	(0.82)	1.22	(0.92)	0.78	(0.79)	0.34	(1.24)	1.59***	(0.46)
	Involved in sport clubs	−0.68	(1.13)	0.57	(1.25)	3.08**	(1.18)	−0.57	(1.03)	1.30**	(0.44)
	Involved in other organizations	2.50**	(0.88)	2.88**	(1.05)	1.88*	(0.82)	−0.13	(0.98)	1.08***	(0.32)
Model 2a	Involved in service-delivery organizations	0.64	(0.70)	1.11	(0.86)	2.26***	(0.54)	0.02	(0.67)	0.95***	(0.28)
	Involved in political organizations	1.40*	(0.63)	2.02**	(0.78)	0.94	(0.62)	0.56	(0.80)	1.30***	(0.34)
Model 3	Involved in native organizations	0.53	(0.60)	1.16+	(0.69)	1.78**	(0.63)	0.18	(0.83)	1.25***	(0.27)
	Involved in pan-immigrant organizations	2.04+	(1.05)	2.48*	(1.13)	4.43**	(1.63)	−0.39	(0.90)	1.62*	(0.65)
	Involved in ethnic organizations[a]	1.74	(1.11)			1.77**	(0.61)	−0.70	(0.98)		
	Constant	−3.55*	(1.55)	−3.71*	(1.71)	−3.74*	(1.60)	−4.24**	(1.63)	−1.11+	(0.65)
	ll	−57.55		−44.98		−59.11		−49.15		−173.63	
	chi2	42.04		37.87		36.11		36.69		56.03	
	N	196		159		254		225		298	

Notes: [a]Involved in ethnic organizations for Muslim Egyptians and Italians have been dropped because of no affiliations. + significant at the 0.1 level; *significant at the 0.01 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at the 0.001 level.

Therefore, I delve into the relationship between organizational engagement and different types of political activities in the second set of analyses presented in Table 4.2. While the main independent variables related to organizational engagement remain the same, the dependent variable in Table 4.2 are overall levels of engagement in at least one political action and the four sub-items of political engagement, namely immigration-related conventional and protest actions, and mainstream conventional and protest actions. In Table 4.2 the analyses are elaborated on the full sample.

Looking at Table 4.1 first of all, any type of organizational engagement is considered to positively and significantly increase the probabilities of Italians to join political action. All the different types of engagement in organizations examined in the models 1 – 3 in Table 4.1 are significant for affecting engagement in at least one political activity among natives. This confirms the powerful and significant effect of organizational engagement, regardless of the type of organization, among the mainstream population.[3] Furthermore, and remarkably, engagement in at least one organization significantly affects engagement in at least one political activity for all groups looked at with the exclusion of Ecuadorians (Models 1s). This may be due partly, to the recent arrival of this group to Milan, whose flows become intensive only after 2000. Therefore, the data used, collected in 2006 and 2007, may not capture the effects that organizational engagement has among Ecuadorians. Political engagement for this group is partly affected by classical variables accounting for political behaviors, like social trust, fluency in Italian, or socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics which have a positive and significant effect on political engagement. Past studies, however, also show that associational engagement among Ecuadorians has positive effects on transnational politics, that is, on activities oriented towards migrants' origin countries which are not the object of this study (Morales & Pilati 2014).

Model 2 and 2a consider the effect of engagement in different types of organizations depending on the sector in which organizations are active. Filipinos mostly engage in religious organizations, Egyptians in trade unions and Ecuadorians in sport clubs (see previous chapter). Model 2 tests if the effect of engagement in each of these types of organizations changes depending on the group considered.

Differently from expectations arguing that trade unions are crucial mobilizing structures, the effect of involvement in trade unions in Milan is positive and significant only among natives. Involvement in trade

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TABLE 4.2 *Predictors of engagement in at least one of the following types of political activities by Filipino, Egyptian and Ecuadorian migrants in Milan*

		Any action		Mainstream protests		Mainstream conventional activities		Immigration-related protests		Immigration-related conventional activities	
		b	se	b	se	b	se	b	se	b	se
	Gender	0.40	(0.31)	1.04*	(0.50)	0.85	(0.53)	0.14	(0.60)	0.10	(0.48)
	Age	−0.03⁺	(0.02)	−0.03	(0.03)	0.02	(0.03)	−0.03	(0.03)	−0.02	(0.03)
	In paid work	−0.00	(0.37)	−0.80	(0.54)	−0.66	(0.73)	0.99	(0.72)	0.19	(0.59)
	Highest educational level attained	2.15**	(0.72)	0.60	(1.16)	3.43**	(1.27)	2.88*	(1.26)	3.13**	(1.13)
	Married	−0.64*	(0.32)	−0.78	(0.56)	−0.53	(0.59)	−0.99⁺	(0.55)	−0.08	(0.51)
	Interests in host country politics	0.32	(0.32)	0.35	(0.52)	1.52*	(0.70)	0.44	(0.61)	0.00	(0.51)
	Social trust	0.06	(0.62)	−0.98	(1.08)	−0.68	(1.17)	1.17	(0.97)	−0.39	(0.95)
	Proportion of years lived in the host country	1.08	(0.97)	1.17	(1.48)	1.85	(1.72)	0.63	(1.52)	0.51	(1.43)
	Has host country citizenship	0.44	(0.57)	0.57	(0.86)	0.77	(0.85)	0.38	(0.89)	0.60	(0.83)
	Fluent in the host country language	1.19***	(0.34)	0.72	(0.57)	0.80	(0.60)	1.54**	(0.57)	1.31*	(0.52)
	Experienced ethnic discrimination	0.23	(0.31)	−0.14	(0.53)	−0.06	(0.54)	0.20	(0.53)	0.57	(0.46)
	Egyptian (REF)										
	Filipino	0.03	(0.40)	1.05	(0.68)	1.30⁺	(0.74)	−2.52*	(1.12)	0.10	(0.63)
	Ecuadorians	0.08	(0.40)	0.55	(0.68)	0.68	(0.86)	−0.02	(0.64)	0.33	(0.61)
Model 1	Involved in organizations	1.15***	(0.29)	0.58	(0.46)	2.22***	(0.57)	0.53	(0.53)	0.65	(0.47)
Model 2	Involved in religious organizations	1.63***	(0.42)	0.72	(0.74)	2.49***	(0.65)	0.74	(0.88)	0.40	(0.69)
	Involved in trade unions	0.46	(0.50)	0.87	(0.82)	−0.08	(0.93)	0.02	(0.93)	0.25	(0.75)
	Involved in sport clubs	0.25	(0.58)	−1.04	(1.00)	0.35	(0.89)	0.31	(0.93)	1.78**	(0.68)
	Involved in other organizations	1.39***	(0.42)	0.82	(0.63)	2.08***	(0.62)	0.07	(0.82)	−0.10	(0.84)
Model 2a	Involved in service-delivery organizations	1.15***		0.48	(0.50)	1.24*	(0.51)	0.93	(0.57)	1.17*	(0.48)
	Involved in political organizations	0.93*		0.94	(0.61)	1.45**	(0.53)	0.25	(0.64)	0.70	(0.55)
Model 3	Involved in native organizations	0.77*	(0.34)	0.62	(0.56)	1.31*	(0.51)	0.37	(0.60)	0.20	(0.56)
	Involved in pan-immigrant organizations	0.94⁺	(0.54)	1.34⁺	(0.72)	1.18	(0.73)	0.82	(0.76)	1.39*	(0.68)
	Involved in ethnic organizations	1.03**	(0.39)	0.46	(0.65)	1.43*	(0.59)	0.41	(0.83)	0.92	(0.59)
	Constant	−3.92***	(0.92)	−3.28*	(1.42)	−9.87***	(2.06)	−6.16***	(1.75)	−5.87***	(1.49)
	ll	−177.94		−83.70		−67.42		−66.13		−88.08	
	chi2	93.86		46.45		72.45		54.82		31.14	
	N	675		675		675		675		675	

Notes: The coefficients, the Log Likelihood, the chi-square reported in the table refer to model 1. ⁺significant at the 0.1 level; *significant at the 0.01 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at the 0.001 level.

unions is not conducive to higher levels of political engagement for any of the migrant groups examined. This somehow reflects the different role that trade unions play for migrants in delivering and providing services, rather than being mobilizing structures. This is a new element compared to the traditional role of trade unions in "old" social movements (see for instance Schofer & Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001). As I will discuss in the next chapter, trade unions are nonetheless crucial for the possibility of migrant organizations to engage in political activities. Trade unions are in fact among the most central organizations in the migrant organizational network, and the ties they build with migrant organizations as well as the resources they deploy are crucial for the involvement of migrant organizations themselves in political activities.

In turn, engagement in religious associations fosters political participation among Filipinos and, less significantly, among Egyptians.

As Table 3.5 in Chapter 3 showed, Filipinos mainly engaged in mainstream and conventional actions, therefore, in actions less critical towards the dominant status quo. Consequently, links that Catholic Filipinos affiliated with religious organizations have with the local Catholic Church are indeed likely to provide the resources required to become engaged in conventional activities rather than in protests. This may be due to the respect for authority that characterizes church attendees, as well as the promotion of respect for tradition and conventional behavior (Wald, Owen & Hill 1988: 534; Warren 2009). In this framework, migrants attending church are expected to be more inclined to support order, and the conservation of the status quo, and to perceive conflict as being at odds with a "morally just conduct." Conversely, engagement in religious organizations is not significant among Ecuadorians either, most likely for the same reasons advocated previously, nor among Muslim Egyptians. The results are different from those shown by Eggert and Giugni (2011) who found some effect of religious involvement on participation of Muslims in London. Results are also different from those found in Brussels, where only Muslims engaged in religious associations have higher probabilities to engage in politics while Congolese Catholics do not (Herman 2015). Table 4.1 also shows that engagement in sport clubs is only significant among Filipinos.[4]

Turning to the effect of being engaged in organizations active in service-delivery or in political organizations, models 2a show that engagement in service-delivery organizations, which includes religious organizations, is only significant among Filipinos. This result partly

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overlaps with the positive impact of engagement in religious organizations among Filipinos. In turn, engagement in political organizations (in which trade union affiliations play the major role) significantly affects political engagement by Egyptians and by Muslim Egyptians. In contrast, it does not significantly affect political engagement by Filipinos or by Ecuadorians either. This suggests that both Muslim and non Muslim Egyptians, need the specific political cues, political discussions and political information transmitted within and by political organizations to engage in political activities. Other more general resources promoted by engagement in service-delivery organizations are not sufficient to mobilize Egyptians into the political sphere.

