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DISRUPTING PATHWAYS TO GENOCIDE

The Process of Ideological Radicalization

Elisabeth Hope Murray

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Disrupting Pathways to Genocide

The Process of Ideological Radicalisation

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This book is dedicated to Jim, Juergen, Jimmy and Randolph for your constant support, mentorship and guidance, and to my loving parents, Barry and Lee Murray, for all I cannot express

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Introduction

Genocide is many things, but perhaps above all else, it is elusive. It is foul and evil, but beyond that, we are largely at a loss. Genocide scholars have tried to provide rationales, insights and mechanisms for prevention, but even we cannot agree on how to define genocide, on how to identify it when – or before, or even after – it occurs. What we can agree on is that we are not finished with genocide; like war, left alone it will keep occurring. Our best efforts are an attempt to stem the tide of death based on a constructed idea of ethnicity and superiority in miasmas of fear and political gain at all cost. Equally, we agree that genocide can change; genocide has worn many hats historically and, as we move into a new era, we can expect certain elements of genocide to evolve to keep up, as it were. The role of ideology in certain 20th century genocides was key to their success; in others, ideology played a lesser role. Many scholars (Zimmerer, Moses and Bloxham, just to name a few) have argued strongly that genocide is not ideological, that genocide studies has erred deeply in focusing on ideology as a rationale for genocide's repeated and ghastly occurrence. Indeed, ideology has, in many ways, become the hanged man of genocide studies; it has been tried, sentenced, strung up and left to dangle from the gallows. However, if we are to understand where genocide can go from here and how to do our utmost to identify it before it occurs, we should revisit ideology. Even those scholars who have belittled ideology's role in genocide cannot deny the role it plays in certain cases, as evidenced throughout propaganda and in places such as the Nuremberg Trials, where we find conversations like the following between British prosecutor Mervyn Griffith-Jones and Julius Streicher, former editor of *Der Stürmer* and key instrument of the German propaganda machine:

> *LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you think that it would have been possible to carry out the extermination of 6 million Jews in 1921? Do you think the German people would have stood for it? Do you think it would have been possible under any regime in 1921 to have carried out the murder of 6 million men, women, and children of the Jewish race?*
>
> *STREICHER: Whether that would have been possible with the knowledge of the people – no, it would not have been possible . . .*

> *LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Was it possible to exterminate people in that way only after some 20 years of incitement and propaganda by you and other Nazis? Is that what made that possible?*
>
> *STREICHER: I deny that the population was incited. It was enlightened, and sometimes a harsh word may have been directed against the other side as an answer. It was enlightenment, not incitement.*
>
> Tribunals 29 April 1946

We should look again at ideology's role in genocide, looking for insights missed in the early years of the discipline of genocide studies. We also need to look at the role of ideology and state mechanisms, the role of ideology as a power source and ideology in the context of structure and agency in order to assess its role in genocides of the 21st century.

Ideology in the Genocidal Theatre

The changing nature of ideology in states radicalising towards genocide strikes at the centre of discussions on power in modernity. Ideology is not the only source of power (Mann 1986), nor is it the only reason why people become willing participants in genocidal activity (Goldhagen 1996). However, it is a key aspect in movements of extreme nationalism in 20th century Europe. The three primary questions I seek to answer in the course of my research are as follows:

1. Does radicalising ideology evolve in a similar way in cases of modern genocide? Using the theatre of modern Europe, I take a macro approach to looking at radicalising ideology. Though I am interested in the detail of individual state approaches to ideology, my research interests are centred on radicalising ideology *generally*. I aim to analyse various cases of radicalising ideology in order to establish whether or not a pattern exists in how states adopt genocidal ideologies.
2. What are the thematic similarities and differences in this evolution? If the first question is a macro question, this question seeks to assess the micro-level, case-specific aspects of ideological shift. Ideology is extremely complex and, though I am looking for patterns, I want to examine various aspects of its thematic complexity by looking for variations within each case.
3. Lastly, why does ideological evolution occur? or What happens to further the radicalisation process? Here, I am hoping to address

whether or not there is a relationship between ideology and events and, if there is, then I am interested in which is more important to the radicalisation process. In other words, what is it that pushes ideology along the radicalising trajectory?

The intended outcome of this book is that, through the analysis and discussion of the questions posed above, new discussions of genocidal ideology can be brought into the dialogue of comparative genocide studies with ideology in its proper place, an important and recognised element of the genocidal process, but not viewed 'in excelsis' as the primary agent in the genocidal process. Ideology is generally either viewed as a constant, inflexible political and cultural platform established early in the life of a political regime and providing a rationale for most policy decisions, or ideology is dismissed as the deluded justifications expressed by elite individuals when it suits their desires, shifting and changing with little regard to the geopolitical minutiae present at the time of conflict. Equally, while there is a substantial amount of literature regarding the ideology of some genocides, relatively little research has been undertaken in the field of comparative genocide studies; thus, I evaluate ideology through the lens of structure and agency. Through analysis of the evolution of radicalising ideology, this thesis will show that ideology provides both structure *and* agency in radicalising states depending on the status of the relationship between ideology and policy. Ideology legitimates policy; state-driven policies provide sanction and justification for action. Policy, then, is a normative outcome of the inductive relationship between structure and agency in radicalising states.

Identifying Ideology

The process of evaluating ideology begins with a brief explanation of the term itself. At its most base level, ideology is a set of closely held beliefs characteristic of a group or a community (Plamenatz 1979: 15); in other words, ideology is a cohesive, non-contradictory set of commonly held beliefs. Within the social sciences, secular forms of ideology have been thoroughly researched, particularly within the economic-political model of Marxism (Apter 1964; Blackburn 1972; Sayer 1991; Schwarzmantel 1998). My interest, however, has been political, rather than economic, forms of ideology and tends to side with Eccleshall's summary of the role of ideology in society – that people need 'both to feel at home in the world and to act with good conscience: to make sense of everyday reality as well as to clothe their interests and aspirations in the finery of moral principle. The powerful have to reassure themselves as well as convince others of the rightness of their might: that power is a trust held for the common good rather than self advantage' (1984: 23).

This allusion to power taps into Mann's assertion that, as the social organisation of meaning is necessary to societal life, power is gained by those who can monopolise ideological norms (1986: 22) and aims at something more specific than ideology as a cultural system, as expressed by Geertz (1964: 49). Equally, ideology is primarily a mobiliser across class delineation (unlike economic power) and across gender delineation (unlike military power). Eric Wolf introduces ideology as being 'unified schemes or configurations developed to underwrite or manifest power' since 'ideas and idea-systems [such as the state] are often monopolised by power groups and rendered self-enclosed and self-referential' (2002 [1999]: 4, 7). This characterisation alludes to the monopolisation of norms from above; in modern Europe, the monopolisation of norms is most often found through control of the state. Therefore, though ideology can be conveyed through various different institutions and be held by individuals and groups alike, ideology in this case should be taken to be linked with the state. Thus, for the purpose of this book, I mean ideology to be *the state-led expression of commonly held belief*. In other words, the term 'ideology' refers to a certain set of ideals, symbols, myths, principles and values *maintained by the state*, outlining a distinct political and cultural order which may not be adhered to by all citizens of that state.

This delineation of ideology is in line with Hall's identification of institutions more generally, that 'institutions are instruments the actors use to negotiate the complexity of the world' (1997: 217). Ideologies contain the ideals of the regimes implementing them; therefore, ideologies represent the ideals of power elites within the political sphere of the nation. Interestingly, however, ideology constrains power as well. In his discussion on institutional creativity, Sheingate reflects that 'even where they are ambiguous, rules still set parameters on the permissible range of action; they establish what can and cannot happen' (2010: 181). Ideology expresses the rules by which elites can implement policy. In this role, ideology can be positive or negative; ideologies of multiculturalism and public freedom are as much ideologies as ideologies of discrimination and slavery. Such clarification begins to illuminate the iterative nature of ideology as both structure and agency. Ideology in this case provides the structure in which agents act and also stands as agency influencing changing constraints.

The intention of my work here, through an exploration of the relationship between ideology and events, is to explain how and why genocidal ideologies are formed. Many ideologies have, historically, held tenets that are morally repugnant but do not result in genocide; other ideologies seem to foster peace until 'suddenly' ethnic violence breaks out. Attempting to explain this dichotomy is a key step towards understanding both our history and our future. This is precisely why I am concerned with analysing the changing nature of elite-expressed social beliefs in states where the beliefs expressed attempt to legitimise action.

In undertaking this research project, I do not intend to concern myself with the spread or comprehensiveness of ideology; I focus on what elites tell people to believe, rather than the extent to which the citizens of the state believe it. Neither do I mean to claim that ideologies expressed by national elites are universally held. Indeed, genocidal ideology is, in every case researched here, always partial, even within the persecuting group, hence strong resistance movements and assassination attempts, such as the 'Valkyrie Level II' assassination attempt on Hitler's life on 20 July 1944. Equally, ideological goals are sometimes sacrificed in order to achieve other aims. For example, many Jews under the Nazi state were kept alive as slave labourers rather than being immediately exterminated upon their arrival at extermination camps. This free labour was vital to the Nazi war effort and became more important as the war continued – so much so that the numbers of Jews 'saved' from immediate extermination from 1944 through the end of the war increased significantly; many of these Jews were even imported to the Reich proper after it had been declared 'Jew-free' (Bloxham 2009a: 253).

Thus, the purpose of this book is not to claim that ideology is the only source of power in radicalising states, nor the only rationale leaders have in making policy decisions. Nonetheless, ideology is one of various reasons why people participate in mass killing, which provides us with an impetus to further seek out the relationship between ideology and policy, particularly because ideological organisation is socio-spatially transcendent. Thus, while it is a power source on its own, ideology is especially geared to generate a 'sacred' form of authority (Mann 2005: 27, 1986: 23) which is vested in the state.

Book Outline

This book begins in earnest with *Chapter 1,* where I discuss my methods of research gathering and my methodological approach more generally. I begin by discussing the strengths and weaknesses of historical sociology as a macro approach to comparative research. Historical institutionalism (HI) and path dependency will be introduced as approaches valuable for providing context and structure. The following chapters will gauge whether or not path dependency is an appropriate means for looking at the evolution of radicalising ideologies. The chapter continues on to provide the rationale for the choice of cases and to address the unique research challenges facing each case in the research-gathering process; I finish by addressing these challenges and situating them within the context of HI.

Chapter 2 develops the backdrop of this investigation into what is commonly considered to be one of the vilest instances in modern history. Here, I trace my own path down the literature of nationalism and genocide while also giving a broader sense of the general literature on the subjects and their interactions with each other. The secondary purpose of this chapter is to introduce not only the geopolitical background of each case but also the events around which my research is structured. Each section begins by providing a short background narrative of each case. I then provide an in-depth discussion of each of my key events, providing the storyboard for each case. Like upcoming chapters, this chapter begins with Turkey and moves chronologically through each of my three cases. The main events I discuss in the Turkish case are: 1) the CUP's assumption of power, 2) the beginning of the Balkan Wars, 3) Russia's declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire, and 4) the massacre and arrests at Van. The German case focuses on: 1) the book burning at Opernplatz, 2) the institution of the Nuremberg Laws, 3) Kristallnacht, and 4) Auschwitz-Birkenau's transition from a work camp to an extermination camp. Lastly, the Balkan case focuses on the following four events: 1) Milosevic's speech to Kosovar Serbs, 2) Slovenia and Croatia's declaration of independence from Yugoslavia, 3) the beginning of the siege of Sarajevo, and 4) the massacre at Srebrenica.

Chapter 3 begins the qualitative analysis of my research. Introducing the term 'anti-nation' as a more appropriate way to discuss otherness in genocidal states, Chapter 3 goes on to discuss the role of the anti-nation in radicalising ideology. I address perceptions of dehumanisation, the effect of the anti-nation on the nation and other influential themes as they arise through an individual assessment of each case.

In contrast to the anti-nation, *Chapter 4* discusses the ideological role of the nation in the radicalisation process. I begin by addressing how an ethnic perception of 'us versus them' exists in nationalising states more generally and then go on to compare this with a more extreme sense of 'nation' present in radicalising states. I look particularly at how a sanctified portrayal of the nation serves to legitimise extreme policies by rationalising extremism through the language of protection.

Chapter 5 is my final thematic chapter, in which I address the role of the homeland in radicalising ideology. Unlike in the previous three chapters, I open this chapter with a discussion on the difference between the Nazi perception of Lebensraum and the idea of homeland. Then I move on to address whether or not radicalising ideology intimates that the continued existence of the homeland is predicated on the eradication of the anti-nation from the nation, thereby completing the triangular relationship between the three themes used to structure the book. Each of my thematic chapters looks at each of my three cases individually before addressing the themes comparatively in the analysis section of each chapter.

As the final chapter of this book, *Chapter 6* serves as the capstone chapter. While I endeavour to avoid the sophomoric mistake of merely summarising previous chapters, this chapter does bring together the loose ends of each individual thematic chapter and also places the thematic arguments into the correct historiographical sequence. The previous chapters of this monograph can be divided into two categories, substantive and theoretical; this chapter is divided in a similar fashion.

Through the research undertaken in this book, I produce a broad framework for comparative ideological analysis in states radicalising towards genocide through investigation into how ideology both affects and is affected by structural shifts that pertain to the anti-nation, nation and homeland. If we wish to debate issues fundamental to genocide, certainly substantial discussion of ideology is desirable, as understanding radicalising ideology is critical to understanding how elite actors compete for power and in preventing radicalisation from occurring at genocidal levels.

1

Problems and Challenges in Genocidal Research

> *'God forbid that we should give out a dream of our own imagination for a pattern of the world.'*
>
> – Francis Bacon (1628: 15)

Introduction

All social scientists face challenges to discovering the answers to the questions they ask. As a genocide scholar, some of my challenges are unique to my field, but many are problems faced and overcome by scholars in various disciplines, showing once again that, though we deal with evil and hatred, we too are mere scholars. Thus, this first chapter simply reviews the challenges of my work – aside from the emotional and moral challenges – and looks at the theoretical and practical methods I have used to overcome them as best I can. Specifically, questions of ideological radicalisation in states moving towards genocide present two overarching problems. The first challenge is simply how to appropriately study ideology; the second challenge is how to appropriately compare cases across space and time.

Though many types of research would have allowed me to study genocidal ideology, this macro-level approach is best suited to a comparative historical analysis. Thus, I decided to structure this chapter around the challenges arising from this type of research project. To achieve this aim, this chapter is broken down into four main sections. The first section addresses the rationale behind my choice of cases, discussing the benefits and complexities of comparison and the relationship between the three case studies. The following two sections seek to explain how my methodological approach fulfils the demands of a complex comparative research model in historical sociology (HS). Since much of my topic deals with causation and with structure and agency, I look at the ties HS has with historical institutionalism (HI) and, through HI, path dependency. I then move on to my final section, outlining my research strategy as structured by ideology.

Case Selection

This book deals with three connected questions, all of which derive from the question of whether or not radicalising ideology evolves in a similar way in cases of modern genocide. From this question, two intriguing secondary questions arise: firstly, 'What are the thematic similarities and differences in this evolution?' and secondly, 'What happens to further the radicalisation process?'

Every genocide scholar understands that a project of this magnitude demands significant emotional reserves. However, macro-level research projects in comparative genocide studies, particularly a project with this type of scope and objective, inherently host substantial challenges, not the least of which involve case study selection. My primary research question deals directly with modern genocide; it is also inherently a question necessitating some sort of comparison of cases in order to properly assess the past century of modernity. To make matters worse, an ideal research project on my topic would incorporate every instance of genocide occurring in the 20th and 21st centuries; however, to maximise the depth of analysis and at the same time moderate the length of the manuscript, limiting myself to a manageable number of cases was critical – three cases being the most appropriate to get the maximum amount of comparison with the maximum amount of depth.

This lack of systematic control made me realise that in order to make my research outputs acceptable and applicable to other cases outside of the three cases selected for this project, I would need to ensure that these cases covered a wide variety of critical elements, including sociological, geographical, technological, historical and political factors. Associations between these elements are found within the European theatre: a linked geography, similar technological advances, an interlinked historical timeline and, frequently, shared political goals. Thus, instead of stretching my analysis geographically, linguistically or historically to include Rwanda, Cambodia, Darfur, Indonesia, Syria, South Sudan, the Central African Republic or any one of the sadly many other options, I decided to look towards Turkey and the Armenian genocide during the First World War, Germany and the Holocaust during the Second World War and Serbian aggression against Bosniaks as my three case studies.

It was these links and similarities that brought me to decide on these three instances of genocide as being strong choices for this type of research project. Geographically, using these three cases gives me an empirical link bridging East and West against the background of changing Europe through the 20th century. Much of the geographic space creating 'the homeland' and the theatres of war in each case is also regionally involved in the other cases as well. This shared European geography goes on to provide a *historical* link between cases. As Figure 1.1 shows, each case is strongly influenced by a historical relationship with the other two cases, which has affected the nature of aggression in each state and has established a circular relationship between the three.

Consider the following: The Balkan Peninsula was at the outer edges of the Ottoman Empire; the Balkan wars of independence in the early 20th century left a substantial number of Muslims in the region but encouraged a mass movement of people to the Ottoman Empire. Many of these individuals suffered great cruelty at the hands of Christian groups, which fomented a sense of distrust towards the Christian Armenian population. Equally, the German alliance with the Ottomans in WWI provided infrastructure, technological advances and eyewitness accounts to the genocidal acts perpetrated against the Armenians. Based on this history, the Nazis put significant pressure on neutral Turkey to form an alliance with them during WWII. The Nazis successfully allied with the Croatian


• Turkish-German alliance during WWI
• German construction of Turkish railway used in deportations
Jewish Anti-nation
• Ustasha aggression against Serbs in WWII
• Yugoslavia absorbed by the Third Reich in WWII
• NATO supporter/anti-conflict power during Serbian aggression
• Germany was main recipient of Bosnian Muslim refugees during the genocide
Radicalising Ideology
Turkey
Balkans
Armenian Anti-nation
Bosnian Muslim Anti-nation
• Ottoman Empire colonised Yugoslavia
• Colonisation ensured Muslims moving to predominantly Orthodox and Catholic areas

Figure 1.1 Connections in Case Studies.

Ustasha regime, which carried out savage attacks against the Serbs, providing the modern Milosevic regime a historical platform from which to foment fear against targeted other groups during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Among many other complex factors, German recognition of an independent Croatia provided a spark for war in the region, leading to genocidal aggression carried out against the descendants of those Muslims remaining in the Balkans after the Balkan Wars.

This triangulation between the three cases visually represented in Figure 1.1 helps make my fieldwork possible linguistically, namely the alliance between Germany and the Ottomans in WWI, German aggression against the Serbs during WWII and Turkish-Serbian relations during the breakup of the Soviet Union. In seeking three cases representative of genocidal aggression in the 20th century, I would have been remiss to dismiss the strong sense of interconnectedness provided by the Ottoman Empire, the Nazi state and the Balkan Peninsula.

Within this comparative framework, a few seemingly obvious points are key. Firstly, I want to draw attention to the fact that every case of genocide is unique and distinct. In fact, as a qualitative researcher, it is vastly important to view each individual case as unique but also to view it as what Stake refers to as 'common' – assessable to and comparable with other cases: 'Understanding each [event] requires an understanding of other cases, activities and events, but also an understanding of each one's uniqueness' (1995: 39, 44). Nonetheless, in the last quarter of the 20th century, scholars have emphasised – to varying degrees and often to their own detriment – the 'uniqueness' of the Holocaust above all others (Schapiro 1972; Poulantzas 1974; Conway 1980; Katz 1981, 1982; Payne 1995; Braun 1994). The Holocaust is indeed a distinctive case. This is not to say that no connections or links exist between the Holocaust and any other distinctive case of genocide. Indeed, I will make a strong show of the relationships between the Holocaust and my other case studies. Regardless, it does not stand representative of any other cases of genocide or ethnic cleansing which has yet occurred.

Thus, though the Nazi genocide against the Jews is unique, the same measure should and must be extended outward to each case of genocide. I find it important to stress that Cambodia is no better or worse a comparison for Rwanda or Armenia than Germany is; this is one of the reasons why comparative studies are challenging to carry out. To underestimate the differences between cases immediately sets up research for failure, as it leads to misrepresentations and misunderstandings of extremely complex circumstances. I expect these differences will help shape the characteristics of the ideology I explain. They will show how different themes of genocidal ideology take precedence at certain times while other themes play a more supportive role depending on outside sources, such as the type of war, the time period, the geography of the genocidal state and the technological advancement of that state. I have roughly identified certain aspects of my cases in Table 1.1 to provide an overview, but it is critical to remember that these are complex issues. Thus, these sources both affect and are affected

Table 1.1 Case Selection Overview.

	Turkey	**Germany**	**Balkans**
Type of war involved	international with history of civil unrest	international	civil/international
Primary perpetrators	military, civilian	military	police/military, civilian
Central leader present?	no	yes: Hitler	moderate: Milosevic, Mladic and Karadzic
Primary types of killing	deportation, starvation/disease, massacres	ghettos, deportations, massacres, starvation/disease, death camps	deportations, massacres, starvation, detention camps
Representative of other past/current ethnic conflicts?	moderate: Rwanda, Sudan	no, but has notable connections to colonial genocides	moderate: Cambodia, Ustasha, China, Soviet Union
Influencing instability	crumbling Ottoman Empire	loss of WWI, economic depression	crumbling empire, Tito's death and fall of communism
Intervention occurring due to aggression?	no, cessation of conflict ended with Axis loss of WWI	no, cessation of conflict ended with Axis loss of WWII, though camp liberation was a part of Allied intervention	yes, direct NATO and UN involvement, led by US negotiators
Resulting in war crimes tribunals?	yes, but incomplete	yes	yes, ongoing
Particular notes of interest	contested in Turkey though only rarely in Western academic scholarship	substantial amount of primary and secondary literature	continued aggression and independence movements in the region

by ideology, meaning that one element of ideology might be very important during one particular stage in the radicalisation process whilst being practically irrelevant in a later stage of ideological development.

Methodological Approaches to Mapping Ideology

Of course, choosing these three cases within the context of answering my research questions throws some considerable challenges in my path. The main difficulties are brought about through the historical spread of cases. Throughout the 20th century, there have been vast shifts in technology, education, political systems, scientific discovery and so on. These changes, and most particularly changes in technology and literacy rates, mean that different kinds of sources are available in each case, and different sources remain in each case. Some primary case material has been lost or destroyed over time. Some material, particularly in the Ottoman case, is inaccessible to Western scholars. To compound the problem, even when primary sources are available, there are significant linguistic challenges. None of my cases have a shared spoken language; all three cases have produced significant primary material in multiple languages. My own language ability is limited to English and German, which hampers my ability to work with these documents. As section three of this chapter will show, I have attempted to work through these challenges as best as possible whilst still remaining sensitive to the differences in each case. However, doing so has necessitated using varying types of sources in order to get a valid picture of ideology over the course of each case.

This is the next challenge to this research project, namely, how to manoeuvre through historical research while maintaining a strong sense of political analysis. Conducting research on these cases means my analysis is, to a large degree, historical; nonetheless, it is critical to note that the *focus* is less history itself and more the study of the evolution of state-sponsored ideology. My research questions are less concerned with individual experiences of ideology and more concerned with how ideologies evolve at the state level. This research deals less with the relationship between the macro- and micro-level structures within a state than with comparing macro-level structures and macro-level evolution between states across time. Through such critical assessment of the interaction between theoretical perspective, methodology and methods, a more specific approach thus begins to emerge from my own research assumptions. Firstly, I approach methodology as ‘the nature of knowledge’, or how we know about what we can know (Crotty 1998: 8). Theoretical perspective entails the more specific connections between epistemology and theory. Methodology is not necessarily based in ontology; it is not a belief but a tool used to shape and refine research.

As regards my own epistemological perspective, I do not deny the existence and importance of certain patterns and repeated sequences occurring throughout modern history and, specific to my own research, in nationalist states. I also believe causation occurs in the social world, a belief necessarily reflected in my methodology. Hence, like Mann (1994), I draw from early philosophy and describe myself as an 'as if' positivist; facts – once discerned – are interpretable but only reflect meaning when drawn into significant categories and analysed. As will be discussed later at length, historical sociologists draw heavily upon historical data and treat findings as true; from this we are able to generate larger analytical theories.

However, I must concede that I also have certain ontological reasons for claiming that I am also 'minimally' a constructionist: 1) I do not believe that only one single actor can entirely influence the path of a social structure. Instead, I believe that an 'intervening possibility' can exert more power over the acts of a mass group. If, for example, a state's ideology is moving along the path to becoming genocidal, one would hope that intervening factors could change the course of that ideology. This could be anything from political intervention from a neighbouring state to sanctions or perhaps a natural disaster. Part of this research project assesses to what extent this is true, if at all.

Equally, I assume that 2) if constructionism finds that meaning is not discovered but constructed, then any study in ideology is constructionist; this especially holds true if we see human agency as 'the problem of finding a way of accounting for human experience which recognizes simultaneously and in equal measure that history and society are made by constant, more or less purposeful, individual action and that individual action, however purposeful, is made by history and society' (Abrams 1980: 7). Ideological manipulation in these cases is the manipulation of the culturally constructed belief of the individual by state elites. *Ideological beliefs are not facts, but often people, on an individual and a collective level, act as if they were facts* – a point arguably much more important than any factual evidence. Thus, I classify myself as 'minimally' constructionist. Presented in this manner, my choice for taking a theoretical approach as opposed to a quantitative one becomes clear. These types of studies differ from the latter in that they entail a shift in orientation, which involves a greater degree of abstraction (Gottschalk 1945: 201).

In order to continue on through a methodological analysis of ideology, it is important to remember that ideology is both structure and agency and, through its iterative nature, plays a 'crucial and autonomous role in shaping political behaviour' (Lecours 2000: 511). As such, we can identify ideology *as an institution*. This understanding is critical in understanding my methodological choice, as it allowed me to focus on the work of historical institutionalists in order to constrain the methodological approach to my analysis. Historical institutionalism is generally categorised into 'new' and 'old' institutionalism. Old institutionalists are generally credited with a strong sense of the importance of historical context and the autonomous nature of institutions as well as evolutionary and holistic economics. Hira and Hira describe old institutionalists as being 'whimsical advocates of an unrealistic and basically empirical research programme' whose focus lies overmuch on the socio-economic relationship of modern states (2000: 268–9).

Over the past 20 years, through the emergence of new institutionalism, institutionalism has changed from its traditional restriction to the economic paradigm. Most key institutionalists do have backgrounds in economics (such as Immergut, Rothstein and Thelen); therefore, they rightly use institutionalism in their own models and theories. However, new institutionalism loosens the theory from the bonds of economics and freely applies it in other areas of social science, such as sociology and politics.

Thus, my use of HI helps place my work firmly within a political framework; this is particularly helpful as 'genocide studies' is a multidisciplinary field. As an approach to politics, the strengths of historical institutionalism are varied. The most important is its explanation of political divergence and irregular action (Lecours 2000: 521, see also 510–14). New institutionalisms conclude primarily that political institutions affect both structure and outcomes of competition between groups in all social strata. These institutions are often unbalanced, profiting some groups and excluding others, particularly with regards to ethnical and historical variants. This definition forms the theoretical foundation of historical institutionalism.

HI also has an interesting relationship with the ideas of power, which play a key role in any society but are critical in radicalising states. According to historical institutionalists, 'institutional factors can shape both the objectives of political actors and the distribution of power among them in a given polity' (Thelen 2002: 6). Identities, such as ethnicity, religion and culture, are not classified as given but as constructed. This construction occurs when political actors exert power over cultural practices and symbolic content, thereby producing and reproducing a number of symbolic codes which have a great influence on social and political actions (Lecours 2000: 512).

Understanding institutions in this way sheds light on the role of institutions in genocidal situations. As we will see in the conclusion, legitimising ideology as a means to power has a linked relationship with legitimising genocidal policy; understanding connections between powerful institutions and between the individuals these institutions vest with power is key to understanding the consequences of behaviour radicalising towards genocide. According to historical institutionalism, these affiliations are institutionally structured; thus, differences in power struggles and outcomes occur due in large part to institutional factors (Lecours 2000: 514; Skocpol 1995: 105).

As mentioned above, an institution is not merely a corporation or academic organisation. To most historical institutionalists, an 'institution' can be a formal organisation, but it also includes 'informal rules and procedures that structure conduct' (Thelen 2002: 2). As historical institutionalism is most concerned with politics, institutions include voting procedures, political party structures and relations amongst governmental branches, economic structures and so forth. One of the strengths of institutionalism as an approach is that it highlights the fact that some of these institutions usually remain constant amidst turmoil in other areas; they are highly resistant to change, even though they themselves cause change to occur in a subtle way over long periods of time (Thelen 2002: 18). Analysis of ideologies in genocidal processes challenges this assumption. Throughout this book, research shows that ideology itself is a highly volatile institution; thus, I propose that when state institutions are in a period of crisis and rapid change over a short period of time, opportunities for new social contracts are established and thus, ideological radicalisation is likely to occur.

Understanding institutions as the primary source of influence in political spheres allows scholars to analyse change, particularly as the power distribution available within those spheres strongly influences other aspects of society. With change comes conflict, where institutions define the terms of conflict, thereby shaping ideology and creating foundations for political manoeuvring, military function and the roles of others within the realm of the state (Immergut 2002: 85). Thus, HI is particularly useful to comparative historical sociologists, as it 'explains the causes for cross-national differences and similarities of particular phenomena. This method consists of analysing "slices of history" from different social systems and focusing on the effect of political institutions' (Lecours 2000: 515).

Charles Tilly identifies the use of historical analysis in social science across four main veins. The first approach is *metahistorical*, in which one attempts to identify temporal patterns across all human history; the second he calls *world-systemic*, in which one traces the shifts and changes in world systems such as states; the third approach is *macrohistorical,* which examines large-scale structures – such as state-led institutions – within these world systems; finally, the fourth approach is *microhistorical*, where one would study the experiences of individuals and smaller groups within the limits of world- and sub-world systems (1988: 706). Naturally, choosing to participate in research in any one of these four approaches to incorporating history into social science results in a more selective approach methodologically (Gottschalk 1945: 201). As my analysis seeks to explain the causal and instigatory roles of ideology in multiple cases, the third *macrohistorical* category is appropriate for my work. Thus, macrohistorical sociology (HS) began to emerge as a valuable methodological approach applicable to my research. As Tilly himself expounds, HS can 'draw in important problems that are prominent in historical analysis and in lived history, but somehow remain neglected in sociology' (1988: 710).

Though it seems to be in the midst of a recent renaissance, HS is, of course, one of the oldest methodological approaches in modern academia. Weber himself, though a sociologist, was a *historical* sociologist, investigating 'the past by developing abstract categories and typologies for identifying generalisable and recurring patterns' (Lustick 1996: 610). The term 'historical sociology' leads some to believe that this is a union between history and sociology in which the two fields meld into one (Burke 1980: 30). Like Abrams, I believe this claim is 'too simple and too bland to do justice to a tangled, difficult relationship which is actually productive just because it is tense, distanced and complicated, because it is built on antithesis as well as on community of interest'; there is, however, a relationship between the two fields in which they can be viewed as distinct ventures with their own characteristic 'discourse of proof' (1980: 4, 5).

Indeed, sociologists can never truly produce theories entirely devoid of history, but the intentions of both fields differ. Historians, claims Goldthorpe, are concerned with discovering evidence from relics; in contrast, sociologists 'invent evidence' which constitutes the foundations of modern sociology (1991: 212). I find this to be harsh and side with Mann, who defines sociology as the 'science of society', which uses systematic methods to generate generalised forms of knowledge; most of history does not participate in this way with its data. The other difference here is that macrosociologists sometimes have a broader understanding of social theory than historians, again allowing for metatheoretical outcomes. Thus, for a macrohistorical project assessing radical change and ideological shift, the approach is particularly relevant.

Historical sociology is defined as discovering and testing hypotheses by 'engaging theory with history', which inspires new theoretical insights and interpretations of social happenings, both historically and in the present day (Mahoney 2001: xi). Indeed, as we have already seen, HS is theoretically based. While it is true that I am a specialist in genocidal states, I have broader theoretical agendas than becoming a specialist in any one particular conflict. Instead, HS allows me to focus a 'narrow but powerful searchlight' on genocidal ideology, 'finding patterns in the data to which historians had not been sensitive and finding inconsistencies or implausibilities in the accounts' (Mann 1994: 43). HS's particular strength in this area, providing it is used well, is the use of general theory rather than focusing on one specific methodological approach. Thus, it allows me the flexibility needed in order to subsume my quasi-positivist cum constructionist perspective described earlier in this chapter. As Dannreuther and Kennedy so aptly describe it, 'HS has rightly viewed itself as a broad church, which is agnostic towards and willing to borrow from any potentially useful theoretical approach or methodological tool' (2007: 7).

Equally, HS is not bound by time, per se. It uses history because it addresses large themes which stretch across time. Skocpol and Somers classify this type of research as macro-causal analysis, as it is particularly focused towards producing new historical generalisations by 'selecting or referring to aspects of historical cases in order to set up approximations to controlled comparisons' (1980: 182). As Abrams critically suggests, HS allows for time to be considered as a means for social structuring (1980: 12). Vesting itself thus allows for the accomplishment of a number of things, namely the analysis of major transitions in the 20th century, the construction of the modern world system, revolution and now, in this work, genocide.

Naturally, sociologists are drawn to this sort of work, as it allows them to extend theories to see how widely over time and space they apply. Perhaps even more importantly, it can draw on important themes which have been overlooked in sociology, politics, anthropology and history.

There is, however, one obvious disassociation between HS and studies in modern genocide. Most projects engaging HS deal with 'big issues', such as revolution, power and rebellion; generally, these are considered macro issues, issues which supersede a specific time period or geographical place. These research projects strive to discover generalised causation (Dannreuther and Kennedy 2007: 7; Mahoney 2000: 508). Again, this is not to say that every case presented by historical sociology is 'the same', nor is it to say that there will never be instances where the theory ceases to hold. My work again shows the difference between more metahistorical approaches and macrohistorical approaches; in my case, I am trying to say something generally about the evolution of ideology in modern states radicalising towards genocide. This subject matter is much more specific than that of many of these other studies. Thus, I will use historical sociology primarily as a means of what Mann calls *historical-causal* analysis, which considers the conditions under which modern institutions, such as ideology, evolve to a place of power (1994: 39) rather than an attempt to test more abstract theories of human experience.

Dannreuther and Kennedy aptly sum up the key strengths and themes of HS, the first of which being this very open willingness to focus on the larger picture of history and thus 'challenge received wisdoms, and to de-naturalize social givens and reified conceptualizations' (2007: 7). In dealing with questions of genocide, assumptions are rife and varied, both from scholars and non-scholars alike. Throughout the course of my work, I hope to unravel some of the more accepted stereotypes regarding radicalising ideology and ascertain which of these are sustainable and which are falsely conceived.

HS is also a methodological approach which specifically deals with causation and rejects the separation of events from their rightful historical placement. Thus, though a proponent of general theory, HS does separate itself from certain postmodern theories, particularly interpretivism and other anti-positivist accounts that have a more 'arbitrary' approach to selecting evidence that is outside historical accounts. In this project, both in its aims and in its outcomes, causation is of key concern. In looking at the shifts in ideology and asking how those shifts occur and the events they are connected with, I am inherently addressing issues of causation and, critically, I am testing causal propositions; this leads directly to John Mahoney's work in path dependency.

HI suggests that institutions have an enduring nature (Caldeira and Gibson 1992; Price and Romantan 2004; Rahm, Brehm and Carson 1999); Mahoney and Thelen (2010) go on to point out that this makes HI an appropriate method when explaining continuity rather than change. Path dependency offers an approach within HI to track changes in institutions. I am interested in path dependency because the research questions I propose inherently hypothesise whether or not a pattern of ideological progression exists. If it does exist, how is this progression expressed? If indeed genocide is a path-dependent process, and the creation of genocidal ideology is a significant and contingent part of that process, then the probability of preventing genocide is greater than if it were otherwise. This is true because 'final outcomes cannot necessarily be predicted on the basis of early events in a sequence, even if the sequence is governed by rigid mathematical laws' (Mahoney 2000: 529–30). Indeed, *possible interferences may occur to change or influence the sequences*. These interferences can be: natural disasters; political, military or economic intervention; a change in power; or a change in stability. Therefore, a greater understanding of the path-dependent nature of genocidal ideology could provide the political community a stronger foundation upon which to implement interventionary measures, providing the set of conditions identified as the 'reversal' of path dependence is applicable. Reversals can occur because political decisions in any institution are not independent but are created based on a sequence of events involving different actors at different times (Mahoney 2000: 511; Immergut 2002: 630).

One cannot assume that because terms such as 'paths of development' and 'pathways to change' are used that the study examines path dependence (Mahoney 2000: 507, 532). Instead, as Lecours suggests, path dependency is the idea that 'institutions, once created, take a "life of their own" and may generate processes not intended, nor foreseen, by their creators' (2000: 517). Similarly, Sewell defines path dependency as 'what has happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time' (in Mahoney 2000: 510). Path dependency asserts that certain events are necessary in order for other events to follow; the link between early events and final outcomes are causal mechanisms generally following a clear order and process within a sequence.

Thus, within path dependency, causal processes 'are highly sensitive to events that take place in the early stages of an overall historical sequence' (Mahoney 2000: 510). Mahoney is supported in this claim by Paul Pierson, who finds early events of much higher value to sequential outcomes than events which appear later. In fact, the same event occurring later in the sequence may have little or no effect, while occurring early in the event it may be one of the most influential factors in the outcome (in Mahoney 2000: 510). Critically, Mahoney also claims that path-dependent processes tend to follow a deterministic, causal pattern, similar to inertia – 'i.e., once processes are set into motion and begin tracking a particular outcome, these processes tend to stay in motion and continue to track this outcome' (Mahoney 2000: 511). This is due to path dependency's characterisation of historical sequences as having deterministic properties, particularly in relation to institutional patterns and designs. In short, we find that Arthur's assertion is Mahoney's basis, that '*when* things happen within a sequence affects *how* they happen' (in Mahoney 2000: 511, emphasis in original).

Mahoney helpfully breaks down path dependency into two different fields: *self-reinforcing sequences* and *reactive sequences*. Most studies of path dependency, particularly in the field of economics, focus on self-reinforcing sequences. These are characterised by institutional reproduction mirroring early events and by the formation of institutional patterns (2001: xi); within a self-reinforcing sequence, we find increasing benefits for the institution over the long term, making the institution particularly resistant to change (2000: 508). Self-reinforcing sequences are circular, as opposed to linear, lending themselves to the age-old adage that 'history repeats itself'.

In contrast, reactive sequences can and often do transform, reverse or even negate early events. This type of sequence is not a reproduction of past events but is generated by an event which sets in motion a set of linked reactions and counter-reactions. Here, each following event is reactive and causal, reacting to the previous event and causing the following event. As each event is causal and caused, they are 'reactive', and therefore they are 'dependent' (Mahoney 2000: 508, 526, 527; 2001: 6); this is more than a representation of connected events influencing institutions, and, in conducting path-dependent research, it is important to show clear evidence of contingency. In *Dark Side of Democracy*, Mann (2005) does this to great effect, showing his readers how clear proceedings from the state's political 'Plan A' caused the shift to 'Plan B' then 'Plan C' and so on, until culminating in ethnic cleansing. He is able to show the 'inertia' Mahoney relies so heavily on, creating the reactions and counter-reactions which create the 'inherent logic' of path dependency.

There is a singular way in which using reactive sequencing can be problematic. As noted above, it requires a primary event to start the sequence. As a *historical* sociologist, it is easy to continue to regress into history looking to find 'one more causal event' and therefore never actually begin the sequence.[1] To lapse into this type of historical mongering is to merely say again that 'history is important', which, as we have already seen, is not the purpose of path dependency. Mahoney goes on to explain that path-dependent sequences begin with a 'critical juncture'. The critical juncture in any sequence is what Mahoney describes as the 'key actor choice point' (2001: 6); it is characterised by the selection of a particular option from among multiple alternatives and is often of 'great historical significance' (Onoma 2010: 89). The critical juncture then shapes institutions in such a way as to trigger one of the two sequences above. The idea of 'critical juncture' adds significantly to the deterministic properties of Mahoney's explanation of path dependency, as, after the occurrence of a critical juncture, the interferences expressed above are less likely to be significantly influential and give states fewer options for change. Mahoney expresses this well, saying,

> once an option is selected, it becomes increasingly difficult to return to the initial point where multiple alternatives [are] still available . . . Not all choice points represent critical junctures. Critical junctures are specifically those choice points that put countries (or other units) onto paths of development that cannot be easily broken or reversed. (2001: 7)

There is a certain amount of tension between HI and path dependency because of the necessary balance in path dependency of maintaining conditions *in sequence*. As most historical sociologists are focused on grand theory, they can easily make the mistake of explaining the outcomes of their case studies without appealing to any contingent events. As mentioned above, this is not path dependency. This is not to say that this work is not profitable or that it does not broaden the realm of knowledge and understanding in any way; it is simply not path dependency.

We then find ourselves faced with a particularly interesting set of questions: As ideology is an institution, and the process of change in some institutions is path dependent, is the process of evolution in radicalising ideology path dependent? Do we find critical junctures quite early on in the process of radicalisation as Mahoney suggests? Thus, one of the more abstract purposes of this project is to test Mahoney's theory of path dependency in states which become genocidal. As discussed in the next chapter, Mommsen's theory of cumulative radicalisation suggests that genocidal processes are reactive, pointing towards the applicability of the reactive sequence to the radicalisation process. Based on the significance Mahoney places on the linked, sequential nature of events in path-dependent cases, I have chosen to shape my research around an episodic approach which forms a storyboard for each case against which we can trace ideological evolution.

This episodic approach provides the structure for my research project, allowing me to fully examine both the relationship between ideology and the event at each episode and to test Mahoney's theories of the importance of a critical juncture and the formulation of the reactive sequence in the ideological radicalisation process. I will be discussing whether or not it is necessary for radicalising ideology to adopt particular characteristics at certain points in the sequence in order for the next level of ideological radicalisation to occur. This approach considerably strengthens the output of my research, as I am not only going to be examining a descriptive process but also endeavouring to contextualise the relationship between ideology and events within the context of the causal reactive sequence. Of equal importance, due to Mahoney's focus on the role of institutions as actors in the path-dependent process, adopting this approach also addresses the challenge presented in the introduction of this chapter, allowing me to research ideological shifts across time and space within the context of ideology as both structure and agency.

Looking forward into work from Holocaust theorists, Mommsen's theory of cumulative radicalisation emerges as particularly relevant in light of Mahoney's work and the sequential processes of evolution. Mommsen strongly refutes the intentionalist claim that there was an overarching intention based on Hitler's early writings or his directives while in power. Instead, the genocide was a development of sometimes spontaneous, sometimes erratic bureaucratic initiatives (1983: 399, 412–15) and stipulates that the basic premise of cumulative radicalisation is the Holocaust as the end point of a long-term process of slowly changing institutions and events which ended in genocide (Mommsen 1976). Bloxham and Kushner further refine the term, encouraging their readers to 'think of it as describing the momentum built up in a partly self-selecting, partly self-driven Jewish policy underpinned by a general racist consensus . . .' (2008: 137). Though some scholars have applied the theory of cumulative radicalisation to their work (Bloxham 2003; Kallis 2000; Hay 1999; Levene 2005) and though Kershaw notes that ideology is increasingly seen as a key element in the process of cumulative radicalisation (2000: 264), there has not yet been a comparative model expanding the idea of cumulative radicalisation to ideology in genocidal states. By evaluating Mahoney's theory of path dependency through three cases of genocidal progression, this analysis will be able to fill that gap.