Egyptians are also the group that is the most discriminated among the migrant groups examined.[5] Therefore, more than other groups they need the political recognition that only political organizations can provide. Even more importantly, most political organizations with which Egyptians are affiliated are native-based and are more likely to provide migrants with symbolic resources such as political recognition. Furthermore, as Table 3.5 in Chapter 3 showed, Egyptians engage slightly more in protests and in immigration-related actions. Therefore, engagement in political organizations which are, by definition, more active in various types of collective actions, including protests, may have an effect on individual levels of protest engagement too.

Finally, models 3 in Table 4.1 provide information on the different impact of engagement in ethnic, pan-immigrant and in native associations on political engagement. Engagement in pan-immigrant organizations is significant for every group analyzed, with the exception of Ecuadorians. In addition, engagement in ethnic organizations positively and significantly affect engagement in at least one political action among Filipinos only. Therefore, engagement in ethnic organizations shows that these are spaces fostering political inclusion of migrants in the country of residence. In addition, as mentioned, Filipinos are mostly engaged in conventional and mainstream activities. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that Filipino engagement in ethnic organizations significantly affects their participation in conventional and mainstream activities and not only involvement in ethnic and migrants-specific agendas. In turn, engagement in native organizations is significant for both Filipinos and Muslim Egyptians.

Egyptians show different results depending on whether I consider the full sample of Egyptians or Muslim Egyptians only. Considering the

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full sample of Egyptians, engagement in pan-immigrant organizations significantly affects political activities. Interestingly, however, Muslim Egyptians increase their probabilities of joining political action through engagement in pan-immigrant and in native organizations. Therefore, as previously suggested, results emphasize the role of native organizations for Muslims' political incorporations, in an environment largely dominated by Catholic values.

4.2 Different types of organizations and different types of political action

I now turn to Table 4.2 examining if associational engagement has a different effect depending on the type of political engagement examined. First, regarding engagement in any political action, excluding engagement in trade unions and sport clubs, all other types of organizational engagement examined, positively and significantly increase the likelihood of migrants joining at least one political action. This finding further illustrates the lack of mobilizing forces of trade unions among migrants, which therefore confirms, that there is a different effect of engagement in trade unions for natives and for migrants. In addition, the lack of a mobilizing role for sport clubs is consistent with some studies in the mainstream population (Klofstad & Bishin 2014). The relationship between civic and political engagement in mainstream conventional political activities offers similar results as engagement in most types of organizations are mostly significant for increasing migrants' likelihood to participate. Unexpectedly, engagement in organizations, regardless of the type, is hardly significant in affecting political protests, either in mainstream or in immigration-related political actions. This finding is surprising in light of social movement theories arguing that organizations play a crucial role as mobilizing structures of protest actions.[6] While there may be differences among groups which I can not examine in this research, at the aggregate level results suggest that migrant organizational engagement provides channels for migrants to join the most legitimized forms of actions, those which do not contest the rules and the boundaries of the dominant political system. This result may be partly linked to the fact that associations consolidate the interests of privileged groups (Melucci 1996). Peripheral actors, like migrants in exclusionary contexts, therefore, are more likely to rely on other

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resources, education for instance or language skills to engage in the most contentious forms of politics.

Table 4.2 also confirms that engagement in organizations mainly affects mainstream conventional activities rather than immigration-related actions. Considering the single types of organizations (Models 2), this concerns engagement in religious organizations. In contrast, engagement in sport clubs significantly affects immigration-related conventional activities. Considering the two broad sectors in which organizations are involved, models 2a in Table 4.2 show that, while engagement in service-delivery organizations more often positively and significantly affects conventional political activities engagement in political organizations only significantly affects mainstream conventional political activities.

Finally, models 3 in Table 4.2 show that engagement in ethnic and in native organizations significantly affect mainstream conventional political activities too. Therefore, engagement in ethnic organizations improves and contributes to migrants' political incorporation. Ethnic organizations are not venues for specific ethnic agendas but for migrants to get involved in issues concerning Italy, and more specifically, Milan and the places where migrants settle. Conversely, engagement in pan-immigrant organizations significantly affect immigration-related conventional activities and, less significantly, mainstream protests. Therefore, our results are not clear-cut in relation to the type of political activities transmitted by pan-immigrant organizations. The latter sustain both immigration-related activities (Espiritu 1992; Okamoto 2003) and less so mainstream activities as well as both conventional and less so protest activities.

This chapter confirms the line of interpretation advanced in Chapter 3. There are different mechanisms at work for Filipinos and Egyptians when examining the relationship between civic and political engagement. In particular, Filipinos' conventional behavior in the political sphere is significantly driven by engagement in religious, mostly ethnic-based organizations. In turn, Egyptians' political engagement, especially by the Muslim component, which is mostly in protest actions seems to be driven by individual engagement in political, pan-immigrant and native-based organizations.

The next chapter will provide further details on how individual patterns of civic and political engagement by Filipinos and Egyptians can be integrated with findings at the organizational level and, specifically, with the organizational networks built by Filipino and Egyptian

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communities. This will enable me to identify two different models for confronting political exclusion in Milan. Conversely, Ecuadorian patterns are not discussed in more depth. In fact, among Ecuadorians, results do not suggest specific modalities of organizational engagement which are significantly associated with political engagement. As mentioned, classical socio-demographic and socio-economic predictors of political participation and variables related to the process of immigration are more likely to affect Ecuadorians' political engagement.

Notes

1 For a similar approach see also Herman (2015). Control variables include the main socio-demographic, socio-economic and immigration-related characteristics: gender, age, being in paid work, highest level of education attained, being married, being interested in the host country politics, social trust, proportion of years lived in the host country, has host country citizenship, fluency in the host country language and having experienced ethnic discrimination. Analyses on the full immigrant sample also include the ethnic group of origin. Due to the lack of data, I cannot analyse the pre-existent political activities by migrants in their origin countries, neither can we control for familial socialization although prior studies show that they are important predictors (Eckstein 2006; Cain, Kiewiet & Uhlaner, 1991). The details on the operativization of all variables are included in the Methodological Appendix A2 and the descriptive statistics are shown in the methodological appendix, Table A1. The specification of the models are included in the methodological appendix A3 which also discuss issues related to the causal directionality between organizational and political engagement.

2 I specifically examine the Muslim component because of the current debate whether Muslims have specific patterns of political engagement (Mustafa 2015).

3 Italians are included as the control group. Therefore, the results on Italians are not commented on further. In addition, the discussion of findings only focuses on the impact of our main independent variables, organizational engagement, despite that models in the tables illustrate the effects of other predictors of political engagement which I have discussed in Chapter 2 as significant for migrants' political engagement.

4 Engagement in other organizations is also significant but this result does not help us to improve our knowledge on specific types of organizations. In fact, the category "other organizations" aggregates all different types

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of organizations looked at with the exclusion of trade unions, religious organizations and sport clubs. Therefore, I will not comment on it further.

5 The survey show that 39.7 percent of Egyptians have been discriminated against because of their ethnic origin in the 12 months before the interview, versus 19.1 percent of Filipinos and 33.2 percent of Ecuadorians (see descriptive statistics in the methodological appendix, Table A1).

6 The role of organizations for protest mobilization is crucial, however, when considering the organizational level. In fact, prior studies show that ties among organizations are crucial for affecting the likelihood of migrant organizations to engage in political activities (Pilati 2012; Eggert & Pilati 2014; Eggert 2014).

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5

Organizational Networks and Political Engagement of Organizations

Abstract: *In this chapter Pilati integrates the previous analyses on the civic and political engagement of individual migrants with the analysis of organizational networks and the political engagement of organizations. The chapter shows that most activities by migrant organizations in Milan are concentrated on service-delivery and provision while political activities play a limited role only. In addition, organizational networks and, therefore, their effects on political engagement of organizations, differ depending on the ethnic group considered. Pilati argues that among Egyptians, links that organizations build with other organizations are crucial for accessing all different kinds of political activities. In contrast, among Filipinos, isolated organizations or small clusters of ethnic organizations are not likely to facilitate access to the political sphere.*

Keywords: migrant organizations; migrant organizational networks; political engagement of migrant organizations

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In the previous chapters, I examined political engagement by individual migrants in Milan. The results clearly show exclusionary patterns among individual migrants from all three ethnic groups studied. Possibilities to engage in the political sphere are not, however, exhausted by individual level actions. Migrants may also engage, more or less directly, in collective actions, which are actions undertaken publicly with the aim of pursuing a common objective representing the efforts of an organized group, and oriented towards change or resisting change (McAdam & Snow 1997; Sampson et al. 2005). In this framework, voluntary associations or organizations are among the most significant mobilizing structures for collective action (Diani 2015).[1]

The first aim of this chapter is to examine activities by migrant organizations to understand the degree to which they engage in the political sphere. In this way, information on political engagement by organizations will integrate with our knowledge on individual migrant engagement in political activities examined in previous chapters. Even though migrants may show high levels of political exclusion from individual activities such as voting, displaying a badge, or boycotting certain products for political reasons, their claims, needs, interests, and identities may be voiced through the political actions of the organizations in which they are affiliated. As a consequence, by combining individual and organizational levels analyses, it is possible to clarify if political exclusion only concerns individual migrants or if it also applies to migrant organizations.