Let me be clear: unlike path dependency, I do not perceive Mommsen's idea of cumulative radicalisation as a theory in need of testing. In fact, I place myself within the functionalist camp by accepting the idea of cumulative radicalisation as a more applicable representation of the complexities present in the Holocaust than those suggestions put forth by most intentionalists. Testing path dependency through an episodic approach further detailed in Chapter 2 allows us to look at the relationship between ideology and events and thus to assess not only how the cumulative radicalisation process occurs but why it occurs in such a fashion.

Thus, path dependency within HI brings conceptual and methodological tools to this type of research initiative, not in the least because path dependency characterises specific instances in history where incidents occur in multiple cases. As contingency without theory is completely invalid, researchers using path dependency must be aware that it is primarily a 'theory-laden process' (Mahoney 2000: 508, 536); historical sociology provides the theoretical substance for the path-dependent framework. HI serves as the connection between the conceptualisation of ideology and path dependency, and, through path dependency, links to the episodic approach expressed in each of my thematic chapters.

Conducting HS Research

As do most historical sociologists, I am taking certain historical events as given; it is not my purpose or intention to expound the horrific living conditions in the Warsaw ghetto and the death camps in Yugoslavia or that there was intentional, ethnic killing on a genocidal scale in Turkey during the First World War. I am taking it for granted that these events did occur based on what is generally understood by the historical community to be true and am moving forward from there. To attempt to prove again the occurrence of the Holocaust would be disastrous; frankly, other scholars have committed generous amounts of time and energy elsewhere to make that very argument. For me to use their impressive work in another way does, I hope, no disservice to them. I mean it to have the opposite effect entirely. Most of the sources I use throughout the body of my work are secondary. So it is with many historical sociologists. This I see not as a weakness but as a strength of this approach. HS puts the facts and circumstances gathered by historians to use in a larger picture, thus deriving macro- and mid-level theories that can be applied across socio-spatial spheres. Historical events are not the outcome of historical sociological research; historical events are instead the foundation of historical sociological research.

The following chapter provides an overview of the literature for each of my three cases, providing a brief historiography and assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the literature in general. It is from these secondary sources, based firmly in primary research, that I am basing much of my theoretical supposition. I am certainly not, as Goldthorpe claims, assembling the past 'willy-nilly' and 'then, in "scissors-and-paste fashion", selecting items to be combined, reordered and marshalled' in order to create a new, fictional version of the past based solely on these secondary sources (1994: 65). In order to sidestep this very issue and to fill in the gaps left in the literature as discussed in Chapter 3, I have pursued primary documentary analysis in the course of this research project. Documentary research is not a clear-cut, organised category. It is usually laborious, even with helpful research tools like indexing and the Internet. However, accessing these documents was worthwhile, as they offer theoretical analysis, verification of fact and illustration of hypotheses and possibilities (Gottschalk 1945: 202, 231; see also Platt 1981: 31).

Truthfully, as a comparative historical sociologist, it is impossible for me to conduct the amount of primary research necessary to complete this project were primary research the only recourse left to me. In her innovative work on revolution, Theda Skocpol asserts that 'redoing primary research for every investigation would be disastrous; it would rule out most comparative-historical research' (1984: 382). I must rely on historical sources. Acknowledging this helps my efforts 'to find opportunities for study in which cases outnumber variables' by paying attention to historiography in my selection of source material and 'in the construction of stylized background narratives' (Lustick 1996: 605, 614).

Nevertheless, there is one significant problem which surfaces and resurfaces when participating in HS-led research: selection bias. In order to keep my analysis from devolving into 'loose interpretations of a second order kind' (Goldthorpe 1991: 223) it is absolutely necessary that I address this problem. Historical sociology is not the only methodology which finds bias problematic. Often research is biased in terms of gender, race, political influence, availability of data or even within quantitative analysis itself. In fact, selection bias can be evident in any analysis which draws upon one-dimensional work to produce background narratives and assumptions, even more so when a vast number of documents exist in relation to one topic. Nonetheless, bias is a serious and problematic issue which has plagued historical sociology since its origins, particularly as it is much more than distinguishing 'true' accounts of history from 'false' ones. Not even Weber attempted to address the problems of bias and data gathering. Ian Lustick is one of the only theorists grappling with this problem who has actually attempted to offer an answer:

> In other words, searching for 'facts' which may be necessary to test a theory of interest to an historically minded social scientist may mean, as Skocpol indicates, searching high and low for monographic work containing the kinds of information and narratives needed, organized in roughly the necessary ways, or even constructing the work oneself,

> with one's own theory as a guide for data collection. But here is the nub of the issue. Such a search may well entail, and can logically be supposed to entail, a heavy selection bias toward works by historians using implicit theories about how events unfold and how people behave very similar to the theory under consideration by the social scientist.
>
> (1996: 607)

For my own work, context is vital: not leaning on snippets of what one or another theorist has said but checking and cross-checking that information within the greater body of literature in order to ensure a true representation of historical fact and interpretive analysis. Though I may not be able to provide a theory capable of encompassing the approach of every historian who works in my field, this type of triangulation does significantly improve the confidence with which HS and path dependency may be effectively used.

Lustick goes on to suggest three ways applicable to approach historiography in order to avoid selection bias, the first being a forthright discussion of historiographical debates within the context of the research. In doing this, historical discrepancy becomes transparent and can even illumine analysis (1996: 614). As it is a contested case in certain circles, I use this technique when dealing with Turkish aggression against the Armenians, particularly as the aforementioned discussions adequately address problems of access. Similarly, this approach will also be helpful when dealing with the Holocaust. However, the vast amount of literature produced on WWII serves an entirely different situation and is problematic in its own way. I will here attempt to follow the second strategy Lustick suggests, that is to 'grant explicit consideration to the historiographical terrain at the outset of the study, identify the particular approach or school of historiography whose work is most convincing, and indicate its distinctive . . . theoretic commitments and biases' (1996: 615). This restricts my focus to a manageable amount of information and will help construct a plausible narrative as required for this analysis. The last approach I plan to implement is to presume, especially in the case of Yugoslavia, that the narratives of historiography comprise a normal distribution of theoretical commitments. '[The] more powerful the theory, the more about historiographical patterns could be explained, despite the influence of sociology of knowledge factors on the orientations and conclusions of historians working in relevant and proximate fields' (Lustick 1996: 615).

This again reflects the theoretical basis from which I am working, emphasising once more the theoretical approach to historical sociology as a grand-theory methodology. Nonetheless, it is unusual to find any piece of historical sociology totally devoid of what is generally known as ‘primary’ sources. John Mahoney (2001), Michael Mann (2005) and Ian Lustick (1996) all use some primary data to formulate their theories, chiefly because primary data helps support links between cases and sustain broader applications of theory to practise.

‘Thus between “primary” and “secondary” research lies borderline territory where we may derive original data from “secondary” sources’ (Mann 1994: 44). Herein lies the key to historical sociology: the things over which many historians debate are not necessarily pertinent to historical sociologists. Though certain historians, such as Bloxham, Kallis and Ramet, situate their work in a broader context of history, much information is presented in secondary sources which other historians of one particular period or occurrence fail to see in a larger picture. This does not take away from the necessity of historical research; indeed, without historical analysis, historical sociology would cease to exist. As Lustick suggests, the historian provides the data or ‘the depiction of past events ready to be coded’ (1996: 605). This is the work of the historical sociologist within secondary sources – to analyse or ‘code’ data to shed light on a particular generalisation or theory.

Research through the HS Lens

The final significant problem my research questions raise is that of researching ideology. Every researcher faces problems in dealing with particular methodological approaches and with the difficulties raised by looking at multiple cases. Bringing ideology into the equation, however, adds another level of complexity. Ideology, or the common understanding of what the nation should believe as expressed by the state through elites, is made manifest in various ways. It was these paths of expression I wanted to explore in order to consider the multidimensional aspect of ideology. As discussed in the introduction, ideology is a breathing, variable and changing thing rather than a static entity with easily identifiable descriptors. Thus, when mapping out the evolution of these ideologies, I am tracing ideologies that become, but were not always, genocidal; they are all ideologies radicalising towards genocide. It is necessary to research the patterns of process while continuing to be sensitive to the geopolitical shifts unique to each case.

Thus, the first question raised here is ‘What are the ways in which ideology is expressed at an elite level?’ Mann provides a helpful answer: ‘Ideologies are carried by communications networks in which some possess greater resources of knowledge and persuasion than others. They mobilize social movements and mass media – mass marches and meetings, the printed word, and the airwaves – all of which may acquire power over people' (2005: 30). This being the case, the second question, dependent on the first, and pertaining directly to this research project asks, 'What relics of these ideologies remain for social historians to access in the three cases I have chosen?' Ideology is expressed mainly through official documents deriving from elites published through mass media outputs. However, historical sociologists can also avail themselves of personal documents and communiqués of state elites instrumental in creating ideology and policy; all three of these avenues are bolstered by personal statements and material presented during the course of both the Nuremberg and ICTY trials in the German and Balkan cases.

Hakim points out that considerations of time and space tend to be overlooked when participating in comparative studies (2000: 157; see also Barraclough 1965); thus, these considerations are critical to my work, as both can affect the sequencing model of path dependency. Studies within the same space and time work within an ordered framework, providing a common background; projects such as this one, researching across time and space, lose some of the benefits of that framework. Though my case studies were selected in order to support the framework's foundations as much as possible, this was still a challenge. Comparability across periodisation, or the compartmentalisation of various stages in history, is important in my project, as historians tend to focus on one stage, or period, in history; my project looks at three different generally accepted stages of periodisation: WWI, WWII and the breakup of the communist bloc. Comparing cases across the lines of periodisation means that not only am I constrained by space in language, but it is also imperative that I assess the constraints placed upon my project across time. Phillips (1994; 2002), Mann (1986; 1993; 2004; 2005), Greenfeld (1992) and Shaw (2003; 2007) amongst others show us that this type of comparison is possible; nonetheless, the problems of analysing cases across time and space are significant.

The problems of analysing cases in this way can largely be summed up in the problem of the comparability of empirical sources. Differences in time mean that in each case, I am dealing with varying levels of technological development. This variance means that each case used slightly different means to communicate ideology and that, of those means, varying types of ideological remnants remain. I express the problems faced in each case more specifically below, but, in sum, the problem of comparability means that my data and analysis is based on multiple data sources.

One of the greatest aids in overcoming the problem of comparability is that, regardless of the varying types of data source, each source is a means through which ideology is expressed; thus, on that basis, the sources are comparable. Equally, using a mixed source base does help solve the problem of selection bias. As my research analysis has come out of a variety of sources across a significant amount of time, there is less of a chance of having a skewed outcome due to over-reliance on certain secondary sources.

Before going on, a brief note on my use of tribunals in only two of my cases is important. 'Of course, international tribunals are not the only legal venues in which cases of crimes against humanity can be heard; they tend to function poorly in practice, being susceptible to pressures from powerful states and the prejudices of the nation-states involved' (Akçam 2006: 292); equally, documents used in these tribunals are biased, allowing a certain level of 'victor's justice' in the courtroom. I have done my best to avoid bias by triangulating the information found therein with secondary sources when available. Nonetheless, these two infamous examples of international tribunals have provided lucrative information spanning the course of the conflict in both cases, as will be seen in the upcoming chapters. I decided against attempting to incorporate information from the Istanbul trials into the research process for this project.[2] Though there are various copies of certain cases in libraries and collections around the world, we are still unsure as to whether or not the complete court records still exist; the records that do exist are hailed by sceptics of the genocide as fictitious accounts of 'victor's justice' (Akçam 2006: 4–5).

With this in mind, the remainder of this chapter looks specifically at the official resources, mass media publications, personal documents and communiqués used from each case.

Official state publications and media sources

Turkey: I have used only a limited amount of official state publications and media sources in this research project; most of the information that would fall under this category was originally found either within the personal communiqués described below or in a secondary source. The reasons for this are numerous, but most importantly, the availability of official Turkish documents relating directly to the Armenian atrocities is still limited, and they are in a language only remotely similar to modern-day Turkish. Thus, I have effectively relied more heavily on preexisting secondary literature to fill these gaps.

Germany: An unparalleled amount of information is available on the Holocaust and on the Nazis' propaganda machine in particular. However, as my work looks at the evolution of ideology, the intricacies of the vast Nazi bureaucratic regime have little scope to be explored here. Though I was able to garnish some information from some of these works, it was easy and helpful for me to expand this knowledge with newspaper articles based around particular events crucial in the expansion and shift of ideology at the time.

Naturally, as I am using media sources, there is much historical information given through the newspaper articles I have analysed in my German case. However, the type of document influences the way that information is presented. In many of these papers, just as much space is given to printing a poem as to describing the German invasion of Poland. It lacks the balance found in my other cases. But again, that is to be expected. I have also restricted the amount of historical framing I would get from my field documents by limiting myself to only looking at newspapers published by the Nazi regime, specifically in *Der Völkischer Beobachter*. *Der Völkischer Beobachter* was one of the regime's most widely read and influential media outlets (Kallis 2008: 119). Unlike more discriminatory papers, such as *Der Stuermer*, which was contested even within the Nazi party (Tribunals 7 December 1946), *Der Völkischer Beobachter* provides a tool of propaganda accepted by both extremists and conservatives. Its wide acceptance has given me a much clearer and nuanced view of how mainstream ideology was actually portrayed. Even within the context of this more mainstream newspaper, internal news and 'true' historical events regarding Jews are simply not discussed. In fact, almost all non-biased reporting is eliminated; every article included is influenced by and biased in favour of Vaterland and Fuhrer. Thus, any historical information provided herein has been cross-referenced and double-checked for validity before using it as a historical reference. Nonetheless, the insight these texts have given me regarding ideology has been invaluable.

In order to effectively limit my research base and test Mahoney's theory of path dependency with an episodic approach, I decided to focus my research on editions of *Der Völkischer Beobachter* published around certain key events occurring after the Nazis assumed state power,[3] listed in Table 1.2. I have endeavoured to use six newspaper articles per key event, one from each of the two weeks preceding the event, the day the event occurred, the day after the event occurred and one from each of the two weeks following the event.

The Balkans: My reliance on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is heavily influenced by its extensive archival achievements and the translation of most of its documents into

Table 1.2 Issues of *Der Völkischer Beobachter.*

	Book burning at Opernplatz	**Nuremberg Laws**	**Kristallnacht**	**Auschwitz becomes an extermination camp**
two weeks before event	26 April 1933	1 September 1935	26 October 1938	20 August 1941
one week before event	3 May 1933	8 September 1935	2 November 1938	27 August 1941
date of event	10 May 1933	15 September 1935*	9 November 1938	3 September 1941
one day after event	11 May 1933	16 September 1935*	**	***
one week after event	17 May 1933	22 September 1935	16 November 1938	10 September 1941
two weeks after event	23 May 1933	29 September 1935	23 November 1938	17 September 1941

*event occurred over both 15 and 16 September though was reported primarily on 16 September 1935

**no paper available for 10 November 1938

***no paper available for 4 September 1941

English. Using these documents allows me to both track the permeation of ideology by seeing how it affects the testimonies of those on trial and to use the prosecution's accounts in a similar way as in the Nuremberg trials (see below). However, using the ICTY trials is not without its problems. Not only are the trials still going on, but some of the key criminals charged with genocide have unfortunately not yet been apprehended. At this juncture, however, I proceed with the cases made available; that is, the ones which show most strongly the influence of ideology.

The ICTY has an extensive and thorough online database; hence, my data is limited to those trials of individuals who have been indicted for genocide and/or extermination. Thus, the pertinent trials are those of Biljana Plavsic, Momcilo Krajisnik, Slobodan Milosevic, Ratko Mladic, Radovan Karadzic, Sasa Stanisic, Momcilo Persic, Sdravko Tolimir, Milomir Stakic, Radislav Krstic, Stojan Zupljanin, Vujadin Popovic, Ljubisa Beara, Drago Nikolic, Ljubomir Borovcanin, Radivoje Miletic, Milan Gvero and Vinko Pandurevic.

The majority of those listed above still have ongoing court cases. The exceptions are Biljana Plavsic, Milomir Stakic, Radislav Krstic, Radovan

Karadzic, Ratko Mladic and Slobodan Milosevic. Biljana Plavsic was convicted of persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds and cut a deal with the prosecution, pleading guilty to the above charges, and thus had the genocide and extermination charges dropped. Milomir Stakic did not plead guilty but evaded the genocide charges he was indicted with and was found guilty of extermination, murder and persecutions. Radislav Krstic was convicted of aiding and abetting genocide, murders, extermination and persecutions, though he was not prosecuted for genocide itself. Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic have recently been arrested, and prosecution against them is in the early stages; these trials will continue to be of interest to genocide scholars and the general public alike. Lastly is the late Slobodan Milosevic, indicted on a lengthy list of counts including genocide, complicity in genocide, deportation, extermination and persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds. Milosevic was not found guilty but died before the end of legal proceedings on 11 March 2006.

Personal documents and communiqués

Gottschalk et al. suggest that two of the uses of personal documents are for the development of the theoretical elements of research and for the illustration of various hypotheses and possibilities (Gottschalk 1945: 202). In my work, these documents serve to do both. The personal documents and communiqués used in my research were written for an exceptionally informed audience, usually to consular employees, other government officials or for the authors' own personal use. Thus, there was no need to offer historical information per se, nor was it always necessary or even possible to constantly refer to other communications received in order to hold an intercommunicative dialogue. Nonetheless, in the rarer circumstances when historical events are described, they are described in exceptional depth and are often very explicit as to what numerous people said, how people were treated, times of day, specific numbers and so on.

Turkey: Of my three cases, use of personal documents is strongest in the Turkish case. Focused in the years 1908–18, with a majority of the documents written between 1913 and 1916, my data focused on five types of documents. The first are field reports from missionaries and civilian personnel, particularly Johannes Lepsius, a German missionary contracted by the German government early on as a field informer and eyewitness to the Armenian atrocities. Lepsius' information is certainly the most thorough and is also the most widely referenced of any German informer in academic work relating to this case. His political aspirations caused him, if anything, to guard against over-antagonising the Turks. In fact, some scholars have proposed that he refrained from divulging some of the most damning evidence against the Turks until quite late in his life in order to maintain the alliance between the Germans and the Turks (Akçam 2006). This increased trust between himself and the Turks in power; thus, his understanding of the genocidal aims of the Young Turk regime was certainly of a higher level than some of the other reports examined.

The second type of document proving invaluable to my research are reports from various German diplomats and military officers. These reports, often coming from high-level officials, are highly nuanced but brutally honest about the purpose and intent of policies initiated throughout the Committee of Union and Progress' (CUP) time in power. Many of the authors of these reports were more than aware of the atrocities being committed; some even signed deportation orders themselves. As time went on, and the scale of the aggression grew, their missives and personal writings express more disapproval and, in certain cases, disbelief (Akçam 2006: 7, 6; R14098/Ab.4215 24.01.1918; R14098/Ab.10208 17.02.1918; R14099/Ab.15733 12.04.1918). Many of these documents were listed at the time as top-secret status and have now been released to the public. Much of the information on regional insecurity and its relation to the homeland, as will be seen in more detail below, is presented through these channels.

Similar in style are documents sent by the German consulate in Turkey to the German State Department, most often in the form of telegrams and short letters with attached reports. As with the diplomatic and military reports, a few of these documents have been declassified over the last century.

International consulate messages to the German State Department and consulates in Turkey are the fourth type of document I use. Primarily coming from French and Belgian diplomatic missions, these reports, though few in number, usually relate to information not reported by German diplomats for reasons of political nicety. They provide information from a different ideological perspective but maintain the high style and information found in the documents noted above.

In contrast to the previous categories, my fifth type of document, letters from Ottoman citizens to the German consular missions in Turkey, lacks diplomatic restraint in favour of providing critical eyewitness testimony; critically, they provide insight into ideological impact and depth in society. Usually these accounts come in the form of letters begging for German intercession into the atrocities. While most of these letters come from Armenians, a small number were written by sympathetic Turks and other minorities, usually Christian.

Germany: To support the various media sources used in my German case, I chose to use a variety of personal documents and statements. The most famous of these printed sources are Goebbels' diaries and Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. I recognise that *Mein Kampf* is in a bit of a grey category, being both personal writing and state-sponsored publication; however, I have chosen to put it in this category as it reflects the personal view of one individual at its time of writing. Only later in the Nazi reign did it come to be considered of vital literary importance.[4]

Personal statements made by key Nazi leaders in the Nuremberg trials are of equal, if not greater, interest. Of primary focus are the 22 volumes of the 'Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal: Proceedings Volumes'. These include personal statements from all of the major war criminals, though I focused my research on the cases of Doenitz, Frank, Frick, Fritzsche, Funk, Goering, Hess, Sauckel, Speer, Kaltenbrunner, Keitl, Jodl, von Neurath, Raeder, von Ribbentrop, Rosenberg, Schacht, von Schirach and Streicher. The statements these men made whilst in court are of great testament to the depth of their belief in a fully fledged ideology.

Balkans: As regards this case, I have used only a limited number of personal communiqués. A majority of these are to be found in the ICTY trial documents, in particular, the statements that the above-listed defendants made in their own defence. Equally, many of the secondary sources I've used for this case do provide substantial amounts of text from these types of documents already translated into English.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter is to outline the questions, problems and challenges arising from my research questions and to discuss the ways in which I have dealt with them whilst carrying out research. The first section focused on the problems of case study selection. The second section addressed my choice of HI as an approach and suggested that this research project may be able to test Mahoney's theories of path dependency in the context of radicalisation. It also contextualised ideology as an institution, identifying HI as the connection between ideology and the episodic approach I take throughout my substantive chapters. The third section, conducting HS research, discussed some of the weaknesses of HS and how other scholars have sought to deal with these weaknesses. Lastly, I have outlined how ideology structured not only my research questions but also my research strategy. Using the way ideology is conveyed in order to provide a skeleton for my research method has been invaluable in the context of HS and HI.

'Comparative-historical analysis is designed to discover and test hypotheses by engaging theory with history; when successfully employed, it can both inspire new theoretical formulations and stimulate new interpretations of historical cases' (Mahoney 2001: xi). This assertion applies to my work in that herein I am seeking to 'inspire new theoretical formulations' regarding genocide analysis. Much has been written on the ideologies of particular genocidal regimes, but how that ideology is formed and whether or not there is any similar pattern of formation is still yet to be established. Whether or not genocidal ideology evolves in a similar fashion is, however, a vital question which must be asked if prevention is ever to be attained. This is what I seek to add to theories of genocide and hope, as well, to add to the greater body of work in HS. It is not my intention to merely interpret historical cases, though I will offer some interpretations; my desire is that these interpretations will be applicable to present and future cases of radicalising states as well as add to the literature on HI and path dependency through my analysis of ideology as structure and agency.

In his noted essay *From Exchange to Structure*, Michael Hechter describes the relationship between methodological holists, those who find that when individuals act, they do not do so as individual actors but as members of a bigger societal structure, and methodological individualists, those who argue that the 'dynamic force' of societal structures is purely in the hands of individual agents acting for individual gains. At the heart of this relationship, he argues, is power. The 'root of power – its internal source – lies in the subjective value that agents place on given goods and events' (1991: 49), or, in other words, structure. My research deals with the power of ideology in a similar fashion. There can be no denying the role of the individual in genocidal action. However, when attempting to describe any grand theory of genocidal analysis, I focus not on the individual and the direct action of an individual. Instead, I am looking at the kind of power state-led ideology has over an individual. Herein, for the purpose of this project, lies the relationship of macro and micro structure and agency.

2

Defining the Devil: A Short Historiography of Genocide and a Case Study Overview

Introduction

As was noted in the introduction, this book analyses the evolution of ideology as it radicalises in states that become genocidal. By comparing three cases in which genocide occurs, I am seeking to establish whether or not there is a common pattern of evolution and what key themes arise within the ideological shifts. The purpose of this section is to develop the backdrop of this investigation into what is commonly considered to be one of the vilest instances in modern history. In doing so, I will trace my own path down the literature of nationalism and genocide while also giving a broader sense of the general literature on the subjects and their interactions with each other.

I begin, as mentioned above, by accounting for the influence nationalism scholars have had on issues of race and ethnicity. This section focuses primarily on the varying approaches to nationalism studies, in particular those taken by modernists and ethnosymbolists. This discussion is of particular import, as it allows me to situate genocide studies within the greater scholarship of social and political studies. The next section details the transition from nationalism literature to the more focused literature of genocide studies; generally, it is dominated by a review of the definition of genocide and expands only to include a broad introduction to the typologies of genocidal literature. I limit this discussion to works that have taken a more theoretical or macro approach to genocide studies, leaving the laudable and, particularly regarding my Holocaust case, almost indefatigable literature of each of my case studies until the final section. With this groundwork established, this chapter concludes by posing certain questions raised by the literature, which help guide the reader through the upcoming chapters.

Nationalism

The academic foundations of genocidal literature are found not in accounts of broad history, nor in critical studies of war and justice; these types of analysis provide accounts of important events of conflict but offer little by way of a macro approach to genocide. For that, we must begin by looking to nationalism theory. Nationalists of all sorts look to their movements to provide them with a different and better society wherein the rights and freedoms of the ethnic groups can come to full realisation. Nationalism scholarship is divided into two very distinct categories: scholars who advocate primordialism and its counterpart, perennialism, and those who support a more modernist, or ethnosymbolist, approach to the nation. In the forthcoming section, I am going to discuss both types of nationalism, but the discussion on modernism and the various theories of modernist nationalism will take up the majority of the discussion.

Perhaps it would be wise for me to quickly justify this choice. The primary argument between modernists and primordialists is what constitutes a nation and its ties to ethnicity, when 'the nation' begins and the possible equivalence of comparison between modern and ancient history. Nonetheless, even the most ardent primordialists/perennialists would acknowledge the differences between ancient and modern nations. Similarly, there is an argument to be made for the antiquity of genocide; Ben Kiernan's *Blood and Soil* (2007), Michael Freeman's *Genocide, Civilization and Modernity* (1995) and Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn's *History and Sociology of Genocide* (1990), as well as more specific works such as Ward Churchill's *A Little Matter of Genocide* (1997) and Richard Bauman's *Human Rights in Ancient Rome* (2000) all serve as examples of arguments where genocide is perceived as a historic event. Nonetheless, that modern genocide differs from conflicts in prehistory, Biblical times, the Middle Ages and even through colonial times has also been well established (see Bauman 2002 [1989]; Mann 2001; Weitz 2003; and Valentino 2004 for examples). In the later sections of this chapter, I will develop this to a greater extent; for now, however, let it be justification for my choice of focus regarding nationalism. The modernity of nations leads to a context and framework for my analysis of genocide literature more generally; thus, I have chosen to focus on modern nationalism more than that of primordialism or perennialism.

Scholars of modern nationalism focus on nationalism during the advent of the modern political state. Uneven development, modernisation, economic division and political displacement feature highly within modern nationalist discourse (Nairn 1977; Gellner 1983; Breuilly 1993; McCrone 1998). Modern nationalism sees a shift through the introduction of mass participation of the *demos* into the political realm (Mann 1990, 1993; Snyder 2000).

Nationality, for the modern society, is based on the search for expression through 'the highest form of organised activity, a sovereign state . . . [the masses] identified themselves with the nation, civilisation with national civilisation, their life and survival with the life and survival of the nationality' (Kohn 1945: 18, 19). Although since the American Revolution the definition of *demos* has shifted to include women and minorities, the basic tenants of Kohn's statement remain the same throughout modern/postmodern society. Much of these modern nationalist movements fall into Seton-Watson's classification 'official nationalism', where nationalism was imposed from the top down out of the crumbling empire-states (1977: 148). Anderson capitalises on this idea, describing official nationalism as 'a major effort to stretch the short, tight skin of the nation over the vast body of the old empire' (Anderson 2001: 35).

Often, the institutionalisation of popular nationalist movements by the state resulted in ethnically based exclusionist policies; other times, such as in France and Italy, a more citizen-based approach to the nation arose. The ethnic/civic divide amongst nationalism scholars is right at the heart of the literature pertaining to this project, hinting at why some radicalising states become violent and others manifest change through other institutions. Indeed, most modern nationalist scholars note the Janus-like distinction visible in national movements. Modern nationalism is credited with state building, enhanced levels of cosmopolitanism, high levels of civic participation and inclusiveness; equally, modern nationalism is blamed for civil war, separatist movements, exclusionist politics and extreme mass conflict. This seeming juxtaposition within the character of nationalism has been generally agreed to come out of two types of nationalism: civic and ethnic. Naturally, because of the problematic nature of terminology in academic study, most scholars tend to ascribe different terms to the two phenomena; however, a general understanding exists that these two typologies of nationalism describe the variable political outcomes of nationalist movements.

Hans Kohn is credited with introducing this split into the academic dialogue, associating the divide between civic and ethnic nationalisms with Eastern and Western communities. The rise of nationalism in the West, Kohn sees as being typically a political occurrence, associated with the concepts of individual liberty and cosmopolitanism popular in the 18th century (1945: 329–30). We must take note of the regional bias present in Kohn's theories; this 'ages' Kohn's proposals in that it is resonant of a neo-orientalist perspective. It is much more common in today's academic sphere to note differences between individual states or national groups rather than continents or large regional swathes.

Civic nationalism refers to a sense of community based on residence within a common territory and appeals to a common institutional past while remaining 'forward looking' (Brown 1999: 283); this, according to Billig, occurs through the micro-level inclusion of nationalist symbols into communities, resulting in a type of 'banal nationalism' present in everyday societies. The common usage of stamps, currency, driving licenses and other societal symbols of nationhood become the 'ideological habits' of nationhood (1995: 8, 41).

The seemingly beneficial banality of civic nationalism is countermanded by the negative associations attributed to ethnic nationalism where nationalism can be dissimilationist and exclusory, directing policies of nationalisation towards spheres of practice rather than groups confined by geographic boundaries; this has historically resulted in the 'large-scale migration of ethnic unmixing', (Brubaker 1996: 90) occurring

> generally at a more backward stage of social and political development: the frontiers of an existing state and of a rising nationality rarely coincided; nationalism, there, grew in protest against and in conflict with the existing state pattern – not primarily to transform it into a people's state, but to redraw the political boundaries in conformity with ethnographic demands . . . nationalism in Germany did not find its justification in a rational societal conception, it found it in the 'natural' fact of a community, held together, not by the will of its members nor by any obligations of contract, but by traditional ties of kinship and status. German nationalism substituted for the legal and rational concept of 'citizenship' the infinitely vaguer concept of 'folk', which, first discovered by the German humanists, was later fully developed by Herder and the German romanticists.
>
> (Kohn 1945: 329–31)

In fact, Kohn's descriptions of ethnic nationalism as being 'backward' and 'natural' hint that there is something in these nationalist movements that stems from perceived historical attachments perfected in some future utopia. In other words, ethnic nationalisms are typically built on ideas or myths of common ancestry and thus seek to 'establish the authentic continuity of their community by proclaiming visions of common destiny located in the future' (Brown 1999: 283).

This belief in a mythic past, found in each of my three case studies to varying degrees (see particularly Chapter 4), is typical of 'new' states, which Geertz credits as being abnormally susceptible to perceiving the 'congruities of blood, speech, custom and so on . . . [as having] an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves' (1963: 109). Thus, ethnic nationalist movements tend to portray the individual as intrinsically bound to other members of the nation, not through individual choice or need, 'but at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself' (Geertz 1963: 110).

Mann takes the idea of ethnic nationalism one step further when addressing nationalism resulting in ethnic conflict. Using the term 'organic nationalism', Mann describes this type of nationalism as being one where the nation is represented by one political movement with a professed belief in 'an enduring national character . . . distinguishable from other nations', which would thus give them the right to exclude minorities who 'would only weaken the nation'. These beliefs are expressed through the political platform of the nationalist group, are reflected in their ideology and resonate predominantly in Europe where the relationship of ethnicity to state was disputed (Mann 2004: 34, 84).

Mann's perspective here is critical because it places the role of ideology into modern nationalist discourse. Nationalism *as an ideology* makes a key difference to the 'quality and content of nations' (Smith 2003: 360). Nationalist ideology deals directly with the relationship between state and society, synchronising the relationship between state and ethnicity, tying in the utopian idea of the ancestral homeland with modern policy and political power. Thus, ideology is a particularly useful concept of analysis as, institutionally, it combines both principle and practise (Sutherland 2005: 188).

Nationalist movements and their linked ideologies inherently follow a moral agenda centred on state authority. This authority is manifested over the individual, which results in the bifold assurance that 1) one's nation is superior to others' nations and 2) too much influence from the greater world poses a determined threat to the nation (Halliday 2000: 165–7). This leads us to the nuanced but vital difference between *nation* and *ethnic group*, a distinction made by the ethnosymbolists above. This balance between ethnicity, nation and state creeps up numerous times throughout any discussion of nationalist literature and is particularly important for establishing the link between nationalism and genocide, as we will see more clearly in Chapter 3. In ideological analysis, I cannot overemphasise the vital importance 'the political' plays in modern genocide, in which elites become political power brokers and cultural symbols become rallying points for discrimination, exclusion, partition and death. The critical point to remember here is that while nationalism can be separate from violent patriotism, in the genocidal cases presented, such separation does not occur. There is a direct link between the state and the genocide. While this point may seem to be obvious in light of the discussion above, it does limit the breadth of nationalism and genocide; these genocidal nationalisms are linked to the state and are therefore inherently modern in nature.

From Nationalism to Genocide

So, the focus of this research is on states in transition from nationalism to genocidal nationalism; tracing this type of change places me within a dynamic, young and growing field of scholarship that attempts to explain why nationalism is so easily linked with conflict. Many nationalist movements exist and thrive without taking up arms against an ethnic enemy.[1] *Nonetheless, while every nationalist conflict is not genocidal, every case of genocide studied in this work is linked to a case of nationalism.* This is a critical link, not only because it opens up the vast literature discussed above and provides theoretical framing for this project, but more importantly because it suggests that key themes in cases of ethnic nationalism will also be critical to any study of cases of genocidal nationalism, including the three cases presented here. Thus, if assumed kinship, homeland, distinct awareness and varying categorisation of otherness, religion, language and cultural markers are all important in cases of nationalism, then they will remain important themes in cases of genocidal nationalism.

As regards the relationship between nationalism and ethnic conflict, Jack Snyder's (2000) work stands out. In *From Voting to Violence*, he asserts that democratisation is the recurring factor in cases where ethnic violence occurs. When a state lacks a democratising populace, Snyder argues, it also lacks a strong nationalist movement. As democratic ideas grow in popularity, elites establish a stronger element of nationalist rhetoric in their ideology in order to elicit power from the masses. Unrest also gives the majority bureaucratic control over minority factions through governmental power. Snyder's other strength is his definition of nationalism, which describes nationalism as 'the doctrine that a people who see themselves as distinct in their culture, history, institutions, or principles should rule themselves in a political system that expresses and protects those distinctive characteristics' (23). Thus, in nationalist movements where geographical boundaries already exist, nationalist ideals can be applied in order to result in the 'purification' or 'true establishment' of a state system controlled by a particular ethnic group. The benefit of this definition is that, like Weber's, it allows for the importance of history, symbols and so on championed by ethnosymbolists without ignoring Heywood's *national chauvinism,* where nationalist movements purposefully incorporate ideologies of ethnic superiority into their policies (1992: 156–7).

Though these are admirable strengths, and Snyder's work, on the whole, offers much insight into the relationship between nationalism and ethnic conflict, his work is not without flaws. What Snyder fails to point out is that, while transitional democracies are often involved in conflict, a genocidal democracy has yet to be established. None of my three cases are cases of democracy – instead, they are cases where democratic rhetoric was used in order for elites to establish legitimacy and was then discarded in favour of a type of government ensuring continued power would remain in the hands of the nation. A more appropriate accounting for the relationship between democracy and nationalism is found in Mark Mazower's work. He reminds his readers that though democracy is not necessarily ethnic, in Europe, the shift to democracy occurred with the goal to create *national* states. This was, in turn, inherently dangerous for minorities and transnational people groups like the Ukrainians and the Jews (1999: 53–60). Nonetheless, this only moderately clarifies the relationship between nationalism and genocide. In order to find an appropriate means of deciphering the conundrums of this relationship, we look next to Michael Mann.

Mann posits that 'political power means state power' (1993: 9; see also 2001: 235), an idea that supports the fact that the role of the state and political ideology in genocide is so strong that genocide is often excused to the international community as an 'act of state' in which any intervention is an infringement of state sovereignty (*par in parem imperium non habet*); the people involved in the implementation of this ideology are, by the laws of the state, required to obey and are thereby released from personal obligation to consequences (Arendt 2002 [1963]: 91). Helen Fein finds that virtually 'everyone acknowledges that genocide is primarily a crime of [the] state' because bureaucracy established the state as the modern power source and continues to encourage the growth of national states (Fein 2002 [1993]: 79; Mann 1993: 445, 734; see also Bauman 2002 [1989]: 111). My main, broad critique of Mann's work – and a problem in the work of many scholars, activists, lawyers and politicians – is one of definition. Throughout his work, Mann attempts, with only very limited success, to avoid using the term 'genocide' and instead uses categories of ethnic violence, including ethnic cleansing (discussed further below), politicide, classicide and forced conversion. His and other scholars' reluctance points to the fact that defining genocide is, and always has been,[2] a problem.

In the academy of social and political research, it is nigh impossible to avoid defining the terms of key words, theories, trends and socio-political phenomena. Most of the time, while this can lead to certain quantitative or qualitative problems in research, this type of definition helps establish the parameters of a project and helps the reader understand the platform from which the author is speaking. To talk about genocide is first to discuss it in the greater context of violence, as Mann does above and as other scholars, such as Bloxham (2008; 2009a; 2009b), do throughout their work.

Of course, numerous types of violence exist. In his *Nazi Party and Its Violence against the Jews*, Nolzen outlines violence as not merely physical violence but any type of persecution at all – including riots, boycotts and exclusion from cultural events. Nolzen's terminology is based on Popitz's, who defines violence as actions that are physically harmful, that cause economic damage and that 'lead to a decreased social participation' (in Nolzen 2002: 248). This type of language is inherently problematic, as it projects the image 1) that there was something singular about the exclusion of the Jews in the early days of the Nazi regime, 2) that all violence is equal and 3) that does not allow for the reader to discern the change and the radicalisation of violence. For instance, he posits that 'from 1936/37, there was no longer any difference between harming Jews physically and the "legal" destruction of Jewish businesses' (2002: 264), as if the shift between the destruction of objects and the destruction of humans occurred naturally and suddenly and not as part of a process of radicalisation that had been taking place for years before 1936. For the purpose of this analysis, however, violence is used to indicate only the first of Popitz's three points – personal, individual physical harm – as this aspect of violence is the lynch pin at the very heart of genocide.

Defining genocide is greatly exacerbated by the legal and moral imperatives entailed upon the definition itself. The key role of the Genocide Convention, passed in 1948, was to ensure that in the event of genocide occurring again, states would be bound by international law to intervene on behalf of those persecuted. However, the Convention's definition itself is highly contentious and quite vague in parts. The critical section offering its definition of genocide is Article II, which reads:

> In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
>
> a) Killing members of the group;
> b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
> c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
> d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
> e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Article III follows, augmenting the already indistinct language of Article II, suggesting the punishable crimes include not only genocide but also conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempting to commit genocide and complicity in genocide.

Contention transpires because, according to this document, when genocide occurs, a moral imperative is placed upon states who are otherwise non-participatory, incurring action and sacrifice of individual security, financial obligation, time commitment and military commitment. Thus, states have a reason to use the vague nature of Article II so as to find that genocide is not occurring and that they are thus relieved from their legal and moral obligation to intervene (for examples, see Holbrooke 1999; Neuffer 2001; Power 2002; Gourevitch 1998). Generally, states tend to use the narrowest definition of genocide and apply it to only the most extreme cases; if a case of ethnic conflict is not comparable to the Holocaust, then politicians are 'excused' from taking action (Shaw 2003: 35).

Scholars, however, are not limited by such realist restraints. One would then expect to find wider parameters, greater variance and a large quantity of opinions. In truth, there are almost as many definitions of genocide as there are scholars of genocide; some, however, are more noteworthy than others, and this synopsis attempts to analyse only a few of the more critical definitions. Most reviews of the literature attempt to 'start at the very beginning', introducing the term as envisioned by Raphael Lemkin, and go forth from there. Thus, it is appropriate for me to first identify some critical points of note about Lemkin's definition before moving on to others' definitions.

Firstly, one must keep in mind that when Lemkin was defining genocide, it was in a time where state sovereignty was even more paramount than in today's climate, where genocide was a crime of the state against the citizens of another state. Guerrilla movements and non-state actors were not inherent players in Lemkin's definition, neither were instances where a state would seek to destroy members of its own citizenry residing only within the bounds of their state (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990: 9). Of course, as established above in the discussion on nationalism, the state is critical to genocide. Perhaps no scholar has made that clearer than Louis Rene Beres when he avers that 'the state is now a providence of which everything is accepted and nothing expected . . . A sanctified killer, the state that accepts genocide generates an incessant search for the products of disassimilation: castoffs, minorities, the wretched. Though mired in blood, the search is tranquil and self-assured, born of the knowledge that its deeds are neither infamous nor shameful, but *heroic*' (1985: 396, 398).

This leads us to another point in Lemkin's understanding of genocide: he envisioned it as being able to take place in a variety of different political climates and through various ways, not only gas chambers, but also through deportation or starvation – in short, any possible way to ensure the eradication of Beres' 'products of disassimilation'. For Lemkin, genocide 'was a comprehensive concept of the social destruction of national groups' (Shaw 2007: 21; see also Levene 2005: 43). Samantha Power claims that Lemkin believed the acceptance of the term meant an acceptance of responsibility for the term, that since there was recognition of the formalisation of vocabulary, states would equally embrace the moral condemnation adhering to the definition (2002: 45). Unfortunately, even in light of the above-mentioned Genocide Convention, this has not been the case, as states will sometimes spend precious time squabbling over determining whether or not something fits the Convention's definition of genocide rather than taking action to hinder aggression.