The second objective of this chapter is to examine the overall organizational structure in which migrant organizations are embedded, defined as the organizational bases and mechanisms serving to collect and use the resources for political mobilization (Rucht 1996: 186). I focus on the dimension related to migrants' organizational networks examining the ties built by migrant organizations with other migrant and native organizations and the position of migrant organization in the organizational field. This will enable me to obtain a broad picture of the way migrant actors at the organizational level relate each other, therefore highlighting, among other things, the emergence of structures of cooperation and the social integration of migrant communities (Diani 2015). In particular, as discussed in Chapter 3, Filipinos showed very high levels of affiliations in ethnic organizations. Therefore, it is important to know if engagement in these organizations enables members of this group to reach out to other organizations. Or, if the structural patterns established by Filipino

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organizations yield to isolated clusters, thus forming organizational structures characterizing the social and political closure around the Filipino community. Examining organizational networks is also important for another reason. Previous studies have indicated that collective actions by migrant organizations themselves are significantly affected by the characteristics of the organizational networks (Vermeulen 2006; Vermeulen & Berger 2008; Pilati 2012; Eggert 2014).[2] Although there is some differential effect depending whether organizations operate in open or closed POS (Eggert & Pilati 2014), past research shows that the ties migrant organizations have with other migrant and native organizations are crucial for the political engagement by migrant organizations. In multicultural contexts, prior research confirms the integrative role of the ethnic civic community, that is, ties that ethnic organizations hold with other ethnic organizations. In these contexts, ethnic civic communities increase engagement by migrants in political activities (Fennema & Tillie 1999, 2001; Vermeulen 2006). In contrast, in the cities characterized by closed POS such as Milan and Zurich, migrant organizations and ethnic civic communities are marginalized from the political sphere (Pilati 2012; Eggert 2014). Thus, most migrant organizations in these contexts are active in recreational, service-delivery and socio-cultural activities. In these contexts, ties that migrant organizations build with native organizations are those that are mostly significant for migrant organizations to engage in political activities. In Milan, not only is the native civic community much more active in the political sphere, but it also provides more resources to enable migrant organizations to engage in political activities (Pilati 2012).

In addition to the examination of ties that migrant organizations have with other migrant and native organizations, I analyze the levels of embeddeness of migrant organizations in the overall structure of networks build by migrant organizations. In fact, resources derived from sparse networks of migrant organizations, characterized by a high number of isolated organizations, or by small clusters of organizations are indeed likely to have a different effect on the political engagement by migrant organizations than those resources deriving from structures of interconnected migrant organizations showing many and dense inter-organizational ties.[3] With regard to this, I will not delve too deeply into the relationship between networks and political engagement, as this has been systematically analyzed elsewhere (see Pilati 2012; Eggert & Pilati 2014). I will nonetheless provide some interpretation on which types

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of network resources are more likely to affect the political activities by migrant organizations observed.

5.1 Migrant organizations in Milan

While the analyses, in prior chapters, on political activities by individual migrants in Milan have focused on three groups, Filipinos, Egyptians and Ecuadorians, in this chapter I focus on the overall number of migrant organizations operating in Milan in 2005, the time when the organizational survey was conducted.[4] Ideally, I should focus on the whole organizational field in Milan including all types of organizations in which migrants are affiliated, therefore, ethnic, pan-immigrant and native organizations. However, due to constraints related to data availability, I can only take into account migrant organizations, specifically those where at least 50 percent of members are of migrant origin. These comprise both ethnic organizations, whose members are from a single country, as well as pan-immigrant organizations whose members include migrants of different origin countries. As a consequence of leaving aside native-based organizations, there is a mismatch between organizational affiliations of migrants discussed in the previous chapters and the organizational-level analysis. Due to the lack of information on native-based organizations, I am not able to draw a broad picture of all activities enacted by organizations in which migrants are engaged. Nonetheless, focusing only on migrant organizations, ethnic and pan-immigrant, does actually allow me to clarify migrant agendas, in particular activities that migrant actors are engaged, their specific ethnic and migrant interests, identities, and needs expressed collectively. In this way, results on organizational activities will not be biased by the presence of activities driven by the interests of a majority of natives. In fact, activities by native organizations may more likely express the grievances, identities and interests of the native majority rather than of the migrant minority affiliated with such organizations. This can become particularly problematic in a competitive organizational setting, given that natives occupy more central positions than migrants by virtue of the higher levels of resources they are endowed with (Messina 2007).

The organizations surveyed were the most visible and accessible migrant organizations active in the Municipality of Milan in 2005. The population of migrant organizations surveyed, 46 organizations, is quite

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limited in size if we compare Milan to other European cities where the same research was conducted (Morales 2009b). The 46 migrant organizations reached in Milan included organizations formed by migrants from all different countries of origin. This number is very close to the number of organizations found in Zurich, where 39 organizations were surveyed, and those found in Budapest, where 51 organizations were reached. In contrast, in cities such as Barcelona or London, the same research could only focus on migrant organizations from two or three ethnic groups, given the extremely high number of migrant organizations of single ethnic groups initially mapped. Where the political context is closed, such as in Zurich, Budapest and Milan (Cinalli & Giugni 2011), the overall size of the organizational field is therefore limited, while the number of migrant organizations is much wider in an open POS. Furthermore, the size of the population of organizations is small regardless of the period in which migration flows, in Zurich, Milan or Budapest, have begun. For instance, post-war migration characterized the migration flows to Zurich, while waves of migration to Milan have been far more recent. The limited presence of migrant organizations in the public sphere has direct consequences on the level of recognition migrant organizations enjoy. The presence of migrant organizations is in fact crucial for migrant communities to claim and express the fact that they "exist" as these organizations often engage in what has been referred to as "identity politics," that is, participation efforts turned towards the symbolic dimension of recognition and expression of new lifestyles as well as cultural claims (Melucci 1996; Boccagni 2011; Boccagni & Pilati 2015).

As migration flows to Italy are rather heterogeneous, the origin of members of migrant organizations surveyed in Milan is consistently the most diverse. Regarding the three groups specifically considered in this research, the survey addressed 8 Filipino-based organizations, 7 Egyptian-based organizations and 4 Ecuadorian-based organizations.[5] The scant number of Ecuadorian-based organizations jeopardizes the possibility of advancing a valid interpretation of results. In light of this and the lack of significant effects on the link between civic and political engagement of Ecuadorians in Chapter 4, I will focus only on Filipino and Egyptian organizations. As I only have a few Filipino and Egyptian organizations, I will nonetheless interpret the results with caution. In addition, the number of Filipino organizations only represents one part of the social groups in which Filipinos are involved. Filipino organizations

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are in fact often shaped by regional loyalties and provincial ties, if not familial and neighborhood ties (Quinsaat 2015). As Espiritu argues in her study on Filipinos in the San Diego urban area, "many Filipino migrants have articulated a sense of home by memorializing the homeland and by building on familial and communal ties" (Espiritu 2003: 14). An interpretation advanced to explain this fragmentation is that this is a way for Filipinos to feel closer to their home country. Therefore, in the Milanese case too, Filipinos are often organized in small groups which are not formally recognized as associations but are rather informal structures which have not been reached within the framework of this study. Despite this limitation, the focus on formal organizations is not likely to be an impediment to providing an interpretation of some organizational dynamics which are specific to the Filipino community.[6]

5.2 Activities by migrant organizations

Organizations can engage in a multiplicity of activities with different degrees of political commitment. As I have discussed in Chapter 3, organizational activities may include service-delivery and provision, actions oriented towards the socialization of members, and the organization of free space, and recreational activities. Organizational activities, however, may also include political actions which specifically aim to change or to resist a change in the dominant status quo, or to relate to political actors or objects (Eggert & Pilati 2014: 859; Pilati et al. 2014). Political activities in which organizations can be involved include targeted forms of political actions such as lobbying for policy change, political contacting and engagement in unconventional forms of activities like public demonstrations.[7] Past studies show that local elites have largely excluded migrant organizations from the political sphere (Campani 1994; Danese 1998, 2001; Caselli 2006; Solari 2006; Recchi 2006; Bassoli 2012; Mantovani 2013). The political exclusion of migrant organizations in Milan has even concerned the management of local policies on immigration issues, as migrant organizations have not been involved in the conception nor in the implementation of local immigration policies (Pilati 2010). The latter have been almost exclusively managed by native-based Catholic organizations (Caponio 2004).

While the research only focused on 46 migrant organizations, results on the type of activities migrant organizations in Milan engage in are

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quite clear and confirm past studies. Table 5.1 presenting the organization of events by migrant organizations, shows that, in average, migrant organizations in Milan have been mostly actively involved in the organization of service delivery and recreational activities like social or cultural events and less engaged in the organization of political events.[8] Around 1 out of 4 organizations have ever organized political activities. Both Filipino and Egyptian organizations are very active in organizing religious events and Egyptian organizations have organized more political activities than Filipino organizations (Table 5.1).[9]

Table 5.2 shows the percentage of organizations engaged in various types of political activities. Generally, migrant organizations in Milan engage more in conventional than in unconventional activities. For instance, only 2.2 percent of organizations were involved in the occupation of buildings. In contrast, more conventional forms of political activities such as writing letters to authorities, participating in press conferences, managing public programs and distributing information flyers were performed by more than 30 percent of all organizations examined. Similar findings were found by Eggert and Pilati (2014) when examining political contacting as a form of conventional political engagement and protests. In particular, the authors find that 60.87 percent of migrant organizations in Milan had at least some regular contact with political institutions. This percentage is the highest among the five European cities analyzed by the authors. However, when looking at participation in at least one protest, the percentage of organizations involved in these activities drops drastically, as only around one out of 4

TABLE 5.1 *The organization of events (weekly or every month) by migrant organizations in Milan*

	Egyptian organizations %	Filipino organizations %	All organizations %
Cultural events	28.6	28.6	37.8
Educational events	14.3	–	6.5
Social events	83.3	50.0	46.7
Intellectual events	57.1	50.0	45.6
Political events	42.9	25.0	23.9
Sport events	28.6	25.0	23.9
Religious events	71.4	62.5	36.9
N	7	8	46

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TABLE 5.2 *Public and political activities by migrant organizations in Milan. Percentage of organizations engaged in the activities at least 4-6 times a year*

	Egyptian organizations %	Filipino organizations %	All organizations
Send letters or writings to the authorities	71.4	12.5	32.6
Press conferences or press releases	57.1	37.5	41.3
Management or implementation of public programs	57.1	12.5	36.9
Distribution of newsletter, information notes or other written materials to influence public opinion	42.9	50.0	30.4
Collect signatures for a petition	–	–	10.9
Organize or collaborate in the organization of demonstrations and public meetings	42.9	25.0	34.8
Organize boycotts to products, institutions or countries	14.3	–	6.5
Organize or participate in the occupation of a building or in a "lock-up"	–	–	2.2
Participate in local radio or TV programs	71.4	12.5	34.8
Participate in national radio or TV programs	57.1	25.0	30.4
Participate in at least one public demonstration	85.7	12.5	26.7
N	7	8	46

organizations in Milan participated in at least one protest, while higher levels of engagement in protests were found in other cities.

Specifically looking at Filipino, and Egyptian organizations, the former are much less engaged in most types of political activity examined, both in comparison to Egyptian organizations and to other migrant organizations surveyed. Unlike other historical cases, especially the civil rights movement which saw the crucial involvement of Black Churches in the movement actions (McAdam 1982; Morris 1984), Filipino organizations, most of which are religious organizations, are rarely or not at all engaged in contentious politics such as the organization of boycotts, occupation of buildings, or participation in public demonstrations (see Table 5.2).

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Conversely, Egyptian organizations have been regularly and actively organizing various types of events, and have higher levels of involvement in different types of political activities, including both conventional and unconventional forms of action. This evidence is consistent with prior studies examining political contacting, a form of conventional action (Pilati 2010). Egyptian-based organizations had regular political contacts, at various territorial levels, with local, regional and national institutions and political representatives. In contrast, only a few Filipino organizations had been regularly involved in such activities and most contacts reached out to local institutions. In fact, more than 75 percent of Filipino organizations made contacts with the Municipality services which deal with immigration-related issues, and more than 30 percent of organizations had contact with local services and institutions linked to education, local police, or health. In this way, Filipino organizations offer their members assistance and mediation on practical issues becoming bridging actors between institutional actors and members of organizations.

Findings on political engagement at the organizational level partly overlap with findings at the individual level. Egyptian actors, both individuals and organizations, are engaged in more and various types of political activities, including protests. Differently, Filipino individuals and Filipino organizations engage in political activities at lower rates than Egyptians, and more often in conventional political activities avoiding involvement in protests and in more contentious forms of action.

5.3 Migrant organizational networks

In order to explore the overall structure of migrant organizations, I analyze two types of networks: the first is formed by ties among all migrant organizations, both pan-immigrant and ethnic organizations; the second is formed by ties that migrant organizations have with native organizations. For both networks, I analyze six types of ties, namely, the most important collaborations, participation in common projects, personal contacts, co-memberships, information exchange and the exchange of resources.[10] I examine the position that migrant organizations have in the organizational network by looking at two network measures: first, I consider the number of ties that migrant organizations have with other organizations, what is referred to as the outdegree.

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Second, I consider the structural embeddedness of migrant organizations within the whole network structure (Moody & White 2003; Burris 2005: 251–252). For this purpose, I use a specific measure of structural centrality called eigenvector centrality (Borgatti, Everett & Freeman 2002). The attention I pay to ties draws on studies on the "ethnic civic community model" which stresses that the ties that ethnic organizations hold with other ethnic organizations increase the levels of migrant political participation (Fennema & Tillie 1999, 2001). Furthermore, I consider ties with native organizations as past studies have shown they are equally significant to affect the chances that migrant organizations have to engage in political activities, especially when migrant organizations operate in closed POS (Pilati 2012; Eggert & Pilati 2014). In addition to ties, past studies have shown that network resources held by organizations being well embedded in the organizational network have higher probabilities to join political actions (Burris 2005). Network embeddedness, or eigenvector centrality, takes into account not only the number of ties built by migrant organizations, but also the number of ties built by her partners. As argued elsewhere (Pilati 2012: 677) the fact that ties may form clusters of organizations isolated from the wider network of organizations has been overlooked. However, outcomes related to the specific structure of organizations may also be negative (Fennema & Tillie 2001). Ethnic civic communities isolated from the broad network structure may be associated with the social closure of certain ethnic groups and the reproduction of common and shared ethnic traits within those groups. By remaining bound to one specific group, engagement in political activities may become auto-referential and convey forms of political subculture rather than the political engagement and integration of migrant organizations in the host-society political context.

Both network measures considered, a high number of ties built by migrant organizations and a high levels of structural embeddedness, identify organizations that are crucial nodes in the network, that is, that are central organizations. Central organizations are endowed with greater network resources than peripheral organizations do. Network resources imply, among other things, that migrant organizations have more information on mainstream politics, on public funding opportunities, more symbolic legitimation to act in the political sphere, more chances to get new recruits and more resources including the possibility to share equipment with other organizations. For this reason, central organizations are more likely to engage in politics.

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Figures 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate the relational patterns in Milan. The network in Figure 5.1 represents ties of collaborations among migrant organizations, specifically, the ties that interviewed organizations had with other migrant organizations, whether they were interviewed or



FIGURE 5.1 *Network of ties among migrant organizations (interviewed and not)*

Notes: Although the interpretation of the network patterns of Ecuadorian organizations has been dropped because of the low number of Ecuadorian organizations reached in the research, I nonetheless identify them in the graph.



FIGURE 5.2 *Network of ties between migrant organizations and Italian organizations*

Notes: Although the interpretation of the network patterns of Ecuadorian organizations has been dropped because of the low number of Ecuadorian organizations reached in the research, I nonetheless identify them in the graph.

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not. The second network (in Figure 5.2) shows collaborations of migrant organizations with native organizations. 86.7 percent of organizations had at least one tie with an Italian organization. Italian organizations include political parties, trade unions, NGOs, Catholic religious organizations, human rights organizations and environmental organizations. Most links with Italian organizations are with trade unions and Catholic organizations. In particular, 43.5 percent of organizations have at least one tie with trade unions, and 58.7 percent have at least one tie with Catholic organizations. Indeed, the most central organizations of the network of migrant and native organizations (Figure 5.2) are trade unions like CISL, cultural organizations close to the leftist political arena like ARCI, and charity organizations close to the Catholic area like CARITAS. These results are consistent with the literature highlighting the central role of Italian organizations in the field of immigration. In particular, the Italian Catholic organizations and trade unions compensate for the lack of welfare assistance and provide services like first-aid shelters or accommodation for newly arrived migrants, as well as legal assistance and support to migrants looking for work opportunities (Pero 2005; Sciortino 2003). As for ties with other migrant organizations, 66.7 percent have at least one tie with other migrant organizations, and 45.5 percent have a tie with organizations of the same ethnic group. As a consequence, migrant organizations in Milan have a slightly higher number of ties with native organizations than with other migrant organizations in Milan. This may be partly explained by the need by migrant organizations in Milan to connect with native organizations due to the lack of many resources, symbolic and material, that only native organizations can partly grant them. For instance, the political legitimization needed to participate in political events may be only gained through the connections that migrant organizations have with other native-based, fully recognized political organizations.

Both networks in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the very diverse positions of Filipino, and Egyptian organizations in the networks. Relational patterns of Filipino and Egyptian organizations are similar across both networks. Looking at the network measures (number of ties and structural embeddedness in Table 5.3), Egyptian organizations have both a higher number of ties than Filipino organizations and higher levels of embeddedness. Organizations where Egyptians participate are well connected to one another, both with other Egyptian organizations but also to other migrant and native organizations.

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TABLE 5.3 *Network characteristics of migrant organizations in Milan: structural centrality (eigenvector) and number of ties (outdegree) (mean)*

	Filipino organizations	Egyptian organization	All organizations
Structural centrality in the network of ties among migrant organizations	0.1	4.8	6.6
Structural centrality in the network of ties between migrant organizations and native organizations	1.0	14.9	7.6
Ties with native organizations	2.7	15.4	7.6
Ties with migrant organizations (members are of a different ethnic origin of the interviewed migrant organizations)	4.6	5.3	5.7
Ties with ethnic organizations (members are of the same ethnic origin of the interviewed migrant organizations)	0.4	0.8	0.4

In contrast, Filipino organizations stand in peripheral areas of the networks. Table 5.3 shows that Filipino organizations have much fewer ties than Egyptian organizations as well as than other migrant organizations surveyed in Milan. In addition, the level of embeddedness of Filipino organizations in the two networks examined, is also more peripheral than that of Egyptian organizations. Filipino organizations are either totally isolated from other organizations (see those organizations which are located in the upper left corner of the Figures 5.1 and 5.2) or tend to form isolated clusters, often with other Filipino organizations, in peripheral areas of the network. These network characteristics suggest patterns of ethnic social closure among Filipinos, whose organizations tend to be isolated, or clustered and fragmented into small communities of organizations. Espiritu (2003: 105) argues that the proliferation of hometown and regional associations is evidence of divisiveness and disunity within the community. Therefore, there may also be dynamics of inter-organizational conflict, which lead to the isolation of Filipino organizations or their organization into small clusters. As a matter of fact, the territorial configuration of the Philippines, which are formed by thousands of isles, may partly contribute to such fragmentation.

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Overall, this evidence shows that migrants' organizational positions in the organizational networks differ depending on the ethnic group considered. This suggests, in accordance with other studies, that the networks formed by Egyptian and Filipino organizations are likely to affect differently the patterns of engagement in the political sphere (Pilati 2012; Eggert & Pilati 2014). In addition, it also suggests different patterns of social integration of the two ethnic civic communities.

Concerning the link between organizational networks and political engagement by organizations, indeed, Egyptian organizations are more active in the political sphere and the scope of their actions is wider than the local level. Political activities by Egyptians are more varied and include contentious politics. As suggested elsewhere, Egyptian organizations are likely to obtain part of their resources through the connections they have with other migrant and native organizations (Pilati 2012). Links that Egyptian-based organizations have built with other organizations and their central position in terms of embeddedness in the organizational networks are therefore crucial for accessing all different kinds of political activities.

In contrast, isolated organizations or small clusters of ethnic organizations formed by the Filipino community are not likely to facilitate access to the political sphere. Filipino organizations are mostly active in the organization of religious activities, have few regular contacts and mostly operate at the local level. They show practically no engagement in contentious politics: none of the Filipino organizations ever signed a petition, none ever participated in a boycott, none ever occupied buildings and only a few took part in public demonstrations (Table 5.2). The links built by Filipino organizations with Church institutions have sustained Filipinos' social organization and employment opportunities (Cominelli 2004). However, they have also contributed to their isolation from the wider community in Milan (Lainati 2000) along with the incapacity to provide resources for their organizations' political engagement (Pilati 2012).

With regards to patterns of social integration of the two ethnic civic communities, results at the organizational level partly resemble those at the individual level. In prior chapters, I have shown that among Egyptians, individual engagement in organizations is mostly in native-based, mainly political, organizations including trade unions. In addition, political engagement of Egyptians includes participation in protest actions. Therefore, combining insights from individual and

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organizational data, it is evident that Egyptians are connected to natives both through individual organizational affiliations, and through the ties that Egyptian-based organizations build with native organizations. Among Egyptians, cross-ethnic networks with natives are therefore crucial for both individuals' and organizations' engagement in the political sphere.