Scholars as well have sometimes fallen into the same trap; their rationale, however, has little to do with resources and international power but instead with their general recognition of the weaknesses of the Genocide Convention. For instance, Helen Fein's earliest definition of genocide is 'the calculated murder of a segment or all of a group defined outside the universe of the perpetrator, by a government, elite, staff or crowd representing the perpetrator in response to a crisis or opportunity perceived to be caused by or impeded by the victim' (in Levene 2005: 78). A laudable definition, but, as Mark Levene points out, Fein baulks at noting a direct relationship with the state and has an unclear idea of the nature of 'group'. Melson's definition, 'a kind of massacre which seeks physically to eliminate or extirpate a communal group from the social structure' (1982: 483) shows similar flaws. Certain aspects of these definitions are filled by Chalk and Jonassohn, who have been defining genocide as a 'form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator' (1990: 23) for more than 20 years.[3] They make particular note of the state but do allow for the influence of non-state actors. The key contribution in both of these definitions is the recognition that it is the *perpetrator* who defines the group and not the victim. However, even Chalk and Jonassohn struggle to avoid the problem of 'group'.

Levene does well in discussing this weakness, present in far more definitions than those two noted above. The problem lies inherent in Lemkin's choice of *geno-* as his Latin premise; the term 'tribe' indicates socio-biological ties between members (Levene 2005: 78–9). However, as we have already seen, such biological ties are not frequently seen in cases of nationalism and thus are equally rare in cases of genocide. Thus, scholars and judiciaries alike have struggled with determining the remits of 'group-ness'; even the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) struggled with this distinction, as 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' were not terms easily categorised into national, ethnic or racial groups accepted under the Convention. The eventual decision was to allow for 'emic distinctions', thus allowing prosecution to go forth (Hinton 2002: 5).

Levene himself hesitates to give a clear and distinct definition for genocide in Volume 1 of his *Genocide in the Age of the Nation State*, though he does describe the common attributes of genocide, which include control of the state and the logistics and resources to undertake 'direct physical extermination' on occasions with minimal interference from without, a heightened sense of threat and victimisation on the side of the perpetrator, a prolonged sequence of killing over time, pursued regardless of age or gender, the employment of 'state-organised' military and paramilitary force to carry out the majority of the killings, the inability of the persecuted group to noticeably defend themselves and, finally, that 'the targeted group is the product of the perpetrator's assemblage of social reality' (Levene 2005: 76–7, 88).

These attributes are generally lauded by, amongst others, Martin Shaw; however, Shaw criticises Levene and others very harshly against their more limited approach to defining the term 'genocide'. His two recent books, *War and Genocide* (2003) and particularly *What Is Genocide?* (2007), provide scholars with the most recent in-depth historiography of modern genocide. Though restricted by a self-noted lack of case studies, Shaw reviews the work of almost all key authors in the field who write from a more sociological perspective and does so succinctly – an impressive feat considering the width and breadth of genocidal literature thus far. At the end of *What Is Genocide?*, Shaw provides us with his own definition of genocide, which attempts to incorporate what he calls the 'missing concept': the nature of the relationship between the civilian and non-civilian actor in genocidal states. The definition he offers finds that genocide is 'a form of violent social conflict, or war, between armed power organisations that aim to destroy civilian social groups and those groups and other actors who resist this destruction' (2007: 154).

Though I contend that Shaw fulfils his goal of classifying the victim group as a civilian social group, there are other scholars who would contend that victim groups can also be combatants, at least on a minor scale, or had, at one time, been combatants (Dadrian 2004; Lampe 1996; Mirkovic 1996; Suny 1996). However, though this is a critical issue now open for further debate, it is not of utmost importance to my particular argument. Shaw's work serves as representative for a large group of scholars, who, unlike Fein, Levene, Weitz, Mann and, to a lesser extent, Chalk and Jonassohn, argue strongly that the first step to reforming the term 'genocide' is to extend it. Scholars have yet to agree on how far this extension needs to go, but it is a key trend in theoretical genocidal scholarship. Academics of this field include not only Shaw but also Benjamin Valentino (2004) and Leo Kuper (1981).

The problem with this approach is that a wider definition of genocide is ineffective at both academic and policy levels. In order to watch for markers of genocide, to attempt to implement policies at the earliest stages of genocide, there has to be a definitive understanding of what that actually is. Genocide occurs for different reasons than politicide or classicide; it looks different on the ground, and the markers leading up to the killings, at some level, vary. When a people group is killed because of ethnicity or race, the rationale behind the killings is a different one than if a people group is killed because of their political affiliation, class or religion.[4] This occurs, as I will discuss later in greater detail, mostly because these other non-ethnic categories are changeable. While it is possible to change your political affiliation, it is impossible to change your blood.

The reason why scholars are so quick to demand expansion of the term 'genocide', and why Shaw has berated Mann's choice to segregate these terms from one another, is based on a moral belief that mass killing of this nature deserves equal consequence, retribution and justice with genocide. This is a belief that I share. But the problem here is not with the definition of genocide *per se*, though I do support changes in the Convention's definition, but with the judicial weight Lemkin's definition and the Genocide Convention give to genocide that is lacking in other cases of mass killing. Instead of attempting to change international law, as Lemkin did, most scholars have attempted to morph genocide into something it was never intended to be – a phrase to cover all levels of mass killing anywhere in the world at any time. This is a critical problem in the literature of genocide studies.

This being the case, I use a restrictive definition of genocide for this analysis, not out of a choice to exclude any group from the justice their suffering has earned them but instead because examples of mass killing that fit this definition have similarities and differences of particular import separate from examples of mass killing that do not fit within its remit. The definition I use is loosely based on a definition by Fein (2002 [1993]), though I have changed some of the more problematic elements, discussed further in Chapter 3. I define genocide thus: *the premeditated action by a nation with control of the institutions of the state to physically destroy a perpetrator-defined ethnic group, sustained regardless of the surrender or lack of threat.*

Ethnic Cleansing, Genocide and Nationalism

In order to positively answer the questions posed in Chapter 1, it is important to clarify that of the three cases of genocide I have selected for this project, two are cases of total genocide, while my Yugoslav case is more complex. It has elements of genocide but is widely acknowledged as a case of ethnic cleansing. However, there are events which are explicitly genocidal, conforming exactly to the definition above. This is a very interesting and helpful case when attempting to identify the key ideological shifts occurring during the process of radicalisation towards genocide. Many scholars make aggressive arguments that genocide and ethnic conflict are, in fact, the same thing. However, particularly since so much of my primary literature is based in international law, and legally there is an important distinction between the two occurrences, I discriminate between the two terms.

In this case, the United Nations provides the definition of ethnic cleansing; it reads that ethnic cleansing can be defined as 'rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove from a given area persons of another ethnic or religious group' (S/1994/555 1994). The focus here is on the physical displacement or removal of an ethnic group rather than on intentional killing. This then allows Article II to focus on what they term the intentional physical destruction of the group rather than muddying anti-genocidal policy with other types of conflict (Schabas 2008).

By this definition, most cases of genocide would be considered acts of ethnic cleansing. Genocide is, in fact, a subsidiary of ethnic cleansing, as successful cases of genocide do indeed 'remove from a given area persons of another ethnic group'. However, ethnic cleansing need not be genocidal; the key difference is in the intentionality of the killing. By allowing the pure definition of ethnic cleansing to stand, no one necessarily needs to be killed in order for ethnic cleansing to be carried out effectively. Though disastrously high numbers of people do generally die as a result of forced migration, these deaths are the by-product of ethnic displacement rather than the direct intent of that policy.

In order to commit genocide, however, intention to destroy a national group by putting them to death is necessary. The by-product of genocide, then, is often an ethnically homogenous, or predominantly homogenous, region. Thus, though cases of genocide are almost always cases of ethnic cleansing, ethnic cleansing need not necessarily be genocidal. My three case studies allow us to assess the difference between the ideology of ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia and the ideology of total genocide in Turkey and Germany, identifying the ideological themes unique to the development of a genocidal ideology.

Let me be clear: I do not perceive of ethnic cleansing as being a 'lesser' crime than genocide. Just as I believe classicide, ethnicide and gendercide to be heinous and vile, I believe ethnic cleansing and genocide to be equally so. I believe the moral consequences of all of these crimes should be prosecuted with equal fervour; however, from an academic and a policy perspective, it is necessary to acknowledge and understand the differences between these crimes. Though the number of deaths resulting from these events can be and are historically similar, it is critical to acknowledge that the rationale initiating such persecutions can differ. It is possible that they will have a different radicalisation process from that presented here and, thus, the way-markers, intervention strategies and post-conflict reconstruction policies should differ. Nonetheless, this research project is attempting to identify a particular pattern of ideological radicalisation towards genocide by looking at two cases of total genocide in Turkey and Germany and one case of ethnic cleansing with genocidal episodes as seen in my Yugoslav case, and I must leave other radicalisation processes to other endeavours.

Within this context, further discussion relating to the relationship between genocide and nationalism is also possible. There are substantial overlaps between the two movements; in fact, as I suggested earlier in this chapter, each case presented in this study involves a case of nationalism. However, nationalism and genocide are not the same thing and only rarely occur concurrently. Unlike the subsidiary relationship between ethnic cleansing and genocide, genocide is not a sub-type of nationalism.

Nationalism is a social movement whose purpose is to attain legitimacy for a national group through gaining control of or within the political machinations of the state. Genocide, as described above, is intentional action by a nation with control of the institutions of the state to physically destroy a perpetrator-defined ethnic group. Thus, we see that the persecutor group has already established political legitimacy. Equally, there is already a substantial amount of political power claimed by perpetrator elites, as they have control of state institutions. In short, in my cases of genocide and, to a large extent, in my case of ethnic cleansing, nationalist goals have been greatly achieved before genocide occurs. Extreme national sentiment, identification and fear of the anti-nation and expansive homeland claims are not necessarily nationalism but are certainly prevalent in genocidal ideology, as we will see shortly.

Historical Context and the Episodic Approach

In order to understand and analyse the strength of a shifting ideology, we must first view that ideology in historical context. The remainder of this chapter is to provide a historical narrative for my cases through a discussion of the events used to form the episodic; this allows us to ascertain whether or not path dependency is applicable when studying the evolution of radicalising ideologies.

Naturally, as Chapter 1 points out, this sort of research mirrors the work of Mommsen (1976; 1983; 2001; 2003a), Kershaw (1989; 2000; 2002) and Bloxham (2003; 2009b), all of whom note the importance of cumulative radicalisation in genocidal states. However, the difference here is that the focus of these scholars' work is the cumulative radicalisation of events. My questions have to do with whether or not there exists a cumulative radicalisation of ideology; I use events to provide a backdrop against which to map out ideological shifts, but we must keep the difference between events and ideology clear in order to efficiently answer the research questions set forth in the earlier chapters.

Therefore, this chapter serves to introduce not only the geo-political background of each case but also the events around which my research is structured. Each section begins by providing a short background narrative of each case. I then go on to an in-depth discussion of each of my key events, providing the storyboard for each case. In choosing which events were appropriate for this type of method, I looked for events generally characterised by four different criteria. Firstly, Mahoney's theory of path dependency is heavily bounded by the critical juncture, or the event during which traditional institutional constraints are in flux. In order to seek to identify this critical juncture and evaluate its ideological impact, it was imperative the events be somehow unique, a key event early on in the radicalisation process. Thus, I identified events marking structural and institutional changes, events which were unique at the point at which they occurred and particularly events setting a precedent for other types of similar events occurring in the future.

Secondly, as my research questions inherently address a process which occurs over time, I limited my events to those occurring relatively equidistant apart in the radicalisation process. While I did not want to contain my events to an extreme extent by saying that each had to be a certain length of time apart, I was cognisant of how close each event was to the institutionalisation of genocidal policy. Mommsen's theory identifies events as becoming significantly more radicalised; by ensuring my events occur at various stages of radicalisation, we are able to ascertain whether or not ideologies progress in a similar way.

Thirdly, I identified events of ideological import. In other words, I wanted to incorporate events acknowledged by that ideology to be important. Usually, though not always, this happened in retrospect. Lastly, I limited my choices to events which were significantly applicable to the genocide itself. In short, genocide in each case occurred within the context of greater conflict; I was keen to ensure that the events I chose affected the conflict between the persecutors and the inner, rather than the outer, enemies.

Let me be clear: I reference many other historical events, such as the Anschluss, the tension between Greece and Turkey, the death of Tito and the dissolution of the Ottoman parliament, and point to their importance within the process of radicalisation. That they did not fit the criteria outlined above and thus are not used to provide structure for my project is in no way meant to detract from their importance in the process of ideological shift. Instead, it is a reflection on my own inability as a researcher to incorporate every important event into a research project of this nature. That being said, the events that I have chosen provide an invaluable perspective on the ideologies they represent.

An episodic approach to historical analysis provides a 'snapshot' of history at various points of ideological progression. Rather than seeing the history of these cases through the lens of genocide, it is vital to view them, as much as possible, as they were at the time. This episodic approach to research and to writing allows us to compare not only case with case but snapshot with snapshot – the way ideology is shaped around one event versus the way ideology is shaped around another event. Thus, we are able to trace the radicalisation process of ideology in each case but also on a macro scale, establishing sequential patterns and pattern-processes more generally in genocidal states.

Turkey

At the turn of the 20th century, the Ottoman Empire was in crisis. A bloodless coup occurring on 24 July 1908 forced the sultan, Abdul Hamid II, to acquiesce to Young Turk demands, including the reinstitution of the Constitution of 1876 and the recall of the parliament, originally disbanded in 1878. As is usually the case, the Ottoman Empire, even under this particularly weak sultan, did not crumble overnight.

Established in approximately 1301, the Ottoman Empire of the mid-19th century stretched from Southeastern Europe to North Africa. Its geographical context means that it contained various people groups from various religions and practices, from Bedouin tribes to urban Armenian city councils. Though only a nominally theocratic state,[5] Ottoman law was based on a combination of Sharia law and 'customary law', with no codified document to detail which was to be used in what situation (Toledano 1993; Shaw and Shaw 1976). Generally, Sharia law was applied to minority religious groups in order to dictate the way in which they would exist in the Empire (see Chapter 3 for more detail). The resulting structure was called the *millet* system. Though considered rather forward-thinking in the time of medieval Europe, the American and French Revolutions had changed the way European states viewed their citizens. In a bid to modernise in a similar way, non-Muslim groups began to vie for political and cultural equality. This perpetual position of infighting weakened the state, particularly in the eyes of the Russian and other European empires, which coveted Ottoman lands.

Thus, in the Turkish case, the desire for minority rights is directly linked to the lack of a strong, secure state, particularly in the border areas of the Caucasus and the Balkans. The integration of the 1876 Constitution in the 1880s was an attempt at true reform, with the term 'Ottoman' used for the first time in reference to all imperial subjects regardless of minority status. Instead of deflating the situation, however, it enhanced it by continuing to acknowledge certain rights and structures based in the old millet system. What emerged then was two separate legal systems, one based on individual rights and one based on group rights, making complete implementation of the Constitution all but impossible.

By the end of the 19th century, substantial military mutinies had occurred across the Empire; civilians were beginning to rise up against discordant government officials. Whilst these events were occurring from Syria, Smyrna, Constantinople, Erzerum and Bitlis, the heart of the uprisings was to be found in Macedonia. Bloxham identifies the primary instigator of the coup as concerns held by Salonika-based revolutionaries that foreign powers would intervene in the unrest in Macedonia, thereby giving Western Europe and Russia a desired foothold in the Ottoman state (2005: 59; see also Dannreuther 2001, Balakian 2003).

This weakening of power provided the opportunity for other political groups to establish themselves in the Ottoman political arena, most notably CUP under the Young Turks. At the time of its establishment, the CUP was neither radical nor ethnocentric. Instead, it was a modern, secular political movement whose political foundations were based firmly on European ideals of the modern nationalist state. Their key focus was on the full integration of the 1876 Constitution into Ottoman society and a severe restriction of Sultan Hamid II's powers (Shaw and Shaw 1976: 262–7). Though only one of several such groups, their focus on pro-Ottoman liberalism, commitment to modern Europeanism and determination to see the Ottoman Empire sustain its power through reform enabled their movement to achieve enough political clout to manoeuvre into schisms opened by a weakened Ottoman state.

24 July 1908 – The CUP takeover of power

The sultan's vast espionage system allowed him, for the most part, to remain aware of the situation and quell many anti-sultanic movements during the early years of the 20th century through the judicious use of police, local forces and the legal system (Ahmad 1969: 4). However, as discord spread, the courts were not always able to condemn every revolutionary; such a situation occurred with Adjutant-Major Niyazi. Niyazi was a strong constitutional supporter who, after being acquitted on account of lack of evidence, called for a secret meeting of the CUP on 28 June 1908 and instigated the first of many minor insurrections taking place over the following month. The key element of Niyazi's movement is that it moved the anti-sultanic, pro-constitution Young Turk movement outside the realm of conspiracy and into the realm of insurrection. Outright rebellion necessitated action by the sultan. However, as the situation began to spiral out of the sultan's control, military troops began to refuse to obey orders to engage in open battle against their countrymen.

By 20 July, Muslim populations across the Ottoman Empire had risen up against the sultan, swearing to restore the constitution. Two days later, after the Ittihadist CUP had announced the restoration of the constitution in Macedonia, the sultan bowed to CUP demands for power, replacing key politicians with members of the CUP. Further to discussions the next day, the sultan acquiesced to reformer demands, enabling him to keep his title as sultan and his role as caliph. However, under the new constitutional monarchy, he would be little more than a figurehead, stripped of political power and role as head of state (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990: 257; Balakian 2003: 143–4; Ahmad 1969: 8–13).

Scholars of the Armenian genocide traditionally make much of this event, as it occurred through support of many ethnic groups, including Armenians and Greeks. Going back as early as 1902 at the first Ottoman conference in Paris, these groups affirmed their support of the Constitution and the rights provided to minority groups under its basic tenets. The relationship between the Armenian Dashnak Revolutionary Federation (ARF) was further reinforced in 1907 during the Second Unionist Congress, again in Paris, when both the ARF and the CUP formalised their agreement to participate in alliance with each other against the sultan. These events are cited by some scholars as being a moment when the Armenian Dashnak community and the CUP formalised their budding relationship, deep-seated in the foundational Young Turk ideals of liberalism focused on new, Europeanised political reforms, noting that 'many Armenians cheered the revolution' (Valentino 2004: 160; see also Waller 2002). However, most scholars give a strong argument that this alliance was a reticent one, made by the CUP for political gain and by the ARF in hopes of securing the reforms promised under the original Constitution. Even when such policy and action was agreed upon by the two parties, 'the façade of unity concealed the assumption that accounts would someday be settled with the Armenians' (Akçam 2006: 51, 58–64; Hanioglu 2006; Dadrian 2004).

Indeed, it was only months after the 1908 takeover that the Ittihadists began preparing for the institution of bloodier policies, primarily through the creation of the secret organisation called the *fedâiin*; this was a precursor of the Special Organisation, described by Akçam as a group of 'brave, self-sacrificing, obedient young men, who would undertake "special operations" – usually the murder of political opponents – on orders. Membership was entirely voluntary, but once one entered, there was no going back' (2006: 59). Two things are worthy of note here: The first is that the *fedâiin* was directly overseen by the Central Committee; thus we can assume that the unionist murders carried out against Turks of differing political orientations – primarily supporters of the sultan – were directed kills by those in control of state power. Before their political ascendancy, such directives were much harder to order. Secondly, these first victims of the CUP regime were *ethnically Turkish* and killed by those claiming to uphold nationality as sacrosanct. This leads one to remember that while ideology is often shaped by events, the reality of gaining and retaining political legitimacy sometimes requires political leaders to both move outside of the ideological platform they themselves create and also to bend and change that ideology to fit their immediate need.

Whilst the Ittihadist regime was swift in eliminating political enemies, they were seemingly at a lack to know what to do with the rest of their power once the sultan had been forced to fulfil their primary requirement. This provided a power vacuum the European powers were eager to fill. Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia, Bulgaria gained independence and Crete left the empire and united instead with Greece. Fearing a Christian Armenian/Christian European alliance, and following rumours the Turkish Ittihadists had been overthrown, Turkish nationalists massacred over 20,000 Armenians[6] at Adana in April of 1909.

8 October 1912 – Balkan Wars begin

Perhaps, then, it is easy to see why Turkish nationalists were so distressed by the outbreak and subsequent loss of the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913. Indeed, in ideological terms, losing this conflict struck a blow to the Turkish ideal of national superiority guaranteed by restoration of the constitution. In practical terms, defeat in the Balkan Wars saw the loss of 60 per cent of Turkish territory, reducing the empire to the approximate size of modern-day Turkey. Poor results in the conflict were blamed further on the sultan and resulted in his complete overthrow on 23 January 1913, followed by an immediate shift in policy, institutionalising the nationalism that had been thematically present for some time. This formalised the triumvirate of power shared between Enver Pasha, the minister of war, Cemal Pasha, the minister of the navy, and Talat Pasha, the minister of the interior and the man now largely credited with instituting the policies necessary for genocide. They oversaw the establishment of such societies as the Society for National Defence, whose aim was to establish unity and social mobilisation, thus 'curing' the ills of the nation, and the National Independence Society aimed at creating a thriving Turkish middle and upper class, replacing all Christians in traditional economic roles. Christians were not allowed to join any of the established societies sponsored by the 'new' Turkish state, as propaganda at the time allied the Armenians with the Christian Europeans of the Balkan region (Akçam 2006: 87–90; Derderian 2005: 2; Isyar 2005: 345).

Institution of these and similar policies coincided with the mass migration of Muslims who feared for their own safety from the Balkan states to Turkey. Many had faced terror and pain at the hands of Christians during the Balkan Wars and were adamant that the state provide protection from the Christian Armenian enemy (Judah 1997: 79); this movement of peoples will have long-lasting effects, resurfacing again in my Bosnian case. For now, suffice it to say that the loss of the Balkan War, minority unrest, not only from Armenians but from Kurds as well (R14079/Ab.12669 25.06.1913), and the tie between Christian Armenia and Christian Europe laid the groundwork for the next event critical to Turkey's procession to genocide. The Balkan Wars ended with established peace in February 1914, terms of which were decided by the European powers and viewed as degrading to Turks (Mann 2005: 131).

2 November 1914 – Russia declares war on the Ottoman Empire

Territorial losses in the Balkan Wars were detrimental to the Ottoman Ittihadist state, not in the least because of the loss of Rumelia, which was the birthplace of a majority of CUP leaders and, at the time, considered the heart of Turan. Amongst other shifts discussed throughout the empirical chapters, the key outcome of this loss was a shift in the importance of Eastern Anatolia to the Turks, not only ideologically, but also geopolitically.

Described by Mann as 'backward' (2005: 112), Eastern Anatolia was populated by the majority of Armenians in the Ittihadist state. Erzerum and Van, two key provinces in the region, were of particular concern, as they shared a border with Russia. Russian influence in the region was recognised as a key area of concern; the primary fear was that Russia would attempt to seize the region based on a shared sense of ethnicity between Armenians living in the Ottoman state and Armenians living in Russia. This also served as a concern that if this conflict were to take place, Armenians would side with the Russians in any conflict (R14078/Ab.2888 8.02.1913).

Regardless of the fact that the Armenian collective emphatically denied any alliance other than to their own Ottoman state (R14077/Ab.1987 29.01.1913), the Russian declaration of war against the Ottomans seemed to justify fears of foreign intervention by an enemy Christian state supported by Armenians. Once war was declared, the Turks presented the conflict as a 'holy war' of supremacy against the heathen 'infidels' in order to 'include and unite all branches of our [Turkish] race' (Enver Pasha in Astourian 1990: 136; see also Dadrian 2004: 203). Unsurprisingly, however, the 'Christian infidel' was not to include the CUP's greatest ally, Germany.

The alliance was established in August of 1914 in secret with hopes to wage off the military and political threat provided by the European powers. In doing so, the Turks secured German agreement for economic assistance to rebuild their military and infrastructure; this was shortly followed by a similar agreement with the Austrian-Hungary Empire (Dadrian 2004: 203–5; Anderson 2013). These agreements, however, remained secret and informal until the Russian Empire declared war in November. It was at this time when German influence in the regime moved from a casual relationship established by party leaders Enver Pasha and Dr Nazim to a formal military alliance.

The outbreak of war caused significant ideological changes, discussed in detail in coming chapters; these shifts were reflected by policy shifts which were, at first, not necessarily overly detrimental for the Armenians. Though they were required to submit themselves to conscription, something not allowed under the millet system of the sultan, the first month of the war reflected no immediate anti-Armenian policy changes. A startling defeat at the Russian border close to Kars, where many Turkish Armenians fought Russian Armenians, caused Enver Pasha to suggest to Hüseyin Cahit Yalçin, editor of *Tanin*, the main CUP newspaper, and the vice president of the parliament, that it was Armenian sedition that brought down the Turks. He suggested then that it was the time to be certain that the Armenians were 'settling in locations that could do no harm' (in Astourian 1990: 137).

17 April 1915 – Persecutions in Van

The Triumvirs acted quickly in response to Yalçin's idea, closing Armenian schools, shutting down the Armenian press and prohibiting Armenian international correspondence through all but the consulates. Whilst aware there would be some political ramifications for these actions, the Porte, as the diplomatic state was addressed, relied on the critical emergency of war and the necessity to continue formal alliances for military gain to override humanitarian claims these policies would normally cause (R14086/Ab.17493 1915).

The massacres at Van, however, were a new level of persecution organised by the CUP. Anonymous ministers at the Russian consul sent a telegram to the German embassy in Copenhagen, describing it thus:

> . . . Entire Kylikien Armenian massacres were carried out in hundreds of towns around Van where total populations have faced utter destruction. In Van itself, Kurdish bands besieged the Armenian city quarter; these new crimes of the Turks against humanity and

> civilisation were undertaken in a coordinated [manner] under orders by the Turkish regime in Constantinople. The alliance of the Russian, French and English regimes must herewith explain to the Porte that the personal responsibility for this crime rests entirely on the shoulders of the Turkish regime, just as the representatives of the regime who participated in the massacres will [be personally] held to account . . .
>
> (R14086/Ab.17667 1915)

Unlike the mass killing in Adana, this was clearly not the work of an incensed mob, but a coordinated attack set out to ensure the entire destruction of a people living in a certain area. Akçam recounts the experience of American missionary Stanley E. Kerr, who collected eyewitness accounts of the Van massacres. Kerr claims that 'more than fifty-five thousand Armenians had been killed . . . before the uprising had even started' in Van (2006: 201). While Bloxham estimates the number of killings from mid-December to mid-April at a more conservative figure of 10,000 (2005: 76), we can assume that there were Special Organisation attacks on the ethnic Armenian minority paving the way for this large anti-Armenian push.

The massacres at Van were swiftly followed by the systematic arrest, torture and killing of approximately 600 Armenian cultural leaders, political leaders and intellectuals on 24 April 1915, a date that stands as the generally accepted date for the 'beginning' of the Armenian genocide. This was followed throughout Eastern Anatolia as the war progressed through 1915. Though the Armenians attempted some resistance to the aggression, including raids on Muslim towns and interference with CUP communications (R14086/Ab.23244 31.07.1915), they had little defence against the combined strength of the Ittihadist state and the complacency of a world otherwise engaged in war.

By 1916, attacks and sustained policies of destruction were being implemented against the Armenians. In the year following the massacres at Van, 11 of the 15 Armenian diocese had been wiped out, and there were no longer enough members remaining alive to continue ministry; the diocese of Adana and Marasch had been completely destroyed (R14090/Ab.5914 3.03.1916). Just over two years later, when the Turks began their evacuations from the battlements of WWI, approximately half of the pre-WWI Ottoman Armenians had been killed outright, sent into camps where they died of persecution, disease or other malady or had been forced into the Syrian desert, where hundreds of thousands perished of exposure, thirst and starvation.[7]

Germany

When did the path towards the Holocaust begin? Where did it branch off from the shared roots of European history to devolve into some of the worst atrocities history has known? Historians tend to answer this question with great variance; Evans begins *The Coming of the Third Reich* (2004) with Bismarck; the entire basis of Abel's *Roots of Anti-Semitism* (1975) is that Jewish persecution begins in Biblical times under Ptolemaic Egypt; Dawidowicz, in her *Holocaust Reader* (1976), and Niewyk and Nicosia, in *The Columbia Guide to the Holocaust* (2000), claim it came with the rise of Adolf Hitler.

Whilst I agree that Hitler's ascension to power and Nazi control of state organisations and institutions are key points on the 'road to Auschwitz', I fervently acknowledge that without the anti-Semitism rife in the Western world at the time and without the extraordinary economic, historical and geopolitical situation of the late 1920s, this rise to power and the fundamental ideologies and policies of the party would have been radically different, if indeed the Nazis had been able to take power at all. In order to maintain balance in each of my cases and to allow this case study to fit into the scope of this book, I have chosen to limit myself to tracing German ideology *under the NSDAP*, thus restricting my research to events occurring after the Nazis came to power. Nonetheless, understanding Germany in the greater context of political shift is vital to understanding how they were able to come to power in the first place.

When discussing Germany in the early 20th century, we must rely on both geopolitical relations and transnational relations because, prior to WWI, there were two main 'German' states: Prussia and Hapsburg Austria; equally, millions of people who considered themselves German lived outside those boundaries. German nationalism at the turn of the century already focused on mistrust of Jews and Soviets, a tendency only heightened by the devastation of WWI, where both empires lost both political power and substantial amounts of land, and Germans were discriminated against by new political systems (Mann 2005: 181–3).

The Weimar Republic, another consequence of WWI, was fraught with institutional problems. Social Democratic functionary Friedrich Ebert stepped into the breach to become the Republic's first Reich's president. His abuse of the ability to rule by decree did nothing to endear him to a fledgling legislative branch and little to uphold the Weimar Constitution of 1919. Also problematic was the Social Democratic party itself; founded on Marxist principles, it could not move away from these ideals without losing significant numbers of working-class adherents.

However, attempting to employ more radical policies would see them alienated entirely, as they were far from attaining an electoral majority at any time after 1920 (Evans 2004: 80, 88–9). Neither the executive nor the legislative branch could control the military which, during the 1920s, attempted to circumvent the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles as often as possible (Crozier 1997: 100–5; Gatzke 1954); rearmament and military training began again, often in the Soviet Union.

The last straw, however, aside from political discontent, ideological disappointment and shame and lack of military support resulting from the Treaty of Versailles, was the effect of the Great Depression on Germany. Most scholars (Aly 2007; Barnett 1998; Benz 1995; Broszat 1987; Broszat, Schwabe and Herbst 1989; Evans 2004; Fischer 1986; Gatzke 1954; Mommsen 2001) recognise the importance this event had on the destabilisation of the Weimar Republic. The number of unemployed in 1932 had risen to as many as 7.6 million individuals, almost 34 per cent of the workforce (Burleigh 2001: 122). Indeed, many people voted for the NSDAP not because of an ideological tendency towards ethnocentrism but instead because the NSDAP campaigned on an open commitment to ease the unemployment burden and offered positive answers to dire economic and financial questions raised by the extremity of the time (Mann 2005: 183–4). Thus, here again, we see a weak state institution leads to geopolitical shift, creating power gaps into which growing, radicalising actors can manoeuvre.

10 May 1933 – Book burning at Opernplatz

The resignation of the Social Democrat government from power on 27 March 1930 marked 'the beginning of the end of Weimar democracy' (Evans 2004: 247); without a parliamentary majority, power began to shift towards the army, which had been illegally rebuilding stockpiles and holdings since the end of WWI. Though some members of the army were acknowledged Nazis at the time, the army generally kept its distance and pressured Hitler and his comrades to quell their extremism, thus becoming 'strictly legal' (Goebbels in Evans 2005: 249). The government was reshuffled with Heinrich Brüning as chancellor; he began the practice of restricting democratic processes of government. However, government support continued to wane, as seen in the September 1930 elections. As a reflection of the popular demands for political change, the Nazis gained an astounding total of 95 seats in the Reichstag. With Hitler gaining more personal popularity in the 1932 election run-offs against Thälmann, leader of the Communist Party, and the current chancellor, Hindenburg, the Nazis were indeed gaining popular support very quickly. However, most of their political campaigning during this time was focused, unsurprisingly, on the weaknesses of the other parties, the mistakes made by the Weimar Republic, the beauty and unity that would occur if Germany was once more united and Hindenburg himself, who was portrayed as an elderly, if honourable, politician who needed to step aside to make room for newer, younger blood.

The early 1930s showed massive gains in political support for the Nazis. Goering sums up the rationale for this quite well in one of his statements before the Nuremberg Tribunal, saying:

> One must not forget that at this moment Germany had arrived at the lowest point of her downward trend. There were 8 million unemployed; all programs had failed; confidence in the parties existed no more; there was a very strong rise on the part of the revolutionary Leftist side; and political insecurity.
>
> (Tribunals 13.03.1946)

People voting in support of the NSDAP were not voting for genocidal aggression; they were instead voting for a strong economic policy in an economic crisis and renewed national pride in the wake of Versailles. Though the Nazis downplayed their anti-Semitic notions around election times, some type of 'pressure' on the Jews was approved of by many (Mann 2005: 183). What that pressure would be and what form it would take, however, remained a mystery to the greater populace of voters and – as I will argue in later chapters – in many ways to the regime itself.

The book burning at Opernplatz is an early answer to how the regime viewed types of radicalised action in its earliest form. The event itself was a few days in the making. Staged on 6 May 1933 outside the Institute for Sexual Science in Berlin, home to an approximate 18,000 books and more manuscripts and photographs, students vandalised the institute's vast library whilst listening to their colleagues play patriotic songs. On 10 May 1933, the SA joined the students, pulling thousands of literary and photographic subjects out into the square, covering them with gasoline and setting them alight. Two days later, the *Völkischer Beobachter* published an article acclaiming the 'symbolic act' in which 'un-German writings were set alight on piles of logs'. In the same article is reported Goebbels' speech on the night in which the Reichsminister pronounced 'revolutions that are authentic do not stop anywhere. No area can stay untouched. As men are revolutionised, so too are things revolutionised'; the destruction of Jewish literature (called 'trash and dirt') was exuberantly praised, a reflection of the joyous feeling of the night (NSDAP 1933e).

Hill argues as a key point of note that the actions at Opernplatz were instigated not through the state but through civil action by the National Socialist German Students League (NSDStB). He points to the ambiguous 'world reaction' of indignation and excuse of student pranks as making the new Nazi regime 'temporarily cautious' about supporting the book burning (2001: 8–10). Unfortunately, Hill overlooks two aspects of the inner workings of the Nazi Party at the time. Firstly, much of NSDAP support and popularity was gained via grassroots approaches. That the book burnings were not decreed by the party beforehand is unsurprising when one looks at the way they unfolded, beginning as what could be termed patriotic vandalism and only days later, supported by leading members of the party. Secondly, Hill ignores the fact that, at the time, the NSDStB was already playing a role in the Hitler Youth (HJ) under von Schirach as Obernfuhrer. Though still in its infancy, the inner workings of the HJ were both overseen and supported by the greater party, and it was already the largest youth organisation in the Reich (Tribunals 23.05.1946). Rather than being an embarrassing mistake for the Nazis, the book burning at Opernplatz gives us an early insight into how the NSDAP worked and serves as an early picture of radicalised aggression against ideas and attitudes outside the state-led platform.

15 September 1935 – Passing of the Nuremberg Laws

Actions such as book burnings did not remain informal for long. The passing of the Nuremberg Laws on 15 September 1935 was not only the legalisation of persecution already present in the Communist Party in events like book burnings but was also a formal statement of acknowledgement of the radicalising anti-Semitic feelings in the party. Between the book burnings and the institution of the Nuremberg Laws, however, there was a general hiatus of specifically anti-Jewish policies; instead the Nazis picked up on another theme of purification suggested in *Mein Kampf* – anti-Bolshevik policy. In truth, many Jews of the time were indeed members of the Communist Party (KPD) and also of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), coming second and third in party power after the Nazis in the 1933 elections. However, the NSDAP were not prepared at the time to attempt outright politicide when political power could be gained by more familiar routs. The Enabling Act, passed in late March 1933, effectively legalised Hitler's dictatorship and allowed him, in July, to disband and make all political parties other than the NSDAP illegal. The power of the communists, then, was tightly monitored after this point and was, by 1935, seen as a conquered threat (Mann 2005: 193; Tribunals 08.01.1946, 10.01.1946b).

This introduces a trend, expounded upon in Chapter 3, in which the Nazis used the legal system to legitimise radical shifts in policy, thus giving further legitimacy to their own institutions of power. Thus, precedent was set to deal with the problem of 'un-German' political ideals. This stands as a perfect example of cumulative radicalisation in which aggressive radicalisation occurs through a graduated process. In this way, a precedent was set to deal with the problem of 'un-German' political ideals. Years later, following a wave of vandalism assaults and boycotts organised by the NSDAP against the Jews, the Nazis once again signalled a political and ideological shift with the passing of the Nuremberg Laws on 15 September 1935; this time, however, the 'problem' was not a political group but a racial group.

The Nuremberg Laws, introduced as a last-minute addition to a September Nazi Party rally (Burleigh 2001: 543), are broken down into two articles of legislation. The first, Laws for the Protection of German Blood and German Honour (*Gesetz zum Schutze des deutschen Blutes und der deutschen Ehre*), set out to ensure the purity of German blood in order to establish a pure folk for the future of Germany. In doing so, this law made marriages and sexual relationships between Jews and Aryans illegal, both within and outside the Reich; it prohibited Aryans from employing Jews to work in their homes as house or garden staff in order to further restrict the effects Jews might have on Aryans if they remained in close proximity. It restricts Jews from flying German flags but allows them to show Jewish colours, promising that in so doing they will be protected by the state.

The second law, the Reich Citizenship Law (*Verordnung zum Reichsbuergergesetz*), relieved non-Aryans of their citizenship, drawing a distinction between 'citizen' and 'national'; it also clearly delineates what constitutes a Jew and lays out provisions for part-Jew (*Mischlinge*). It stipulates that those who are citizens of the Nazi state were specifically obligated to support it. Jews were to immediately provide their local government branch with the birth or baptismal statements of themselves, their parents and all four grandparents in order to prove their blood-status.

Bearing this in mind, let us return to the comparison of the Nuremberg Laws with the law prohibiting the continuance of other political parties. The key difference between the Jewish problem and the Bolshevik problem is that because of the ethnic affiliation of the Jews as a group, they could not simply change their allegiance. A communist could conceivably change political orientation; a Jew would never be able to change his blood. This is a key difference; otherwise, one could argue that the passing of the Nuremberg Laws would have effectively made being Jewish illegal, and many people would simply have changed their religious orientation, and Jews would have no longer been problematic. Taking Judaism out of the realm of religious orientation, placing it firmly in the realm of race and pairing this notion with ideals of social Darwinism[8] so integral to the Nazis and other parts of the West at the time, proved to be part of the rationale behind more radical events, such as the Night of Broken Glass.

9–10 November 1938 – Kristallnacht

One cannot, however, simply jump from 1935 to 1938 without a brief look at events occurring in and because of Germany during this critical time. Whilst not technically at war until the German invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939, two key military and political victories were 'won' by the Reich in early 1938: the first was the Austrian Anschluss on 12 March 1938; the second was the signing of the Munich Agreement on 30 September 1938, when Germany assumed control of the Sudetenland. The expansion of German borders and the beginning of the attainment of greater *Lebensraum* did more than fulfil promises made in the early campaigns of the Nazi Party in the late 1920s and 1930s; the assumption of more land meant that there were also a much greater number of Jews living under the auspices of the Reich.

This being the case, it is hardly surprising, but nonetheless noteworthy, that following on from the Nuremberg Laws there were further restrictions placed on Jews all coming from the legal, statutory policies of the Reich. Two weeks after the Anschluss, the NSDAP published a decree under the auspices of the Four Year Plan[9] that all acts of disposal of Jewish enterprise necessitated permission of the local Nazi government branch. Twelve days after the signing of the Munich Agreement, and only two days after Kristallnacht, there was another decree published fining the Jewish collective 1 billion Reichmarks in order to 'atone' for the economic crisis; also published this day was a second decree citing that Jews were no longer allowed to legitimately own retail stores, offer their goods at market, act as economic leaders or be members of any cooperative (Tribunals 20.03.1946). The way in which these events mirror each other is not merely a point of interest but also a case-in-point example that Nazi policy regarding the Jews grew out of geopolitical events as much as out of an ideological compulsion.

Nonetheless, as I argue throughout the upcoming empirical chapters, ideology also pivots around events; in the case of Kristallnacht, or *Reichskristallnacht*, the weeks preceding the event showed a dramatic upturn in the frequency and ferocity of anti-Semitic articles and inferences in propaganda sources throughout the Reich, primarily because Herschel Grynszpan, a Polish Jew, had shot Ernst vom Rath in the German Embassy (Tribunals 10.01.1946c; NSDAP 1938a, 1938b, 1938c). As usual, a NSDAP meeting had already been scheduled in Munich on 9 November in order to commemorate those who died during the 1923 Beer Hall Putsch. However, once Hitler and Goebbels were alerted to the young diplomat's death, Hitler ordered a 'massive, co-ordinated, physical assault' on Jews (Evans 2005: 581; Tribunals 24.05.1946). Goebbels responded by deploying some of the most radical elements of the Nazi Party, including the *Sicherheitspolizei* (SiPo) and the *Sturmabteilung* (SA). Their actions developed into what Rubenstein and Roth quantify as a 'multiple disaster' (1987: 117). Firstly, it resulted in the destruction and looting of thousands of Jewish shops, the arson of hundreds of synagogues, the abuse of unknown numbers of Jews, the death of 91 Jews and the arrest and consequent incarceration of over 30,000 Jews in concentration camps. The second 'disaster' was done to the Nazi leadership. Generally, the population did not react supportively of the riots and vandalism. Himmler and Heydrich were caught unawares by the action and, in an attempt to win further favour from the Fuhrer, argued strongly that the event was mishandled by Goebbels (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990: 352–3; Coppa 2006: 174–5; Kallis 2008: 45).

Eventually, their arguments succeeded, and it quickly became obvious that in order to rein in any further 'mistakes', a new way of answering the Jewish Question was necessary. For instance, a look at the 1946 Military Tribunals reveals that Walther Funk, the NSDAP minister for economic affairs, testified to shock and outrage at the events of Kristallnacht; five days later, once a new approach to these and other anti-Semitic events was formulated, he made a speech characterising them as a 'violent explosion of the disgust of the German people, because of a criminal Jewish attack against the German people' and saying that the elimination of the 'Jews from economic life followed logically their elimination from political life' (Tribunals 01.10.1946h).

Nonetheless, there was still a certain progression of other events necessary for policy to change from this dynamic persecution to genocide – though the end point was considerably closer than five years previously. The idea that Jews would be deported and forced to migrate elsewhere was still strongly popular within the regime and understood to be Hitler's wish for the remainder of Jews in Germany (Tribunals 29.04.1946). Bloxham and Kushner remind us that even up to 1940, the ghettos constructed were to be temporary collection points for Jews leaving the Fatherland rather than extermination camps (2008: 135).

3 September 1941 – Auschwitz receives first import of Jews for extermination

It took less than three years after Kristallnacht for the Nazi regime to shift into genocidal action, made possible by many things, though most scholars agree that the crisis of global war was the key instigator. After the outbreak of war in Europe, the key historical events of the time unsurprisingly centre on military events. After the German invasion of Poland in September 1939, Germany invaded (amongst others) Denmark and Norway on 9 April 1940, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg on 10 May 1940 and Greece on 6 April 1941. The military coup in Belgrade during the night of 26–27 March 1941 saw the overthrow of a government 'less than forty-eight hours after they had succumbed to Hitler's threats and signed up to the Axis Tripartite Pact' (Judah 1997: 113).