In contrast, among Filipinos, individual organizational affiliations are mostly ethnic-based and religious. In addition, their political engagement is mostly in conventional mainstream actions. At the organizational level, Filipino organizations are isolated or clustered in small ethnic groups. Among Filipinos, ties at the individual and organizational level seem therefore characterize the overall closure of the community and Filipinos' political engagement in conventional and mainstream activities.

In the concluding chapter, I will provide a more in depth discussion on how the particular patterns of relationships established by Filipino and Egyptian individuals and organizations, and their patterns of political engagement, end up characterizing two different modalities for facing an exclusionary context.

Notes

1 To avoid redundancy I indistinctively use association and organization.
2 The characteristics of the organizational network are among one of the several factors which are likely to affect political activities. Other crucial factors affecting political engagement by migrant organizations are the political context and the group-related resources (Pilati 2012).
3 For a general discussion of the impact of organizational networks on collective actions see Diani (2015, ch. 1).
4 The time lapse between the organizational survey conducted in 2005 and the individual survey completed in 2007 does not constitute a significant problem given the focus of our analysis. Evidence shows that the characteristics of the overall network have not changed between 2005 and 2010 (Bassoli & Pilati unpublished manuscript). Therefore I expect they have changed even less between 2005 and 2007.
5 I refer to Filipino, Egyptian and Ecuadorian organizations to denote organizations in which Filipinos, Egyptians and Ecuadorians are involved, therefore including pan-immigrant organizations as well.

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6 I am not describing the profile of migrant organizations in Milan in depth However, one of the important characteristics of these organizations is that resources held by migrant organizations are overall scarce: most work is performed by voluntary staff, as around 90 percent of organizations declared to have no paid staff, and 34 percent of organizations need to share the office space. 50 percent of all organizations declared to have less than 10,000 euros available for one whole year. Most Filipino organizations declared to have a budget of less than 5,000 euros. In addition, most of the migrant organizations surveyed were founded after 1993, and 20 out of 46 after 2000.

7 As it was for individual political engagement I am only discussing activities oriented to the country of residence, therefore, excluding transnational political activities (for a focus on the latter see, among other things, Halm & Sezgin 2012).

8 Due to the low number of cases it would be wiser to include absolute numbers and not percentages for measures related to Filipino and Egyptian organizations. However, for comparative purposes between the two communities I include the percentages.

9 Studies on other cases equally show exclusion from political activities by migrant organizations (see, among others, Schmidt di Friedbeg 1996).

10 The details on the construction of the two organizational networks and on the operativization of the centrality measures are included in the Methodological Appendix A4. The tie "personal contacts" refers to ties among members of two organizations which enable them to consider that the organizations whose members share such ties are connected themselves (Breiger 1974).

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Conclusions

Abstract: *In this final chapter Pilati combines findings from previous chapters. Supporting prior evidence she confirms patterns of political exclusion of individual migrants from various forms of conventional and unconventional political activities, and the exclusion of migrant organizations from various types of political actions. In addition however, Pilati illustrates three different modalities of facing an exclusionary context by migrant communities: political exclusion may engender the ethnic social closure of migrant groups into political subcultures characterized by social closure towards the majority as well as towards other migrant groups; it may also lead to externally-driven participation, namely, to modalities of reaching the political sphere by engaging in political actions through their links to mainstream actors; finally, Pilati explores a third possible modality of facing political exclusion through the radicalization of the repertoires of actions.*

Keywords: externally-driven participation; political exclusion; political subcultures; radicalization

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The book aimed to provide a detailed picture on civic and political engagement by migrants in an exclusionary context. Focusing on three migrant communities, Filipinos, Egyptians and Ecuadorians in Milan, Chapters 2–4 analyzed data at the individual level and showed levels and types of involvement by individual migrants in different types of organizations and political activities. Chapter 5 analyzed data on migrant organizations examining organizational networks and migrant organizations' political activities. In this conclusive chapter, I try to integrate the findings from data collected at the individual and organizational level in a more systematic way to have a comprehensive view of the possible modalities of facing a context of political exclusion by migrant communities settled in Milan.

Evidence emerging from the previous chapters on the effects of a closed political context on migrants' political engagement in Milan is manifold. The most striking, clear, and not new effect is a general exclusion of most individual migrants and migrant organizations from the political sphere. Political exclusion regards various forms of conventional and unconventional political activities. At the individual level, the political exclusion of migrants is evident when comparing patterns of engagement by Filipinos, Ecuadorians, and Egyptians in Milan vis-à-vis natives. Evidence on political exclusion also emerges when comparing patterns of migrants' engagement in Milan with levels of engagement of migrants in several other European cities. At the organizational level, the political exclusion translates into a weak migrant organizational structure, and a limited presence of migrant organizations in the political sphere. Thus, constraints are posed both on the possibility for migrants to get organized in migrant organizations, and by excluding migrant organizations out of the political sphere.

What emerges from the study is therefore a dramatic situation with respect to the overall conditions of migrants' political integration in Milan given the significant, persistent and systematic exclusion of migrant individuals and organizations from various types of political activities.

However, within this overall picture of political marginalization of migrant actors, patterns of civic and political exclusion are not equal across the three groups analyzed. In particular, this is evident in the analyses of the Filipino and the Egyptian communities. While the Ecuadorian community does not show clear-cut and specific patterns of civic and political engagement, the Filipino and Egyptian groups

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show different and specific characteristics along several dimensions of engagement examined in the past chapters. The two communities show different levels of engagement in various types of voluntary organizations, engage in different levels and types of political activities, their organizational networks are shaped differently and different also is the engagement of migrant organizations in political activities. Among Filipinos, individual organizational affiliations are mostly ethnic-based and religious. In addition, Filipino ethnic-based and religious organizations are either isolated or are clustered in ethnic enclaves with limited reach to native-based organizations and to political institutions. The few political activities in which individual Filipinos engage are mainstream and conventional activities. These activities are significantly affected by engagement in Filipino religious organizations. Whenever Filipino migrants participate in political activities, they mostly do in the least risky and in the less costly actions. Filipinos do not dare to go beyond a certain accepted limit of what "can be done," and tend to engage in conventional behaviors which less dramatically aim to change the dominant system, somehow accepting or remaining subordinated to the existing order.

Quite differently, Egyptians' organizational affiliations are mostly in political organizations, namely, trade unions, and native-based organizations. Organizations in which Egyptians are members or participate, occupy central positions in the organizational network in Milan. They have both a high number of ties with other organizations and are well embedded in the organizational field by building dense and multiple types of ties with other migrant and native organizations. Egyptians engage slightly more in political activities than Filipinos do, and engage in protest activities too. Political activities by Egyptians are significantly affected by their involvement in political organizations. In particular, activities by Muslim Egyptians are significantly affected by their involvement in native organizations. Therefore, for the least legitimized and the most ethnically discriminated group among those that I considered, i.e. Muslim Egyptians, political engagement passes through the resources gained by linking to external actors, that is, natives. This is also true for Egyptian-based organizations as they have multiple ties with Italian organizations and have higher levels of engagement in political activities than Filipino organizations. Therefore, Egyptians draw the symbolic and material resources from external actors, namely, from native individuals

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and organizations who have the resource to participate and access to participation, and can therefore sustain their engagement in the political sphere.

By joining the findings at the individual and at the organizational level, on the Filipino and Egyptian communities, I identify two possible modalities of coping with an exclusionary context. These modalities of facing an exclusionary context are ideal-types, and do not completely overlap with practices of the specific ethnic groups, although the first modality is observed among Filipinos more than in other groups, and the second modality is present among Egyptians more than in other groups. Filipinos and Egyptians are somehow more likely to face two possible reactions to a context of political exclusion:

- The first, observed among Filipinos, can be defined as *subcultural participation.*
- The second, observed among Egyptians, can be defined as *externally-driven participation*.

While results of this research clarify these two modalities of facing exclusionary contexts, the literature suggests that there may be a third possible outcome. In particular, drawing on evidence from studies on political mobilization in repressive contexts (Tilly 1978; Della Porta 1996; Almeida 2003; Alimi, Demetriou & Bosi 2015), another way migrants may cope with an exclusionary context can be identified:

- The third modality of facing an exclusionary context is through the *radicalization of the repertoires of action*.

I will explore this third possible outcome by considering extant literature on the presence of radical forms of action among migrants in Italy.

Subcultural participation

Filipinos' patterns of civic and political engagement unfold into subcultural forms of participation (Pizzorno 1993; Diani 2015, ch. 1). Subcultures accept and abide the values of the dominant society, partially elaborating other values at the margins of the society, isolating their members. A subculture regroups members who feel somehow a condition of subordination, and who think it is more convenient to limit their relationships

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within a homogeneous area, whose boundary is the common attribute determining its real or perceived subordination. Members sharing this condition of subordination feel equal to one another and share feelings of solidarity. Moreover, "interorganizational linkages are sparse, yet there are widespread feelings of identification with a much broader collectivity than that represented by specific organizations, and a set of practices, multiple affiliations, and so forth that support it" (Diani 2015: 24). Subcultural participation may bring to the isolation and to the social closure of individuals into their own specific groups. Indeed, most relationships of Filipino actors analyzed are limited to other Filipinos: at the individual level, organizational affiliations in ethnic organizations overcome those in pan-immigrant or in native organizations; at the organizational level, ties between Filipino organizations and other pan-immigrant and native organizations are rare. Filipino organizations are either isolated or form isolated clusters of Filipino organizations.

Therefore, with a high number of affiliations in ethnic organizations, which are themselves mostly isolated, the Filipino community tends to show strategies of ethnic social closure linking members to their own ethnic origin group and, at the same time, remaining isolated from other migrant groups.

In turn, political participation by members of a subculture, when it occurs, tends to equate participation with particularistic objectives, it does not aim to change dominant values like social movement participation does (Pizzorno 1993: 120–123). Indeed, as mentioned, Filipinos are more often engaged in mainstream and conventional forms of political action, less critical to the dominant system, and less likely implying radical changes. Filipinos are weakly engaged in protest activities which more directly contest the dominant status quo. In addition, activities by Filipino organizations are rarely political, being mostly oriented to the religious, social and cultural dimension.