During the course of these events, circumstances for Jews continued to deteriorate; the first ghetto was established in December 1939 in Łódź, Poland (Litzmannstadt), after the invasion; though Łódź was the first, the Warsaw ghetto was the largest and arguably most famous (Adelson, Lapides and Web 1989; Roland 1992). However, there were numerous ghettos established, mostly along the Eastern Front after the Nazis had established a military victory in an area; these ghettos were varied and had different purposes and roles within the Nazi state (Trunk 1972). A critical development in the ratchet effect of radicalisation, the establishment of these ghettos continued the legitimisation of the ideological necessity of the physical separation of Jews from 'real' Germans. It was from these ghettos that most of the workers in concentration camps were chosen (Mostowicz 2005).

However, an argument can be made that this move from limiting rights and freedoms to 'ghettoisation' to concentration was not genocide but extreme persecution, that there was as yet no deliberate attempt to completely exterminate any nation, only to enslave them. While the argument would be weak and the distinction slight, the argument would be silenced entirely after the events of 3 September 1941, in which Auschwitz received the first intake of Jews for the sole purpose of extermination. Prior to the arrival of this train into the station, Auschwitz was recognised as one of the most desolate concentration camps. The largest camp established by the Germans, it was housed near Krakow, Poland, and dates back to May 1940. Initially, the Auschwitz compound was formed of three camps, Auschwitz I, Auschwitz II (Auschwitz-Birkenau) and Auschwitz III (Auschwitz-Monowitz), led by Rudolf Höss until 1943. Though terrible human rights violations occurred at all three camps, including the spine-chilling medical experiments carried out by the infamous Dr Mengele at Auschwitz I (Nyiszli 1993: 17–18, 63–5; Bloxham 2009a: 181) and workings at I. G. Farben by the workers in Auschwitz III (Rubenstein and Roth 1987: 153–4, 241–3), arguably the worst conditions and largest number of killings were found at Auschwitz-Birkenau. Initially provisioned with two gas chambers, four complete crematorium chambers were erected in 1943, including changing rooms, gas chambers and crematorium ovens (USHMM 2010).[10]

After the establishment of Auschwitz as an extermination camp, the progression *towards* genocide was complete. While overlooked by many scholars, it is important to remember that the next four years of war were not as straightforward as is sometimes thought, either on the military or the genocidal fronts. Other policy initiatives, such as the *Nacht und Nebel Erlass* of December 1941 and Seyss-Inquart's decree institutionalising compulsory labour service, which resulted in over 500,000 people being sent *from* the Netherlands *to* the Reich as interned labourers, attempted to ensure that the anti-Semitic policies were at once legal and, to a great extent, clandestine (Tribunals 30.09.1946j, 01.10.1946m; see also Kallis 2008). This is not to uphold claims made by much of the German populace and Nazi leaders that they were not aware of the tragedy of the Holocaust (Goldhagen 1996; Tribunals 23.01.1946a, 07.02.1946, 10.01.1946a, 10.01.1946c), but to say that the state often did hide the inner workings and directives about the answer to the Jewish Question behind legalities and bureaucratic speak, particularly in their propaganda and within the social spheres of the state.

Nor was the German propaganda machine impervious to attack; until the military losses of late 1942, and particularly the loss of the battle of Stalingrad on 2 February 1943, the Nazis were able to claim unilaterally to be 'the' authority on truth, giving them a necessary standard of power through legitimacy of the print media. However, the long duration of war coupled with military losses and repeated attacks by anti-Nazi propaganda from within Germany (Kallis 2008: Ch. 6) meant that the strength of state-led propaganda was less reliable and thus, the effectiveness of state-inspired ideology was, to an extent, beginning to wane. Hitler's withdrawal from the public sphere did little to restore the faith of a weary people. Nonetheless, the Nazi regime was still far from collapse. As the war in the eastern front became more intense with greater losses for Germany, the 'level of brutality towards its own population was about to rise sharply' (Kershaw 2001b: 552). The way to recover from these losses, then, was to 'eliminate Jewry not only from Reich territory but from the whole of Europe' (Goebbels in Kershaw 1989: 555);

the ‘threat’ of the Jews was becoming increasingly tied to the ‘menace’ of the Soviet east (Ch. 3).

By the time of German surrender in May 1945, approximately 6 million Jews had been killed in the gas chambers, starved to death, executed, drowned, beaten to death or had died in medical experiments or from camp-induced illnesses and their bodies fed to the fires. On top of this number are the millions who were enslaved and suffered many of the same maladies, including rape, slavery and abject debasement and survived. It is thanks to the work of many other scholars that we are unable to forget the other groups of ethnically and racially ‘lesser’ humans – many of them German – the other approximately 7 million people who were killed in the Nazi reign of terror, reminding us that it is rarely only the anti-nation who suffer at the hands of their national persecutors. It is a theme reflected, as already shown in my Turkish case, in many cases of genocide. Yugoslavia is no exception to this abhorrent rule.

The Balkans

My third case is an outlier in comparison to my other two cases of ‘total’ genocide (Melson 1992: 26–9; 1996: 28). The critical difference separating the crisis in Yugoslavia from those in Germany and Turkey is that here we have a case of what is frequently referred to as ‘ethnic cleansing followed by genocidal episodes in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995’ (Malesevic 2006: 209). It is important to remember, however, that the distinction between these two events is often blurry, particularly in the academic, rather than the legal, realm. As the upcoming chapters will show, total genocide – the attempted complete and absolute destruction of one people group from the entire earth – was only ever discussed in my German case in the very latest stages of the conflict on policy and ideological levels and even then was only seen as a last resort. More similarly to the Armenian case, the conflict in the Balkans radicalises to an ideology focused on the destruction of one (and occasionally two) people group(s) from the homeland. Unlike my two other cases, a more complex system of aggression exists wherein each of the three primary groups (Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks) committed crimes against humanity (Dijilas 2003: 318; Ron 2003: Ch. 3; Weitz 2005: 214–19). However, the Serbs tended to act first and most aggressively, seeking out avenues for political gain through nationalist rhetoric and following through with extreme military tactics unused by Croats or Bosniaks to the same degree, mostly due to their military prowess. Nonetheless, the persecutions were less controlled than in my other two cases, less centralised and less systematic; this is indicative of the way in which the Yugoslav state dissolved. As Malesevic suggests, we find an 'unprecedented institutionalisation of cultural difference had a decisive role to play in the eventual disintegration of the federal state . . . the roots of the collapse [of the Yugoslav state] are to be found in the very ideas, structures and processes that were created by the state and its political system' (2006: 162). Mann describes these massacres and desecrations by mostly Bosnian Serbs against Bosnian Muslims (herein termed 'Bosniaks') as 'wild' in a way unfound in the other two cases (2005: 358). Nonetheless, it is the *ideology* that is so fascinating, as it is still an ideology radicalising towards genocide policy and towards genocidal aggression.

Serbs consider themselves to be one of the 'true' nations, with kinship and cultural claims going back well into the first century AD (Judah 1997: Ch. 1). However, the conflict in the Balkans is not a history of the Serbs; it is instead a Yugoslav history with roots in a Yugoslav problem. Thus, when recounting the history of the Balkan conflict in the 1990s, we must go back to just before the dawn of Yugoslavia. In 1918, the region's population was broken down into approximately 39 per cent Serbs (including Slavs), 23.8 per cent Croat (including Montenegrins) and 36 per cent 'Other', which included Muslims, Macedonians and Albanians (Judah 1997: 106). This 'Greater Serbia' restricted minority rights, causing suffering in particular to the Macedonians and Albanians, though Croats were more vocal about their position as second-class citizens. This partially explains Croatian alliance with the Nazis (Fine 2002: 11).

As we have seen in the section above, the Second World War brought sorrow and suffering to many. However, as certain scholars have emphasised (Bloxham 2010), that suffering was in no way limited to the Jews – though my own work focuses on that aspect of Nazism. Nazi support of the Croatian Ustasha government established in a military coup on 26–27 March 1941 sanctioned mass killings of Serbs and sparked a civil war amounting to all but 10 to 15 per cent of deaths from 1941 to 1954, resulting in the deaths of over 500,000 Serbs (Burleigh 2001: 410; Valentino 2004: 77). Before this tragedy occurred, Serbs and Croats had been living under a policy of 'national unity' established in 1905 with the Croatian-Serbian Coalition; Nazi support of the Croat surge for power under the Ustasha state destroyed the fragile trust this agreement founded (Judah 1997: 93). At the end of the war, after implementing a certain level of strong-arm tactics against opponents, Yugoslavia was established, formally dissolving the monarchy and vesting power into the hands of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia under Josip Broz Tito (Lampe 1996: 226–33).

The establishment of a Yugoslav state did not mean immediate establishment of a Yugoslav identity; it took rather a significant amount of Stalinesque-type rule to quell ethnically driven political dissent (Lampe 1996: 252–3). Nonetheless, with the reminders of WWII and Nazi rule still present in memory, fear of Soviet invasion arguably did more to create the 'us versus them' mentality necessary in constructing a new identity, where 'us' meant Yugoslavia and 'them' meant the USSR. Yugoslavia was never intended to be a fluid entity, more of a salad-bowl approach to government in which each group was represented to create a whole entity. By the time the 1981 census was taken, 20 to 25 per cent of the population in Bosnia's largest cities identified themselves as 'Yugoslav' rather than as 'Muslim', 'Serb' or 'Croat' (Weitz 2005: 203).[11] Yugoslavia at this time was constructed of six republics (Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia and Slovenia) and two autonomous regions (Kosovo and Vojvodina). Bosnia-Herzegovina was given its status to keep it from being a region of contention between Serbia and Croatia; indeed, Bosnia-Herzegovina was considered to have been the most severe, least democratic of all the republics (Malesevic 2006: 217). Macedonia was given its status to keep it from being a region of contention between Serbia and Bulgaria. Kosovo's autonomy was granted as a nod to its Albanian population; Vojvodina's autonomy was granted on the more historical claim that it had never been a part of Serbia, regardless of its 50 per cent Serb post-war population (Judah 1997: 137–8).

By the 1970s, some scholars posit that much of Yugoslavia's initial growing pains had been worked through; decentralisation had picked up momentum, establishing what Ramet terms 'a network of quasi-feudal national oligarchies' whose power was entrenched in each republic of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) (2001: 5). This balancing act was only made possible by attempting to limit Serbian bureaucracy to a certain extent; in an attempt to fulfil this need, the 1974 Constitution provided structure through ethnic quotas in multi-ethnic areas such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and the right of the republics to veto; the Yugoslav economy was booming. Many Yugoslavs considered the last years of Tito's reign as a golden age (Ramet 2001: 5).

However, with Tito's death came confusion. There was little guidance for what was to be done after the event of his death, and there was much power mongering as the institutional threads of governance began to unravel. This was paired with rising rates of unemployment and a faltering economic system (Lampe 2003; Jovic 2009: Ch. 5). Here again we see the same sort of power gap emerging as found in the previous cases; Tito's death, economic decline and the lack of institutional power independent of his person provided the opportunity for a more radical approach to politics in the Balkans. Though Tito's death is only one of many early occurrences adding to the foundations of radicalisation, ideologically it plays a particularly important role.

By the mid-1980s, the nationalism underlying the regional system instituted by the past and present Yugoslav constitutions began to reassert itself, often, as seen in Chapters 6 and 7, recalling the nationalist sentiment and fervour of WWII. Thus, we see introduced what Oberschall terms 'the crisis frame' wherein 'ordinary people were held collectively responsible for their nationality . . . [elite] ethno-nationalists did not invent the crisis frame'. They activated and amplified it with 'our nation is threatened discourse' (Oberschall 2007: 101–2). As with the other two cases, this growing radicalisation revolved around certain events, the first of which is Milosevic's infamous speech to Serbian Kosovars in 1987.

24 April 1987 – Milosevic's speech at Kosovo Polje

The period of Yugoslavian history between 1987 and 1991 is dominated by political struggles between rising Serbian nationalism promoted by Milosevic and the Serb elite and levels of rising nationalisms in other republics (Malesevic 2006: 177). Rising nationalism coupled with the delegitimisation of communism 'set the stage' for what Pavkovic terms 'the generation of fears of domination', fears felt by each nation against other, if not every other, nations (Pavkovic 2000: 98). This was the stage against which Milosevic was to solidify his leadership as a nationalistic figure. With a background in banking and as leader of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), Milosevic's rise to leadership is peppered with back-stabbing and favour-mongering, including the orchestrated ousting of his friend and mentor Ivan Stambolic, the then-leader of Yugoslavia (Silber and Little 1997: 40; Ramet 2001: 25). Before Stambolic was forced out, however, Milosevic had already made a name for himself as a nationalist, keen on appealing to Serbian masses – though he found little support outside Serbia itself (Lampe 1996: 346–9). He did so almost by accident, in an impromptu series of speeches and meetings held over a 12-hour period after a crowd of Serbs attempted to break through police lines and into the building where Milosevic and local communist leaders were meeting.

After the resulting beatings, clubbings and arrests, mostly by Albanian (and a few Serb) police forces in an attempt to stop the mob, Milosevic was informed. Cohen describes what occurred next:

> When a dialogue ensued between the demonstrators and Milosevic, they implored him to protect them from the police violence. Acting on a journalist's suggestion, Milosevic re-entered the hall, and proceeded to a second-floor window. From that vantage point he nervously addressed the frenzied demonstrators, and uttered his soon-to-be legendary remarks: 'No one will be allowed to beat you! No one will be allowed to beat you!' Milosevic also invited the demonstrators to send a delegation into the hall to discuss their grievances.
>
> (2001: 107)

It was this series of meetings that established in Milosevic's mind the seriousness of the Serbian 'plight' – though, in truth, they had considerably more power and influence than any other national group at the time. Certainly, before this series of discussions, he had only refrained from discussing Serb dominance or from using nationalist rhetoric to any great effect (Cohen 2001: 107). Afterwards, however, such language became more frequent, as we will see in forthcoming chapters. Again, perhaps because of the role of Kosovo and the context of this encounter, Milosevic focused on the relationship between Kosovo and Serbia and particularly on Serbians living in Kosovo.

Stambolic's defeat in December 1987 made room for Milosevic, like many communist leaders of the time, to enhance the power of his position and party (Weitz 2005: 209). Milosevic's rationale for many of his policy initiatives had an obviously pro-Serb intent. Soon after his takeover of power, Milosevic's government began allowing media outlets to publicise stories on the corruption of Tito's regime, thus separating himself from the former regime. His visit and discussions at Kosovo Polje cleverly revived the Kosovo myth, the idea that Serbs were significantly at risk outside of Serbia proper; he thus established himself as the leader of a movement bringing back the greater Serbian republic. The passing of constitutional amendments followed in 1989, allowing Serbia to reintegrate Kosovo and Vojvodina along with legislation enabling Serb deputies in federal parliament to outvote their Croatian and Slovenian counterparts (Pavkovic 2000: 105–8). Thus, Serbian leadership began to be institutionalised, and the idea of 'Greater Serbia' quickly began to spread to Serbs in other republics. Borisav Jovic, key aide to Milosevic through the late 1980s and president of the Presidency of Yugoslavia from May 1990, showed in his diaries that by late June 1990, Milosevic was already considering ways in which the areas of Croatia with majority-Serb populations could be subsumed by Serb-led Yugoslavia (2009: Ch. 7).

June 1991 – Slovenia and Croatia declare independence

In the early years of his presidency, Milosevic remained a strongly centralised leader with a firm grip on the power his position allowed him to maintain. Though much of Milosevic's support was ostensibly based on his representation of Serbian needs, Serbia resisted democracy within its own republic. However, as post-communist states began to be successfully established across Eastern Europe, Serbia's non-party pluralism was replaced by a more multi-party approach. Thus, 'authoritarianism was given democratic legitimation, but in a plebiscitarian manner, in which citizens were presented with a "take it or leave it" choice, designed by a leader . . . who had emerged during the pre-pluralist one-party system' (Cohen 2001: 165). With the creation of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) in 1990, Milosevic was able to distance himself from the 'old' Yugoslavia and claim the establishment of a modern political party. However, with Milosevic at the helm and with his increasing influence over the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), the economy, the increasingly pro-Serb education system, the police and the media, there was little to differentiate the SPS from the former League of Communists of Serbia (SKS) or from the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SSRNJ), its two father organisations (Lampe 1996: 262–3; Cohen 2001: 165, 166). Indeed, the only functioning federal institutions were the office of the prime minister and the army, neither of which were strong enough to support a faltering state (Malesevic 2006: 178).

The nationalist ideals and policies espoused by the Serbian republic were beginning to chafe other non-Serb ethnic groups. By 1990, most of the six republic presidents were in favour of Yugoslavia's governance system moving towards a loose federation of sovereign regional states; this would necessarily significantly reduce the amount of power and influence held by both Serbian-led Yugoslavia and the JNA, and it would mean giving up the idea of all Serbs in one state, the foremost component of 'Greater Serbia' (Glenny 1996: 37). As we will see in Chapter 4, Serb leadership incensed nationalist sentiment by staging pro-Serb rallies, aggrandising the dangers faced by Serbs living outside Serbia and using the Serb-led JNA to threaten military intervention if independence were attempted or if Serbian authority was limited within the federation.

Unsurprisingly then, institutional changes did little to endear Slovenia and Croatia, the leaders of the independence movement for the six Yugoslav republics, to a Serb-led Yugoslavia. The two republics had been vying for increased powers within the state system since the mid-1980s; thus, after attaining a positive result for independence in the December

1990 elections in both Croatia and Slovenia, a breakup of Yugoslavia proper loomed. After increased violence in Croatia's Krajina region throughout the spring of 1991, and after Germany declared its support, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence after an almost unanimous vote in their respective parliaments (Weitz 2005: 211; Ron 2003: Ch. 2). Though upcoming chapters discuss the ideological shifts this event highlights, let it suffice that the ease with which Serb leadership allowed Slovenia to break from Yugoslavia and the conflict with Croatia, not over independence but over the right of some areas to belong to Croatia or Serbia over others, signalled a shifting commitment away from Serb-led Yugoslavia to 'Greater Serbia'.

The immediate outcome of Slovenia's declaration of independence was a ten-day sham invasion by the JNA. The immediate outcome of Croatia's declaration of independence was outright war, with Bosnia caught in the middle. Bosnia, with its ethnically mixed population, could exist as a state within Yugoslavia; however, with Serb – and to a slightly lesser extent, Croat – policies of 'all Serbs in one state', Bosnia was merely a chew toy between the dogs of Serbia and Croatia. Croatian paramilitary forces in Bosnia were arming their supporters, Serb media propagated the idea that Serbs could not exist within an independent Bosnia, and the JNA was transferring significant amounts of arms and supplies to Bosnian Serbs to the tune of almost $1 billion (Weitz 2005: 213; Ramet 2001: 158). Ethnic conflict had begun, though the outcome and Bosnia's role was still uncertain.

1 March 1992 – Bosnian referendum for independence

Bosnia's road to independence was more of a forced march: either remain a truncated version of itself as a puppet state of Greater Serbia or declare independence and hope the international community would protect it, as they had promised to do with Croatia – who was receiving arms from the European Community (EC) – and Slovenia (Bougarel 2003: 113; Holbrooke 1999: 31–41; Ron 2003: 40–1). If independence was declared, Karadzic had already threatened Bosnia would not survive even one day of freedom from Yugoslavia and would 'lead the Muslim people into annihilation' (in Weitz 2005: 214). In the event that a referendum take place, Karadzic had encouraged Bosnian Serbs to abstain from voting; the Serb-led Yugoslav air force helped spread the word by dropping leaflets encouraging Bosnian Serbs to boycott the referendum. Nonetheless, on 1 March 1992, over 63 per cent of Bosnians voted; of those who participated, 99 per cent voted pro-independence (Ramet 2001: 205). Almost immediately upon this announcement, and regardless of EC recognition on 6 April, Serbian troops barricaded Sarajevo and commenced one of the 20th century's most infamous sieges.

Boasting one of the richest cultural histories of all cities in the Balkans, Sarajevo hosted the Winter Olympics in 1984, is home to numerous university students and serves as a base for art, poetry and music. Cosmopolitanism in Sarajevo was a matter of course until the Bosnian declaration of independence. Though Sarajevo had a Muslim majority, the Serbs were better organised (Mann 2005: 385; see also Ramet 2001: 264). Karadzic then announced a plan to separate the city into three main sectors, the largest for Serbs and the smallest for Bosniaks, though the Croats would also have a sector. The Bosniaks' sector was essentially a ghetto; though the Serbs never did manage to hold on to control over the entire city, a quasi-partition did hold, defined by a line Serb forces had reached while commanding the hills around the city (Oberschall 2007: 106–7; Weitz 2005: 215–16).

By the time Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic declared independence on 3 March 1992, Karadzic was openly discussing plans of war in order to keep Bosnian regions of Greater Serbia attached to SFRY (Ramet 2001: 205). Thus, concurrent to the siege of Sarajevo, Milosevic ordered attacks on Prijedor, Omarska, Bijeljina, Zvornik and Kozarac, all cities and towns along the so-called 'Corridor of Life' across the northern border of Bosnia-Herzegovina into Krajina, a Serb-dominated area of Croatia where fighting had been taking place since the Croatian declaration of independence. In contrast to the Croatian conflict, the JNA was not immediately directly engaged on behalf of the Bosnian Serb forces, though Bosnian Serb paramilitaries had been receiving weaponry and tactical officers since early 1991; eventually, the JNA did openly side with Bosnian Serb militia groups (Malesevic 2006: 182–3; Pavkovic 2000: 163). Battles for control of the corridor, or the Posavina valley, were sometimes costly for the Serbs but vital in the fulfilment of the idea of Greater Serbia, as it provided the link between SFRY, Bosnian Serbs and Krajina Serbs (Judah 1997: 207–9). It was along this corridor where some of the worst camps were established and where some of the greatest crimes against humanity occurred, including the Prijedor massacres and the Omarska, Bosanski Novi and Trnopolje camps, many of which were established, in a macabre turn of events, on the sites of primary and secondary schools (IT-99-36-1 1999; IT-99-36-1 2004).

11–13 July 1995 – Massacre at Srebrenica

At its height, Serbian forces came to control close to 70 per cent of territory claimed by Bosnia-Herzegovina; most of this territory was secured and stabilised in 1992 and held until the NATO offensive in autumn 1995. However, this is not to say that the relations between Serbia and Bosnian Serbs were equally stable. Significant disagreements between Karadzic and Milosevic had driven a wedge between the two leaders personally; politically, Serbia succumbed to (largely economic) pressure through the UN and the international community and imposed an internationally monitored blockade on *Republika Srpska*, restricting the flow of military supplies to the Bosnian Serb military (Pavkovic 2000: 164–6). Nonetheless, this did not stop the humanitarian crisis.

Code named 'Krivaja 95', the massacre at Srebrenica was planned months in advance after an increase in military aggression against the Bosnian Serbs by the UN and NATO (IT-98-33 2008; Silber and Little 1997: 360). The killing of Muslims had already begun, particularly those in camps, by Bosnian Serb military personnel. Bodies would be scattered around fields and buildings where the killings had taken place, frequently within sight of other prisoners and Bosniak civilians. Often these killings inspired such terror among remaining Bosniaks that suicides were rife, and many fled en masse in an attempt to escape further persecution (IT-95-18 1995). Nonetheless, the massacre at Srebrenica was different; not only was Srebrenica a UN-declared safe area, but the massacres themselves also established a new, heightened level of killing.

Once the Bosnian Serbs began to attack the town in early July 1995, the majority of the population sought one of two courses: thousands of elderly men, women, children and some able-bodied men sought shelter at the UN compound in Potocari, seeking aid from the Dutch UN troops (DutchBat) stationed there. They remained at the compound until 11 to 13 July, when they were forcibly removed by busses and trucks operated by Bosnian Serb militia – a decision made by Ratko Mladic at a meeting with the DutchBat and Bosniak representatives the first night of the attack, furiously announcing that Bosniaks could either 'survive or disappear' (IT-04-80-1 2005). The majority of Bosniak men who had sought refuge in Potocari were then identified and summarily executed (Weitz 2005: 217; Pavkovic 2000: 166; IT-95-18 1995; IT-05-88-PT 2005; IT-05-88-T 2006).

A second group of Bosniak men and some women and children numbering around 15,000 sought refuge in the woods towards Tuzla; the majority of this group went unarmed and were civilians or unarmed military personnel. The same night the forced transfer of group A began, the decision was made to destroy those attempting to flee through the woods. Thus, as many as 7000 to 8000 men were executed in the days immediately following the massacre within Srebrenica itself (IT-95-18 1995; IT-05-88-PT 2005; IT-05-88-T 2006; IT-98-33 2008).

> Thousands of Bosnian Muslim prisoners were executed. Some were killed individually or in small groups by the soldiers who captured them and some were killed in the places where they were temporarily detained. Most, however, were slaughtered in carefully orchestrated mass executions, commencing on 13 July 1995, in the region just north of Srebrenica. Prisoners not killed on 13 July 1995 were subsequently bussed to execution sites further north of Bratunac, within the zone of responsibility of the VRS Zvornik Brigade. The large-scale executions in the north took place between 14 and 17 July 1995.
>
> (IT-98-33 2008)

These few days of intensive killing sparked mass killings of a similar nature throughout other places in Serb-dominated Bosnia-Herzegovina. For example, near the village of Meces, Bosniaks successfully fleeing Srebrenica were encouraged to surrender and guaranteed their safety by Bosnian Serb military personnel. Approximately 350 Bosniak men summarily surrendered. The soldiers then took over one-third of them, forced them to dig their own graves and executed them (IT-95-18 1995). Bosniaks in Zepa were given the choice to either be 'evacuated' as the Bosniaks in Srebrenica were evacuated or to be overrun by the Bosnian Serb forces (IT-04-80-1 2005; IT-95-5/18-1 2002). The latent function of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina was to significantly change the

> normative orientation to which Bosnian Serbs were both dependent and subject as members of the Bosnian community. The objective consequence was to maim the collective sentiments that integrated Bosnian Serbs into their society . . . the result was to detach Bosnian Serbs from the value elements that they use to make judgements not only about others but also about themselves.
>
> (Doubt 1999: 21)

Conclusion

In many ways, the above quote can be extended to each case when applied to the disassociation of the persecutor from their moral obligation. Throughout the differences discussed in each case, this is one of the truths shared between them. This chapter, however, has attempted to show not only the similarities but also the complexities and the differences in all three cases. Thus, we see that indeed, each of these three cases is unique. As Dannreuther suggests, 'each of these wars developed their own dynamic and had their specific causes and origins' (2001: 17). There are distinct differences, not only in the events themselves but also in the way these events affected the radicalisation of both state and ideological institutions, something that will be discussed at length in the upcoming chapters.

Nonetheless, there is one significant way in which all three of these cases are similar: in each case, weak government systems led to a power gap into which three 'new' regimes were able to insert themselves. In the Balkans, the death of Tito and the lack of continuing multi-ethnic power balance provided the opportunity for leaders to assert the Serbs' right of dominance throughout the region and the need for the protection of Serb rights above those of other minorities (Judah 1997: 309). This led to a quasi-seesaw aggression, during which the Bosniaks drew the shortest straw. The Weimar Republic crumbled under the weight of the Great Depression and the strictures of the Treaty of Versailles. By the late 1920s, the party was essentially picked away by the communists and the National Socialists, with the Nazis finally winning the bones. As we will see, much of their anti-Semitic sentiment present in the early days of the party was founded on policies established by the Weimar state and earlier institutions. The Ottoman state had been struck by the misfortunes of empire – a weak sultan, a failing economy and a loss of geopolitical territory. As we will explore more fully in the upcoming chapters, the movement to 'modernise' in this case included a more centralised approach to government, whose focus on establishing a Turkish identity led to more ethnocentric policy implementation and ideological radicalisation where Christian minorities, and Armenians in particular, were associated with the 'old' empire.

These regimes were then able to acquire a strong foothold, asserting influence and eventually gaining substantial control of political, military, economic and ideological power through the institutions of the state. Though the focus of the rest of this book is on the path of radicalisation of only one of these four 'sources of social power' (Mann 1986), it is critical to remember that within the greater picture of social conflict, each of these four areas is vulnerable to corruption and to chauvinistic radicalisation.

3

The Anti-nation: Otherness and Ideological Radicalisation[1]

Introduction

Scholars and policy makers alike are becoming more aware of the role the link between nation and other plays in shaping national identity, particularly when governmental policies institutionalise practises of othering where 'the other' is considered as being outside of, different than, external to or less than 'the nation'. Nowhere is this practise more extreme than in cases of genocide. This being the case, it is surprising that the role of othering in nationalist ideology radicalising towards genocide has received little attention within nationalist and genocidal theory dialogue, something this chapter seeks to rectify. In doing so, I hope to provide a more comprehensive foundation and vocabulary for discussing elements of otherness throughout the radicalisation process.

This article revisits nationalist perspectives on ideological otherness, critiquing particularly the focus on the black/white relationship between '*the* nation' and '*the* other' through the lens of genocidal ideology. I then move on to more recent discussions on varying *types* of otherness as a key element of understanding national identity. Against this background of multiple other groups, we return to the question of otherness in genocidal cases, looking particularly at the problem of victimisation rather than othering in academic scholarship. A new term for otherness in the process of ideological radicalisation, that of *anti-nation*, is proposed and defended. Descriptors of the anti-nation are discussed and, finally, shown as a part of the radicalisation of genocidal ideology through case study analysis.

Analysing Otherness in Nationalism Literature

Defining the nation, constructing national identity and mainstreaming nationalist ideology are three norms institutionalised in the late 19th and 20th centuries. When analysing scholars' perception of the role of otherness in the nationalism debate, certain points deserve re-examination in order to appreciate the strengths and weaknesses of current literature. To begin, most theorists of nationalism, whether modern or primordial, civic or ethnic, banal or chauvinist, assume the necessity of othering in the establishment of the idea of 'nation'. For instance, Anthony Smith notes that national identity defines the self and self-distinctiveness 'vis-à-vis other national communities and their members' (2010: 20); Weber notes the definition of 'nation' includes a specific 'culture mission' where the nation is at once superior to the other and thus able to be both defined and expanded (1948: 177). Moreover, most of these theories acknowledge the role of otherness in the development of nationalist ideology. Hall's work serves as a good example, claiming that 'only when there is an Other can you know who you are . . . the Other is not outside, but also inside the Self' (1996: 345; see also Craib 1998; Guibernau 2006; Hearn 2002). Otherness, then, is a necessary element of nationalist ideology, a common understanding that *sameness* is fundamental in establishing national identity leading to an ideologically expressed common understanding of *otherness*.

Despite the acceptance that otherness is vital to nationalism, the role of otherness within national ideology is critically underdeveloped. Many scholars, including those discussed above, limit discussions on otherness to a sentence or paragraph within a large body of work. Though this is beginning to change as the work of a new generation of nationalism scholars is gaining influence (below), this theoretical oversight is surprising considering that 'others' tend to be historically persecuted at the hands of the nation. Indeed, considerable work has been done on the relationship between nationalism and persecution, particularly the more extreme crimes, though those works have generally failed to connect these policies with theories of ideological otherness.

Finally, there is a repeated trait amongst nationalism theorists to use the singular terms of '*the* nation' and '*the* other' (Mann 2005: 3, 6, 151; Smith 1998: 182; Connor 1994: 105, 170, amongst others). This is not to say scholars deny multiple groups exist in radicalising states, but they fail to recognise this as otherness and generally fail to acknowledge that national identity is not only created out of the identification of one other group but within the context of multiple other groups. Unfortunately, projecting otherness as a black/white, us/them relationship is a critical misstep, primarily because such terminology limits the influence of shifts in otherness on national identity creation. Using inflexible terms has led to inflexible theories and thus to inflexible policies. This point is important in cases of complex identity creation and conflict. Many modern conflicts have 1) nationalist overtones and 2) lasted for ten years or more (Marshall and Cole 2011). As Dan Smith points out, this can lead to shifts in intentions and rationales in ideological spheres, including shifts in the importance of one other group over another where outcomes are theoretically underdeveloped due to restrictions necessitated by an adherence to the idea of '*the* other' (1996: Ch. 3).

Typologies of Otherness in the Nationalism Debate

Though the first generation of nationalism studies provides us with a perspective on identity and state formation, it is the next generation of scholars who address complexities of otherness within cases of nationalism, though few considered cases are genocidal, providing replies to some of the critiques mentioned above. An important critical typology of other-groups in nationalism literature is introduced by Triandafyllidou, whose research focuses on 'significant others', ethnic minorities whose participation in state construction, distinct culture, language and traditions separate them from the nation due to a sense of threat posed to the nation (1998: 601). Within this context, Triandafyllidou presents four possible other-group types, beginning with 1) the internal/cultural significant other and 2) the internal/territorial significant other; here, significant others are typically immigrant communities or ethnic minorities whose threat is a perception of 'destroying the nation from within'. She goes on to note 3) the external/cultural significant other and 4) the external/territorial significant other; here, significant others tend to be rival nations or dominant ethnic groups whose threat is a 'challenge' to the 'territorial and/or cultural integrity of the nation from without' (1998: 601–2). Each nation usually maintains only one significant other at any one time, though these can and do shift over time.

Petersoo builds on the internal/external other typology by adding a moral element to the discussion, using Estonia to show the effects internal negative, internal positive, external negative and external positive others have on identity (2007: 121–9). Yadgar takes Triandafyllidou's definition and brings us one step closer to specifically genocidal cases by pointing out the importance and uniqueness of conflict in the nation versus significant other relationship (2003: 52). By recognising the importance of multiple other-groups, we find the argument for the dual nature of national identity as both excluder and includer is strengthened; it allows for the relative aspects of the debate to be seen, that 'nationals are not simply very close or close enough to one another, they are closer to one another than they are to outsiders' (Triandafyllidou 1998: 598–9).

Categorisation and sub-categorisation provides intriguing analysis, namely the distinction between external and internal others carries into ideologies radicalising towards genocide. This occurs in the first instance as states are preparing to go to war and maintains a more common rationale found in conflicts throughout history where a group defines itself against (and generally superior to) those on the other side of the battle lines (Buckley and Cummings 2001; Bergen 2003; Dannreuther 2001; Fearon 2003; Shaw 2003). Convincing work has been done on the subject by Winter, who presents his readers with a study of the Armenian genocide in the context of WWI. Total war, he finds, unifies states, allows for the establishment and destruction of an enemy and is modern; all of these are necessary for genocidal ideology to be instated (2003: 197). Mann also agrees with the relationship between war and genocide, saying that war 'itself if the most serious escalator. It normalises and legitimises killing' (2001: 237).

However, even within the context of war, the categorisation and subcategorisation of otherness introduces new terminological questions. Amongst theories of multiple types of otherness, there is recognition that not all other-groups are created equal. Zukier (1996) uses 'essential other' to describe groups such as Armenians; Gol relies on 'first other' to distinguish Armenians from multiple other-groups in Ottoman Turkey (2005: 121). This persistent extreme-ising terminology, where Armenians, Jews and Bosniaks are seen as distinctive amongst other-groups, indicates that we might need to question whether or not merely subcategorising otherness is the appropriate evaluation of otherness in genocidal states. Does it properly evaluate the role of otherness in states radicalising towards genocide or does the uniqueness of genocide as a type of nationalism necessitate a different type of group altogether in order to explain the role these groups play ideologically?

Analysing Otherness in Genocidal Literature

In order to answer this query, we should turn to the work of genocide scholars. At first glance, we see that they also tend to discuss 'otherness' as something inherent in genocidal cases, a problem of 'race and space' as described by Jürgen Zimmerer (2011) in his discussions on the Herero and Nama genocides. Cathie Carmichael summarises this relationship by defining genocide as cases where 'nationalizing regimes tried to impose radical solutions and displace, expel or murder those defined as outside the national group' (2010: 397). Generally, genocide scholars use a sense of otherness to explain why certain groups are selected to play the scapegoat victim role: because they are unlike the nation, a particular group instils a sense of fear and uncertainty in the nation (for more on otherness and fear, see Gagnon 1995; Melson 1996; Young 2001). Though limited to genocidal cases of conflict, this conception of 'otherness' carries similar problems of inflexibility and a lack of complex analysis as when posed by scholars of nationalism more broadly. Outside this black/white perception of otherness, we find that, as shown below, there is very little focus on discussing the effects of otherness on the ideologies and policies of genocidal regimes outside the chronicled description of the victimisation of some other-groups.

Within the context of conflict, this focus on victimisation is unique to genocide scholarship; it is through the lens of victimisation that most discussions regarding the relationship between nation (perpetrator) and other-group (victim) take place. Here, within scholarship analysing the victim-perpetrator relationship as opposed to the nation-other relationship, we begin to see reflections on sub-categorisation of otherness and insights into the role of 'other' on theoretical and empirical levels. Insights such as those from this Bosniak schoolteacher, who stated that '[Bosniaks] never, until the war, thought of ourselves as Muslims. We were Yugoslavs. But when we began to be murdered because we are Muslims, things changed. The definition of who we are today has been determined by our killers' (in Kaufmann 1996: 144), lead Chalk and Jonassohn to foundationally claim that, in cases of genocide, victim identities are perpetrator-defined (1990: 23). Following from this, Fein also falls into the language of 'victim group' and 'perpetrator group', using the distinctions to gauge differences in responses and effects on both (2002: 84). Valentino uses the victim-perpetrator categorisation throughout his work (2004: Ch. 5), where he follows the process of policy radicalisation in response to particular victim-groups.

Thus, looking at victim-perpetrator relationships does offer insight into the role of otherness in genocidal states. However, this approach has significant limitations. The most obvious is that 'the victims', be they Armenian, Hutu, Ukrainian, Muslim or others, are not the only victim-group of their respective regimes, nor are they even the only ethnically based victim-group of their respective perpetrators. Though this fact is quickly acknowledged by most, if not all, scholars of these cases of genocide, it is generally overlooked when discussing the concept of 'otherness' in these cases. The acknowledgement of multiple victim-groups, particularly when those groups are identified through ethnic markers by external sources such as the perpetrator, is equally an acknowledgement of multiple other-groups. This eliminates our ability to discuss 'the other' or 'the victim' as if there were only one other-group at play in genocidal processes.

The second problem associated with viewing the role of 'other' through the lens of 'victim' is that scholars are attempting to use hindsight as a predictive indicator. By focusing on victimisation, we are looking at the outcome of policy rather than at the process of radicalisation. Take Fein's approach as only one of many options; she discusses a sequence of preconditions for genocide, including identifying a victim-group previously defined as outside the universe of obligation, the reduction in rank of the state by defeat in conflict, the acquisition of state power by nationalist elites and that the perceived cost for extermination changes as war with a party expected to protest extermination policies is instigated (1981: 9). In order for these preconditions to apply, victimisation must already be an accepted fact. This becomes problematic when identifying *current and ongoing* ideological markers. For example, in 1933, the Jews were an already marginalised group, but they were not yet victims of genocide. We should not look at the ideology present in 1933 to explain ideology in 1943. In a field driven by the search for what Moses titles 'the general theory of genocide', explaining why genocidal ideologies are adopted by certain elites in certain circumstances (2008: 1, 6), it is surprising that so many scholars adopt an approach to otherness which assumes victimisation as a starting point. It is critical, when approaching the process of radicalisation, that we perceive otherness as an agent of ideological shift.

A further drawback of perceiving otherness through the victim-perpetrator relationship is seen when we return to the ideological role of nationalism. Though there is no doubt multiple groups suffered victimisation at the hands genocidal regimes, the ideological projection of these relationships are reversed: 'Armenians in Turkey must and were going to be killed. They had grown . . . in wealth and numbers *until they had become a menace* to the ruling Turkish race; extermination [is] the only remedy', as the governor of Harput explained to German vice-consul Max Scheubner-Richter (Akçam 2006: 150, emphasis mine; see also R14084/Ab5647 1914; R14086/Ab12110 1915). Though certain groups are victims of mass violence, radicalising ideology expresses a reverse relationship where the nation is the victim and must act aggressively to protect itself. Therefore, discussing victimisation in ideological terms has a propensity to become unnecessarily complex without a better identification of this group which goes beyond both 'victim' and 'other'. Though genocide scholarship, and particularly a focus on the victim-perpetrator relationship, provides some insights critical to the role of otherness in genocidal states, alone it is lacking when addressing the specific nature of 'otherness' expressed through the role played by groups such as the Armenians.

What this discussion suggests is that a new approach to otherness is necessary in order to properly understand the role of certain other-groups as actors of structure and agency within ideological spheres in states radicalising towards and participating in genocide. We need an approach to otherness serving three main functions: Firstly, any new expression of otherness requires an in-built element of agency, in that it is process driven, rather than outcome driven, avoiding problems of 'victimisation' discussed above. Secondly, this new terminology should allow for the possibility of multiple other-groups to exist within any particular case. Thirdly, any new category of otherness will need to acknowledge that certain groups have an ideological role unique amongst other-groups. In fact, what this new category of otherness needs is to actually go beyond otherness. By emphasising the role of multiple others and by acknowledging the unique ideological role of certain groups, we see that otherness alone is not enough to identify the role of certain groups in radicalising ideology. It is not mere otherness; it is not even extreme otherness – their ideological role is that of absolute antithesis to the nation. Thus, I suggest that the role played by such groups is that of *anti-nation*.

Defining Characteristics of the Anti-nation

Broadly, five ideological characteristics set within the socio-economic and political setting typical of radicalising states can be used to identify a group as an anti-nation, creating a unique 'Molotov cocktail' group identity ripe for mass destruction. Ideology radicalising towards genocide portrays, if not all, then most of these five elements at varying levels of extremism throughout the course of ideological evolution as qualities of the anti-nation. The level to which these characteristics are present will vary from case to case, something that perhaps explains differences between certain types of genocide.

The first of these five characteristics is that of 1) *homeland claims*. Current or historical competing claims for land, particularly if that land is claimed by the nation as critical to the national homeland, put a particular other-group at maximum risk. Though these claims can regress during times of duress as persecuted groups try and assuage national elites, as we will see further in Chapter 5, the perception of the 'homeland at risk' at the hands of the anti-nation tends to remain at some level throughout the radicalisation period. This characteristic is particularly potent in states where there has been a recent loss of significant territory (Mandelstam 1931: 31; Dadrian 2004: 191–2; Astourian 1990: 129; Ahmad 1969: 91).

Similarly, the use of 2) *religion* in genocidal states, both on an institutional and symbolic level, has been addressed at great length with good reason (Dietrich 1994; Fox 2004a, 2004b; Frisch and Sandler 2004; Kershaw 2002; Gagnon 1995; Peterson and Flanders 2002; Banac 1994; Streng 1974). Religion streamlines customs, provides the structure for a belief in common descent and unifies historical perceptions, thereby becoming one of the primary culture bearers – even in seemingly secular states. Perceived religious marginalisation offers national elites a foundation to build upon fear of the anti-nation. The way in which this is accomplished will vary case by case; nonetheless, though the nation and anti-nation are generally associated with different religious groups, that association is typically cultivated ideologically by elites over the course of the radicalisation process.