Externally-driven participation

Egyptians' modality of participating in the civic and political sphere in the exclusionary context of Milan is characterized by resources drawn from external actors. Egyptians' participation is largely native-driven. Egyptians, especially Muslims, face more constraints related

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to the lack of policies in favor of cultural pluralism (Ambrosini 2013). As a consequence, they need more resources than more legitimated groups, like Filipinos do, certainly those resources associated with the symbolic dimension, like cultural and religious recognition. Therefore, links that Egyptian actors, both individuals and organizations, build with natives enable them to partly overcome such institutional constraints.

Egyptians show the lowest levels of engagement in organizations and the highest in political engagement. Most organizational resources are provided by affiliations in political native-based organizations, and these end up being particularly significant in affecting political engagement by Muslim Egyptians. Egyptians' engagement in protest activities is also more frequent than in other activities. Therefore, partly thanks to resources derived from links with natives, Egyptians are also able to participate in the most costly and contentious forms of actions, more likely challenging the dominant status quo.

Similar patterns occur at the organizational level whereby Egyptian organizations build dense networks and engage in all different kinds of activities, including the less conventional ones.

Externally-driven participation has one major consequence however: the risk of having Egyptians' claims subordinated to natives' claims, given the asymmetries between migrants and natives (Messina 2007). Along this line, scholars argue that established associations tend to give stronger support to the interests of the dominant groups and act more frequently to consolidate patterns of structural advantages (Melucci 1996: 305). This may occur both at the individual and organizational level. At the individual level, Egyptians are mostly affiliated in native-based organizations. Within these organizations, the more central position of natives may lead to natives' claims, interests and identities to become the priority and prevail over the Egyptians'. At the organizational level, while Egyptian organizations build dense networks, Italian organizations occupy the most central positions in the organizational network in Milan. Therefore, native organizations end up dominating the management of organizational fields and agendas. Evidence has already confirmed that these dynamics are at work in Milan, showing the marginalization of migrant organizations and the dominant position of native organizations in the implementation of immigration-related policies (Pilati 2010).

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Radicalization

While the two modalities discussed before draw on the empirical analyses addressed in the previous chapters, a third modality of facing an exclusionary context may be for migrants to participate in the political sphere through radicalized forms of actions. This discussion needs some caution: as mentioned, this research does not enable me to provide evidence on the relationship between the political exclusion of migrants in Milan and the path of political radicalization, that is, the use of more confrontational activities, including engagement in violent actions by some migrants. In fact I lack the information on these types of activities. Therefore, the aim of this discussion is not to provide an analysis and a clear understanding of the issue based on a systematic collection and interpretation of data, which would be too ambitious for these final remarks. My aim is to offer some reflections nurturing ideas for future researchers. To discuss this third modality I draw on the literature focusing on the consequences that repressive contexts have on the repertoires of action, especially on the radicalization of the repertoire of actions (Tilly 1978; Della Porta 1996; Almeida 2003; Alimi et al. 2015).

I do not equate repression with a closed political context, although they both raise the contender's cost of collective action (Tilly 1978).[1] Forms of repression include non violent state-actions like sanctions, restrictions of liberties as well as forms of control such as arrests, tear gas and shootings. In turn, the definition of a closed political context mainly regards cultural and structural constraints related to the lack of rights for migrants in their countries of settlement. In this framework, I share one major argument proposed by the literature focusing on repression, namely, that repression affects exclusion which is the underlying mechanism of changes observed in the repertoire of action, like the political radicalization of activities (Alimi et al. 2015). Indeed, extant literature shows that, among a multiplicity of factors associated with the political radicalization of actions, the political marginalization as a consequence of repressive measures, may significantly lead to the radicalization of the repertoires of action. Dynamics of radicalization usually regard the peripheral fringes of social movement actors and develop at the margins of social movements actions. The diffusion of violent political activities is also often the fruit of interaction with state actors, first and foremost the police. For instance, in the social movement literature, the radicalization of activities has been documented by Della Porta (1996), when analyzing

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the climate of the terrorist emergency in the mid-1970s in Italy, who has discussed the reciprocal relationship between protest policing and the increasing number of violent movement groups. Della Porta concludes that "repressive, diffuse, and hard techniques of policing fuel the more radical fringe" (Della Porta 1996: 90).

On these bases, I try to make a link between the political exclusion of the population due to targeted repressive measures, and the political exclusion of migrants due to a closed political context. I try to understand if radicalization may be a useful category to clarify possible outcomes related to the political exclusion of migrants. Under this framework, I expect that the political marginalization of migrants in closed political contexts may lead to some forms of radicalization of the repertoire of actions among peripheral fringes of the migrant population. What does extant evidence suggest to us on the use of radical actions among migrants in Italy? Existent literature on the subject is weakly developed, and the debate has been often hegemonized by media who have dominated our understanding of the issue. Under this framework, I particularly try to understand the presence of political violence claimed to be practiced by some young Ecuadorians affiliated with organizations like Latin Kings (Brotherton & Barrios 2004; Queirolo Palmas 2009, 2010; Giliberti 2014).[2]

Latin Kings is a street organization operating in many countries, like the USA, Spain and Italy where it is prevailingly active in Genoa, Milan, Piacenza and Perugia, and counts around 500 members (Queirolo Palmas 2009: 496). Most of the members of Latin Kings in Italy are of Ecuadorian origin although the organization also includes members from other Latin American countries, as well as Pakistanis or Moroccans, and natives (Giliberti 2014: 68). Most members share low socio-economic conditions (Brotherton & Barrios 2004). This organization has gained the public attention after some episodes of violence and murders occurred in the past years involving some of their members. While violence has catalyzed the media attention, empirical studies on the organization, however, provide a different picture. Studies on the repertoires of actions by Latin Kings in Italy show that this organization has indeed major political goals, associated with fighting against racism, and oppression, as members desire equal chances and an increase in their social mobility (Queirolo Palmas 2009: 501). The discourse by members of this organization is imbued with references to human rights, and especially the lack of rights among individuals of migrant origin (Queirolo Palmas 2009: 504). The social and

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political exclusion experienced by members of these youth organizations is emblematic in the use of a specific language. The most used concept by members of Latin Kings to address their organization is "nation." Clearly, the organization is a way for members to face exclusion in the origin and in the host country, and represents a construction of shared feelings of belonging to a group, providing individuals ways of social recognition, approval, esteem and symbolic power (Giliberti 2014: 73). Evidence also shows that the use of violence among these groups is extremely low compared to the broad range of actions these organizations usually engage (Giliberti 2014). In addition, the use of violence often involves single members of the organizations and conflicts concern the private sphere. Frequently, violence is a means to assess the members' masculinity (Giliberti 2014: 72). In contrast to the claimed use of violence, these groups engage in practices of mutual help and are ways for individuals of migrant origin to gain help, information and sustainment on jobs, lodgment and educational opportunities. As a consequence, as it has occurred in other countries like Spain (Giliberti 2014: 63), there has often been a process of stigmatization and criminalization of these organizations.

The scant evidence provided by the aforementioned studies of Latin Kings on a possible link between a context of exclusion of individuals of migrant origin and the engagement in violent political actions is weak. Evidence suggests that the use of violence has concerned single isolated members. Furthermore, the use of violence by the organization lies in the symbolic dimension, and has been so far manifesting itself through the use of language to affirm the superiority of a group over another one (Giliberti 2014: 71). Further research is, however, needed. In particular, other cases seem to suggest that a link between the radicalization of action among migrants and extremely discriminant and repressive conditions may exist. As claimed in Pilati (forthcoming) a case in point regards the clashes involving migrants in Castel Volturno, in the Province of Caserta, Southern Italy in September 2008. In this occasion, migrants did organize a series of radical activities in reaction to the brutal killing of six African-origin migrants by the organized crime groups acting in the region (camorra). This included protest cortege, blocking of highway traffic, arson of garbage dumpsters, damages to parked cars, destruction of small business shops, and attacks on public transportation. Therefore, future research needs to assess more systematically if there are specific dimensions of the political context which are more likely to lead to the emergence of dynamics of radicalization, and to investigate the characteristics of different forms of radicalization that may emerge.

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The three modalities of facing exclusionary contexts I have discussed are, as mentioned, ideal-types. They may be present at different degrees across a multiplicity of migrant groups in Milan as well as in other contexts. Further studies will provide evidence on whether these dynamics are at work among other migrant groups in Milan, and in other contexts. In particular, while the book has analyzed the dynamics in Milan, a closed political context, it is not certain whether these dynamics are only specifically related to a closed political context. What happens in open political contexts? Certainly, the literature shows higher levels of political engagement in various types of actions experienced by migrant individuals and organizations living in cities with open political contexts compared to the political exclusion experienced by migrant individuals and organizations in closed political contexts (Morales & Giugni 2011; Eggert & Pilati 2014). However, research may further examine whether dynamics of subcultures, externally-driven participation, and radicalization are found in more open countries and cities, and clarify how these dynamics relate to the organizational affiliations and organizational structures of migrant communities.

While the application of these dynamics to other groups and contexts needs to be further tested through empirical evidence, it is certain, however, that if the political exclusion experienced by migrant individuals and organizations in closed political context is dangerous for democracy, policies of integration need to go much further than the security concerns that European countries are now mostly concerned. A major limitation of this book is that my main argument has focused on the intermediate role of organizations in an exclusionary context. Formal organizations may not be the only useful mobilizing structure though. Other intermediate groups may act as mobilizing structures. For instance, scholars show that social movements have often relied on informal and small groups at the local level, along with highly decentralized structures (Rucht 1996: 194). Informal ties are particularly crucial mobilizing structures in repressive contexts where the free space available to organizations of the opposition is extremely limited (Bayat 2010; Duboc 2011; Menoret 2011). Similar mechanisms may therefore occur among migrants who do not have an easy access to formal organizing. As much literature stresses, migrants have significant lower levels of engagement in formal organizations than natives (Voicu & Şerban 2012). Therefore, while informal groups have not been reached by our survey their role as mobilizing structures may be also taken into account in future research.

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Notes

1 Following Tilly's definition (1978: 100), repression is indeed considered as "any action by another group which raises the contender's cost of collective action."
2 Other instances could be discussed, like the presence of Islamic fundamentalists among Muslims. However, I prefer not to discuss this hotly debated issue in these brief final remarks as more systematic analysis, which is not the objective of this study, is needed (see Vidino 2014).

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Methodological Appendix

A1 Sources of data

This research draws on two main types of sources: a population survey and an organizational survey.