Religion can also be one of the factors influencing the perceived and/or actual 3) *alliances* of the anti-nation with surrounding states. The anti-nation is ideologically portrayed as allied with other national enemies; when these enemies are perceived as directly threatening the nation, particularly during times of war, the threat of the 'enemy within' is exponentially increased. Illusory political and ethnical alliances can be of weight regarding the importance of alliances in distinguishing the anti-nation from the remaining other-groups.

To say that the anti-nation 4) usually includes individuals from a *range of economic and social backgrounds* is merely to imply that the anti-nation is not necessarily restricted to a class or political group. Unlike cases of group association (Mann 2001: 210; Jones 2004), where the victims are members of one particular political, class or gender group, the anti-nation usually has victims from a large range and variety of groups – the one exception usually being religion.

Lastly, there is a strong perception of 5) *historical animosity* between the nation and anti-nation; to what extent this perception is 'true' rather than an ideologically constructed myth will vary. Even so, the perception of historical violence allowed national elites to drive a wedge between the nation and this particular other-group, further singling out the anti-nation from remaining other-groups.

Using the terminology of 'anti-nation' instead of 'other' or 'victim' fills the necessary prerequisites, in that it acknowledges the unique role the anti-nation plays amongst other groups as an ideological actor, it allows for the influence of multiple other-groups on ideology and it allows us to analyse and evaluate the importance of the anti-nation as an active element in radicalisation. Ideology, then, becomes the structure in which the agency of anti-nation develops and radicalises, along with ideas of *nation* and *homeland* integral to 'successful' genocidal nationalisms.

Ideology therefore provides a structure in which anti-nation identities develop. As that structure is forced to shift due to varying geopolitical changes, ideology as agency is constrained, though at varying levels between cases. If it is true that there is a variance in the level of otherness present in radicalising states, then further analysis is necessary into how the idea of the anti-nation affects the cumulative radicalisation process of ideology. The next section leaves this discussion on otherness and focuses instead on what role the anti-nation plays in radicalisation, determining the ways in which it remains static and how increasingly extreme policies bring about increasingly extreme ideological change.

Ideological Radicalisation in Action

The role of the anti-nation in radicalising ideologies is best observed by focusing on two questions: 1) Are there any recurring themes or patterns in ideology as it relates to the anti-nation? and 2) What are the key elements of the relationship between anti-nation ideology and policy? Referring back to the discussion in this book's introduction regarding structure and agency, my goal here is to further discover the ways in which the structure of radicalising ideology reflects, projects, absorbs and disseminates patterns and themes relating to the anti-nation; equally, I am interested in addressing the ways in which the agency of state elites both affects and is affected by structural shifts that pertain to the anti-nation. I am seeking to ascertain whether or not ideology is a vehicle for dehumanisation and if my cases demonstrate the ideological objectification of the anti-nation as a threat whose elimination will allow the nation to flourish. This analysis becomes even more critical when viewed in light of radicalising policies and events in each case.

The following sections study each of my three cases, using time periods demarcated by key developments in the ideological dynamisation process set out in Chapter 2. The analysis section focuses on the key themes arising in each case in comparative perspective, discussing the similarities and differences thematically in light of geopolitical change before drawing out key conclusions.

Turkey

Armenians under the late Ottoman state

Under the Ottoman Empire, the acceptance of Christian peoples in a Muslim state was considered routine, provided the non-Muslims were fully cognisant of their unequal status. Classified as *gâvur* (infidel) and *rajah* (cattle), Armenians were not allowed to own weapons and were legally required to allow Turks and Kurds house and quarter for as long as necessary, for themselves and for any livestock; Armenians were also expected to be deferential in public, pay higher taxes than Turks or Kurds and have no legal standing under the law when their case was put against a Muslim (Bryce, Toynbee and Sarafian 2000: 617; Astourian 1990: 117–20). Nonetheless, the Ottomans, with policies of taking Armenian women as wives or otherwise into their households, had engineered a system through which Armenians could be Ottomanised, particularly if taught to be so at an early age. 'Boy collection', or the abduction of Armenian boys by Ottoman officials, became ever more popular throughout the empire. Young children would be taken from their families, forced to convert to Islam, reared in Ottoman households and put to work in the Ottoman military or civil service. Particularly in the mid and late 1890s, massacres were used to force the Armenians into continued submission, regardless of European pressure to institute reforms promised in the Berlin Treaty, repealing many of these policies (Isyar 2005: 354; Akçam 2006: 47; Balakian 2003: Ch. 4; Bloxham 2005: Ch. 1).

Even the abjection of the Armenians was a reason for further spite: 'Armenians are a degenerate community . . . always servile', cast Sultan Abdul Hamid II in 1896. Around this time period, he also began claiming that Armenians were wealthier and better educated than their Turkish compatriots; note that, as we will see in the German case, this perception of wealth does not diminish perceptions of inequality but rather enhances it. In this case, education and wealth were claimed to have been obtained at the expense of the Turkish nation, else such a 'degenerate community' would not be able to rise to such an elevated lifestyle (in Akçam 2006: 43; Melson 1996: 159). Both Christians and Armenians were seen as having a stronger hold over land and goods than the Turks and Kurds, the Turks because of national conscription into the army and the Kurds because they were typically nomadic. Note again that these claims portrayed the Armenians as having secured wealth in a time when the Ottoman state was in economic disrepair, particularly when compared against the growing European market; in 1913, real wages of workers in London were 2.7 times higher than those in Istanbul (Özmucur and Pamuk 2002: 312–13). This suggests that these early characterisations of a thriving Armenian community later provided the CUP with an excuse to institute anti-scapegoat policies, regardless of the 'real' state of the Armenians, who were suffering the same economic limitations as their Muslim neighbours.

Economic instability throughout the Ottoman Empire and claims of Armenian wealth made anti-Armenian antagonism easier to foster. This was helped by Armenian uprisings in the late 19th century in certain geographical enclaves. Most of these uprisings were bids for regional security against marauding bands of Kurds and Circassians, easily quelled by Ottoman forces; these skirmishes, however, often resulted in Armenian massacres,[2] during which the Armenians were criticised for acting in their own defence, calling such actions bids for complete self-rule. This idea was consistently supported by *Tanin*, the first 'Turkish' newspaper run under the CUP, claiming that Armenians had one goal – to destroy the country. At their first organised public action held in Istanbul in 1895, the CUP flew flyers reading 'Muslims and our most beloved Turkish compatriots! The Armenians have become so bold as to assault the Sublime Porte, which is our country's greatest place and which is respected and recognised by all Europeans' (in Akçam 2006: 27, 33, 50, 60–1). Through these uprisings, the anti-nation is portrayed as being directly aggressive and malevolent in its action towards the nation.

Thus, even before the CUP had taken power, the portrayal of the Armenians as a degenerate and faulted people, hoarding their ill-gotten wealth from their Ottoman betters, was already present. Incensed by a loss of territory throughout the 19th century, Turks mistrusted Armenians and feared they would make a bid for independence. This would in turn reduce Ottoman power and sovereignty on the international stage and damage the ideals of Ottomanism prominent at the time.

1908–1912

As described in Chapter 2, the CUP took control of the government in July 1908, resulting in significant changes to policy and ideology in the Ottoman Empire. As mentioned earlier, the CUP had come to power through the support of other non-Turkish groups, including the main Armenian political party, the Armenian Dashnak Revolutionary Federation. The key issue at hand was to restrain the power of the sultan, ensure the reinstitution of the parliament, which had been disbanded after the Treaty of Berlin, and to enforce the constitution; this included measures of equality and the extension of civil rights and liberties to groups such as Jews, the Orthodox and the Armenians. Some of these measures were acted upon, but as the nationalism fostered by the social Darwinist machinations of the CUP began to expand, most of the promised reforms and liberalisations for other-groups faltered and floundered.

Shortly after the Young Turks' ascension to power, Bulgaria declared independence from the Ottoman Empire, and the Austrian Empire annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, further weakening the empire and strengthening the Turkish desire to strengthen their own borders and sovereignty. Due to the common association of Armenians being in league with the Christian European community, these independence movements resulted in the expression of stronger nationalistic aims, finally provoking a counterrevolution on 12 April 1909, supported by the Mohammedan Union and various Islamic seminary students, calling for the implementation of Islamic law (Balakian 2003: 145–9; Akçam 2006: 61–4). The counterrevolution was quelled a mere 11 days later, and relative peace ensued. However, the counterrevolution was to have ramifications felt throughout the empire; one of these is in the massacre at Adana in April 1909.

A result of developments at national and local levels and miscommunications from Istanbul, the massacre in Adana stands as the first massacre where the rationale for killing is revenge. In this case, when news of a counterrevolution reached Adana, Islamic religious authorities led the massacre to gain revenge for the rights given to Christians under the 1908 Constitution. These rights, it was argued, led to the deterioration of Turkish rights, as they were Muslims, a trait inherently tied to their ethnicity by this point in the eyes of the CUP. Based on the understanding that Armenians had a higher standard of life than Turks, the massacre gave the perpetrators an opportunity to act on their jealousy and 'tak[e] revenge' for these 'crimes' during a time of immense uncertainty and change in a border region of the Turkish homeland. The claim of Armenian provocation was not used until after the first round of the massacre had taken place, when the CUP sent its troops in to 'quell' the killing – resulting in the deaths of some 15,000 to 20,000 Armenians (Balakian 2003: Ch. 12; see also Akçam 2006: 69).

What we see here is direct interaction between ideology and events. In this case, the CUP sacrificed an ideological platform of constitutional reform and minority rights on the altar of an organic nationalist movement sparked by a loss of territory. Here, events have directly influenced the way ideology has radicalised. The massacre of Adana occurred in the wake of Bulgarian independence and Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, Young Turk nationalists feared a further loss of empire in Anatolia, where the Armenians might secede and create an independent state if the rights allocated to Christians in the 1908 Constitution were granted (Staub 1989: 182).

The majority of Anatolia's wealth was in the hands of the Armenians. Most of Istanbul's international commerce was completed by Christians (Mann 2005: 115, 127). This situation led to the popular perception that Armenians were rich with wealth made from Turkish labour, giving Armenians the power and the (unearned) ability to become independent. The CUP then began crafting an economic plan 'freeing' Armenians from their wealth, which would in turn 'liberate the Turkish nation'; reform was based on state spending and taxation (Astourian 1990: 127; Ahmad 1969: 118–22) and would further inhibit the Armenians from seeking independence. Thus, we see the early steps of the ideological dehumanisation process arising out of a fear of economic collapse.

As a consequence of fear and the need for further legitimacy, the CUP tightened its rein on Armenians, suppressing hopes of equality. In 1909, as a consequence of the counterrevolution, a series of laws were passed: 'The Law of Associations', the 'Law for the Prevention of Brigandage and Sedition' and the 'Law on the Conscription of Non-Muslims'. These laws restricted the formation of political associations using nationality or ethnicity, formed special units ensuring the disarmament of Greeks, Bulgarians and Armenians and ensured Christians were drafted into the army; as they were generally disarmed ('Law for the Prevention of Brigandage and Sedition') most Armenian men were used for hard labour (Ahmad 1969: 23, 62; Isyar 2005: 346–7). These laws are critical steps in the relationship between ideology and policy, as these legal restrictions of rights and freedoms were newly institutionalised reflections of radicalising anti-Armenian ideology. The institution of these legal changes is also one of the early anti-Armenian policy shifts effected under CUP leadership. While these laws are clearly a part of the radicalisation process of events, they also play a role in the radicalisation process of ideology: state elites radicalise propaganda, which encourages policy changes; in order to add legitimacy to the policy changes, new laws ensue. The resulting legalisation of anti-Armenian policy legitimises ideological structure.

The introduction of these sorts of policies and increased violence against Armenians is a reflection of an ideological change occurring within the CUP. This change had to do with a move away from Ottomanism to the more social Darwinist-driven Turkism. Historian Yusuf Akcura asks the key question of the time: Within the broad expanses of the Ottoman realm, there are two civilisations, two ways of looking at life and the world, two very different philosophies colliding. Is their coexistence at all possible?' (in Akçam 2006: 71–2). Within Ottomanism, there were institutionalised ways to 'become' Turkish, but with Turkism, those policies were dismissed, as ethnicity cannot be changed. Though the Armenians pleaded with European powers to force the Turkish hand, by 1912 any shared mandate between Young Turks and Armenians had disintegrated (R14077/Ab.257 1913); Armenian schools and societies were closed. Anyone who had 'worked against the Government at any time' was to be arrested and sent out of Turkey proper and 'into the provinces such as Baghdad or Mosul' before being killed 'either on the road or there' (in Balakian 2003: 189–90).

1912–1914

After the loss of the Balkan Wars, Arab influence in the CUP expanded, helped by the CUP's desire to distance itself from the bitterness of defeat represented by a Christianised Europe. While there were some practical elements to this shift, such as the use of Arabic in schools, it critically marks the shift from Ottomanism to Islamic Turkism:

> How could it be that Turkey, a Muslim state, ever had an aversion to Arabic, its religious language? Was it not realised that hostility to Arabic meant hostility to Islam? We love Arabic as the language of the Quran and of the Prophet. We love it because Muslim civilisation and Arabic are inseparable, and to turn away from Arabic is to turn away from thirteen hundred years of learning and civilisation. One thing is clear: Arabic is more widespread and has more vitality than any other Islamic language. In denying this claim a Turk . . . wipes out his own civilisation and his own past . . . The Ottoman Government has taken a step in the right direction, but this step must be followed by others. Greater attention must be paid to Arabic not only in Arab-speaking areas but everywhere else. The Government should do this, not as the rule of a few million Arabs, but as a Muslim state.
>
> (Babanzade Ismail Hakki in *Tanin* 21 April 1913 in Ahmad 1969: 136)

This Islamic focus seated itself nicely in ideas of Pan-Turanism, mostly because both Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanism were expansionist ideologies focused on ensuring the aggrandisement of the homeland (Ahmad 1969: 154). This further emphasised the idea that the anti-nation sought rebellion, which would destroy the homeland necessary for the secure establishment of a Turkish state.

Thus, despite continual pleas that the Armenians wanted to remain under Turkish control, and despite sustained, if mild, pressure from Europe to reform its Armenian policies (R14077/Ab.2888 8.02.1913; R 14077 1913), the entrance and subsequent loss of the Balkan Wars only served to radicalise anti-Armenian ideology, particularly emphasising the need to separate anti-nation from nation in order to maintain national culture. This encouraged regiments, particularly Kurds who had stayed behind from the front, to continue Armenian persecutions (R14079/Ab.12669 25.06.1913). Whilst certain Western individuals did act in favour of the Armenians, the effect of European and American pressure on Turkey to reform sparked a battle over sovereignty. Europeans began to demand the implementation of certain rights granted under the Berlin Treaty and discussed again at the London Conference of 25 April 1913. These included the installation of a European over-commissioner, who would report not to the Turks but directly to European powers, local reforms dealing with justice and finances as well as reprimands for the compensation of robbed and looted land and property owners (R14078/Ab.9798 10.05.1913).

Naturally, reform was expressed in such a way as to restrict Turk sovereignty. Thus, claims that 'no one has the right to combine the name of the Armenian race in the internal affairs of Turkey' became the rationale for continuous disregard for Armenian life (Nr.1939/B.223-225 1913). The Young Turks continued linking the Armenian anti-nation with these external enemies and began using Armenian massacres as a way to assure sovereignty in their new state. Armenians were blamed for the increase in international pressure, and it was claimed that their 'religious and ethnographic ties' gave them the foundational elements to 'build an enigmatic political propaganda in greater Asia' based particularly on a Russian alliance (R14078/Ab.4311 1913). Melson notes that some scholars, basing their evidence on these demands for Armenian self-administration and the pro-Russian sympathies of some political voices, conclude that the Ottoman decision to attack was a direct result of provocation (1982: 485; see also Lewis 1961; Shaw and Shaw 1976).

In fact, official Turkish history claims that the deportations of Armenians beginning in late 1913 and early 1914 were prompted by Armenians volunteering to fight with Russian gangs, who had supposedly been staging uprisings around the country, thus sparking the claim that Armenians were outlaws and not 'true Ottomans' (Akçam 2006: 140, 196). Thus, Armenians continued to be portrayed as a national threat, attempting at every turn to undermine CUP sovereignty and the establishment of a secure state, which would, in the fulfilment of Turkish propaganda, usher in a new utopia.

In order to secure Turkey from the anti-nation, further dehumanising measures were instituted against the Armenians. Numerous Armenian women were tattooed as proof of their Armenian status and sent into slavery; members of the military and police force increased their incomes by selling Armenian women as slaves in markets across the

Ottoman Empire. In order to deal with 'that pack of dog lice' (demonstrator, 1912, in Dadrian 2004: 189), the Special Organisation (SO) was instructed to assault and massacre residents of border villages, particularly in Anatolia; the systemic deportation of Armenians from 'problem' regions began, resulting in the expulsion of hundreds of thousands into the desert (Tachjian 2009: 65; Akçam 2006: 140, 147; Balakian 2003: 258; Derderian 2005: 11).

As November 1914 approached and Russia began to move to declare war on the Young Turk state, the Armenians found themselves cast as enemies siding with the Russians, regardless of the fact that most Armenians declared they had no intention of doing so (R14077/Ab.1987 29.01.1913). Stories of Christian terrors against Muslims travelled from the Balkans with Muslim refugees after the loss of the Balkan Wars. The only way to solve the 'Armenian threat', then, was to 'remove them . . . and send them somewhere else' (Enver Pasha in Akçam 2006: 152). Through a lack of allegiance and allies, the anti-nation was portrayed as having brought its fate upon itself (R14084/Ab.5647 15.03.1914); thus, at the dawn of WWI, the ideological foundations have radicalised to such an extent as to make the leap to genocide ideologically feasible.

1914–1915

Though certain anti-Armenian policies had begun being institutionalised before the onset of WWI, the war provided greater legitimacy for further radicalisation of anti-nation policy. The CUP leadership looked upon the war as an opportunity to rid itself of internal enemies whilst eradicating international pressure: 'the Porte [wants] to take advantage of the World War to thoroughly get rid of its internal enemies, the indigenous Christians, without being disturbed by foreign diplomatic intervention; that is also in the interest of the allies of Turkey, the Germans, because Turkey would in this way be strengthened' (Talat Pasha in Astourian 1990: 116). Again, as we see in the section above, the intention here is to remove the anti-nation from the nation using any and all means possible but has not yet moved from an ideology of sustained persecution to one of total genocide.

The move to total genocide did drastically increase with the onset of WWI, partially due to the perceived alliance between Russia and Armenia. Just as in the Balkan Wars, proportional numbers of Armenians did fight alongside the Russians; most of these Armenians were *Russian* Armenians, but some Ottoman Armenians did participate in the war on the side of the Allied forces (New York Times 1915; Bloxham 2005: 73, 84–5; Astourian 1990: 133). This, even today, has become a rationalising factor for Turkish atrocities. However, the total number of Armenian volunteers was minimal, somewhere in the range of 4000 to 8000, a number dwarfed by over 200,000-plus conscripts and volunteers present in the Turkish army (Mann 2005: 136; Akçam 2006: 196). Regardless of the actual number of Armenians fighting on either side, the mere fact that *any* Armenians were fighting against the Turks provided a rationale to continue persecutions by linking the internal enemy of the anti-nation with the external enemy of the aggressor state and repeatedly expressing the key fear of Armenian insurrection and independence.

The war also hampered European pressure on Turkish reform; Entente powers needed the Ottoman alliance and the Allies no longer had the influence to complain against the Armenian Question. Again, the idea that the Armenians would have to persevere through the hardships they had brought upon themselves by posing as a threat surfaced and is peppered throughout Turkish and European writings at the time (R14084/Ab.5647 15.03.1914; R14086/Ab.12110 16.07.1915; Bloxham 2005: 95). By mid-1915, Armenian deportation was openly discussed, being victoriously announced in May 1915 by Enver Pasha (R14086/Ab.17493 31.05.1915); while it became seemingly necessary to rid the homeland of the anti-nation, that deportation was synonymous with annihilation was never openly admitted in Turkish propaganda. In their official documents, the Germans tellingly referred to the deportations and massacres as ‘wiping out’ (*ausrottung*), suggesting that the Armenian genocide was generally accepted as an open secret (R14086/Ab.17667 6.06.1915; see also Akçam 2006: 9).

‘Armenians in Turkey must and were going to be killed. They had grown . . . in wealth and numbers until they had become a menace to the ruling Turkish race; extermination [is] the only remedy’, as the governor of Harput explained to German vice-consul in Erzerum, Max Scheubner-Richter (in Akçam 2006: 150). This is an obvious difference to the language used in previous sections; the focus has shifted from one of distancing the anti-nation from the nation to a focus on the destruction of the anti-nation. The military losses of the first few months of WWI was propagandised as being due to ‘a treacherous deception, to a conspiracy of murderous criminals, to our fighting units being stabbed in the back by the traitors among us’ (in reports and leaflets distributed by the Ministry of War in Akçam 2006: 125), leading to a standard of ‘Repressing and Revenge!’ justified by Armenian action in the war (Konst./Ankara.171/Ab.6381 09.1915). Claiming that all Armenian officials were spies, the Ten Commandments (further discussed below) called for the Armenians to be ‘driven out absolutely’ from government jobs and enjoined Turks in the military to 'kill off in an appropriate manner all Armenians in the Army' (in Balakian 2003: 189–90). This was made easier by the continued dehumanisation of Armenians. Not only classed as spies, traitors, cowards and outlaws, members of the anti-nation were now regularly termed as 'things' rather than 'humans'. This is of particular note in relation to women and young girls because of their lesser status as female and their role as symbols of the future of Armenian life (Konst./Ankara.170 19.08.1915; Tachjian 2009).

By February 1915, the 200,000 Armenian men conscripted into the army had been turned into forced labourers or had been murdered. This continued through to deportations in early April and further to the 'official' starting point of the genocide when, on 24 and 25 April, several hundred Armenian societal leaders and intellectuals were deported from Constantinople and summarily killed. Those Armenians being deported were often attacked by killing squads organised by the SO, the *Teshkilat-I Makhsusiye*. The Ten Commandments, the centrepiece of a secret CUP meeting held in December 1914 or January 1915, explicitly stated that Turks were to 'apply measures to exterminate all males under 50, priests and teachers; leave girls and children to be Islamised' and to 'Carry away the families of all who succeed in escaping and apply measures to cut them off from all connection with their native place' (in Balakian 2003: 189–90; see also Melson 1996; Cohen 2001; R14086/Ab.23244 31.07.1915). The women left behind were often forced to convert and marry their aggressors, or, at the very least, become their slaves or concubines; this trend, however, was openly criticised only months later at the height of the genocide by the CUP leadership, who had 'decided to exterminate entirely all the Armenians living in Turkey . . . without regard for women, children [or] the infirm' (Talaat Pasha, 15 September 1915 in Derderian 2005: 4). They then went on to 'strictly forbid this and enjoin the dispatch of women of this kind into the desert, after they have been separated from their husbands' (Talaat Pasha, 29 September 1915 in Derderian 2005: 4). Rape and group rape was prolific and often public (Bryce, Toynbee and Sarafian 2000: 128, 196, 551, 583), also adding to the dehumanised nature of the Armenian archetype. These types of public pronouncements and policies made the secret of genocide harder to keep; indeed, plans to hide the genocide were slowly falling away as ideology and policy reached their radicalised zenith.

Post 1915

Throughout the conflict, like the Jews and Bosniaks of my other two cases, the Armenians pleaded with Europe to intercede for them, a plea unanswered even after the open realisation that this was not mere civil unrest but that what was occurring amounted instead to 'the elimination of Armenians' (Konst./B.191 30.06.1915; R14092/Ab.18623 7.07.1916). Deportees were denied any help offered 'in money, food or any other form' (R14086/Ab.12110 16.07.1915; R14090 27.12.1915). Turkish sovereignty had been solidified; Armenians were now portrayed as 'their "herd", to be exploited or slaughtered, according to their good pleasure. No system of foreign control or supervision, single or joint, will serve' (Price 1918). This language of dehumanisation was reinforced and radicalised by the treatment of deportees. Generally sent into the desert without food or water, the impression of the deportees was of inhuman corpses, rather than that of the healthy, hearty Turkish men and women portrayed as members of the nation. This was further reinforced during the later years of killing, when particularly women and children were subject to medical 'experiments' and atrocities. The writings of Dr Mehmed Resid, Ittihadist and governor of Diyarbekir, reflect this well; he himself was charged with war crimes after the conflict:

> Even though I am a physician, I cannot ignore my nationhood. I came into this world a Turk. My national identification takes precedence over everything else . . . Armenian traitors had found a niche for themselves in the bosom of the fatherland; they were dangerous microbes. Isn't it the duty of a doctor to destroy these microbes?
>
> (Resid, January 1919 in Dadrian 1986: 175)

Thus, we are presented with a self-reinforcing dehumanisation where policies of dehumanisation act in such a way as to fulfil the ideological perspective. In this case, similar to the Holocaust and Balkan cases, CUP ideology expressed Armenians as sick, crippled beings often in a worse state than death; the resultant policies of 'cleansing' enacted because of this assessment then went on to fulfil these perceptions by forcing the anti-nation to crippling illness and death. Though no longer attempting to show Armenians as thriving during times of national decline, Turks continued to link Armenians with the persecuting Russian troops, who were attempting to 'wipe out man for man' (R14099/Ab.15733 12.04.1918). The Turks alleged the establishment of an Armenian national council suggested by their European allies was akin to the foundation of a fully recognised independent state, serving to further legitimate their actions, as they 'could not allow their [Turkish] rights to be tested' (R11053/Ab.31351 5.07.1918). In short, like my other two cases, the extermination of the Armenians 'was not merely being carried out with an eye toward military considerations' (R14087 27.07.1915) but also towards the ethnic ideological considerations of a genocidal state.

Germany

1918–1933

As discussed in Chapter 2, the problem of the Jewish Question was established in German ideology and culture well before any genocidal policies were actually implemented. Before Hitler became chancellor, however, the only strategy for approaching the subject was to restrict Jewish legal and civil rights. In a similar style to the Turkish case, regarding Jews through the lens of social Darwinism was established on a policy level in the late 1800s, when Jews were publicly deprived of full citizenship and began being regarded as a racial, rather than a religious, group (Mann 2005: 65).

The Weimar Republic, already perceived as a weak political institution due to its inability to win the support of the military and civil service branches (Evans 2004: 97, 102), did little to dissuade the German populace from the anti-Semitism rife throughout Europe, and much study has been done regarding the question of continuity from this time period through WWII.[3] Most notable, of course, is Fritz Fischer's *Griff nach der Weltmacht* (1962) followed more recently by his *From Kaiserreich to Third Reich* (1986), in which he posits that the policy platforms and policies of pre-WWI Germany were not so radically different from those established in the pre-WWII years of the NSDAP. Though met with indignation in the early days of its publication, the continuity of certain ideological aspects are hard to ignore; more recently, other key scholars, such as Dirk Walter (1999), have built upon Fischer's work, pointing out that in post-WWI Germany, Jewish violence and persecution was widespread. Media discourse, policies present in cultural activities such as recreation sports and the lack of persecution towards anti-Semitic crimes all helped foster an attitude of derogation under the Weimar Regime. More radical activists burned synagogues, and some vacation resorts began excluding Jewish guests (Borut 2000; Burleigh 2001: 329). Panayi suggests that much of this persecution was due to a perception of Jewish wealth in a time of dire economic need and to their prominent position in the arts sector of German society (2001: 220–1).

As we will see further in Chapter 4, the NSDAP used these stereotypes to build up the idea of the German Volk 'revamping the sagging morale of the lower middle class' (Kershaw 1989: 93). One of the ways the Nazis went about establishing this change was to cast the anti-nation as national traitors, profiteering from German defeat in WWI (Staub 1989: 92; Cecil 1972: 70–5). Thus, the Jews, in a similar situation as the Armenians after the Balkan Wars, were perceived as 'picking a fight' against Germany. Identifying Jews as bloodsuckers and extortionists, and building on the perception of the lesser status of members of the anti-nation, Julius Streicher and Alfred Rosenberg set to work the propaganda machine, assuring both Jews and Germans that

> Jewry wanted this battle. It shall have it until it realises that the Germany of the brown battalions is not a country of cowardice and surrender. Jewry will have to fight until we have won victory . . . National Socialists! Defeat the enemy of the world. Even if the world is full of devils, we shall succeed in the end.
>
> (Streicher 30 March 1933 in Tribunals 10.01.1946c)

Along with Hitler's inflammatory messages in speeches and in *Mein Kampf*, these two men were primarily responsible for the further popularisation of anti-Semitism in the founding years of Nazi ideology, promising German freedom would only come about when 'the Jew has been excluded from the life of the German people' (Streicher 1922 in Tribunals 10.01.1946c); if this exclusion did not occur, 'the Jew would really devour the peoples of the earth' (Hitler 1969 [1925]: 411). All German devastation was attached somehow to Jewish 'contamination': 'The Jew today is the great agitator for the complete destruction of Germany. Wherever in the world we read of attacks against Germany, Jews are their fabricators, just as in peacetime [. . .] and Marxists systematically stirred up hatred against Germany' (Hitler 1969 [1925]: 568, 512; see also Cecil 1972: 72). Thus, we see Nazi elites serving as instruments for ideology as agency, moving within a structure partly of their own making, partly inherited from ideologies of previous regimes.

This trend of associating communism, Marxism and Judaism is typical of early German ideology, as the early years of Nazism focused primarily on defeating political opponents; this is also the reason Goering gives for the establishment of concentration camps. The camps were not necessarily a place to hold Jews but instead 'a lightning measure against the functionaries of the Communist Party who were attacking [Germans] in the thousands, and who, since they were taken into protective custody, were not put in prison. But it was necessary, as I said, to erect a camp for them – one, two, or three camps' (in Tribunals 18.03.1946). Nonetheless, the Nazis were not necessarily understated in their dehumanisation of Jews in the early stages of their ideology. *Mein Kampf* again provides numerous examples where Hitler has equated Jews with poisoners, the plague, tuberculosis, putrefaction, maggots and parasites (Hitler 1969 [1925]: 38, 211–12, 276, 307, 506).

1933–1935

After Hitler's rise to the chancellorship, little changed in the first few years not previously established ideologically in the early years of the NSDAP; equally noteworthy is that anti-Semitism had played a rather subdued role in Hitler's quasi-election. Bloxham and Kushner summarise this well, saying 'in no way was the murder of the Jews a necessary outcome of Nazi (or German or occidental) antisemitism as of the year 1933 . . . The logic of the view to which Hitler and many of his coterie subscribed, of Jews as a defiling and subversive "racial" element, *was* always their exclusion from the "Aryan", and particularly German community, but exclusion did not instantly equate to murder' (2008: 71).

In fact, it is interesting to note that during this time period, the Nazis did relatively little to implement policies dealing with the 'Jewish Question'. Though there was still an ideological assumption of the 'badness' of the Jews and an increase in stereotypical propaganda, the only attempts to change policy were discussions on restricting Jewish civil rights and liberties (Kershaw 2000: 101). While the earliest period of NSDAP power was peppered with anti-Semitic actions such as riots, boycotts and the exclusion of Jews and other-groups from cultural activities, actual killings were few and often prosecuted in the courts (Nolzen 2002: 250–1, 254–5; Evans 2004: Ch. 6). Again, the focus of the time was on implementing policy and focusing on the aspects of ideology ensuring the political and social consolidation of power under the NSDAP (Jick 1998: 158–9; Kallis 2008: 16; Nolzen 2002: 248).

Ideologically, much anti-Semitic discourse remained the same. Jews continued to be linked to Marxism and portrayed as rich money-wasters seeking to disrupt the struggling German economy; they were explicitly blamed for mobbings and murders both in Germany and abroad (*Völkischer Beobachter* 1933b, 1933c). Streicher, in speeches and articles, represented the Jews as forcing anti-Semitic policies into action as they did not recognise the strength of the anti-nation (Tribunals 10.01.1946c). Propaganda avers that Jews would attempt to poison the Volk with their 'alien albumen' by raping German women who would then never be able to bear 'pure' German children, thus endangering the heart of the culture-bearing aspect of the nation:

> One single cohabitation of a Jew with an Aryan woman is sufficient to poison her blood forever. Together with the 'alien albumen' she has absorbed the alien soul. Never again will she be able to bear purely Aryan children, even when married to an Aryan. They will all be bastards, with a dual soul and a body of a mixed breed . . .
>
> Julius Streicher 1934, *Deutsche Volksgesundheit aus Blut und Boden* in Tribunals 10.01.1946c

Though this type of dehumanising language is present in cornerstone texts such as *Mein Kampf,* there is a change in the frequency and popularity of using scientific language to describe Jews. While prior to the Nazis' ascension to power much of this sort of language was kept out of the mainstream press, this changes soon after Hitler comes to office (NSDAP 1933a, 1933d, 1933g, 1933e).

1935–1938

As discussed in Chapter 2, the Nuremberg Laws are exceptional due to the fact that this is the first time under the NSDAP when the ideology of anti-Semitism is expressed through institutionalised legal practise in a way reminiscent of the series of laws passed under the Turks in 1909.[4] Until the passing of the Nuremberg Laws, direct physical assaults were seemingly regionally variable, occurring via pressure from the SA or from particular Nazi party members seeking to radicalise anti-Jewish policy within their sphere of influence (Bloxham and Kushner 2004: 116). The laws themselves, while restricting the liberties and freedoms of Jews, were another step towards dehumanising the anti-nation altogether. As with so much of Nazi policy, the institution of the Nuremberg Laws was not the result of a long, drawn-out policy plan but was instead the outcome of hasty, last-minute decision making. Though there had been discussions of dealing legally with the 'Jewish Problem', little evidence suggests any policies had been thoroughly debated (Burleigh 2001: 294).

Making Jewish-German marriages illegal, stripping Jews of the right to fly the Reich flag and of their German citizenship were all policy initiatives following from ideological precepts. This was rationalised as protection against the anti-nation, who would otherwise persecute the nation to a heretofore unknown degree (*Völkischer Beobachter* 1935c, 1935e, 1935f). Goering rationalises this radicalisation thus:

> I believe that if, in this connection, many a hard word which was said by us against Jews and Jewry were to be brought up, I should

> still be in a position to produce magazines, books, newspapers, and speeches in which the expressions and insults coming from the other side were far in excess. All that obviously was bound to lead to an intensification.
>
> (Tribunals 14.03.1946)

In short, the Jews had brought this upon themselves; if they had not been attacking the Volk, then they would not themselves have been attacked.

Books with titles like *Don't Trust the Fox in the Green Meadow Nor the Jew on His Oath*, (*Trau keinem Fuchs auf grüner Heid und keinem Jüd auf seinem Eid*) were funded by Streicher's propaganda machine and pitched to children because 'no one should be allowed to grow up in the midst of our people without this knowledge of the frightfulness and dangerousness of the Jew' (1937 in Tribunals 10.01.1946c). Another new trend in the evolution of this ideology is the portrayal of the anti-nation as ritualistic killers of Germans, particularly of German children, who had been killed by Jews in the most gruesome ways imaginable (Tribunals 10.01.1946c). Portrayed thus, Jews were not only persecuting the current generation of Germans but were directly, purposefully attacking future generations of the Reich. This desecration could not be allowed to occur.

How to go about preventing these occurrences, however, was still not fully formed in either ideology or policy at the time. The HJ (*Hitlerjugend*) slowly began incorporating anti-Jewish action into their activities and teachings, including the vandalisation of Jewish graveyards and other properties (Nolzen 2002: 269; Burleigh 2001: 237). The most popular policy idea was of forced Jewish immigration 'to countries where the Jews wanted to go' (von Schirach in Tribunals 24.05.1946). This then inspired policies encouraging Jews to emigrate from Germany; ghettos and concentration camps were built as 'holding camps' for Jews waiting to be exported from the Reich (such as Bergen-Belsen, erected as late as 1943) and to provide slave labour for rebuilding the Reich and its war machine, thus 'removing the most dangerous element of disorder directed against [the Reich]' (Goering in Tribunals 13.03.1946; Bloxham and Kushner 2008: 9, 135; Evans 2005: 81–90).

1938–1941

The effects of Kristallnacht on the Jewish community were immediate and striking. Nolzen sums it up well: 'more than 680 Jews were killed or committed suicide; nearly 30,000 were interned in concentration camps. Nearly 200 synagogues were set on fire or devastated; and more than 7,500 Jewish-owned enterprises were destroyed. This had all happened within hours' (2002: 271). Though still an outcome of a policy focused on getting Jews to remove themselves from Germany, Kristallnacht marks the beginning of large-scale state-empowered violence against the Jews in a way not previously occurring under the Nazis. Much of this violence occurred concurrently with an increased level of media focus on the certainty of Germany going to war, which in turn led to an increased level of fear.[5] Similarly, expulsions of Russian, Hungarian, Romany and Polish Jews during this time period show the coordination of the branches of the Nazi state in their ability to pursue policies resulting in mass murder (Milton 1990: 274). Here we see again this relationship between ideology and events. In this case, it is the ideological belief in the necessity of separating the anti-nation from the nation that spurs policy changes regarding these expulsionary measures taken against the Jews.

The inverse relationship is seen upon German entry into WWII. Being blamed for forcing Germany's hand to war, the Jews were seen as profiting from the deaths of Germans on the battlefield and thus having brought their own destruction down upon their heads (Hitler in Time Magazine 1939), just as the Armenians had been blamed upon Turkish entrance into WWI. *Der Stürmer* articles between 1938 and 1940 urged that only when world Jewry had been annihilated would the Jewish Problem have been solved and predicted that 50 years hence Jewish graves 'will proclaim that this people of murderers and criminals has after all met its deserved fate'; *Der Völkischer Beobachter* began to openly discuss 'a neat separation of Germans and Jews' as a solution to the Jewish Question. All avenues of the press were personally encouraged by Hitler to publish more 'enlightening articles on the Jewish question' in order to 'educate' Germans about the risk posed by Jews (Tribunals 29.04.1946, 01.10.1946g; Völkischer Beobachter 1938e).

Nonetheless, until approximately 1940 to early 1941, there was still a possibility of some Jews avoiding extermination by forced migration. 'The forced emigrations of 1938 and 1939 from Germany and Austria, which seemed so cruel at the time, saved Jewish lives. "Exterminationist anti-Semitism", if one could use such a term, then meant forced emigration, not mass murder' (Jick 1998: 160). Between late 1940 and mid-1941, however, the institutionalisation of policy for the concentration of all Jews in ghettos became rote; by this time, Jewish registration, economic discriminations and decrees compelling Jews to wear the Star of David, sporadic arrests and detention in camps was *de rigueur* (Tribunals

01.10.1946m; Völkischer Beobachter 1938f; Tribunals 02.01.1946; Kershaw 1989: 97).

The implementation of these policies would inherently benefit the Reich, as it would then come into control of the wealth of the Jews and take revenge on them for the perceived advances Jews had made in times of national decline. This would result in 'healing this sickness among the people' and the 'joining together of Greater Germany in defiance of the world' (*Völkischer Beobachter* 1938e, 1938f; Tribunals 30.09.1946j, 30.09.1946l). Separating the anti-nation from the nation would also rescue the nation from the persecution of the enemy within in this time of war. The state of war initiated a shift in ideology wherein the fear of the outer enemy, the Allied forces fighting against the Germans, was linked directly with the fear towards the inner enemy, the Jews. The media began to preach that the Jews' desire was to 'kill all Hitlerites' and that 'the Jews of all the world hate [Germans] because we are a stronger state with a stronger army' (*Völkischer Beobachter* 1938f; Tribunals 10.01.1946c). Not only did Streicher continue printing articles of Jewish murder around the world as in earlier time periods, but in 1938 *Der Völkischer Beobachter* began to focus on malcontent in Palestine, claiming that 'Concentration camps in Palestine are full! The blood price of four months [of war]: 1,089 Arabs slain [by Jews] . . . in hand-to-hand combat', and other articles written in such a way as to suggest that it was the Germans who would next fall to Jewish retaliation (*Völkischer Beobachter* 1938e; see also *Völkischer Beobachter* 1938b, 1938d; Tribunals 15.01.1946a).

These suggestions were paired with increased radicalisation of propaganda, which continued to strip away the human nature of the Jews. *Der Stürmer* went so far as to associate the anti-nation with 'a parasite, an enemy, an evil-doer, a disseminator of diseases who must be destroyed in the interest of mankind' and, in February 1940, published a letter from one of its readers comparing Jews with swarms of locusts (Tribunals 01.10.1946g, 10.01.1946c). *Der Völkischer Beobachter* 'educated' its readers about Jews' inability to 'keep their sicknesses out of the air' and the danger of the Jewish bacillus (*Völkischer Beobachter* 1938b, 1938g).

By this time the difference between the other-groups and the anti-nation is becoming quite clear: the Nazis were beginning to outline brutal policies for groups they labelled subhuman, particularly during this time the mentally ill, incurably sick and handicapped; but, in order to fulfil their ideological platform, they were consistently downgrading Jews to 'non-human' status, not only in ideological terms but in policy terms as well (Rubenstein and Roth 1987: 5). As discussed in the above section, integrating the Nuremberg Laws into state and cultural practise, Jews were excluded from normal German day-to-day activities; after the outbreak of war, the rounding up of Jews into ghettos and camps further entrenched ideas of the Jew as something non-human. In fact, the conditions within both camps and ghettos were contributing factors furthering the dehumanisation of the anti-nation. Illness and death were rife, poor living conditions meant that it was indeed hard to keep 'sickness out of the air'; levels of contagion from disease were high, and cleanliness, due to the depraved living conditions, was devastatingly low. This culminated in reinforcing the ideologically presupposed idea that it was necessary that Jews be separate, apart from the German nation.

This exclusion is part of the dynamic process of the radicalisation of state policy and ideology in which the 'state is both *instrument* of genocide through its administrative and executive organs and *instrumentaliser* of its citizens and other resources towards genocide' (Bloxham and Kushner 2004: 63). The work of the Einsatzgruppen in late spring of 1941, the first institutionalised measure of mass murder, is without doubt an outcome of this instrumentalisation as well as a visible outcome of the centralised power of the state (as an instrument) predicated on and encouraged by radicalising ideology. By late summer 1941, Nazi ideology had shifted to such a degree that mere separation was no longer enough to secure the further existence of the nation.

Post 1941

Mid to late 1941 saw a shift in many types of policy, from the end of the Sino-German cooperation to the invasion of the Soviet Union and the declaration of war on Germany by the United States. Equally, there is a mirrored shift in anti-nation ideology. No longer was it enough to simply remove the anti-nation from the homeland; forced emigration was not 'safe' enough. 'Jews must either be exterminated or taken to concentration camps' (Ribbentrop in Tribunals 01.10.1946c; see also Tribunals 01.10.1946g). Thus, the extermination of the Jews by extreme murder began being implemented as the answer to the Jewish Question with the transition of Auschwitz-Birkenau from concentration camp to extermination camp in 1941. The year 1942 thus became the beginning of the 'final solution' of the Jewish Question and, though it was far from static, continuing throughout the end of the Second World War (Kallis 2008: Ch. 7; Tribunals 02.01.1946).