The population and organizational surveys are part of larger surveys conducted within the framework of the comparative project LOCALMULTIDEM (Multicultural Democracy and Immigrants Social Capital in Europe: Participation, Organizational Networks, and Public Policies at the Local Level, http://www.um.es/localmultidem/). Within the framework of this project, the population survey consisted of an investigation of individual migrant political participation in 9 European cities: Barcelona, Budapest, Geneva, Lyon, London, Madrid, Milan, Stockholm and Zurich (Palacios & Morales 2013). In turn, the organizational surveys were conducted in Barcelona, London, Zurich, Madrid, Budapest and Lyon (Morales 2009b).[1]

A1.1 The population survey in Milan[2]

The population survey in Milan was undertaken between November 2006 and April 2007 on a migrant sample of 900 migrants. The total sample surveyed included 300 Filipinos, 300 Egyptians and 300 Ecuadorians. In addition, it included 300 Italians as a control group.

The migrant sample analyzed in this book excludes second generations due to the low number of cases, and only includes documented migrants.[3] The final sample

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used in the analyses includes 717 migrants, specifically: 264 Filipinos, 212 Egyptians (of which 80.2 percent were Muslims and the others were mostly Copts), and 241 Ecuadorians. All individuals interviewed had resided in Milan for at least 6 months prior to the interview, and were at least 15 years of age.

The migrant sample was extracted by following the centers of aggregation method (Baio, Blangiardo & Blangiardo 2011). The sample is designed to achieve representativeness of the migrant population – including undocumented migrants – assuming that each migrant entertains some relationship with some aggregation centers or gathering places identified in Milan. Based on the assumption that the sample is large enough and that the relative importance of each center is known, the technique consists of the random and independent selection within two different levels of sampling. The first level requires the identification of a certain number of local migrant meeting places distributed across the municipality. Centers include the following categories – police, passport and foreigners' offices, other public offices (population registers, post offices), consulates, first aid centers (public canteens, dormitories), medical/health assistance centers (hospitals, specific non-profit organizations dealing with health related problems of migrants), legal assistance centers, places organizing Italian as a second language lessons, training centers, places furnishing services for migrants (phone centers, money transfer), ethnic stores, markets and malls, entertainment places (ethnic and non-ethnic discos, restaurants, bars, cinemas), and open meeting points (stations, parks, squares). This set of centers represents a set of heterogeneous environments which all the Filipinos, Egyptians, and Ecuadorians in Milan are expected to attend, with contact once or several times per week. The second level of sampling refers to the individuals sampled in the various local centers. Migrants were asked to answer an additional questionnaire on their attendance at all the reference centers with a view to constructing a corresponding attendance profile. The universe of migrants, present at the time of the survey is thus made up of a list of H statistical units, each of which represents a set of contacts with a local center.

Interviewed migrants were administered a structured face-to-face questionnaire, of 30–35 minutes, either in Italian or in the migrant's mother tongue. The same questionnaire was administered to Italians through interviews implemented through the CATI method (*computer assisted telephone interviewing*).

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A1.2 The organizational survey in Milan[4]

The organizational survey was administered in Milan between January and June 2005 and focused on 46 organizations based and operating in the Municipality of Milan. We selected organizations assuming Knoke's (1986: 2) definition: "A minimum definition of association is a formally organized named group most of whose members – whether persons or organizations – are not financially recompensed for their participation." The selection of migrant organizations was based on the ethnic composition of organizations. We defined "migrant organizations" on the basis of the ethnic origin of their members or of the organization's executive board. When at least 50 percent of them had the same ethnic origin, we defined the organization as an ethnic organization. When organizations had at least 50 percent of migrants of migrant origin, not necessarily from the same ethnic group, the organization was defined as migrant, mixed or pan-immigrant organization.

In order to collect information on the associations we contacted organizational leaders or their closest associates who were given a 1 hour and 15 minute questionnaire. Given the central position of the leaders within the association, we expected them to convey the most reliable information on the organization and to interpret organizational objectives and shared value orientation of the association better than any other member (Nagel & Staeheli 2004: 11; Portes et al. 2008). The process of selecting organizations first required the mapping of migrant organizations. For this purpose, we contacted all organizations in Milan who were registered in official registers such as the one of the Municipality of Milan and of the Region Lombardy. However, since the registration of associations is not compulsory and registers were not updated, we could not simply rely on this data alone. Additionally, we collected information from several key informants such as pro-migrant organizations in Milan (trade unions, NGOs, social centers), political parties, intercultural mediators, consulates and tourism offices of foreign countries, places of worship for migrants and websites. Furthermore, more information was directly drawn from the first telephone contacts we had with the migrant organizations we could contact. We stopped the mapping process once organizations were repeatedly cited more than once, meaning that we had already included the organizations in our list. We collected and mapped 155 migrant organizations to be interviewed. Most of these

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organizations were not reachable. Among the latter, 83.4 per cent could not be contacted because of the wrong address and/or telephone number and could not be reachable by other means, 11.1 per cent were not active, and 5.5 per cent were not eligible and were excluded because they did not fulfill the criteria used in the selection of organizations, namely, they were based and operated outside the Municipality of Milan. We eventually contacted 65 organizations (58.1 per cent). Out of these, two refused, and two were excluded after being interviewed, because they were not part of our population. Fifteen organizational leaders did not have time to be interviewed after three requests. Eventually, we were able to interview 46 organizations. The low response rate may preclude the validity of the data collected. However, we considered the 46 interviewed organizations to be the population of all the most visible migrant organizations in Milan. The 19 organizations which were not interviewed were in fact not part of the core structure of migrant organizations given that none of them was cited more than once by the interviewed migrant organizations. This is particularly relevant to be able to construct the whole and complete network of migrant organizations in Milan. We followed Marsden's notice that "if egos are sampled 'densely,' whole networks may be constructed using egocentric network data" (Marsden 2005: 9; Kirke 1996).

A2 Coding of variables[5]

CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

Engagement in at least one organization: This is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for respondents who are involved in voluntary associations and 0 for those who are not. We considered involvement in 18 types of association: (1) sport club or club for outdoor activities; (2) organization for cultural activities, tradition preserving or any hobby activities (e.g. musical, dancing, breeding, etc); (3) political party; (4) trade union; (5) business, employers, professional or farmers' organization; (6) organization for humanitarian aid, charity or social welfare; (7) organization for environmental protection, or animal rights; (8) human rights or peace organization; (9) religious or church organization; (10) immigrant organization (e.g. organization for the support or promotion of immigrants' interests, broadly defined);

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(11) [ethnic group] organization (an organization that primarily seeks the advancement of the ethnic/national-origin group); (12) anti-racism organization; (13) educational organization; (14) youth organization; (15) organization for the retired/elderly; (16) women's organization; (17) residents, housing or neighborhood organization; and (18) other organization. Specifically, the variable takes the value 1 if respondents declared to be members (currently or currently and in the past) of at least one type of organization or to have participated in any activity arranged by at least one type of organization in the last 12 months and 0 if not so.

Engaged in at least one religious organization/ trade union/ sport club: three dummy variables taking the value 1 for respondents who are involved in a religious organization/ trade union/ sport club and 0 for those who are not.

Engagement in other organizations: a dummy variable taking the value 1 for respondents who are involved in voluntary associations with the exclusion of religious organizations/ trade unions/ sport clubs and 0 for those who are not.

Engaged in at least one service-delivery organization: a dummy variable taking the value 1 for respondents who are involved in at least one of the following types of organizations: sport club, cultural organizations, humanitarian organizations, religious organizations, educational organizations, youth organizations, and organizations for retired people.

Engaged in at least one political organization: a dummy variable taking the value 1 for respondents who are involved in at least one of the following types of organizations: political parties, environmental organizations, human rights and peace organizations, trade unions, neighborhood organizations, business organizations, anti-racism organizations, ethnic advocacy organizations, immigrant advocacy organizations, and women's organizations.

Engagement in at least one ethnic/pan-immigrant/native organization: Respondents were probed about the membership composition of each organization in which they were involved.[6] One question asked whether half or more members were of migrant background, and another whether half or more members were of their same ethnic/ country background. Thus, each organizational involvement was classified as either an ethnic, pan-immigrant or native organization. Consequently, we constructed three count variables, with values that

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range, theoretically, between 0 and 18: engagement in N types of ethnic organizations, engagement in N types of pan-immigrant organizations, and engagement in N types of native organizations whereby N types indicates the number of different types of organizations as defined by their main sector or domain of activities (e.g., sport clubs, cultural organizations, environmental organizations, etc.). We then used the following dichotomized variables:

Engagement in at least one ethnic organization: a dummy variable for which 1 is assigned to respondents involved in at least one organization in which half or more of the members are of the respondent's ethnic/national origin.

Engagement in at least one pan-immigrant organizations: a dummy variable for which 1 is assigned to respondents involved in at least one organization in which half or more of the members are of multiple migrant origins.

Engagement in at least one native or mainstream organizations: a dummy variable for which 1 is assigned to respondents involved in organizations in which half or more of the members are of the majority native group in the country.

POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT

Engagement in any political action: individuals were assigned a value of 1 if they had participated in the previous 12 months in any of the following activities: (1) contacted a politician; (2) contacted a government or local government official; (3) worked in a political party; (4) worked in a political action group; (5) worn or displayed a badge, sticker or poster; (6) signed a petition; (7) taken part in a public demonstration; (8) boycotted certain products; (9) deliberately bought certain products for political reasons; (10) donated money to a political organization or group; (11) taken part in a strike; (12) contacted the media; (13) contacted a solicitor or a judicial body for non-personal reasons. If they participated in any of these forms, they were asked to specify the people concerned by the activity. The response categories were: "only yourself, your family or a few other people," "people in this city or region," "people in whole host country," "people in homeland country," and "people in the whole world." We included as positive answers the three first categories and the last category.[7]

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The four sub-items of political engagement (mainstream protests, mainstream conventional activities, immigration-related protests, and immigration-related conventional activities) were constructed considering the following:

Protest actions: individuals were assigned a value of 1 if they had participated in the previous 12 months in any of the following activities: signed a petition, taken part in a public demonstration, or taken part in a strike.

Extra-electoral conventional action: individuals were assigned a value of 1 if they had participated in the previous 12 months in any of the following activities: contacted a politician; contacted a government or local government official; worked in a political party; worked in a political action group; worn or displayed a badge, sticker or poster; boycotted certain products; deliberately bought certain products for political reasons; donated money to a political organization or group; contacted the media; or contacted a lawyer or a judicial body for non-personal reasons.