Reaching the peak of anti-Semitic ideology and policy, however, did little to stem the propagandised belief that Jews were still thriving in times of national struggle. In a January 1944 radio broadcast, Fritzsche declared that

> it is revealed clearly once more that not a new system of government, not a young nationalism, and not a new and well-applied socialism brought about this war. The guilty ones are exclusively the Jews and the plutocrats . . . This clique of Jews and plutocrats have invested their money in armaments and they had to see to it that they would get their interests and sinking funds; hence they unleashed this war.
> (Tribunals 23.01.1946b)

Statements like this one point not only to Jewish wealth but again to the idea that the Jews were at fault for the war, thus bringing the idea that the anti-nation deserves to be condemned once again to the forefront of Nazi ideology.

This was made easier by the continued idea that Jews were tormenting the Germans and posed an immediate threat from the Soviet Union, Poland, the United States and the United Kingdom; thus, the elimination of Jews from Europe was seen, as von Schirach neatly puts it, as 'an active contribution to European culture' (15 September 1942 in Tribunals 24.05.1946; see also Tribunals 15.01.1946b; *Völkischer Beobachter* 1941c). Just as the Turks associated the Armenians with their Russian enemies, through the end of the war the Nazis persisted in equating the Jews as the internal enemy with the Marxist/Bolshevik/communist external enemy of the Soviet Union: 'Jewry . . . has by now placed itself unreservedly on the side of Bolshevism' and the 'international Jewish-Democratic-Bolshevistic campaign of incitement against Germany still finds cover in this or that fox's lair or rat hole' (Fritzsche 1941 and 1945 in Tribunals 23.01.1946b); Goering also played on this theme, famously stating: 'If we lose the war, [Germans] will be annihilated . . . This is not the Second World War. This is a great race war. It is about whether the German and Aryan will survive or if the Jew will rule the world, and that is why we are fighting abroad' (4 October 1942 in Herf 2005: 57). In fact, there was a tangible sense through Nazi propaganda that WWII was being fought between Germany and an actual Jewish conspiracy (Herf 2005: 52).

Associations such as this with scheming foxes and disease-bearing rats were, as in previous times, popular in propaganda throughout the end of the war. In a series of speeches in 1943, Himmler applauded the Germans for their ruthlessness in the extermination of the anti-nation, describing it as 'delousing'; this process 'was not cruel – if one remembers that even innocent creatures of nature, such as hares and deer, have to be killed so that no harm is caused by them' (Hitler in Tribunals 21.03.1946; Himmler in Tribunals 30.09.1946l). Like in the Turkish case, even after the end of the war, key Nazi ideologues such as Streicher and Fritzsche persisted in their anti-Semitic diatribes throughout the course of the tribunals, rarely expressing remorse. In his work on the Holocaust, Herf points out that 'two key verbs and nouns were the core of this language of mass murder . . . they were the verbs *vernichten* and *ausrotten*, which are synonyms for "annihilate", "exterminate", "totally destroy" and "kill"' (2005: 55).[6] These two words also pepper documents relating to the Armenian genocide and give us a very clear picture of the intention of policy makers in the latter stages of radicalisation. This stands in contrast to the Yugoslav case, which, as a case of partial genocide, is arguably more dynamic in the complexity of its anti-nation ideology. Nonetheless, further examination of Yugoslavia in light of the other two cases brings interesting points to light.

The Balkans

1974–1987

Unlike the Turks and the Nazis, the Serbs took longer to identify an anti-nation; the polyethnic status of Yugoslavia under Tito was generally more effective than that of the Ottoman Empire at the turn of the 20th century. There were some inequalities between national and non-national groups, as the communists were hesitant to give any other-group the same status as Slovenes, Serbs or Croats, claiming that doing so would create problems on the regional level in the republics and provinces arising out of the right to self-determination provided in the constitution. Nonetheless, the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina became more active in governmental administration in the 1960s; this was noted with a certain degree of negativity from Serbs at the time, though these naysayers were generally quieted through political pressure (Judah 1997: 150–6). It was not until the new 1974 Constitution was written and more rights were granted to other-groups that things began to change in some sectors of the Serbian and Croatian nationalist wings.

Tito's death proved catastrophic for Yugoslavia; no longer having the ideological tie to a strong leader, national factions began to take a stronger line, particularly in Serbia. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the 1974 Constitution gave Kosovo (amongst others) greater autonomy; this caused Serbian nationalists grave concern. In a way reminiscent of Nazi claims against Jews in the early stages of ideological development, Serbs in Serbia began to claim that Serbs in Kosovo were being subject to genocide, that Serbian women were being raped at the hands of Kosovar men and that the entire non-Muslim community in Kosovo was being repressed and intimidated; these claims were then reproduced by the state, the press and the Serbian Orthodox Church (Carmichael 2010: 8; IT-00-39&40/1 2008). One of the various outcomes of these claims was the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences' (SANU) memorandum of 1986.

The memorandum's primary focus was to alert its readers that under Tito's governance, Serbia and the Serbian people were continuously persecuted (Banac 1994: 150). It was Kosovo, rather than Bosnia, that was at fault for taunting Serbia; the document largely overlooks the role Bosnia-Herzegovina and its resident Bosniaks played in national decline. Quite a lot of this has to do with the fact that at the time, Bosnia-Herzegovina was still considered politically cowed under the thumb of Serbian influence. Serbs still held a majority in many areas across Bosnia-Herzegovina, though in states on the Bosnia-Herzegovina/Croatia border this was beginning to shift. The memorandum itself, disturbing, but quite innocuous on its own as merely one draft memorandum, was not originally intended for popular use. It was instead a calling to return to the original communist principles and intended for its readership to be the supreme political bodies of Yugoslavia and Serbia. It was, however, leaked relatively soon after its release and was met with vehement aggression in the pro-Yugoslav press, particularly in Belgrade. It was only when Milosevic took power a year later in 1987 that the ideological ideals expressed in this document became the foundation for a political policy platform (Pavkovic 1994: 445, 446).

1987–1991

In a way reminiscent of the Turkish case, one of the key metres of national distinction in Yugoslavia is religion. After being mildly repressed by Tito's communist regime, the late 1980s saw a renewed interest in using religion to further nationalist goals posited by nationalist leaders, Milosevic in particular. 'Milosevic, who was first to realise that Tito was dead, was also the first communist leader since the Croatian Spring to break the taboo of speaking to an audience consisting solely of one ethnic group (Serbs) and openly using ethnonational rhetoric' (Malesevic 2006: 177). The years 1987 and 1988 were a time of aggression against the Catholic Church and the Islamic community. In fact, these religious identities, Islam in particular, was critical in identifying the anti-nation. As Carmichael explains, 'a rise in religious consciousness may not wholly explain the occurrence of violence in these regions, secessionists and politicians eager to redraw boundaries cynically exploited the idea of an ideological purpose and traditional identities under threat to motivate and legitimise armed resistance' (2010: 16; see also Banac 1994: 161; Mirkovic 1996: 194).

Unlike in my other two cases, there is no clear identification of the anti-nation at the earlier stages of ideological progression; the focus is instead largely based on a religious identity.[7] In the 1960s and 1970s, the focus was on obtaining equal civil rights and liberties *for Muslims* in Yugoslavia; by the late 1980s, the primary professed ideological 'enemy' to Serbs had shifted away from 'Muslims' as a whole to 'Kosovars' as a group. On one hand, there is no real ideological distinction between Muslims; Muslims were the ideological enemy, regardless of whether they came from Albania, Kosovo or Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the other hand, however, there is a crucial distinction between Kosovar and Bosniak based in geography, history and, to a large extent, geopolitical importance. Scholars have claimed the Serbs had a particular tendency to react to ideologically inspired fears due to years of Ottoman rule and the genocidal action they suffered under the Ustashas during WWII, particularly when fear was couched in terms of Islamic encroachment (Carmichael 2010: 9). Nonetheless, it was not until Croatian independence seemed imminent that relations between the nation and Bosniaks came to a head.

The election of the HDZ in April 1990 convinced many Serbs living in Croatia that Tudjman would soon begin to install the institutions of fascism if and when Croatia became independent of Yugoslavia; particularly Serbs in border areas like Krajina 'understood fascism above all to be a state system promoting virulent Croatian nationalism, and the revival of Croat national sentiment in any form was *ipso facto* interpreted by them as the return of fascism' (Glenny 1996: 11). In the spring of 1991, when conflict in the border regions of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia had already begun, the JNA issued mobilisation orders to the men of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The regional government issued orders alerting the population to ignore this call, as the non-Serbs in the administration almost unanimously opposed it. Thus, very few Bosniaks or Croats entered the JNA; Bosnian Serbs, however, responded en masse, once again solidifying the differences between Serbs, Muslims and Croats (IT-95-5/18-1 2000; IT-99-36-1 1999). The Bosnian Serb alliance with the JNA became further enmeshed after the student riots of 9 and 10 March 1991, when the JNA was called on to halt the rioting which had started in protest to the Serbian regime's increasingly extremist rhetoric (Ramet 2001: 154). Milosevic responded soon after, saying,

> Serbia and the Serbian people are faced with one of the greatest evils of their history: the challenge of disunity and internal conflict. This

> evil, which has more than once caused so much damage and claimed so many victims, more than once sapped our strength, has always come hand in hand with those who would take away our freedom and dignity . . . All who love Serbia dare not ignore this fact, especially at a time when we are confronted by the vampiroid, fascistoid forces of the Ustasha, Albanian secessionists and all other forces in the anti-Serbian coalition which threaten the people's rights and freedoms.
> (Milosevic, March 1991, in Glenny 1996: 57)

This was spoken amidst Milosevic's political offensive, dispatching orders to party units urging them to take action against internal and external enemies and highlighting the need to separate anti-nation from nation due to fears that the anti-nation would continue persecuting the nation – a feat made easier through the 'demo network' Milosevic established in the early years of his presidency. These 'networks' were made of previously unemployed male youths, paid to travel to attend pro-Serb rallies and generally encourage hysteria. These demonstrations were generally instituted in order to convey the idea among Serbs that Serbs outside Serbia proper were being persecuted and that it was necessary to reunite 'the People, the State Authorities and the Church' (Pavkovic 2000: 89–90; see also Gagnon 1995: 146–7; Banac 1994: 153). Note also that, regardless of the fact that multiple Serb nationalist ideologies were beginning to be established, the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) begins speaking on behalf of all Serb groups, including Croatian Serbs, Bosnian Serbs and Kosovar Serbs (Brubaker 1996: 73, 74–5).

In these early stages, then, the Balkan path to anti-nation identification radicalises in a different way from the Turkish and German case, a key difference between a case of ethnic cleansing with genocidal episodes and cases of total genocide. Nonetheless, certain aspects of the iterative nature of ideology reveals itself in a similar way to that of my other two cases. Here, the ideological structure preceding Milosevic's rise allowed and supported a mistrust of Muslims, centred in the late 1980s around the Kosovars. As the geopolitical theatre shifted, ideology was constrained within that established structure; this necessitated the ideological identification of an exaggerated link between Kosovar and Bosniak in history and religion the two regional groups previously only tenuously shared.

1991–1992

By 1991, the shifting political atmosphere begins to have direct ramifications on anti-nation ideology in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Despite calls to abstain from doing so, Germany was adamant in its decision to recognise Croatian independence (Malcolm 1996: 223), causing Serbian fear of a new Ustasha-like regime to become even further entrenched. For many, including radical leaders such as Mladic, the creation of a newly independent Croatia was perceived as synonymous with the 'establishment of an ultranationalist regime that threatened the liberties, livelihoods and . . . the lives of Croatian Serbs' (Brubaker 1996: 71–2).

Furthermore, a population census taken and published in 1991 in the Bosanska Krajina region showed that Serbs outnumbered Bosniaks by only 127,358 and that Serbs had lost the majority in certain key towns in this region (in IT-99-36-1 1999). The implication of such publications was to rouse Bosnian Serbs into the belief that Muslims were taking over, undermining the nation and forcing them out of their national homeland; in short, the claim was that Serbs were being bred out, a similar claim to that of the Nazis about the Jews in the latter years of their ideological radicalisation. Biljana Plavsic, in the newspaper *Borba*, ardently claimed that 'rape is the war strategy of Muslims and Croats against Serbs. Islam considers this something normal' (in Oberschall 2007: 102). Beginning in 1991, the SDS and other Serb nationalist leaders in the ARK region (Autonomous Region of Krajina), called the SAO (Serbian Autonomous Region) Krajina by the Bosnian Serbs, began disseminating propaganda portraying Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats as fanatics intending to commit genocide on the Serbian nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to gain control of the region (IT-99-36-1 1999). This led directly to a heightened sense of fear, particularly for Bosnian Serbs, and began cementing the idea that the Serbs were in fear of national desecration into Serb ideology at the time. As the majority of the non-Serb citizens in most of the ARK areas were Muslim, a majority of this propaganda related directly to them; Serbs were particularly quick to use their Muslim identities as a rationale behind the killings. In the municipality of Prijedor, for instance, out of the total population of 112,543, 43.9 per cent of the population were Bosniaks and only 5.6 per cent were Croats. The 42 per cent of Serbs, already in the minority, began to fear for their lives (IT-97-24-PT 2002a; IT-97-24-PT 2002b). As the war with Croatia went into 1992, pro-Serb propaganda became ever more visible, as they were continually reminded of Serb massacres in WWII. The threat was that if they allowed the Muslims to remain, the same thing would occur again (IT-97-24 2008). Karadzic openly warned Muslims that they would be 'destroyed' if they sought independence in Bosnia-Herzegovina (IT-00-39&40/1 2002b).

The beginning of the Croatian conflict also saw the opening of camps across the Serb-controlled regions, particularly in the ARK region. Most camps followed the routine established in the Omarska and Keraterm camps, where the inmates were categorised into three groups. The 'A' group consisted of people considered to be leaders of the Muslim community or volunteers for a Bosnian militia or territorial defence group. Generally, these inmates were executed soon after their arrival to the camps. Group 'B' consisted of people drafted into military defence; Group 'C' was everyone else. Often, members of both groups B and C were exchanged for Serbs, either those taken prisoner or those living on Bosnian-held territory who wanted to relocate to Serbia (Silber and Little 1997: 251; Wood 2001: 68). This population exchange is mildly reminiscent of the Turkish and Nazi immigration and exile policies against the Armenians and Jews respectively; it again points to the fact that though ideology necessitated the separation of the anti-nation from the nation, inherently genocidal policies of total extermination were not the primary resort of these states.

Nonetheless, this process of internment served, as in the German Holocaust, to dehumanise the Bosniaks to an extreme degree, holding them in terrible conditions, subjecting them to untold horror, until their visage became a justification for Serb claims that Bosniaks were not 'real men' like Serbs. Often, at the executions occurring after the categorisations described above, Bosniaks were made to dig their own graves (Judah 1997: 240). Again, the point of these atrocities was not necessarily to rid the world of Bosniaks. Instead, the point was to ethnically cleanse the homeland, separating anti-nation from nation; again, as discussed in Chapter 1, this is ethnic cleansing, not genocide (IT-99-36-1 1999; see also Melson 1996). In short, it mattered less to the Bosnian Serbs that the Muslims were allowed to exist, *so long as they did not exist in Greater Serbia*.

1992–1995

After the siege of Sarajevo began, non-Serbs in Bosnia reluctantly held an independence referendum that Bosnian Serbs were encouraged to boycott and thus undermine any legitimacy for independence claims. Thus, when the majority voted in favour of independence, Serbs were able to claim the Muslim majority and Croat minority were destroying the Yugoslavia Serbs were attempting to preserve (IT-02-54-T 2002). The Serb propaganda machine continued to build on this foundation. 'Muslim fundamentalists' were charged with allying themselves with 'Croat fascists' to wage a war of aggression against Bosnian Serbs, making it easy to exaggerate feelings of revenge in light of the WWII Ustasha massacres (Malesevic 2006: 226). Attempts of defence or retaliation on the Bosnian side resulted only in a greater radicalisation of anti-nation policy, as seen in the attempt to retake Prijedor in May 1992. The Serb authorities used this to legitimise and accelerate the campaign to cleanse the area (IT-97-24-PT 2001); as Ratko Mladic dictated, 'the moment has finally come for us to take revenge upon the Turks here!' (1995 in IT-04-80-1 2005).

Similar to Germany in the mid-1930s, Serb governments in Bosnia-Herzegovinian towns began to institute various restrictions upon Muslims and Croats. In Celinac, for instance, Muslims could not swim or fish, gather in groups of more than three, drive cars, make phone calls in public places other than at their local post offices or leave without permission (Judah 1997: 204; Silber and Little 1997: 246). Between April and December 1992, a campaign to collect 'illegally held weapons' from 'Muslim and Croat extremists' was instituted; many massacres and other atrocities occurred during these raids (IT-04-79-PTb 2005); 'The Turks are going to be like walnuts in a Serbo-Croat nut-cracker' (Bosnian Serb in Silber and Little 1997: 303).

During this time period, another ideological twist creeps into popular propaganda. In October 1992, a document was published, signed by SANU, the SPS and the Serbian Orthodox Church claiming that Muslims (both Kosovar and Bosniak), Albanians and 'Romans' (Croats) were reproducing at an unprecedented rate and that their intent was to outgrow Serbs in order to force them out of the geographical homeland of the Serbian nation (Salzman 1998: 350, 351). The ideological ramifications this had on the nation will be discussed further in Chapter 4; for the anti-nation, however, the results were catastrophic. This sort of fear resulted in the excessive use of rape as a tool of war in the Bosnian tragedy.[8] Roy Gutman recounts the popular belief that Muslim men would attempt to 'remove [a Serbian woman] from her own family, to impregnate her by undesirable seeds, to make her bear a stranger and then to take even him away from her' in order to raise a 'generation of janissaries', or Christians raised by Muslims (1993: x), as we saw in the Armenian case. 'To be successful [Serbian nationalism] had to depict Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats as bloodthirsty Ustashas and Ottoman-era janissaries, hell bent on recreating a fascist era "Independent State of Croatia" (NDH) or an Islamic state' (Malesevic 2006: 212). This, then, added to the sense of justification for Serbian crimes of mass rape and ethnic cleansing, particularly when viewed against a backdrop, found in both of my other two cases, of 'we are only doing to them what they have done to us'. Thus, there are radicalising shifts in the evolution of ideology occurring in the Balkan case, though these shifts do differ somewhat.

Analysis

The above discussion allows us to now analyse the role of the anti-nation in the development of ideology and to identify any key themes perpetuated throughout all three cases when viewed comparatively.

Thus, let us return to the Turkish case. Immediately some interesting points come to light, the first of which is the established perspective of the Armenians as having unequal status, both culturally and legally. By the beginning of the Balkan Wars, the idea of the dehumanised anti-nation has already been normalised within the language of CUP ideology. This becomes the foundation for the implementation of further perceptions over the course of the conflict.

This idea of the dehumanised Armenian is further exacerbated by the popular perception of the Armenian as wealthy during a time of economic hardship; this is particularly effective in the early stages of ideological radicalisation in this case. The portrayal of Armenian success in the European trade area as a direct threat to Ottoman/Islamist influence in the area was critical to amassing popular support for increasingly aggressive anti-Armenian policies. As anti-nation aggression is formalised, this aspect of ideology in the Turkish case diminishes, suggesting that there is an inverse relationship between ideology and policy regarding this particular theme. Certainly this relationship is reflective of the growing perception that the Armenians should be entirely removed from Turkish society. Due primarily to the multi-ethnic nature of the Ottoman state, this theme is slow to emerge but is strong in the latter years of escalation. Note, however, that the focus was generally on the removal of the Armenians from the homeland rather than their destruction.

The third point of interest in the Turkish case is the perceived relationship between the Armenian anti-nation and external states. Beginning with the uprisings in the late 1800s, the Armenians are persistently identified as an internal enemy, damaging the nation; it is worth noting, however, that there are specific spikes of ideological emphasis placed on this point, first upon the outbreak of the Balkan Wars and secondly during the early years of WWI. During these times, Armenians are directly associated with external enemies due to perceived religious ties. Much of this perception of Armenians as the national persecutor is founded on the early uprisings, as described in Chapter 2. These uprisings, when paired with the significant reduction in territory, helped establish a fear of the further reduction of empire through the loss of Anatolia.

Unlike the Armenians in Turkey, the Zionist movement for an independent Jewish homeland played practically no role in German propaganda relating to the anti-nation. Nonetheless, there is still a growing perception of the necessity to remove all aspects of Jewry from the German nation. Early on in the Nazis' reign, there are hints that Jews and Germans should not exist in the same place; ultimately, until the armament and build-up to WWII begins in earnest between 1935 and 1938, the only clear idea regarding the separation of Jews from Germans is the physical separation of the two entities. This means roughly the separation of Jews within Germany and the separation of Jews from Germany (Bloxham and Kushner 2004: 72). Once armament begins and war looms, the shift away from territorial segregation in Germany to extermination begins to make itself felt in Nazi ideology. By 1942–43, the height of German ideological radicalisation, it became ideologically clear that Jews must not only live apart from Germans but that they must be entirely eradicated. This is the only case where the ideology regarding separation goes to such an extreme.

The need for such extreme separation is presented as being due to the damage the Jews have done through their persecution of the German nation. Similar to the Turkish case, the Jews are supposed to have committed egregious acts demeaning the German state and the German Volk through their association with external and internal enemies, specifically communists and Marxists. In Germany, 1938 serves as the apex of radicalisation on this theme. From this height, it does decrease as Germany gets embroiled in war, but I would suggest this is due to the fact that it was very important to Germany to show it was winning the 'war' against the Jewish 'opponents' (Tribunals 18.03.1946; Dawidowicz 1975).

Nazi ideology was particularly clear of the self-fulfilling nature of anti-Semitic policy. By this I mean that anti-Jewish policies were implemented in such a way as to suggest that the Jews brought the action on themselves by acting in a certain way; in particular was the perception that, like Armenians in the Turkish case, the Jews were thriving during the economic depression Germany suffered in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Regardless of the fact that Jews represented only 2 per cent of German bankers and stockbrokers, Jews had become symbolic with wealth and class conflict (Mann 2004: 141). This idea increases in popularity until the Anschluss; upon entrance in WWII, this theme declines, only to be resurrected again at the end of the war, when Jews were once again linked with Germany's external enemies.

The final point, resurfacing time and again in the German case, is the Nazis' extreme dehumanisation of the Jews. Though in each of my three cases, the anti-nation is compared to non-human elements, be they cattle, aliens, vampires or rats, the Nazis had a particular focus on associating Jews with scientific and medical terminology – growths, parasites, microbes, germs. This has to do with recent breakthroughs in scientific knowledge, something which most of the Western world was taken with at the time, paired with the extreme social Darwinist tendencies of the organic Nazi movement. Equally, it is interesting that the language of dehumanisation begins at an extremely high level and remains so throughout the conflict.

This is different from the Balkan case, where the dehumanisation of the anti-nation begins quite slowly but continues to swell in importance at each period addressed in my analysis; thus, it is similar to the association of the Bosniaks as the persecutor of the nation. Similarly to each of the other two cases, Serbian entrance into war with Croatia served as the primary radicaliser for this theme, as there is a large rise in anti-Bosniak propaganda, mirroring a shift occurring in Bosnian-Serb propaganda. Crucial here was the role of the religious myth, drawn upon by elites quite selectively, demonising Muslims as attempting to destroy the persecuted Serb (Gagnon 1995: 141). This perception of the Bosniaks as a historical enemy is of much greater import in this case than in either the Turkish or German cases, though Bosniaks are equally shown to have 'dangerous' links with external enemies as well. Thus, as we saw above, though there is a late identification of the Bosniaks as the anti-nation, this identification is preceded by an early mistrust of Muslim groups due to unrest in other parts of the region. Seamless ideological affiliation of Kosovar to Bosniak mirrors the internal enemy/external enemy relationships found in my other two cases. More similarly, Bosniaks had begun accepting help from the greater Muslim community (Bringa 1995), largely based on their affiliation with a religious identity which had become more of an ethnic marker than an indicator of faith.

Secondly, the Serbs also, as do the Turks and Germans, portray the Bosniak anti-nation as thriving during a time of national struggle. Unlike other aspects of ideology in this case, this point is particularly strong in the early years of radicalisation and declines over the course of the conflict. Bosniak encroachment on governmental administration is established early in the radicalisation period, as Muslims were thriving politically in a time where Serbian influence was waning; there is also a spike in this trend in late 1991 and early 1992 during the independence movements, when Serbs feared the breakdown of their political sphere of power. After this point, however, the theme of national decline decreases throughout the course of the conflict.

Lastly, there is the fact that throughout the Balkan conflict, the drive to separate the nation from the anti-nation is paramount. It should be noted, however, that unlike in my other two cases, this goal was shared across Serbs and Croats alike, with Bosnia-Herzegovina remaining the only region committed to the multicultural idealism established under Tito. Their own goal of establishing a Bosniak region evolved only after years of persecution at the hands of Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats alike. Equally, Serb ideology was less specific about the eradication of Bosniaks from the homeland and more conscious of the eradication of all other-groups from the homeland. Keep in mind, however, that in real terms, this meant a significantly higher number of deaths and persecution against Bosniaks than against other groups. Equally, this homeland-driven approach to anti-nation policy mirrors that of the Turks rather than the Nazis in that the ideological focus was on the eradication of peoples from the homeland rather than the complete destruction of the anti-nation.

Conclusion

This chapter shows that the identification of an extreme out-group beyond the bounds of ordinary other-groups is present in all three cases of genocide; this identification has come about mainly through political elites building on beliefs of historical claims of difference and injustice. In order to rectify these 'wrongdoings' and to justify the elimination of the anti-nation, national elites seek to ideologically strip the anti-nation of attributes that would elicit a merciful response from the nation.

On a more micro level, however, evidence from each of my three case studies demonstrates that the ideological progression of radicalisation occurs primarily in four ways: 1) *a persistent perception of the anti-nation thriving in times of national decline*; it is here where we see the economic tension of nation versus anti-nation come into play. These stereotypes were critical to amassing popular aggression against the anti-nation. In each of these cases, the idea of the anti-nation thriving during times of national decline is established before ideology becomes genocidal. Also noteworthy is that upon entrance into war in each case, there is a notable shift in how much emphasis is placed on this theme.

We then move on to 2) *the reinforced dehumanisation of the anti-nation through propaganda as well as through policy*. Reinforced dehumanisation, paired with the chaos ensuing from war, is the theme Kershaw identifies as providing the context in which mass killing develops (1989: 106; see also Astourian 1990: 125); theft, rape, slave labour, unmitigated abuse and the societal restrictions of the anti-nation present in each of my cases provide reinforced *policies* of dehumanisation which, paired with the *language* of dehumanisation present in propaganda, fulfils Kershaw's criteria. This theme, perhaps more than any other, provides a picture for the 'ratchet-effect' relationship between ideology and policy in increasingly genocidal states. Though the use of dehumanised language is present in each of my three cases in the early stages of ideological development, the radicalisation of policy allows for a greater, and, especially in the Yugoslav case, faster radicalisation of ideology. Thus, we see that it is not merely a rhetorical radicalisation but is radicalisation based on the effects of previous policies of restriction and degradation in society.

Thirdly, we see radicalising states 3) *project the anti-nation as an historical, present and future national persecutor.* Of all the themes discussed in this chapter, this is perhaps the strongest and most influential. This incorporates Staub's idea that 'perpetrators come to believe either that the victims have something they want or . . . stand in the way of something they want' (1989: 23) and Kaufmann's idea that invented tales of aggression planned by the anti-nation or occurring against the nation provide national hardliners with an 'unanswerable argument' (1996: 142) regarding the necessity for increased persecution. This can be manifested in a variety of ways, including military persecution, political persecution and cultural persecution. I want to note, however, that again the anti-nation is cast as something more than a mere enemy. An enemy can be a passive thing, but radicalising ideology in these three cases presents the anti-nation as an active immediate threat. The anti-nation is actively acting contrary to, undermining and traitorously persecuting the nation. In short, casting the anti-nation as both historical and future persecutor provides the nation with justification for revenge and protection. Rebecca West sums up the radicalised ideology well, saying in the context of Serbs in the Yugoslav case, 'having seen what Turkish conquest means to the Slav, it is certain they were justified in their crime. A man is not a man if he will not save his seed' (in Judah 1997: 78). Propaganda regarding this theme shifts similarly in each case: each time the nation prepares to enter war, the association of the anti-nation as the national persecutor rises.

The last main theme regarding the anti-nation arising from my research is 4) *the perceived necessity of physically separating the anti-nation from the nation.* By casting members of the anti-nation as a festering sore or as a disease, the political elite instituting genocidal ideology gathers support from the members of their nation. In this way, genocidal ideology both defines and justifies the need for the elimination of its chosen victims; the anti-nation is cast as an invader of the national homeland and, as such, they are denied the rights of citizens of the state and placed outside the realm of the nation's moral obligation. As Mosse finds, ' . . . a person doomed to a life of criminality must be killed as this [is] the only way to protect society. Capital punishment would therefore be part of a process of "deliberate selection", which might serve to supplement and strengthen natural selection' (1985: 84; see also Snyder 2000: 67; Waller 2002: 237; Breuilly 2001: 103). In this light, mere coexistence is not enough to save the homeland from destruction by the anti-nation. By identifying the anti-nation in such a way, it allows the nation to easily justify the implementation of genocidal policy on multiple levels, varying at the different stages established in this analysis.

Anti-nation ideology, then, is at once a believable structural framework and a 'cynical, utilitarian political instrument' (Herf 2005: 54) of agency. It is also flexible, dynamic and at times at odds with policy initiatives. It also, as suggested in Chapter 1, is a key participant in the dynamicisation process of policy – an ideological belief instils fear, demanding that policies be put in place to secure the nation from the anti-nation; this then further segregates the anti-nation and restricts civil rights and human liberties, leading to a life regarded as less valuable than a 'normal' life; this, then, leads to strife, poverty, persecution and acts of dehumanisation, which then reinforce the language of dehumanisation present in the original ideology. Encouraging an ideological state of fear of the anti-nation then provided these radicalising states with the moral responsibility to act aggressively against the anti-nation. By committing genocidal aggression, these perpetrator states were able to present themselves to their constituencies as fulfilling their moral obligation; through that fulfilment, they hoped to achieve legitimacy and further secure their power base. To what extent this same cyclical relationship between policy and ideology exists in the other two primary themes of ideology will be discussed in the next two chapters.

4

The Nation: Ideological Radicalisation of the Elect

Introduction

When reflecting on the ideological placement of the anti-nation in genocidal ideology, one can be forgiven for agreeing with Hitler when he averred that the nationalisation of the masses 'can never be achieved by half-measures, by weakly emphasising a so-called objective standpoint, but only by a ruthless and fanatically one-sided orientation towards the goal to be achieved' (1969 [1925]: 306). Though certain scholars of civic and civil nationalist movements would heartily disagree that such extremes are necessary to form national identity, even they would admit that the understanding of a national self is at the core of any nationalist movement. This chapter seeks to address whether or not there are shifts in the ideological perception of the nation in cases of radicalising ideology and, if ideology does change in this regard, whether or not there are any similarities of themes or patterns across cases.

The purpose of this chapter is to ascertain how extreme ideology of the national group radicalises in its evolution towards genocide with hopes to further the discussion regarding the appropriateness of path dependence to the cumulative radicalisation of ideology. In other words, does state-led ideology regarding the national self go beyond self-awareness and even beyond traditional feelings of national pride? Is the ideological depiction of the nation used to legitimise policies portrayed as having the intent of protecting the nation?

This chapter begins with a brief overview of the nation and how the 'us versus them' mentality of ethnicity manifests itself generally in nationalising states. This moves towards a more focused discussion of the nation in radicalising states in which I begin discussing Turkey, Germany and the Balkans in detail, using the geopolitical events discussed in Chapter 2 to follow the dynamisation of ideological shifts.

The Nation

Chapter 1 shows how ideas of nationhood are expressed in academic scholarship; the work of theorists of nationalism has shown us that though ethnic and other types of conflict can arrive out of nationalist sentiment, it need not do so. Indeed, unlike Hitler's assertion above, their work goes so far as to describe the nation as 'a relative community of character', where the community is the 'totality of physical and mental characteristics that are peculiar to a nation, that unite its different members and divide them from other nations' (Bauer 1996: 51). In short, there is a perception that the nation is composed of a people group sharing a similar history and culture, which includes religious/mythic symbols and language. The national idea 'is a general conception, arising in the course of an intellectual debate, which attempts to define the identity and historical goals of a nation' (Pavkovic 1994: 441). This, however, is contrasted with a more ethnocentric view of the nation in which the national self is perceived as 'a social entity rooted in space and time and characterised by an enduring inner essence, a spirit or Geist, a vital soul, which manifests itself in cultural expressions, language and art, social relations and legal codes, and even economic arrangements' (Wolf 2002 [1999]: 235). From this perspective, the nation is no longer a collective united by culture, religion, language or citizenship but is instead a shared soul manifested in each individual, which then *results* in these activities; this is a fine distinction in definition but a vital one. Wolf's description points to the heart of ethnocentrism in organic nationalism: that man 'is before he acts; nothing he does may change what he is' (Bauman 2002 [1989]: 114). The nation, then, becomes the embodiment of what Lifton calls the 'racial-cultural substance' in political and apolitical spheres (in Staub 1989: 122).

Not all consequences of this fastidious belief in a collective are entirely malevolent all of the time. Take, for instance, patriotism in war, bureaucratic support and civic activeness, all of which carry positive connotations in modern society and can be outcomes of collective national pride. In many cases, however, a belief in a chauvinistic ethnonational collective encompasses more than mere pride; as discussed in Chapter 1, organic nationalist movements result in a belief that one's nation is inherently elite to the extent that inclusion in the nation is hard to attain if one begins as an outsider.

As Wolf and Bauman infer, to be a part of the nation is believed to be an inherited quality, one typically based on an accepted belief of blood and generational ties. Organic nationalist movements are typically comparative doctrines where 'each nation's genealogy [is] inserted within a wider civilizational story', one in which the nation is portrayed in an elite position (Mann 2004: 84). Within nationalist propaganda, these inherited rights and qualities of national inclusion are not presented as ideologically constructed myths; they are instead presented as 'natural', and, therefore, unchosen, just as one's race and parentage are unchosen. Paired with this understanding is the perceived need to transcend all things that put the needs of the individual self before the needs of the nation (Anderson 1983: 143; Weber 1996: 37; Mosse 1985). These premises form the base of ethnocentrism, in which individual men and women are given a defined identity and role within society through a distinction of the 'good' and 'bad' in the world in which they live, thereby making it impossible to set one's identity aside (Barth 1996: 81; Mosse 1985: xxvii; Kaufmann 1996).

Ethnic identity established upon these lines is problematic. When state elites understand the national self in such a way, an 'us versus them' relationship is established, resulting in situations where the identity of other-groups is not self-subscribed but is instead imposed by national elites in control of the state – particularly when the nation's religion, culture, language or history is similar or closely linked with other-groups present in the geopolitical region. National identity cannot be objectively measured, particularly if Kershaw's claim that social groups exist 'to serve in their different ways the political goal of the struggle for "national survival" . . . it was as parasitic as it was predatory' holds true (1989: 142; see also Staub 1989: 253).

In the upcoming sections, I endeavour to show how this perception of the nation shifts and changes over the course of radicalisation, on a micro and a macro level. Through this analysis, I am also hoping to show how events and policies affect ideology and whether or not an inverse relationship exists, as we saw in Chapter 3.

Turkey

1895–1908

In the mid-19th century, a sense of a Turkish identity had not yet manifested into state ideology. Instead, the focus was still on preserving faith in the emperor and the Ottoman state through a reclaimed identity offered to a polyethnic citizenry. Though the sultan, Abdul Hamid II, was technically the leader of the Islamic community under the Ottoman Empire, Ottomanism was generally disassociated with religion and was the claimed identity of individuals from a variety of other-groups.

The Turkish movement itself was in a very early stage. Mostly composed of a cosmopolitan intelligentsia, the early members of the CUP, though of Muslim background, were not religious. They chose instead to put their faith into a platform of science and literature. Astourian points out that the 'Young Turks were positivists influenced, on the one hand, by Auguste Comte and Emile Durkheim and, on the other hand, by German nationalism' (1990: 133). They were focused on the necessity of social and cultural change through state-led policies; hence, constitutional reform was high on their list of political priorities. Though they were drawn to power through the modern state, most of their early members were products of the state schools and had little political experience (Ahmad 1969: 16–17; see also Mann 2005: 116).

Meanwhile, as discussed in Chapter 3, the turn of the century saw Ottomanism re-establishing links with Islamism, drawing upon the richness of Muslim heritage in an attempt to stem the flow of decline occurring in the region due to the complex situation of change and shifts in international policy by the European powers (Akçam 2006: 43, 50; Balakian 2003: 61–2, 81–92; Dadrian 1996). Thus, it was Muslims who were portrayed as sacrificing for the good of the nation:

> We are being killed on Crete, slaughtered on Samos, massacred in Rumelia, cut into pieces in the Yemen, mown down in the Hauran, throttled in Basra. But it's not the Greeks, Armenians, Bulgarians, Vlachs, Jews, Arabs or Albanians who are sent there, is it? Let them sit in their houses . . . devoting themselves only to their own affairs. Let them grow rich, marry, and have children.
>
> (Berkir Sikti Baykal, Sark Buhran ve Sabah
> Gazetesi in Akçam 2006: 33)

These complaints were born from a legal loophole – Armenians could purchase their conscription and, therefore, not have to join the Ottoman army. This led to a perception that only Ottomans and Muslims could 'truly' fight for the empire and thus be full citizens. This sort of discourse is interesting because, as a consequence, we begin to see the open establishment of Turkish identity being 'not Armenian' and the encouragement of the perception that the Armenians were taking advantage of the Ottoman Turks: 'the apparent aim of the Armenians is to incite the Turks, and then, after enough force has been used to suppress them, to cry of oppression and elicit the sympathies of Europe, especially of England' (Sultan Abdul Hamid II in Akçam 2006: 62; see also R14078/Ab.4311 24.02.1913).

Thus, by the early 20th century, there is a clear idea of Ottomans, if not yet Turks, as elite and above other ethnic groups living in the empire; ideology at the time was founded on a basis of Ottomanist/Islamist superiority. In fact, it is the multi-ethnicity of the Ottoman Empire that Ziya Gökalp, a poet and lead ideologue, denounced as having 'stifled the Turkish national spirit', which directly led to the demise of the Ottoman state (in Mann 2005: 121; see also Akçam 2004: 134–40; Isyar 2005: 349). Though they had sacrificed on the battlefield, claims Gökalp, they have become victims of impurity.

This mentality began to ease the shift of nationalisation from Ottomanism to Turkism as the nationalist arm of the CUP grew in power, making it easier to claim the Turks' role as culture bearers. This was brought about mainly by *Türk Yurdu*, the first journal attached to the CUP; *Türk Yurdu* claimed to publish 'scientific' articles on the history of the Turks, proposed to serve the Turkish race in 'any way possible' and reflected the ideals of social Darwinism so popular in Young Turk propaganda (Isyar 2005: 347). The Young Turks' deification of the sciences and their focus on modernisation through the state enabled key ideologues such as Ziya Gökalp to merge ideas of Sufism with Durkheim's deification of society, the only difference being, according to Astourian, his replacement of 'nation' for 'society' (Astourian 1990: 133; see also Akçam 2006: 57). Thus, by the time the CUP came to power in 1908, a Turkish national identity had begun to be made manifest in political ideology. The Young Turks believed in and popularised a sense of national election which had come under threat by the ethnic minorities present in the empire (Ahmad 1969: 6) and, as seen in Chapter 3, most especially by the Armenians.

1908–1912

This foundation, particularly the firm establishment of the idea of a Turkish nation, provides the CUP a prime base from which to operate upon their assumption of power on 24 July 1908 after overthrowing the sultan. There are some immediate shifts in ideology that take effect after their assumption, most notably the lack of focus on the nation in disgrace, as was present under the old regime. The Young Turks continued to appeal to a cosmopolitan, modern base but were driven by their ethnonationalism, particularly regarding language; they proclaimed the modernised Turkish language as the only language accepted in the Ottoman Empire and insisted that all political and academic teaching take place in Turkish (R14097/Ab.23000 9.07.1917; Mann 2005: 123; Ahmad 1969: 40, 136). When paired with the loss of territory experienced in the early years of the 20th century, the unfortunate consequence of these policies was the alienation of other-groups. Equally, wars in Europe encouraged further scepticism of Christian groups; this caused an ideological shift in which 'Turkification' came to mean a closer identification with Islam.

Thus, and particularly after the counterrevolution of 1909, the focus began to turn to the need to further establish the nation through purification. The elimination of impure elements, couched as unnatural and unclean, ideologically became necessary to protect the natural glory of the physical condition of every Turk. 'The historico-biological discourse which analysed the condition of the Turks prepared the conditions of birth of a historico-medical discourse that outlined what was to be done to recover the glory of the Turks' (Isyar 2005: 355, 356).

Tapping into the aforementioned military emphasis of Turkish identity, in the early years of CUP leadership, military prowess became another foundational aspect of ideology. Calls for war were published in newspapers and journals, advocating military aggression in the Balkans to retake the 'natural border' of the river Danube (Bayar in Akçam 2006: 85). It was during this time that the Ittihadist youth movement began receiving training from the national army (Mann 2005: 130), directly attaching the idea of the youth as carrying on the warrior traditions of their glorious national past as upheld by the ancients. This made it ever easier to ensure the idea of national transcendence, as Gökalp's poetry was able to be institutionalised to a degree, and more people were reading things like this 1911 excerpt: 'Turks are the "supermen" imagined by the German philosopher Nietzsche . . . New life will be born from Turkishness' (Gökalp in Akçam 2006: 88). By 1911, a focus on 'National Economics, the boycotting of Armenian and Greek enterprises, and further endeavours to centralise power resulted in the final destruction of the liberal movement within the CUP' (Astourian 1990: 130). Thus, we see a growing perception of the nation as being superior, elite and a culture bearer.

1912–1914

The outbreak of the Balkan Wars solidified Turkish national identity and ideas of Turkish election culturally and politically through unionist propaganda. The war itself was hailed, amongst other things, as 'a stroke of good fortune upon the Turkish people who had been sure of their own decline' (Hüseyin Cahit Yalçin in Akçam 2006: 117) and was seen as an opportunity to ensure the unity of Ottoman lands and an attempt to restore the election of the Turks. This was to be accomplished through literary and governmental means. Firstly, soon after the outbreak of the war, the CUP established the Committee on National Defence (*Muüdafaa-i Milliye*), from which Armenians were barred, intended to actively encourage support for the role of Turks in the war effort. They easily substituted 'Turkish' terminology for what would have been 'Ottoman' or 'Islamist' before the new regime (Staub 1989: 181; R14078/Ab.2888 8.02.1913; Akçam 2004: 139, 143). The subsequent loss of territory in the Balkans only reified Gökalp's assertion that 'what needed to be done was to stop hiding behind the mask of Ottomanism' and instead startle awake national consciousness by simply substituting one word for the other. 'Turkism is simultaneously Islamism', which was simultaneously 'Ottomanism', as they held the same ideological and religious basis (Akçam 2006: 79, 84).