Mainstream political activities: individuals were assigned a value of 1 if they had participated in the previous 12 months in activities that were not primarily related to a situation concerning people with migrant, foreign or ethnic background. The distinction is applied to both conventional and protest activities.

Immigration-related political activities: individuals were assigned a value of 1 if they had participated in the previous 12 months in activities that were primarily relating to a situation concerning people with migrant, foreign or ethnic background. The distinction is applied to both conventional and protest political activities.

Control Variables

Gender

A dummy variable taking the value 1 for male and 0 for female.

Age

A ratio variable that records the age of respondents (range 15–99).

Educational level attained

Item wording: "What is the highest level of education you have achieved?" The original categories of answer are: (1) "not completed primary education," (2) "primary education or first stage of basic education," (3) "lower

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level secondary education or second stage of basic education," (4) "upper secondary education," (5) "post-secondary, non-tertiary education," and (6) "first and second stage of tertiary education."

From the original ordinal scale we computed a variable ranging between 0 and 1. The variable was obtained by subtracting 1 from the original categories and dividing by 5.

In paid work

Item wording: "Which of these descriptions best describes your situation in the last seven days? Please, select only one." The response set was: 01. in paid work; 02. in education (not paid for by employer); 03. unemployed and actively looking for job; 04. unemployed, wanting a job but not actively looking for it; 05. permanently sick or disabled; 06. retired; 07. in community or military service; 08. doing housework, looking after children or other persons; and 09. other.

A dummy variable was created that identified with a value of 1 those that had chosen category 01, and assigned a value of 0 to all other respondents.

Married

A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the individual is married or lives in partnership.

Social trust

Item wording: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" Response categories: score in a 0 to 10 scale in which 0 meant "you can't be too careful" and 10 "most people can be trusted."

Missing values have been set to the mean value 0.5.

Egyptian/Ecuadorian Filipino migrant:

A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if individuals were born in Egypt/Ecuador/Philippines

Juridical status:

A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if respondents declared to hold the citizenship of the country of residence and 0 for those who do not (because they hold a long permit to stay, a short permit to stay, or are renovating the permit). Respondents were asked in which country or countries they hold citizenship (up to 3 possible countries).

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Proportion of life living in the country: Numerical variable (range 0–1), calculated as the number of years since arrival divided by age.

Fluency in language of country of residence (fluent)
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for respondents who speak the host country language fluently and 0 for those who do not. The variable was computed on the basis of three questions: (1) the language or languages which the respondent considers as her/his native language (up to 3 possible languages); (2) the host country language proficiency declared by the respondent: "I do not speak (HCL)," "I speak a little (HCL)," "I speak reasonably (HCL)," "I speak fluently (HCL)," "I speak (HCL) like my native language," "(HCL) is my first language"; and (3) the control of the host language proficiency declared by the respondent as reported by the interviewer. Cases of declared fluency that do not match the interviewer report were excluded.

Has felt personally discriminated against for his /her ethnic origin
Item wording: "And have you personally felt discriminated because of your origin in the past 12 months?" This is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for those who felt discriminated against in the past 12 months and 0 for those who did not.

Years since arrival
Continuous variable (range 0–69), calculated as the difference between the survey year and the year of arrival.

Political context:

Political context, Individual rights: average value of the following indicators: access to: short-term permits, long-term permits, nationality, family reunion, labor market rights, welfare state access, anti-discrimination rights, and political rights. For comparative purposes, a 3-level scoring has been used. The score −1 refers to the most restrictive situation that can be envisaged, the score +1 corresponds to the most open configuration and the score 0 applies to intermediary potential situations. The final variable is the average score of the scores assigned to each indicator. −1 = closed political context; 0 = mixed political context; 1 = open political context.

Political context, collective rights: Average value of the following indicators: cultural requirements to access the community, host country language programs, schooling, religion, media, and group-rights in the labor

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market. The final index is calculated as the *Political context, individual rights.*

Table A1 includes the descriptive statistics of the independent variables included in the multivariate analyses shown in Chapter 3.

TABLE A1 *Descriptive statistics of the variables analyzed by group (percentages and means)*

	Italians	Egyptians	Filipinos	Ecuadorians
Gender	46.7	72.2	33.0	42.7
Age (mean)	50.0	36.3	37.8	35.6
In paid work	49.7	69.9	86.0	71.4
Highest educational level attained (mean)	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.6
Married	55.3	71.2	73.5	59.3
Interests in host country politics	77.7	48.8	38.9	30.8
Social trust (mean)	0.5	0.4	0.6	0.4
Proportion of years lived in the host country (mean)	–	0.3	0.3	0.2
Has host country citizenship	–	13.2	01.5	2.9
Fluent in the host country language	–	26.4	12.1	15.4
Experienced ethnic discrimination	–	39.7	19.1	33.2
N	300	212	264	241

Note: The percentage of Italians in paid work is low, and is likely due to the high share of retired people in the Italian sample, partly, a result of the use of interviews implemented through the CATI method.

A3 Model specification

Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variables related to political engagement I estimated the probability to join political action through logit models. I do not intend to make strong claims regarding the direction of causality in the relationship between civic and political engagement.

As argued by Pilati and Morales (forthcoming) we do not have longitudinal data and, consequently, the causal directionality between

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organizational and political engagement cannot be tested explicitly (see however van Ingen & van der Meer 2015). However, the approach of studying political action as the outcome and organizational engagement as the correlate or "explanatory" factor is backed by a well-established scholarship that studies the effect of organizational involvement on political engagement (Verba et al. 1995; van Deth, Montero & Westholm 2007). Moreover, some scholars emphasize that "immigrant groups demonstrate dynamic community-based organizing and yet often remain disengaged from formal politics and off the radar of political parties" (Landolt & Goldring 2009: 1228). In addition, migrants in Milan are likely to be in contact first with local organizations, than to engage politically, particularly because these organizations are frequently the public service providers that migrants come across in their new countries of residence. Thus, it is plausible to assume that for migrants in Milan organizational engagement is likely to precede political engagement more often than not.

A4 The construction of the two organizational networks and the measurement of structural centrality

To construct the two organizational networks, I have first distinguished ties that migrant organizations had with other migrant organizations and those they had with native organizations. Concerning ties among migrant organizations, I have considered two matrices: the first matrix is the result of analyses of all ties that interviewed organizations had with other interviewed organizations; the second matrix is the result of the analysis of ties that interviewed organizations had with migrant organizations which were not reached. In the first case, referring to ties among interviewed organizations, I used a symmetric, squared (46X46), and 1-mode matrix. The second matrix is an affiliation matrix nXm, a 2-mode network where n stands for the 46 interviewed organizations and m represents the organizations to which n are linked. The affiliation matrix was transformed into an adjacency matrice nXn, 46X46 where n represented the interviewed organizations. A tie between the interviewed organizations represented a shared organization.[8] A similar procedure was also followed when working with the matrix of ties between interviewed organizations and native organizations.

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In other words, if two interviewed organizations had a tie to a same third organizations (either a migrant organization which was not interviewed or a native organization), they were linked through it. The transformed matrices included the shared ties or undirected ties among interviewed organizations. Centrality measures have been calculated on the adjacency matrices. The use of undirected ties in the study of political engagement is in line with Burris's study on *interlocking directorates* (2005). The author uses a variable that measures "*firms that each have a director on the board of a third, intermediary firm.*" Following Mizruchi's reasoning, the author emphasizes that these ties can contribute to political engagement and to political cohesion in a more significant way than direct ties do (Burris 2005: 251).

The final matrices contain ties with different value intensity (*valued links*). These values identify the number of ties and, therefore, the strength of ties between organizations. A value of 4 means that the 2 organizations shared 4 different ties.

A4.1 Measuring structural centrality of organizations[9]

In order to measure structural centrality of organizations within the organizational networks I used two measures. The first one is the outdegree centrality counting the following number of ties: the most important collaborations, participation in common projects, personal contacts, co-memberships, information exchange and resources exchange. The second measure of structural centrality is called "eigenvector." The eigenvector measures the Bonacich centrality of a vertex by determining the centrality of the vertices it is connected to (Borgatti et al. 2002). With respect to several measures of centrality, the "eigenvector" is a robust measure of organizational embeddedness in the network. It allows taking into account not only the number of links of interviewed organizations, but also the links of the organizations the interviewed organization is connected to. In this way, such measure considers the degree of embeddedness of each organization within the network and assigns a lower score to organizations with many links forming isolated clusters compared to organizations with many links and well embedded in the whole network, a characteristic not identifiable through the use of the degree measure. In other words, being equal the number of links of an organization, the eigenvector score is lower in cases of isolated clusters (that is, when organizations to which the interviewed organization

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is connected to, does not show any link to other organizations) than in cases of organizations whose organizations they are connected to are also well connected to other organizations. The higher the eigenvector scores, the more central and embedded an organization is in the whole organizational network.

Notes

1 Within the framework of this project the author has been involved in the Italian research team.
2 The paragraphs on the sampling method largely draw on the online methodological appendix of a joint article by Morales and Pilati (2014).
3 The undocumented component constitutes a large share of the migrant population in Italy (Barbagli, Colombo & Sciortino 2004; Delvino & Spencer 2014). Estimates report that, on July 1, 2006, irregular Ecuadorians in the Municipality of Milan represented 24 percent of all Ecuadorian migrants, irregular Egyptians 21 percent, and Filipinos 17 percent (ISMU 2007: 53-4).
4 The paragraphs on the definition of organizations largely draws on Eggert and Pilati (2014: 863).
5 The operativization, of some of the variables related to civic and political engagement and of most control variables, follows the coding used in previous studies (Morales & Giugni 2011).
6 In the few cases of respondents involved in more than one organization of the same type (e.g. more than one environmental organization, or more than one sports club), the probing was in relation to the organization in which they were more active, or to which they devoted more time.
7 The categories used, refer to activities migrants have engaged in the residence country and oriented to people in the residence country. In contrast, "people in homeland country" includes activities oriented to the origin country and its peoples. It is therefore more likely to be used as an indicator of transnational political activities.
8 The transformation of affiliation matrices into adjacency matrices has been elaborated through the following functions in UCINET: *affiliation* and *cross-products* (*co-occurrence*) method (Borgatti et al. 2002).
9 This discussion largely reports the methodological details provided by Eggert and Pilati (2014) in the online appendix, Section B.

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