The loss of the Balkan Wars, then, served as proof that the remainder of the empire should be left to the 'real' citizens, the Turks, who were being abjectly exploited by Armenians through their alliances with other Christian (i.e., Balkan, Russian and other European) powers (Isyar 2005: 347; R14077/Ab.257 10.01.1913). From a European perspective on the Armenian question, the concern was that 'the Turks in their racist power could go forth and alone play the role of conquest as the lording nation' (R14078/Ab.4311 24.02.1913). Russia quickly became of particular concern as, under Article 61 of the Berlin Agreement, Turks feared a Russian attempt at Armenian annexation (R14077/Ab.257 10.01.1913). The only way to ensure that this did not occur was to ensure the purity of their own nation, as 'only nations that belonged to and represented one people, one race, could succeed . . . others were destined to fail' (Gökalp in Isyar 2005: 346).

One of the first steps taken by Turkish authorities in their attempt to purify the state was the 'Turkification' (*verturken*) of Armenian children (R14090/Ab.5914 3.03.1916). Policy dictated that these children be taken from their families and placed 'in newly opened establishments where they received an education characterised by strict disciplinary codes that was aimed at "Turkifying" them and converting them to Islam' (Tachjian 2009: 65). Armenian women also were offered the possibility of life if they married a Turk, renounced their Christianity and became Muslim – though in reality many became sexual slaves, beaten and often thrown out or killed at the hands of their 'husbands' (Balakian 2003: 253–4, 258; Tachjian 2009). Men, however, were not offered this option. This gender/race discrepancy points towards the perception of how ethnicity was established at this moment in Turkish ideology. It suggests that ethnicity was perceived as being passed on through the male line and that, in these early days of conflict, Turkism was something that could be learned given the correct circumstance of marriage and age. It is, perhaps, a throwback to Ottoman multiculturalism.

Nonetheless, this time period sees the ideological beginning of the end for Ottoman 'equality' set up under the very constitution the CUP was dedicated to enforcing: 'Down with equality . . . we don't want equality!' (army commander Ahmed Muhtar Pasha in Dadrian 2004: 189). The state began to publicly assert its inclination to 'pursue a utopian goal, and to halt, as never before, those who work with nihilistic ideals' (R14078/Ab.4311 24.02.1913).

1914–1915

By the time Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire, the CUP was well established in power and had further radicalised its ideological voice. The loss of the Balkan Wars had been contextualised as 'Allah's divine punishment for a society that did not know how to pull itself together' (Mehmet Akif Ersoy in Akçam 2006: 84). The success of Serbia, Bulgaria and the other Balkan states in their bid for independence were classed in Turkish propaganda as being due to the 'racial consciousness of their people' (in Isyar 2005: 346). WWI became an opportunity to pour out rage on the Christians who had 'caused' their defeat: 'our anger is strengthening: revenge, revenge, revenge; there is no other word' and 'Let this be a warning . . . O Muslims, don't get comfortable! Do not let your blood cool before taking revenge' (Enver Pasha and Tarih ve Toplum in Akçam 2006: 115, 86).

Newspapers and journals repeatedly reminded readers of the '350,000 Muslims murdered during the Balkan War' and that those responsible for those killings would revenge themselves on the Turks with further killings in WWI (diplomat Galip Kemal Söylemezoglu in Akçam 2006: 117); this fear led to further ideological intensification of the need to purify the nation and further established the nation's election through its sacrifices on the battlefield. Similar to what we will see in the German case, much of this election was made ideologically manifest through the idyllic representation of the strength and vigour of youth: 'The function of an officer is not merely to wear a colourful uniform. Being a soldier means exercise and education, science and art, and above all bravery and hard-work. It is only the young who possess these virtues and are capable of learning and hard-work' (Enver Pasha, 1914 in Ahmad 1969: 147). Spurred on through the focus on the sciences and ideas of natural selection, there was also an increased focus on the physical bodies of the Turks, in which 'robustness, strength, vitality became the keywords of the [new "Turkish"] societies'; this physical perfection, for the CUP, was not the result of hard work or training but was instead the by-product of the election of Turkish blood (Isyar 2005: 355–6).

As a result of the growing need for purification, anti-Armenian policies ensued, one of the most extreme being the establishment of the *Teshkilat-i Makhsusiye*, the killing squads organised by leading members of the Young Turks (Melson 1996: 160). This ostensibly was to protect the Turks from the Armenians living along the Russian border who 'represented a great threat to the country's future'. Doing so, says Dr Behaettin Sakir, member of the CUP Central Committee and head of the SO, might necessitate members of the nation 'to act contrary to the laws of nations and of humanity', but it is a fundamental imperative; thus, 'the Committee is ever ready to rescue the homeland from the blemish of this accursed nation [the Armenians]. It has been decided to wash our hands of the responsibility for this stain that has been smeared across Ottoman history' (in Akçam 2006: 129).

Post 1915

After the massacres at Van, and further losses on the battlefields of WWI, the intensification of anti-Armenian ideology and policy came to fruition; while a certain reticence remained for discussing killings outright, the CUP openly admitted deportations and discussed candidly amongst themselves that deportations were the equivalent of massacres (Konst./Ankara.170 19.08.1915; Dadrian 2004: 233–4; Akçam 2004: 163–4). Only a few weeks after the massacres at Van, the legal legitimisation of ideology was implemented as the CUP passed an emergency law, the Temporary Law of Deportation. This law gave authorities permission to deport and massacre any group or individual they 'sensed' (*hissetmek***)** posed a threat to the nation. While never citing Armenians, this law could not be applied to Turks, Catholics (primarily Greeks and Russians), Protestants (Americans and Europeans), the ill and elderly, soldiers and their families, officers and merchants – thus exempting most notable other-groups except the Armenians.

This being the case, we see that there is a perception that the nation is under threat; any actions instituted to protect the nation are justified as defensive. 'Turkey is set on fulfilling, in its own way, a policy that will solve the Armenian question by destroying the Armenian people. Neither [German] intercession, nor the protests of the American ambassador, nor even the threat of enemy force . . . have succeeded in turning Turkey from this path and nor will they succeed at a later date' (R14093 18.09.1916).

There was a sincere belief that in order for the true purification of the nation to be achieved, the Armenians had to be removed; once this had occurred, the nation – and through the nation, the state – would be able to reach its utopian aims. If this purification did not occur, the destruction of the Turkish nation was ensured (Enver Pasha in Isyar 2005: 357). All the while, in key speeches and debates from religious pulpits and political platforms, forceful nationalist addresses were made, hailing the Turk for his fearlessness in the face of death, assuring the people they would live eternally in the grace of God. 'The Turk entered the world on the day it was created by God', says one CUP leader, 'and he has made history; he has changed the map' (in Akçam 2006: 299). This rhetoric continued throughout the end of WWI and even during the trials of those war criminals held at Malta.

Germany

1918–1933

Unlike the Turkish case, a sense of national identity had been established in Germany long before the Nazis came to power. An understanding of the German Volk became a tangible entity in the early to mid-19th century out of what Liah Greenfeld terms 'the Wars of Liberation from Napoleonic domination' (1992: 277). Much of the credit for this idea of a national self is given again to strengths in literature and culture, based in Pietism and early Romanticism, both of which are products of the Reformation and the Enlightenment; these were then fortified under the geopolitical policies of statesman Otto von Bismarck and carried through WWI. From its conception, the undertones of German nationalism were more racial than in my other two cases, which tend to focus more broadly on other aspects of ethnicity. In his book *Myth of the Twentieth Century*, published in 1930, Rosenberg describes what German nationalism hoped to bring about:

> The essence of the contemporary world revolution lies in the awakening of the racial type; not in Europe alone but on the whole planet. This awakening is the organic counter movement against the last chaotic remnants of the liberal economic imperialism, whose objects of exploitation out of desperation have fallen into the snare of Bolshevik Marxism, in order to complete what democracy had begun, the extirpation of the racial and national consciousness.
>
> (quoted in Tribunals 09.01.1946)

One of the ways in which the Nazi state differs from the Turkish state is that a key piece of German propaganda and a springboard from which much early ideology was shaped was dictated from a prison cell. *Mein Kampf* provides us with the primary basis of the pre-1933 Nazi ideological and policy platform; here, Hitler describes the German Volk as being 'stricken with blindness', living 'by the side of a corpse' with 'the poisonings of blood' that, since the Thirty Years' War 'have led not only to a decomposition of our blood, but also of our soul'; this 'weakness' would lead to the destruction of the German Volk and thus, the destruction of civilisation: 'All great cultures of the past perished only because the originally creative race died out from blood poisoning' (Hitler 1969 [1925]: 15, 360, 262, see also 209). Again we are presented, as in the Turkish case, with a strong sense that though the nation is in need of purification, it does not deserve its fate; it is only through some vast mistake that such a thing could come to pass. Much of this was built on the marginalisation of Germans throughout Eastern Europe, particularly in the remnants of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after the Versailles Treaty (Riga and Kennedy 2009).

This undeserved catastrophe, Hitler goes on to say, was caused by directing foreign blood into the German nation, the 'catastrophic splintering of our inner being which is expressed in German super-individualism' (1969 [1925]: 355, see also 297, 353–4). This feeling was particularly identifiable for German refugees and those living in the border areas disputed after the end of WWI. This is primarily due to the fact that those Germans living in areas considered part of the Second Reich had been taken over by other European states; German propaganda, like Rosenberg's 1922 assertion, began to describe the nation thus: 'the entire German people would still be, just as before, the slave of other nations' (Tribunals 09.01.1946). In short, Nazi ideology dictated that the only way to save the nation from its current state of disgrace was to purify national blood, as the consequences of a weak ethnicity would damn future generations.

Thus, from the shame of losing WWI and as a consequence of the Versailles Treaty, discontent begins to emerge as what Mann describes as 'ethnic imperial revisionism' (2005: 183), in which the purified blood of the nation would result in the restoration of national pride. The need for this 'restoration', then, placed an imperative on women and children as symbols of the future of the nation. This ideological premise sparked the foundation of the National Socialist German Students League (NSD-StB) in 1926; its platform was 'the ideological and political conversion of students in universities and technical schools to National Socialism'

(Tribunals 15.01.1946b). The Hitler Youth (HJ) had over 18,000 members at the time of the Reichstag elections of 1930 (Kater 2004: 16). By 1932, the HJ was the largest youth movement in Germany; by 1937, there were over 6 million members (Tribunals 23.05.1946). In April 1933, less than a month after the Nazis seized power, National Political Education Institutions (NPEA schools) began providing a place where the NSDAP could teach and train those who 'were to have some sort of leading position' later in their professional lives. The establishment of these schools was built on a speech Streicher gave in June 1925, demanding the introduction of Nazi doctrine into German schooling (Tribunals 18.03.1946, 01.10.1946c; Stephenson 2001: 27–33; Cecil 1972: 151). This emphasis on youth and education points to the role of culture bearer established in these early years of the ideological representation of the nation.

Women also bear a noticeably prominent place in early Nazi ideology: 'This work of care and education must begin with the young mother'; 'Not in the respectable shopkeeper or virtuous old maid does it see its ideal of humanity, but in the defiant embodiment of manly strength and in women who are able to bring men into the world'; 'The German girl is a subject and only becomes a citizen when she marries. But the right of citizenship can also be granted to female German subjects active in economic life' (Hitler 1969 [1925]: 372, 373, 401). Hitler rationalises this emphasis by explaining that 'human culture and civilisation on this continent are inseparably bound up with the presence of the Aryan. If he dies out or declines, the dark veils of an age without culture will again descend on this globe' (1969 [1925]: 348). This type of discourse expresses the idea that the nation is superior to all and thus the needs and desires of the nation transcend those of the remaining other-groups. National honour, then, comes from being completely assured of the political renown of the Fatherland, an idea represented by the SS motto: 'My honour is my loyalty.' Note, however, that this type of assertion becomes more frequent as the radicalisation process continues.

1933–1935

After the Nazis take power, we begin to see interesting shifts as ideology begins to evolve. Days before the 5 May book burning at Opernplatz, the regular police are awarded military standing. In and of itself, this does not necessarily speak of a massive change in policy; on an ideological level, it speaks to the mindset of the German state, as it is presented as a necessary shift because Germany is being continually discriminated against by its external and internal enemies, both in Europe and in America (Völkischer Beobachter 1933b; 1933g).

In this time of the young Nazi state, workers took on an ideological role in which they were portrayed as combatants against Bolshevism, as serving actively as culture guardians (Richard Euringer in Völkischer Beobachter 1933d; see also 1933a; 1933b). As the Nazis assumed state power, they also assumed responsibility for massive unemployment and economic depression. Though they attempted to stem the tide of financial collapse by overturning trade unions, regulating wages and supporting a new system of industrial-state relations (Evans 2005: 458–61), the purpose of this shift in ideology was to recreate the representation of the working man in the Nazi state as a figure of pride, rather than a figure of shame.

This is not to say that the roles of women and children were in any way diminished; on the contrary, this is when much of the German ideological patriarchy is developed. Financial grants for child support were given for households with multiple children, 'heroic' stories were told of widows and wives of German soldiers; in many ways, the role of the woman was the embodied return to the glorious past of Germany's former glory, as they were extolled to 'be productive' and imitate women of 'the German renaissance' (Völkischer Beobachter 1933e; 1933g, 1935f). Youth, it was promised, 'will carry forth the inheritance of their fathers' (Völkischer Beobachter 1933b) as they unite north and south as brothers (*Nord und sued reicht sich bruederlich die haende*) wearing the 'flying flags of German honour' (Völkischer Beobachter 1933b). Mother's Day was made a national holiday almost immediately after the Nazis took power, and pro-Nazi posters proclaimed that 'the care of mothers and children is the holiest duty of the entire German Volk' (in Mouton 2007: 116).

This taps into the emerging idea that the 'awakening of our Volk has come' – an awakening that stands 'not for a political party, but for Germany!' (Tribunals 09.01.1946; Völkischer Beobachter 1933a; 1933b). Streicher, in his 22 June 1935 speech to the HJ, reminded his listeners that Hitler 'cried to the people to take courage again and to rise and join in liberating the German people from the Devil, so that mankind might again be free from that race which has roamed the globe for centuries and millennia, marked with the brand of Cain' (in Tribunals 10.01.1946c), thus associating the nation with world liberators. This 'awakening' is due to the Nazis move to 'elevate the concept of race to the status of a legal term. The German Nation, unified racially and nationally, will in the future be legally protected against any further disintegration of the German race stock' (Frank in a radio address 20.03.1934 in Tribunals 10.01.1946b). The passing of the Nuremberg Laws saw the legal institution of race move from intention to policy.

1935–1938

As Germany prepares for war, the German propaganda machine begins to shift gears away from tales of a nation disgraced and victimised to one where, unless the state begins to take extreme measures, the nation will be victimised again. In short, ideas of looming fear begin to be infused into national ideology. Stories of German refugees fleeing Poland from persecution were described as 'historical fact', and an impending invasion of Germany by England and France was assumed at all but the highest level – even if there was not 'sufficient proof for the outside world' (Tribunals 23.05.1946, 16.03.1946). This was particularly worrisome, as the 'spirit of Versailles has perpetuated the fury of war; and there will not be a true peace, progress, or reconstruction until the world desists from this spirit. The German people will not tire of pronouncing this warning' (Schacht July 1936 in Tribunals 10.01.1946a). Doing so would only condemn the next generation to a lifeless world without the Volk and overrun by the Jews:

> *Der Stuermer* is right in not carrying out its task in a purely aesthetic manner, for Jewry has shown no regard for the German people. We have, therefore, no reason for being considerate toward our worst enemy. What we fail to do today, the youth of tomorrow will have to suffer for bitterly.
>
> (von Schirach March 1938 in Tribunals 01.10.1946c)

Der Völkischer Beobachter assured its readers that 'the surest path to immortality in this world lies in the maintenance of nationality' (1935c) and that this was the work of a nation charged with responsibility towards maintaining the goodness of the whole world.

While the men were to primarily perform this task in the workplace and, later, on the battlefield, the women and youth of Germany were still encouraged in their roles as culture bearers on the home front. The NPEA schools were expanded in 1937 to include 39 Adolf-Hitler Schools, two for girls and the rest for boys, to recognise those with particular leadership abilities (Cecil 1972: 151–2). While being influenced by far less than 'every organisation' as Goering claimed (Tribunals 18.03.1946), they were certainly influenced by state policy, as membership in the HJ had become mandatory as of March 1939 in order to educate youth 'physically, intellectually, and morally in the spirit of National Socialism to serve the people and the community' (Tribunals 15.01.1946b; see also Tribunals 23.05.1946, 01.10.1946j; Kater 2004: 79). Women, for the most part, were encouraged to go on as before, though one starts to see glimmers of an ideological shift beginning through news stories with headlines such as: 'The confident woman and the building of the Factory Workers Communal Responsibilities for a Dynamic and Willing People', 'The workers front works for the working mother' (Völkischer Beobachter 1935a) and 'The Nazi Sisters – over the past years, there were 80,000 working women and mothers were given essential help' (Völkischer Beobachter 1935c). In a word, a move is being made to support working women who, like women in Allied countries, had to go to work to take the place of men in the armed forces. However, this had yet to be developed to any noteworthy degree and is generally characterised as carrying on the ideal of the mother working in and for the home. The reawakening of these 'admirable' national traits would, says Bormann on 16 January 1937, enable the rest of the nation to become conscious of their Germanity as they 'stand together in mutual esteem and [are] taught to place the German higher than any foreigner, irrespective of state or descent' (Tribunals 07.02.1946) particularly, as Goering continues on 8 July 1938, 'if Germany wins the war. Then she will be the greatest power in the world, dominating the world market, and Germany will be a rich nation. For this goal, risks must be taken' (Tribunals 08.01.1946).

1938–1941

By the time formal conscription in the armed forces was introduced in 1940, 97 per cent of those eligible were already members, in large part due to the emphasis on service and the greatness of the German military might present in German ideology at the time (Tribunals 01.10.1946c). The key shift here is that the idea of the nation in disgrace has largely disappeared. The need to establish the nation through purification, however, is more visible than ever before. National purification became the ideological key to defeating not only the inner enemies of the Reich but also the outer enemies. For instance, *Die Republik – a work of Judas* tells its readers German history was written by Jews, infused with their ideology and brought down through underhanded ways; in other words, traditionally learned German history is actually a perversion of Germany's golden history.

> The foundation, then, of our understanding of German politics has always been a democratic understanding, but not necessarily as the Volk meant it to be; many others were concerned with the constant concealment of the authorities and others whose purpose was to split the national Volk in every possible way . . . Political parties,

> communities, groups, religious confessions, occupational unions were all subject to antagonism and aggression by Jews as they found their way into state power and law-making in such a way as only they could.
>
> (Völkischer Beobachter 1938f)

During this time, Streicher funded the publication of many books aimed at children – most of which contained information about how Jews undermined the strength of the nation and ruined the sanctity of women and children. One such book, *The Poisoned Fungus*, published in 1938, contains this excerpt:

> Inge had already been waiting for an hour. Again she takes the journals in an endeavour to read. Then the door opens. Inge looks up. The Jew appears. She screams. In terror she drops the paper. Horrified she jumps up. Her eyes stare into the face of the Jewish doctor. And this face is the face of the Devil. In the middle of this devil's face is a huge crooked nose. Behind the spectacles gleam two criminal eyes. Around the thick lips plays a grin, a grin that means, 'Now I have you at last, you little German girl!'
>
> (Tribunals 10.01.1946c)

Streicher explains the rationale behind such publications in his book *The Jewish Question and School Instruction*, also published in 1938.

> Racial and Jewish questions are the fundamental problems of the National Socialist ideology. The solution of these problems will secure the existence of National Socialism and with this the existence of our nation for all time. The enormous significance of the racial question is recognized almost without exception today by all the German people. In order to come to this realization, our people had to travel through a long road of suffering.
>
> (Tribunals 10.01.1946c)

The ideological rationale for national survival up to this point is due to the racial strength of Aryans in the first instance and strong Nazi leadership in the next. This gave the current and future generations strength to continue fighting the inner and outer enemies 'knowing that with their blood they will lead the way towards the freedom of their dreams'; Gunter d'Alquen, a soldier in the SS, waxes poetic about this very thing, saying 'They come to us to fight unconditionally as soldiers of the

German Fuehrer for the new, great Germany. Every enemy of Germany is their enemy. The march to the East is for them one way to their final judgement' (Tribunals 15.01.1946a; Völkischer Beobachter 1941b).

Post 1941

As the radicalisation of policy moves from violent oppression to premeditated mass killing, we once again see new extremes in anti-Jewish, pro-German propaganda. After the institutionalisation of genocidal policy, there was 'no turning back' ideologically, though there are some noteworthy changes in the way that ideology was manifested. Firstly, as the war continued, claims of the persecution of 'racial Germans' were popularised by *Der Völkischer Beobachter, Der Stuermer* and other media voices, thereby radicalising the state of fear established ideologically in the earlier time of war. While doubts that Germany would win the war were never publicly expressed, this looming fear provided a legitimate excuse to continue fighting internal enemies while external enemies remained (Völkischer Beobachter 1941d; 1941e; Tribunals 23.01.1946b). This intensified ideology of fear, strongly encouraged and inspired by Hitler personally, leads to an exaggerated need for national purification as protection: 'Nations which do not rid themselves of Jews perish' (Hitler April 1943 in Tribunals 21.03.1946; Evans 2005: 613–15).

Nor did ideals of the German Volk as a culture bearer die out. By this time, the idea that the Aryans were 'a master race of which the lowliest German is racially and biologically one thousand times more valuable than the local population' (Ernst Koch 1943 in Mann 2005: 245–6) was well established ideologically. For Stuckart, co-author of the Nuremberg Laws, the state needed people whose personal characteristics meant they would be 'promoter[s] of culture, coloniser[s] and economic organiser[s]', people who understood 'the grand political, legal, economic, cultural and social contexts' of their work (in Bloxham 2009a: 261). Indeed, this sort of language continued to tie the fate of the German nation to the fate of the continent of Europe, asserting a 'common destiny' between Germany and the rest of the continent (Kallis 2008: 69).

German youth were consistently applauded for their frugality and their genetic superiority when compared to the youths of Western and Russian societies (Kallis 2008: 69). The HJ continued to grow and expand as the SS used HJ members as the first resource to replenish SS numbers through the war (Burleigh 2001: 791; Tribunals 01.10.1946j). However, it should be noted that much of the propaganda concerning women and children died down as military victories began to overtake room in the media. What space newspapers did give women often extolled them for showing the brave face of the German Volk while men were at the front, encouraging them in keeping the hearth warm whilst waiting for the certain return of their mates (Völkischer Beobachter 1941e; 1941d; see also Mouton 2007: Ch. 1). This, along with the German military advances reported in the media, imbued ideology with an extreme idea of the election of the Volk: 'We saw the proof that no opponent can rival the courage, discipline, and readiness for sacrifice displayed by the German soldier, and we are particularly grateful for these lightning, incomparable victories' (Fritzsche radio broadcast 9 October 1941 in Tribunals 23.01.1946b).

The Balkans

1974–1987

Of my three cases, the Serbian propaganda and Western writers of Serb history make the strongest case for a Serb national identity stretching back as far as the 14th century and beyond. Constraining ourselves to more recent times, there are strong surges of national sentiment and national persecution throughout the 20th century. The Balkan case is also the most geographically bound of all my cases, restricting itself to a smaller, more specific region (see Ch. 5). The cornerstones of Serbian nationalism are language and religion; their use of the Cyrillic script and Orthodox Christianity are the two ethnic identifiers separating them from their Bosniak, Croatian, Slovenian, Albanian and Macedonian neighbours. Also of note is the fact that Serbs particularly had a strong military and state apparatus at their disposal and used ideological radicalisation to justify the legitimacy of this control (Dannreuther 2001: 15–18; Malesevic 2006: 212).

The idea of a disgraced Serbian nation, dying out under pan-Yugoslavism, is a theme traceable throughout the radicalisation process: 'The present course which our society in Yugoslavia has taken is totally opposite from the one that has moved for decades and centuries until the formation of a unified state. This process is aimed at the total destruction of the national unity of the Serbian people' (SANU 1986). Starting with the 1986 Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, 'proper' forms of national analysis, such as censuses, are used to ascertain the health and vitality of the Volk. According to a 1948 census presented in SANU's memorandum taken in Croatia, at that time there were 543,795 Serbs in Croatia (14.48 per cent of the total). In 1981, according to another census, that number decreased to 531,502, 11.5 per cent of the total number of inhabitants in Croatia (1986). The lesson, then, is that the Serbian people are disappearing; their culture and beauty are being lost to the aggressive, perverse cultures of others within the Yugoslav state. This gives clemency and legitimacy to an ideology claiming that Serbia was the victim of Yugoslavia and that the Serb nation was at risk of becoming victimised again (see Gagnon 1995: 148).

Tales of Serb regions within Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo being left in poverty began to filter through to the population. This, people were assured, was forcing Serbs to 'other parts of Croatia where the Serbs, being newcomers, are a minority and socially inferior group, greatly exposed to . . . a sophisticated and quite effective policy of assimilation' (SANU 1986). Through the early 1980s, there was also escalating rumours about Serbs fleeing persecution in Kosovo. Hailed as refugees, it was only rarely mentioned that many of these individuals had sold their homes and possessions for large profits due to a housing shortage (Mikelic, Schoen and Benschop 2005: 120). These 'lost' portions of the Serbian nation 'have never been as persecuted in the past as they are now', infusing readers with a sense of urgency, demanding the immediate protection of their nation as indeed 'the integrity of the Serbian nation and its culture in Yugoslavia as a whole is an issue vital to its survival and progress' and 'the cultural and spiritual integrity of no other Yugoslav nation is so roughly challenged as that of the Serbian nation' (SANU 1986).

The complete disintegration and consequent destruction of the Serbian nation could not be allowed to occur, as the Serbian nation had existed with similar goals, traits and aims since the kingdom of the Nemanja, established in the 1160s, which 'transformed' the Serbs into a people and thus established 'an identity which would survive hundreds of years of Ottoman domination' (Judah 1997: 17). Unfortunately, propagated the Serbian national media, Serbian election had been cast into shadow

> because of narrow-mindedness and lack of objectivity on the part of official historiography. This so impoverished and restricted the true picture of the contribution made by Serbian bourgeoisie society to law, culture, and statesmanship that, deformed in this manner, it could not provide mental or moral support to anyone nor could it serve as a foothold for preserving or reviving historical self-confidence. The brave and honourable efforts at liberation exerted by the Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina and by all Yugoslav youth, which included Young

> Bosnia, experienced a similar fate and were pushed into the historical background by the contributions of a class ideology.
>
> (SANU 1986)

Again, the particular role of youth in nationalist ideology resurfaces. Again, these members of the nation are considered 'brave and honourable' and at the highest risk of destruction. In order to protect these bearers of the nation, the Serbian population needed an opportunity to 'find itself again and become a historical agent' with historical pride. To do so, it was necessary to 're-acquire an awareness of its historical and spiritual being, must look its economic and cultural interests square in the eyes, and must find a modern social and national program that will inspire this generation and generations to come'. Complete assurance of Serbian national integrity is an inherent right based on their history and democracy, 'no matter in which republic or province they might find themselves living' (SANU 1986).

1987–1991

As with my other two cases, the SDS' rise to power in a post-Tito Yugoslavia is chronicled by increasing allegiance to more fundamentalist sectors of society. Serbs throughout Yugoslavia feared a loss of freedom and rights. Milosevic promised to defend the rights of Serbs across the whole of Yugoslavia and allied himself with political nationalists who revived extreme plans for Serb security (Cohen 2001: 120–43; Carmichael 2010: 8). The economic crisis heightened levels of insecurity. Milosevic used the resulting protests to further radicalise feelings of nationalist sentiment. As one observer noted, 'the protestors came as workers, and went home as Serbs' (in Bieber 2011: 161).

This is the period in which the Serbian media began to repeatedly show documentaries and publish articles about the aggression of Croat Ustashas in WWII, comparing Serbian suffering to that of the Jews, swearing that 'the Serbs were endangered again' (Karadzic in Oberschall 2007: 102). The second shift seen during this period, as discussed in Chapter 3, was the recognition of the Bosniaks as that enemy. For Serbs, the Ottoman period was generally viewed as an age of occupation by Muslim blasphemers and, with looming independence in sight, Serbian political elites began to cite the early nineties as a time to 'revenge themselves' on the Bosniaks for Ottoman imperialism (Neuffer 2001: 11–13). Tales of the mass rape of Kosovar Serbs perpetrated at the hands of Muslim Kosovars were rife, regardless of the fact that the actual incidents of rape were significantly lower in Kosovo than in Serbia, and the rapes which did occur were usually perpetrated within national groups (Oberschall 2007: 102). These claims led to an increased level of fear, shifting the ideological space in which policy-level decisions were being made. Here again, we see that ideology plays a significant role as an element of structure.

Politically, the only way to continue the fostering of the Serbian nation was to create a place where the true glory of Serbs could shine; this is where the idea of Greater Serbia was established and was openly circulated in SFRY during the late 1980s. Not doing so would establish instead a state with 'insufficient political authority' to keep the state together and ensure national protection (IT-95-5/18-1 2000; IT-02-54-T 2002). The election of the Serbian nation and their natural ability to excel in times of persecution would ensure their survival: 'Gentlemen, you have forgotten one fact. Yes, it is nice to live well, to have good pay, to have good clothes, a good car. However, there is something which money cannot buy. What cannot be bought is our Serb dignity. We would rather go hungry, as long as we are together with our Serb people. We will eat potatoes and husks, but we will be on the side of our people. We will remain human' (Martic 1990 in Bert 1997: 39).

1991–1992

Serbian reaction to the Bosnian declaration of independence intimates that Yugoslavia during this time took its ideology more seriously on an individual level, in such a way as to acquire the preconditions necessary for ethnic cleansing in a way atypical within the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Gagnon points out that 'the larger and more immediate the threat to the ruling elite, the more willing it is to take measures which, while preserving its position in the short term, may bring high costs in the longer term' (Gagnon 1995: 138; see also Malesevic 2006: 186).

This is certainly true of Republika Srpska (RS) elites during this critical time. Another census of the Bosanksa Krajina region was circulated in 1991 with numbers detailing the fact that though Serbs maintained their overall majority within the municipality, they were not able to maintain a majority in Sanski Most, Prijedor, Kotor Varos and Bosanska Krupa (IT-00-40-I 2000). This was in line with the coalition's goals to portray the Serbs as victims (IT-00-39&40-PT 2002a); Glenny describes the results of this fear very well:

> Gangs of gun-toting Serbs rule Foca . . . The Moslems, who made up half of the town's population of 10,000 people, have fled or are in

> jail. Many of their houses have been destroyed or are in flames. Black smoke billows from two houses that belonged to Moslem residents. Entire streets have been destroyed, restaurants reduced to cinders and twisted metal, apartment blocks charred, the hospital hit by mortar fire. The Serbs say that despite the damage, only seven or eight of their own men and about twenty Moslems were killed in the fighting that began on 8 April [1992]. They say the Moslems began it. A feverish distrust of all that is not Serbian and a conviction that they have narrowly escaped genocide at the hand of Islamic fundamentalists has gripped Foca's Serbs. 'Do you see that field?' asks a Serbian woman, pointing to a sloping meadow by the Drina River. 'The jihad . . . was supposed to begin there. Foca was going to be the new Mecca. There were lists of Serbs who were marked for death,' the woman says, repeating a belief held by townspeople and gunmen. 'My two sons were down on the list to be slaughtered like pigs. I was listed under rape.'
>
> (1996: 169–70)

Such a portrayal broadened the level of Serb domination out of Kosovo and Serbia and into Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unless Serbian security was absolutely assured through control of state power, the Serbs would 'once again be subjected to the laws of Muslim landlords, agas, begs and pashas', everything Serbs had fought against since 1389 when St. Lazar fought the historic battle of Kosovo (Mann 2001: 361–2). Thus, the need to expunge this fear by way of ideological focus on national purification starts to take place. Not all Serbs, however, willingly bought into this idea, and these found themselves the unfortunate victims of the very nationalism they were resisting; these so-called 'Alija's Serbs' were those whose doubts cast aspersions on others' loyalty to Serbdom (Gagnon 1995: 148).

After the Plebiscite of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina was conducted on 24 October 1991 and a second time on 9–10 November 1991, propaganda of this nature was easier to dissimilate to the masses (IT-99-36-1 1999). What became increasingly clear during this time was that, like the Turkish case, it was national purity and not racial purity which was of vital importance to the Serbian state; in other words, there was, ideologically at least, some opportunity for Bosniaks to 'become' Serbs. The perpetuation of national myths such as those of Jug Bogdan and St. Lazar, the continued use of Cyrillic as the national script and that Orthodoxy continued to be the cornerstone of faith and allegiance in Yugoslavia were key (Silber and Little 1997: 309–10;

Judah 1997: 61–2). The belief, originally made popular during WWII, was that Catholics in Bosnia-Herzegovina and other regions were not Catholics at all but Serbs who had fallen to the pressures of invaders to change their allegiance. Muslims were not necessarily Saracens but were instead Serbs who had submitted to Muslim rule by changing their religious association to Islam from Orthodoxy; as Muslims, however, they were to be reviled and targeted (Fine 2002: 11; Milic of Macva 1991 in Banac 1994: 168). Again, we will look at this in greater detail in the analysis and conclusion sections in comparison with the other two cases.

1992–1995

The ideology of fear established so early in this conflict continues and builds after the siege of Sarajevo begins; however, as mentioned in Chapter 2, there is a power shift occurring in which a rift between Milosevic's Serbia and Karadzic and Mladic's RS are at loggerheads ever more frequently. Though Serbian elites in Serbia may have had almost complete control over propaganda, military and politics in 1992, much of that control had been lost by 1995 (Milanovic 2006: 600). This influences ideology significantly, as both leaders become more significant ideological carriers as their power increases. By 1993, Karadzic had begun to circulate ideas of a 'linguistic' nationhood: that all Stovakian speakers were 'really' Serbs and only needed to be reminded of their true identity (Judah 1997: 199; Pavkovic 1994). This is a shift from the premodern ideal of national identification based on religion and provides the contextual markers for the debate on Serb national identity in which the martyr-nation is categorised as sacred (Banac 1994: 144). The only way to remind these others of their true identities, however, was to fight for their own, as they were constantly threatened with attack:

> A Serb refugee couple [were asked] why they had fled their village. They had heard on the radio that the Serb military had uncovered a Muslim plot: Muslims planned to take over the district, a list of names had been drawn up, the Serb men were to be killed, and the women were to be assigned to Muslim harems for the purpose of breeding Muslim janissaries . . . And they believed this propaganda even though their Muslim neighbours 'were decent people' who had never harmed them.
>
> (Oberschall 2007: 103)

Mladic's leadership made legitimising and justifying the ongoing perilous military action easier. Plavsic, who was made a member of Supreme

Command of the armed forces of the Republika Srpska in late November or early December 1992, speaks to this in her guilty plea to the ICTY saying,

> At the time, I easily convinced myself that this was a matter of survival and self-defence. In fact, it was more . . . although I was repeatedly informed of allegations of cruel and inhuman conduct against non-Serbs, I refused to accept them or even to investigate. In fact, I immersed myself in addressing the suffering of the war's innocent Serb victims. This daily work confirmed in my mind that we were in a struggle for our very survival and that in this struggle, the international community was our enemy, and so I simply denied these charges, making no effort to investigate. I remained secure in my belief that Serbs were not capable of such acts. In this obsession of ours to never again become victims, we had allowed ourselves to become victimisers.
>
> (IT-00-39&40/1 2008)

That Serbs would be incapable of violence at this level points again to the idea of Serbian election. Regarding the 'innocent Serbs' Plavsic notes above, Karadzic seems to go to great lengths to encourage and bolster pictures of Serb innocence. For instance, on 5 February 1994, the Serbs bombed a bustling market square in Sarajevo; Karadzic later insisted that the bomb had been a ploy of 'the Muslim side' fired by 'Muslim positions'. Later, and even more unbelievably, Karadzic suggested that the bodies pulled out of the wreckage were plants of the media (in Silber and Little 1997: 309–10). These claims, though false, encouraged a new degree of violence. It became increasingly easier to make these claims through the arts and media, for as well as shutting down most of the anti-Serbian and pro-other media outlets, Milosevic and Karadzic corralled the support of theatre to encourage youth and non-military personnel in this time of conflict (Jakovljevic 1999: 6; IT-04-81-PT 2008).

Analysis

Bearing the ideological progression of each case in mind, it is now time to move on to further analysis of what this information has to offer comparatively. This section returns to the basic question laid out in the introduction: Does state-led ideology regarding the national self go beyond self-awareness and even beyond traditional feelings of national pride? Is the ideological depiction of the nation used to legitimise policies portrayed as having the intent of protecting the nation? A brief comparative analysis suggests that there are certain themes present; however, before going on to speak to them, I want to briefly address some unique points arising in each case.

When addressing the Turkish case, the first interesting point of note is that, in the early years of the conflict, a deeper sense of nationhood is being established through the loss of empire. While, as I discuss further in the next chapter, loss of territory occurs in each state, the process is slower in the Turkish case and directly affects the way the establishment of the nation is perceived; here, losses on the battlefield reiterated the need to secure the nation through purification. As the loss of empire occurred more slowly in the Ottoman case, its effect on ideology is more entrenched and more important in the early stages of radicalisation.

Also in the early stages of the radicalisation process under the CUP, we have a sense that the Turks' cultural identity had been submerged by the multiculturalism of the Ottoman state and that, as we saw in Chapter 3, the inclusion of other-groups had somehow weakened the nation. Throughout the conflict, Young Turk propaganda is always clear that this weakened state is in no way the fault of the Turks themselves and that they do not deserve to live in a state of fear. This encourages a reconnection with Turkish language and a re-establishment of the identification of Turkism with Islam. These cultural symbols reinforce the ideological portrayal of the nation as the culture bearer.

Again, the primary symbols of culture were women and children. These groups are symbolically present in Young Turk ideology but not to such an extreme level as found in the Nazi case; soon after the CUP came to power in 1908, Young Turks began integrating the symbolic role of the glory of youth into ideology. This was quickly followed by policies supporting youth in military branches and incorporating 'Turk' into educational programs. It is worth noting that in the Turkish case, there is more emphasis on youth than on women. This, I propose, has more to do with the role of women generally in the Ottoman Empire (see Özmucur and Pamuk 2002; Toledano 1993) and thus serves as a cultural difference between cases rather than something specifically particular about the genocidal aspects of ideology.

Lastly, though the CUP based its perception of the nation in the social Darwinist ideals of ethnicity, certain elements of the multiculturalism of the Ottomans remain. For example, instances of the 'Turkification' of Armenian children and the inclusion – voluntary or otherwise – of Armenian women into Turkish households persist throughout the conflict. This did not detract from the increasingly vehement claims that

Turks were superior to every other-group and that the needs of the Turkish nation were paramount.

This recent history of multiculturalism is something shared between the conflict in Turkey and the conflict in the Balkans. Like the Turks, the Serbian nation is consistently portrayed as a victimised entity, suffering at the hands of its neighbours over the years. Unlike the Turks, this portrayal continues over the course of the conflict with equal strength, though it does shift a bit in the final genocidal stages of conflict to give space to military gains. As the conflict radicalises, this idea of a victimisation leads into the idea that purification is necessary if Greater Serbia is to be established and maintained. Note also that, as compared to the previous chapter, there is a much more concrete understanding of the Serbian nation than of the anti-nation. This further illuminates Pavkovic's claim that in the former Yugoslavia, each nation was more focused on 'their' ethnic group and on how the latter years of the communist regime had failed 'their' nation (1994:441). This again points to a difference between the two cases of total genocide and this case, where genocidal episodes are present but not total. Ideology as structure has established a backdrop where policy decisions are made with a focus on the protection of the nation rather than the complete eradication of the anti-nation from the earth.

A second interesting point arises in the Balkan case in the portrayal of the nation as a bearer of the cultural history of the region. In my other two cases, women and children are given special roles to symbolise their ideological status; in the Balkan case, however, there is little ideological differentiation between the masculine and feminine. Though some attention is paid to the role of youth, it is usually projected in reference to the military, where young Yugoslav men are cast as 'brave and honourable' and take the highest risks. Nonetheless, gender symbols are still important, as the growing literature on rape in the Balkan and Kosovar conflicts shows.[1]

Multiculturalism was not an important foundation in the history of German ideology. Without doubt, the Nazis have the most defined, sustained delineation for the victimised nation across the entire course of my research. Take, for instance, Hitler's assertion regarding the decline of the Second Reich, saying 'whether we consider questions of general justice or cankers of economic life, symptoms of cultural decline or processes of political degeneration, questions of faulty schooling or the bad influence exerted on grown-ups by the press, etc., everywhere and always it is fundamentally the disregard of the racial needs of our own people or failure to see a foreign racial menace' (1969 [1925]: 297) and later: 'when a nation of a hundred million people, in order to preserve its state integrity, suffers the yoke of slavery in common, it is worse than if such a state and such a people had been shattered and only a part of them remained in possession of full freedom' (1969 [1925]: 557), meaning that it would have been better for the German nation to have been entirely destroyed rather than leave itself to this abject level of national shame brought on by the 'foreign racial menace'. This sort of language tends to promote feelings of individual helplessness paired with national elation – that the sort of revolution needed to shake off national humiliation is going to be brought about by the new national state.

Equally, the importance of youth as a symbol of the vigour of the German nation, and the role of women as symbols of the future of the German Volk, is critical to address because of the ideological importance the Nazis place on the perpetual, immortal nation. Though the role of the woman as child bearer and homemaker was elevated to an almost sanctified level in the earliest years of the Nazi regime, the key shift in this case is between 1938 and 1941, when the Nazi state was entering military conflict. Here, we see a shift in which the ideal of women solely responsible for work *at* home is replaced to a small degree by the idea of working *for* the home, thereby supporting working mothers filling roles left by men fighting at the front. Though their ideological importance declines slightly in the latter years of the war, the role of women and ideological symbols remains high throughout.

A final note about ideology as structure and agency and Mahoney's theory of path dependency: in each case, though particularly in Turkey, we see the construction of national identity and the radicalisation of that process occurring not out of one critical juncture but out of a series of cumulative events. These events allow for the structure of ideology to shift and therefore accommodate and constrain varying degrees of identification of national election. Thus, when the next event occurs, national elites are working within an ideological structure, presenting them with multiple, if restricted, choices regarding how the ideology of the nation should be used to interpret the event and respond. This is key, as we begin to see both strengths and weaknesses in Mahoney's theory when applied to radicalising ideologies.

Conclusion

Thus, four key themes arise out of my research, the first of which being that all three ideologies include terminology identifying 1) *the nation as being victimised and in disgrace*. It seems at first counter-intuitive that a foundational principle of national identity creation in genocidal states would be the reiterated idea that the nation is one of ignominy and dishonour. Indeed, one could say that, without exception, it is the most prominent theme in the early establishment of radicalising genocidal ideology. Through the course of radicalisation present in my cases, the pervading re-evaluation of past versus present is one that emphasises motifs of sacrifice on the battlefield in recent and historical battles, the collapse of empire and tales of subjugation and cultural suppression told by refugees. Also present in each case is a sense that the nation does not deserve the hand it has been dealt; some terrible omission or fault has occurred in order that such a thing should come to pass. This is generally coupled with what Staub describes as an expressed belief, whether real or merely paranoid, that external states or internal other-groups are preventing the nation from receiving its just desserts, whether in 'material possessions, prestige, or honour' (1989: 55).

Though this is an exceptionally strong theme early on in the radicalisation process, the idea of a victimised, disgraced nation is generally unsustainable. I believe this occurs for a number of reasons; firstly, due to the emphasis propaganda places on it, the perception of the nation in disgrace quickly becomes such a vivid part of the national consciousness that it is no longer necessary to continue discussing it at such an exaggerated degree for it to be accepted as truth. Secondly, at different points in their radicalisation process, each of these states finds itself undertaking actions of war.[2] Therefore, at a time to bolster national consciousness, it becomes necessary to praise and assure the nation – as we will see below – rather than constantly remind the nation of past failures. As states begin to transition into war, focus shifts entirely away from the idea of the nation in disgrace, though, as we see particularly in Yugoslavia and Turkey, the perception of the nation as a victim may endure longer. This perceived victimisation inspires fear, and with fear comes the idea that losses in war, both historical and present, are just punishment for a lack of ethnic purity.

Lastly, the weak, disgraced nation is generally associated with the 'old' political system, be it the corrupt sultan, the weak Weimar system or the collapse of communism. This works well in early ideological stages, particularly as it separates the new political regime from the former political regime. However, once new political elites are firmly ensconced in their positions, encouraging the nation to blame the state system for national weakness is no longer expedient. Accordingly, the state begins to express the nation in a new light with a new purpose, and thus a second theme comes to light.

The next theme regarding the nation is that 2) *the nation is portrayed as a culture bearer.* This theme has the greatest variance across my three cases. Primarily, this is propagated through a discussion of the glorious past of the nation and how that is being re-established, generation to generation. This entails a special role for women and children, as they are the physical bearers of the next generation through whom will pass the re-established glory of the nation after it has shaken off its current shame, as discussed above. Equally, the idea that cultural history and glorified modernity is irrevocably married within the nation is another aspect of this theme. From the modern social Darwinism that aids the establishment of the Turkish nation before the Young Turks take power to the weight of historical glory established in the Serbian case from its earliest stages, this is just as important as the role of women and children – particularly in the Serbian case – and is a sustaining force throughout the radicalisation process. Thus, individual members of the nation take on the heroic giants of their past as well as the political leaders of the current state, an honour that has been bestowed upon them as culture bearers of the world.

The third theme is quite closely linked with the anti-nation; ideology in these states all include allusions to the idea that 3) *the security of the nation can only be assured through the purification of the nation*. The purification of the nation is not as simple as cleansing the 'network of consanguinity' Sondermann suggests, 'in which impure blood . . . can be joined in purity by an oath of loyalty' (1997: 132). The social Darwinist ideals of these modern genocidal states entail that the ethnic notions discussed in previous chapters necessitate radical social elevation of the nation out of the 'ethnic mire' produced by other-groups. This 'necessary' separation is done in the name of elevating the nation and, thus, eliminating 'basic deficiencies' in the national self.

This theme has an inverse relationship to that of the nation in disgrace; whilst one declines in importance, the other rises. However, while the transitions are sometimes of great variance in the first theme, there is a fairly steady increase throughout the radicalisation process as regards purification. In each case, the focus begins on the nation itself as opposed to the anti-nation and steadily increases in its extremism throughout the course of radicalisation. We find the idea that the nation can thrive only if national elites are in control of state power is present even in Yugoslavia, where the identification of the Bosniak anti-nation was not established until quite late.

The policies of cultural assimilation present in the Turkish and Yugoslav cases are consequences of the projected necessity of purifying the nation. In the Ottoman Empire, this idea grew in popularity particularly after the beginning of the Balkan Wars, though it transitioned into ethnic persecution after the outbreak of WWI. This is due primarily to a need to win the 'next' war; cultural purity was not enough to win the Balkan Wars, and thus ideology dictated that more radicalised policies were necessary in order to ensure national purity, and through purity, national strength.

All three of these themes point to the final ideological premise of the genocidal state: 4) *the transcendence of the nation over all*. It is here we see that it is the good of the nation, and not necessarily the individuals composing the nation, that is the focus of national protection and pride. This deadening of individual needs makes it easier to request that the masses make national martyrs of themselves in battle and easier to subjugate the anti-nation to its ultimate fate. In fact, as the genocidal state is portrayed as being just and good, 'victims will often be seen as deserving their fate' (Staub 1989: 57). In short, we may take Hans Frank's statement to the Academy for German Law to be the definitive explanation for this trend: 'For the maxim – that which serves the Nation is right, and that which harms it is wrong' (November 1939 in Tribunals 10.01.1946b).

Looking at how this theme is made manifest in ideology, it has a similar relationship to that of the purification of the nation. Though relatively unimportant in the very early establishment of the nation, it grows in importance at every step; in fact, without a strong sense of national election, the implementation of genocidal policies in these cases would cease to be sustainable. That the nation is transcendent is never in question, but, as we shall see in Chapter 5, it is portrayed as being under attack, which is why national election is, in every case, presented ideologically as established on the battlefield.

Through the identification of these themes, my research suggests that radicalising states produce a sense of extreme identity in order to legitimise both their ideology and their policies. Mere national awareness or a feeling of otherness is not enough to produce the type of allegiance or rationalisation necessary for a genocidal state. In creating the necessary type of national allegiance, genocidal states use a complex ideology, preaching that the survival of the nation is of utmost importance – even beyond the survival of any one individual.

Regardless of its complexity, we can trace four general themes through the course of each case in order to generate proof for the statements above. As we have seen in the previous section, these themes provide a framework for analysing the evolutionary nature of this aspect of ideology. By analysing the nation cast in disgrace and as victims, the idea of the nation as a culture bearer, the establishment of the nation through purification and the pre-eminence of the nation above all else, we can see some of the necessary shifts ideology makes in order to point the nation towards legitimising state policies on the foul path to genocide.

5

The Homeland: Changing Perceptions of *Blut und Boden*

Introduction

Most nationalist movements integrate homeland claims into their ideological message (James 1996; Özkirimli 2000; Connor 1994; Smith 1999, 1998; Hutchinson 2001). My research suggests that genocidal states are no different in this regard, but we must ask whether these claims are manifested in a unique way. In this chapter, I seek to investigate the use of the idea of 'homeland' in the radicalisation process of genocidal ideology. This type of analysis will hopefully allow us to draw certain conclusions that can be applied to other cases within the greater body of literature regarding genocide studies.

To start, I want to briefly discuss the definition of 'homeland'. Thereafter, the bulk of the chapter will discuss whether or not radicalising ideology intimates that the continued existence of the homeland is predicated on the eradication of the anti-nation; in other words, does ideology regarding the salvation of the homeland attempt to justify policies of discrimination and attempted annihilation?

In order to complete these aims, this chapter discusses the ideological and, to a lesser extent, policy implications the two terms have in my cases. I use the same case study analysis approach established in earlier chapters wherein I approach each case chronologically, looking to identify key ideological themes and shifts. My analysis section will revisit each case comparatively, in the hope of drawing out the similarities and differences in each ideology before concluding.

Defining the Homeland

The idea of homeland, a geographical boundedness of physical space, is based in nationalism scholarship and is critical to most, if not all, modern national movements, and that is the reason why I am focusing one of my thematic chapters around this macro theme. Indeed, the idea of homeland is well established in all three of my cases, which will be discussed shortly in greater detail. In using the term 'homeland', I borrow a definition put forward by Anthony Smith when he describes ethnoscapes; a homeland is a geographical territory claimed by an ethnic nationalist group through its links with the historic nation (1998: 63). Smith goes on to explain how these territories emerge:

> The terrain in question is felt over time to provide the unique and indispensable setting for the events that shaped the community . . . Often the landscape is given a more active, positive role; no longer merely a natural setting, it is felt to influence events and contribute to the experiences and memories that moulded the community. This is especially true of ethnoscapes, where the landscape is invested with ethnic kin significance, and becomes an intrinsic element in the community's myth of origins and shared memories.
>
> (1999: 150)

Thus, through the ties of history, ethnicity and kinship, the homeland becomes a vital element of the nation; nationalist ideology then establishes the homeland by imbuing it with a sense of sacredness.

In each case, the idea of homeland is manifested in a unique way; *what* exactly the homeland is and *where* exactly the homeland is are topics of keen interest to propagandists and politicians alike, elites in the genocidal sphere. However, how these questions of what and where are answered is part of the evolutionary process along the pathway to genocide.

Turkey

1895–1908

One of the primary concerns for the failing Ottoman Empire was loss of territory, particularly to European powers and explicitly to Russia. The Ottoman homeland, while not yet claimed for the Turks outright, was clearly at risk through loss of territory and the 'endless persecutions and hostilities of the Christian world' (Abdul Hamid II in Akçam 2006: 43). In 1876, the Young Turks had sought a political alliance with the Armenians to press the sultanate for reform;[1] the Armenians rejected their offer, an action the Young Turks interpreted as evidence of Armenian aspirations towards independence (Staub 1989: 178). This political blow was quickly followed by the loss of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78, which forced the recognition of the independence of Serbia, Montenegro and Romania; Cyprus was also ceded to British control in 1878, and independence movements began in Palestine, Egypt and the Sudan.

Thus, the empiric homeland was portrayed as a man deprived of hands and feet by the European powers. A rising fear that Armenia would also declare independence fuelled animosity towards the anti-nation, claiming that anti-nation agitation was merely a way 'to get at our most vital places and tear out our very guts. This would be the beginning of totally annihilating [Ottoman Islamists] and we must fight against it with all the strength we possess' (Abdul Hamid II in Akçam 2006: 44). Note, however, that by this time, fear for the loss of homeland was already moderately established within the ideological structure of the time and was not the consequence of any one critical juncture. Instead, it was the cumulative loss of land due to the losses of war throughout the 18th and 19th centuries that brought about this particular insecurity.

Therefore, as the pan-Turkish movement progressed, ideology began to express the idea that a new 'Turkish' empire extending from Anatolia to the edges of western China would re-establish Muslim superiority over Christians and reinstate much of the honour lost over the 19th century. The new state would be cleansed of its non-Turk elements by excluding minorities until they became 'Turks by nationality and Muslim by religion' (Melson 1996: 159).

1908–1912

After the CUP's ascension to power, ideological assurance that 'the country was only a "homeland" for the Turks' was standardised as propagated by Hüseyin Cahit Yalçin, editor of *Tanin*, the official unionist news journal. This being the case, 'it [is] essential that the right to steer and decide the fate of the country and make the essential decisions be in Turkish hands' (in Akçam 2006: 50). Gökalp supports this in his poetry with stanzas like 'For the Turks, Fatherland means neither Turkey, nor Turkistan;/ Fatherland is a large and eternal country – Turan!/ The land of the enemy shall be devastated,/ Turkey shall be enlarged and become Turan!' (in Mann 2005: 132). The idea of a shared national consciousness, so tenuously adhered to under Ottoman reign, was almost entirely eliminated during this time period; instead, Young Turk ideology begins shifting distinctly towards the idea that Turkey, and thus greater Turan, should be in the hands of Turks. Note that though these were expansionist homeland claims, they generally applied to Ottoman territories lost in the late 19th century, rather than having a larger, broader claim, such as that found in Nazi demands for *Lebensraum* (living space).

Events of late 1908 served only to spur on the nationalist rise in homeland propaganda as the Austro-Hungarian Empire annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, followed by Bulgarian independence and Crete's unification with Greece (Astourian 1990: 129). Armenians continued to demand the rights they were promised under the reinstated 1878 Constitution but were repeatedly denied and criticised by nationalist unionists. The concern was that Armenians did not only want rights equal to those of Turks but that they wanted 'self-rule in an area they call Armenia. To demand this does not mean to bring about a revolution, it means making war against us' (Kirakossian in Akçam 2006: 61). Here we see much more expressly the idea that the Armenians are actively seeking to destroy the homeland through a perceived independence movement and, thus, destroy the peace and prosperity that Young Turk propaganda promised would otherwise come with Turkish control.

These types of ideas were further entrenched into CUP ideology when Italy declared war in September 1911. Though the war had severely detrimental consequences for the Turkish citizenry, for the Young Turks it was a 'blessing in disguise and gave the Committee a new lease on life' (Ahmad 1969: 91) as it provoked a reassertion of nationalist sentiment and dedication to the state. As such, more nationalist groups, such as that of *Türk Ocaği*, the Turkish Hearth Society founded in March of 1912, were established, becoming a key source for CUP propaganda. Much of the *Türk Ocaği* message promised that, under the CUP, Turan and the Turks would proceed to 'cover the entire world with its raging torrents . . . leave no neck unbowed, no sword unbroken, no fortress not struck . . . The custodian of Turkish strength, the watchman of the Turkish hearth, the defender of the Turkish homeland – they shall be the vanguard of Turan' (in Akçam 2006: 90). This sort of terminology is telling of the role of the homeland during this period of time: Turkey is portrayed as both a fortress and a hearth, a watchman and defender. In short, CUP ideology is casting the homeland as the Turks' primary defender in times of uncertainty. The geopolitical climate, instead of helping to assure national sentiment, reinforced for Young Turk elites that policies of decentralisation would not work and that a strong, centralised elite was absolutely necessary to secure their power (Astourian 1990: 129).

1912–1914

As mentioned in Chapter 4, the loss of the Balkan Wars and subsequent momentary loss of power to the sultan meant that the CUP was forced to re-approach certain elements of its policies. First among these was the shift of focus away from the northern European provinces and instead towards the 'Islamic' provinces of Arabia; following Gökalp's lead, Anatolia became a state of particular ideological import (see Ahmad 1969: 121–4, 153; Berkes 1959: Ch. 9). This shift of homeland perspective runs concurrently with the arrival of refugees into the area, primarily Muslims fleeing the Balkans for fear of retaliation or persecution in the former Ottoman territories. The danger this situation caused was aggravated by returning soldiers from the front at the end of the conflict (R14078/Ab.9798 1931). The influx of people, particularly into key towns and cities in Anatolia, put pressure on the economic market, most especially regarding housing and food.

Ideologically, however, the loss of the Balkan Wars was disastrous, as Turkey had lost the eastern province of Rumelia, the birthplace of most of the CUP leadership, the seat of Turkish pride and history. In this case, the homeland actually was 'under attack' just as was post-WWI Germany. Armenian provinces had been given a semblance of autonomy, particularly through the right to their own ground army corps and police for Anatolia (R1480/Ab.14922 14.07.1913); when the discussions began again regarding claims of Armenian rights, Turkish ire sparked, fearing a similar loss of Anatolia. Thus, the Turks begin framing much of the anti-Armenian propaganda in terms of homeland loss, threatening that the goal of the Christian Europeans was 'to swallow' Turkey piece by piece (Dadrian 2004: 185, 188; Akçam 2006: 81, 85). As Isyar points out, Young Turk elites were beginning to express the belief that Ottoman unity 'served only to exploit the Turkish race and from now on the empire should be left to the real owners, the Turkish race. The Turkish race, apparently, was not only suffering from the losses of the empire more than any other race but also was being exploited by them' (2005: 347). In short, a loss of homeland provided an opportunity for Armenians to exploit the nation at a vulnerable time. Thus, Turks not only associated the Christian Armenians with the European powers to whom they had lost the heart of their homeland, but they reaffirmed the importance of the homeland to Muslim Turks, warning the population repeatedly of Russian influence in Anatolia (R14080/Ab.13152 1913).

Thus, the quick shifts in population, paired with the shame of loss and increased fear of future homeland depletion set the stage for the deportation of Armenians. Not only did deportation solve the policy problem of housing Turks, but it also served as a preventative measure against future loss of the homeland (see R1480/Ab.14922 14.07.1913; R14084/Ab.9737 18.05.1914). Thus, the Young Turks were able to assure their people that they were doing all possible to protect their homeland from inner, as well as outer, enemies.

1914–1915

As the deportations continued to grow in frequency and ferocity, so also did the resettlement of Muslims into what had been Armenian territory.

In certain towns and villages, 'reestablishment' of Muslims began even before the general deportation order had been issued (Akçam 2006: 182). The Russian declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire seemed to fulfil the doomsdays fears promised by CUP propaganda since the end of the Balkan Wars – the homeland was now not only at risk but actually under attack from Russia and, through Russia, other European powers. It only made sense, said CUP propaganda, that the Armenians would side with the Russians and take up arms against the Turks. Germans, Austrians and Russians were, amongst themselves at least, talking of the partition of Armenia from the Ottoman Empire as a *fait accompli* (Mandelstam 1931: 31; see also Dadrian 2004: 191–2). The military attaché to the Austrian Embassy in Istanbul from 1909 to 1919 summed the situation up nicely, saying that

> a great number of Turkish intellectuals have sincerely expressed the sentiment that the reason for the Ottoman Empire's loss in recent years – and more generally, over the last two centuries – of [many of] its provinces in Europe and Asia lies first and foremost in the excessively humanistic behaviour of the previous sultans. What should have been done was either the forcible conversion to Islam of the population in the provinces . . . or their utter and total extirpation.
>
> (Joseph Pomiankowski in Akçam 2006: 120)

His advice was soon followed. Enver Pasha began to claim that the 'only way out of the dismal position in which Turkey had found itself' was to unify Turks and Islamists in one pure homeland; as non-Muslims had proven their traitorousness with their support of the Russians, the continued existence of the homeland was predicated on the need to radicalise measures against the anti-nation to ensure the continued security of the homeland (in Akçam 2006: 102).

Thus, it is in this time period that the key moral legitimation for radicalised approaches to dealing with the 'Armenian Question' was taken well in hand (Bloxham 2002: 106). While outright genocide had yet to be initiated, extreme population transfers and ethnic cleansing had moved from ideologically driven propaganda to initiated policy, particularly in certain geographic regions.

Post 1915

The massacres at Van and the concurrent arrests of leading Armenian thinkers led to very few changes in the homeland ideology of the CUP. Through the end of the First World War, the Turks associated the

Armenians with the Russian enemy. They warned that Russia was the ear to Europe, 'foundationally listening to the demands of the Armenians', whose 'cries of autonomy [would] only be answered by the Turks with the gallows' (R14097/Ab.32245 26.09.1917; R14092/Ab.19095 12.07.1916). In 1918, focus was re-established on securing Turkish borders and establishing Turkish influence in the area by whatever means possible. By 1919, the assumption had shifted from one of Armenian independence to continued Turkish jurisdiction over the Armenian regions of Anatolia (R11053/Ab.31351 5.07.1918; R14105/Ab.10808 26.03.1919). In this regard, the aims of the Turkish genocide against the Armenians were fulfilled: the homeland was kept intact and under Turkish control, an outcome that was uncertain until the mass persecution, deportations and death of the Armenian population. These deportations were necessary to ensure the future of Anatolia and of the Turkish nation:

> You are aware that the deportation matter was an event that has caused uproar in the world and all of us are to be thought of as murderers . . . But why should we call ourselves murderers? Why have we taken on this vast and difficult matter? These things were done to secure the future of our homeland, which we know is greater and holier than even our lives.
>
> (Hassam Feney Bey in Akçam 2006: 129)

Germany

1929–1933

The Nazi approach to homeland is somewhat different from that of the CUP. While the Young Turks were attempting to hold a homeland together, the Germans were trying to regain what had been lost. Aside from the multidimensional and rather unique ideological aspect of Lebensraum, Nazi ideology, even in its earliest manifestations, was concerned with reuniting land lost since the late 19th century. As a result of WWI, Germany had lost both land and colonies since the Berlin Conference of 1885, both of which the Nazi state was determined to regain. Exactly which regions of Europe would be German colonies and how they would be governed vacillated over the course of the conflict, from Poland and the Ukraine, which would be directly overseen by German administrators after being cleansed from their non-Germanic elements, or to Crimea, Yugoslavia and other parts of the Soviet Union, which would be governed in a more *laissez-faire* approach more popular by the 1940s (Lower 2005: 185–6; Tribunals 08.01.1946). Thus, we see that in this case, Mahoney's idea of critical juncture might be more applicable than in either of my other two cases, as the loss of land occurred not as a result of crumbling empire but instead as a result of one immediate event. However, it is important to remember that the loss of WWI is only one event affecting Germany at this stage; I point out the role of that particular event to bring attention to the fact that this loss of the homeland is part of the inherited ideology the Nazis were working within once they gained power of the German state.

Thus, the idea of the homeland at risk was well established by 1929 – as evidenced by claims that the Versailles Treaty had not only stripped the nation of their German honour but also of the very land that inherently belonged to them. Even the land remaining to them had to be defended from all enemies:

> Today we must struggle for the existence of our fatherland, for the unity of our nation and the daily bread of our children . . . Never suffer the rise of two continental powers in Europe. Regard any attempt to organise a second military power on the German frontiers, even if only in the form of creating a state capable of military strength, as an attack on Germany, and in it see not only the right but also the duty, to employ all means up to armed force to prevent the rise of such a state, or, if one has already arisen, to smash it again.
>
> (Hitler 1969 [1925]: 565, 607)

Evidence seems to suggest that the primary reason for this incensed reaction to perceived aggression is that, for Germany, there is no distinction between blood and soil (*Blut und Boden*); the excellence of one entailed the excellence of the other. This also tapped into social Darwinism: colonised regions and areas used for Lebensraum could be 'Germanised', but people living within their bounds were tied intrinsically to their race (Hitler 1969 [1925]: 353). Even the earliest expressions of the NSDAP movement claimed that its object was to unite Germans in the Fatherland 'under the guidance of the Fuehrer', a thing to be achieved by renouncing Versailles and by the creation of 'a Greater Germany beyond the frontiers of 1914' ruled by the whole Volk, mobilised into an ethnonational political entity (Tribunals 30.11.46c; see also Mann 2005: 181). This idea is spurred further by, similarly to the Turkish case, the evidence given by refugees and soldiers returning from the front of WWI. Bloxham and Kushner claim that these refugees' accounts solidified popular stereotypes of Eastern Europe 'as a great space waiting to be properly exploited, the people as primitives whose lives were not only cheaper but who would benefit from civilising German overlordship' (2004: 88). The assurance that the re-establishment of a strong German homeland would be advantageous for Germans living within and without Germany was an assertion made over the course of much of the pre- and early war years.

1933–1935

By the mid-1930s, as the prospect of Germanic expansion was firmly turned eastward, Russia was seen as the most threatening rival power, though what exactly was to be done in defence of this threat was left relatively unestablished until c.1941 (Goebbels 1982 [1939–41]: 191, 203, 284–6). Malcontent about the Treaty of Versailles had moved into what Mann terms 'ethnic imperial revisionism', meaning that the next stage of homeland establishment was to 'revise the borders to incorporate the "lost territories" and create an ethnic German Empire' (2005: 183), thus explaining the integration of Austrians into the NSDAP, occurring directly after the book burning at Opernplatz (Völkischer Beobachter 1933f). While these were important shifts in policy further refining the homeland debate, during this time period, Nazi ideology was primarily concerned with the *Führerprincip*, that Hitler and his teachings were sacrosanct and on establishing the Jews as the anti-nation, as seen in Chapter 3, at the expense of homeland ideology. For instance, after the death of Reichspräsident von Hindenberg on 2 August 1934, soldiers in the German navy no longer swore their service oaths to the German Fatherland but directly to Hitler himself (Tribunals 15.01.1946a).[2] Thus, though there were still tangible threads regarding the importance of the homeland, the early 1930s is when this theme is least important. It would take the strengthening of the rumblings of war to spur on a shift in Nazi ideological focus, nudging the minds of the Volk back to the importance of homeland.

1935–1938

Indeed, merely a brief look shows a strong resurgence of the importance of the homeland in NSDAP ideology between 1935 and 1938 as the Nazi state prepared for war. In *Der Völkischer Beobachter*, much of the focus is phrased in terms of the persecution of members of the German Volk in 'lost' German lands, parts of the homeland now under the political jurisdiction of other states, such as Poland and Lithuania. The restriction of German rights, rigged anti-German elections, the abolition of German status and threats against Germans were all reported as fact (Völkischer Beobachter 1935c, 1935e, 1935f). The received perception was that of immediate personal threat to Germans outside the homeland governed by the NSDAP. Also expressed was that these regions were direct geographical corridors through which enemies like Russia could attack the Fatherland (NSDAP 1935e).

This being the case, Nazi ideology dictated that it was the 'right and duty' of Germans to do something to prevent these atrocities from occurring on both individual and national levels (Völkischer Beobachter 1935f). Thus, German military aggression is justified as a necessity in order to save the homeland and, through the homeland, the nation itself (Völkischer Beobachter 1935b; Tribunals 01.10.1946o). The annexation of Austria was couched in terms of the prodigal son returning home; growing pressure on Czechoslovakia to cede territory to the Reich was done under the ideological guise of 'an arrangement' with 'other minorities, peacefully and without oppression' (Hitler in Tribunals 30.11.1946d).

Both Austria and Czechoslovakia were vital parts of Greater Germany, a homeland 'where all those can live and work together who speak German and have German blood' (Streicher in Tribunals 29.04.1946; see also Völkischer Beobachter 1935f). As discussed above, Streicher makes clear that those living in these regions are racially German, and their lands are historically German; thus, regardless of their current citizenship, these people and these lands should belong to the Reich (Tribunals 29.04.1946). As we will see, this sort of justification is carried throughout the course of the conflict.

1938–1941

My sources for this time period show a distinct leaning towards a 'if we don't, then they will' theme regarding the use of war and aggression, an idea popularised by *Der Völkischer Beobachter*, Goering and even Hitler himself (Tribunals 16.03.1946; Völkischer Beobachter 1938a, 1938c). Germans were alerted to the fact that German culture was being put directly under attack in homeland-claimed lands in Lithuania, that Germans were being forcibly expelled from the Sudetenland and that invasion was assured unless something was done (Völkischer Beobachter 1938a, 1938c). This is due perhaps to the recent socio-economic struggles Germany had experienced; since it was impossible to guarantee economic security, it became increasingly imperative to guarantee cultural security.

By 1938–41, unlike in earlier years, Germany was ready not only to call for action but to act. While Jews were being told of their possible relations to undivulged colonial outskirts (Kershaw 1989: 98), the finite boundaries of the German homeland were seemingly established:

> In the discussion that took place in the night of 29–30 August [1939] between Dahlerus and me [Goering], I believe at the Fuehrer's, I tore a map from an atlas on the spur of the moment and outlined with a red pencil, and I believe a blue or green pencil, those regions – not the regions which we would demand, as declared here before by the Prosecution – but those regions of Poland in which Germans live. That the witness Dahlerus was also of this opinion can be seen most clearly from the fact that he repeated the same markings on another map and then wrote as follows, next to the marked section: 'German population according to Goering' and next to the dotted section: 'Polish inhabitants according to Goering'.
>
> (Tribunals 19.03.1946)

Not only was the German homeland, as in my other two cases, geographically bounded, but the establishment and the fulfilment of bringing these lands back into the Reich were cause for celebration; poems were written acknowledging the might and sanctity of German lands, news stories were written telling of cheering and celebration across the contested lands as German influence became established in places like Hendekrug and the Sudetenland (Völkischer Beobachter 1938c). In short, what we see is a claim of responsibility politically, culturally, linguistically, militarily and racially over lands classified as part of Greater Germany.

Post 1941

By 1941, Germany was well into the Second World War, and it was this that primarily shaped Nazi ideology of the homeland until the end of the war. Though much of this was no longer directly expressed in terms of the homeland being at risk of invasion – seeing as they were at war – there is a constant and expected theme of German soldiers fighting and dying 'for the Fatherland' (NSDAP 1941a, 1941c, 1941d, 1941e). This, however, is far from unique to the German case, as we find similar expressions in most modern wars;[3] nonetheless, there are certain elements particularly worthy of note. First is the influence America had on genocidal ideology regarding the homeland. After their entrance into the European theatre, Hitler began to express the idea that the 'USA could only be defeated by a racially pure European state, and that it was the task of the Nazi movement to prepare "its own fatherland" for the task' (Kershaw 1989: 126). Though Hitler never attempted to claim the

USA as part of the German homeland, American involvement in the war proved yet another justification for German aggression towards the antination. Unless the homeland was purified of the inner enemy, the outer enemy could never be beaten.

Also of note is a particularly interesting suspicion rumoured in 1943 that Bavaria might secede from Greater Germany (Tribunals 13.03.1946); naturally, this was never incorporated into Nazi ideology and was quickly defused as coming from the Jews. Nonetheless, it speaks to the depth to which ideology of the homeland filtered down into all aspects of society, reminding scholars of ideology and propaganda that simply because something is repeatedly said, one cannot assume it is a belief held by all individuals or of all regions within a state.

The Balkans

1979–1987

Variations on homeland claims are one of the strongest themes of genocidal ideology in my Yugoslav case. Unsurprisingly, as will be discussed in greater detail in the analysis section, there are some notable similarities to both the German and Turkish cases, but there are some particular issues that set the Serbs in their own category. The fall of the Iron Curtain, while generally regarded as a victory by Western states, was also a sounding bell of nationalism, serving as the collapse of 'empire' bringing uncertainty and change to Yugoslavia; even the geographical space of Yugoslavia would be contested in the wave of rising Serb and Kosovar nationalism through the early 1980s. Rising propaganda began to describe the current 1974 Constitution as a direct hit against the Serbs by dividing them up regionally and thus reducing their power (Mirkovic 1996: 192; SANU 1986). The 'expulsion' of the Serbian nation from Kosovo, long considered the heart of Serbia, rankled, bearing 'spectacular witness to [Serbia's] historic defeat'. Earlier media and political trends explaining the positives of the current constitution were described as a war, one 'waged through the skilful application of various methods and tactics, with a division of functions and with the active, not merely passive, and little concealed support of certain political centres within Yugoslavia . . . its present form, disguised with a new content, is proceeding more successfully and is moving towards a victorious outcome' (SANU 1986).

In short, ideological foundations were being established suggesting that Serbs had been attacked through trickery and deceit, losing their land through legislation created by those who wished the Serbs harm.

Here we see the homeland at risk from enemies within their very ranks. These ideas carried much weight in Serbia, where tradition is 'to cherish one's own state as one's own home' (Pavkovic 1994: 452). This is reflected in a place where, similarly to Germany, 'Fatherland' terminology had been used by scholars and politicians since the 19th century. Similarly, support for the creation of Yugoslavia was much less popular with post-WWII Serbs; more dominant was instead the creation of a Greater Serbia that would include Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as some lands in Croatia, Slovenia and Dalmatia (Judah 1997: 60, 94). In order to restore certainty in a time of great change, the provinces given autonomy under the 1974 Constitution must again become 'true integral parts of the Republic of Serbia by granting them a degree of autonomy that would not destroy the integrity of the Republic and would make it possible to act in the common interests of the wider community' (SANU 1986). Once again, we see national assumption of the homeland being portrayed not only as a right but as something that is morally just.

1987–1991

The idea of entitlement established in the early and mid-eighties is one of the strongest themes in this case; as Biljana Plavsic so strikingly said when asked about the inhumane living conditions forced on Bosniaks, 'it is the habit of the Muslims to live in this way . . . They like to live on top of one another. It's their culture. We Serbs need space' (in Silber and Little 1997: 233). For the Serbs, the whole of the Yugoslav state, and not merely the Serbian region, was perceived as 'theirs'; most nationalist leaders regarded other internal boundaries as 'merely administrative' (Brubaker 1996: 73). However, once the communist ideal began to disintegrate, 'Yugoslavia' became a less useful vehicle for an ideology supportive of Serb unification (Pavkovic 2000: 90). Post 1987, Serb leadership began setting the foundations for the creation of Serbian municipalities in non-Serb regions, such as Prijedor and Bosanska Gradiska, controlled at the time by Bosnia-Herzegovina, in order to form part of a pure Serbian state (IT-97-24 2008).

Silber attests that Milosevic never disputed the right of Croatia and Slovenia to secede, claiming only that 'the break-up of Yugoslavia would necessitate a redrawing of the borders' (Silber and Little 1997: 147). Out of this idea comes the well-known slogan of 'All Serbs in One State'; even Cosic, soon to become president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and only a nominal supporter of the overall policy, believed it was important for Serbs to support 'the realisation of their centuries-long national goal – the life of the whole of the Serb diaspora in a single state' (in Pavkovic 2003: 266; see also Jovic 2009: 358–60). During this time, however, Serb elites radicalised this statement, determining that it should be interpreted to mean that if all Serbs were to be in one state, then only Serbs should be in that state – no other minorities were welcome (Judah 1997: 165). This points directly to the ethnocentric perspective on homeland popular at the time.

As noted in previous chapters, in the late 1980s, Serbian ideology was less concerned with Croatia, Slovenia or Bosnia-Herzegovina. Growing Serbian nationalist sentiment was mirrored by growing Kosovar nationalist sentiment throughout the early part of the decade. As part of the Yugoslav ethnoscape, Kosovo is critical to Serbian national myth and history. Thus, though Kosovo was approximately 90 per cent Albanian, for the Serbs, it was their Jerusalem – their promised land and the heart of their civilisation. In his speech of 24 April 1987, Milosevic expressed this claim of Serbian-ness in Kosovo, saying,

> You should stay here. This is your land. These are your houses. Your meadows and gardens. Your memories. You shouldn't abandon your land just because it's difficult to live, because you are pressured by injustice and degradation. It was never part of the Serbian and Montenegrin character to give up in the face of obstacles, to demobilize when it's time to fight . . . You should stay here for the sake of your ancestors and descendants. Otherwise your ancestors would be defiled and descendants disappointed. But I don't suggest that you stay, endure, and tolerate a situation you're not satisfied with. On the contrary, you should change it . . .
>
> (in Pavkovic 2000: 104)

It was the 1990 election results, however, that saw a distinct shift in Serbian concern from Kosovo to Bosnia; what the election results showed was that the SDS would be unable to use democratic means to prevent the secession of Bosnia-Herzegovina from the Yugoslav state currently under Serb control. However, the Serb leadership refused to allow the secession to occur, claiming that the loss of land would also entail the destruction of the nation, as Serbs would 'not be compelled to leave Yugoslavia' (in IT-97-24-PT 2001). In order to keep secession from occurring, the SDS began organising Bosnia-Herzegovina into more formalised regional structures, using the concept of 'Associations of Municipalities' used when writing the 1974 Constitution. The first of these regional associations, the Association of Bosanska Krajina Municipalities in Banja

Luka, was established in April 1991 (IT-99-36-1 1999; IT-99-36-1 2004). Although formed through claims of economic necessity, the municipality had a political agenda of homeland salvation which ran contrary to the very constitution justifying its establishment.

1991–1992

This 'reorganisation' of municipalities continued throughout the autumn of 1991 as the war with Croatia began and increased in severity. Serb political leadership, fearing that Bosnia-Herzegovina would follow in Slovenia and Croatia's footsteps, transformed regional municipalities into Serbian autonomous districts and one Serbian autonomous region (both hereafter called SAOs). These were the foundation of the Serbian homeland: September 1991 saw the creation of the Autonomous Region of Krajina (ARK),[4] the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina was established on 24 October 1991 and, by the end of November of that year, the SAO Romanija-Birac, the SAO Semberija and SAO Northern Bosnia. The rationale behind the creation of the SAOs and the leadership claims held over them by the SDS was to increase Serb rights in the area and ensure the safety of Serbs throughout their land (IT-99-36-1 1999; IT-95-5/18-1 2000; IT-02-54-T 2002; IT-99-36/2 2008). Here we see that the institutional structure of the state is redesigned to fit within the ideological structure established from a direct territorial polity (Vladisavljevic 2011: 144); this is the agency of ideology coming in to play, where ideology itself causes and legitimates policy decisions. Thus, not only did the SDS claim these lands as the sole possession of Serbs, Serb leadership used maintaining their homeland as justification for aggressive political action.

In order to legitimise these homeland claims, the Serb authorities held a plebiscite deciding whether or not Bosnia-Herzegovina should remain in the Yugoslav state. Unlike the 14–15 October 1991 decision to create a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bosnian Serbs flocked to participate in this decision, voting overwhelmingly in support of Bosnia-Herzegovina remaining within SFRY (IT-00-39&40-PT 2002a; IT-00-39&40/1 2002b; IT-02-54-T 2002).

As viewed by the SDS political leadership, Bosniak and Bosnian Croat presence in Serb-claimed lands served as a major problem in the creation and control of Serbian territory (IT-95-5/18-1 2000). In order for Serbs to live safely, they needed a cleansed geographical homeland to thrive. Thus, in secret, the SDS authorised instructions for the 'Organisation and Activity of the Organs of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Extraordinary Circumstances', a plan outlining complete

Serb takeover in the claimed municipalities of Bosnia-Herzegovina (IT-99-36-1 2004). On 28 February 1992, the SDS-led Bosnian Serb Assembly adopted a declaration on the Proclamation of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The region included the SAOs and 'other Serbian ethnic entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the regions in which the Serbian people remained in the minority due to the genocide conducted against it in World War Two' and was declared to be a part of the SFRY. A few months later, on 12 August 1992, the Bosnian Serb republic was renamed as 'Republika Srpska' (RS) (IT-99-36-1 1999; IT-95-5/18-1 2000, 2002; IT-99-36-1 2004; IT-04-79-1 2005). Again, here we see national claims being made on one specific geographical region. While there is less focus on revenge and fear, what primarily shines through is a sense of justification through the regained unity of the homeland.

It is important to note that, unlike in Germany, these homeland claims were not ideologically demarcated by majority populations but were instead based on historical claims. It is in this way that ideology reacts against events, namely the independence of Slovenia and parts of Croatia. Ideology in this time period begins to stipulate that independence was acceptable as long as territorial independence did not involve the annexation of historically claimed ethnic Serb territories (see Pavkovic 2003: 260) regardless of current population densities within regions. For example, in the Prijedor municipality (population: 112,543), Bosniaks constituted 43.9 per cent (49,351) of the total population, whilst Serbs were only 42.3 per cent (47,581).[5] Bosniaks, then, were identified as the largest ethnic group in the municipality and were categorised as the greatest threat to Serbs, ethnically, culturally and politically (IT-97-24 2008; IT-97-24-PT 2001; Mikelic, Schoen and Benschop 2005). Here is where, as discussed in Chapter 2, we begin to see some of the key differences in the way ideology shifts in this case of ethnic cleansing. There is ideological space established early enough in the radicalisation process (the structure of ideology) to make future policy decisions resulting in an equally violent, if non-genocidal, action, but with less intent on absolute ethnic destruction.

1992–1995

The key policy shift established in light of growing discontent was initiated by Karadzic and executed by Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the RS National Assembly, on 12 May 1992, when he established six 'strategic objectives' for Bosnian Serbs: 1) *establish distinct state borders* separating the Serbian people from other ethnic communities; 2) *create a corridor between Semberija in the northeast and Krajina in the northwest* of

Bosnia-Herzegovina; 3) *establish a corridor in the Drina River valley*, thus eliminating the Drina River as a border dividing Serbs; 4) *establish a Serbian border* on the Una and Neretva Rivers; 5) *divide the city of Sarajevo* into Serbian and Muslim parts, establishing effective state authorities in both parts; 6) *ensure access to the sea* for RS. Policies to achieve these objectives were immediately initiated, but the strategic objectives themselves were not published publicly until 26 November 1993 (IT-99-36-1 2004; IT-00-39&40-PT 2002a; IT-04-81 2005; IT-05-88-PT 2005; IT-05-88-T 2006; IT-95-5/18 2008b). The purpose of these strategic goals was to seize and control the territory claimed as the Serbian homeland, ensuring that these regions were neither able to secede from SFRY nor would they be able to become usurped by the newly established Croatian state, who claimed the contested lands for political and regional clout (IT-04-79-PTb 2005). Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic stated, 'We have what we want. We control 70 per cent of the territory, but we claim only on 64 per cent' (Oberschall 2007: 110).

The formalisation of ideology into policy in such a tactical way also enabled a more efficient approach to ethnic cleansing; in these Serb-claimed areas, protracted violence became rote as churches and mosques were destroyed. The indictments used in my primary research show a total of 304 religious institutions demolished after 1992: 30 Catholic churches and a shocking total of 274 mosques (see IT-99-36-1 2004; IT-97-24-PT 2001; IT-04-79-PT 2005; IT-04-79-PTb 2005; IT-02-54-T 2002). Medical supplies, food and water were also specifically restricted, particularly in the enclaves of Bihac, Gorazde, Srebrenica and Zepa, in order to create unbearable living conditions for those living in these areas, a large majority of whom were Bosniaks (IT-02-54-T 2002; IT-97-24-PT 2002a; IT-99-36-1 2004). Doing so served to cleanse the homeland of the anti-nation, thus ensuring continued national dominion. Also worth noting is that, in a similar way to Germany and to Turkey, the worst atrocities were committed in the contested areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina; though Bosniaks were in great peril in RS, Muslims living in Serbia proper were generally left alone. 'Those atrocities that did take place were carried out to remove populations from land during a period of the breakdown of authority, not primarily because of "ancient hatreds"' (Carmichael 2010: 14).

The last events altering the course of ideology through the massacres of Srebrenica were the passing of UN Resolution 819 on 16 April 1993 and the Vance-Owen plan of spring 1993. The UN resolution classified the towns of Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde, Sarajevo and their surrounding areas as the 'safe areas' free from attack or other types of hostility. The

Vance-Owen plan proposed to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina into ten sections, distributed amongst Croatia, Serbia and the Bosniaks. As it denied Serbs the corridors Karadzic claimed in 1992, and thus disallowed the ability for a 'whole' homeland, Serbian leadership rejected the plan, arguing that Serbs would have to live in danger and isolation, and doing so would amount to the ethnic cleansing of Serbs (IT-95-5/18-1 2002; Silber and Little 1997: 276–7, 282; Glenny 1996: 147). In this case, the UN action spurred the Serbs to act, as it was viewed as an attack on the homeland by an international (external) enemy – the policy could not be fully implemented if the health of the nation was tied to the sanctity of the homeland.

Analysis

The basic premise of this chapter is the question 'What role does the homeland play in the evolution and radicalisation of ideology towards genocide?' By assessing the manifestation of ideology regarding the homeland set out in the previous sections, I hope to answer this question by moving into the comparative evaluation of that information.

A quick recap of the Turkish case brings out a number of interesting points. To begin with, from very early on, the ideas that the unification of Turkish homeland was in jeopardy and preventing this destruction were paramount to the creation and justification of ideology and policy at the time. The history of war and subsequent loss of territory from the mid-1800s meant not only a loss of political legitimisation and clout internationally, but, when paired with the social Darwinist nationalism popular in the CUP, the idea of the failing homeland begins to associate itself with the idea of a failing nation. This provides the opportunity for persecution to be legitimised, as it is a cause to 'save the homeland', particularly when the reforms promised by the CUP failed to do so.

The third recurring theme of the Turkish case is the influence of international actors and the characterisation of these actors as national enemies. Arguably more than in any other theme in genocidal ideology presented in my three cases, the role of outside actors is evident in shaping changes in policy. In the Turkish case, the primary outer enemy is, as mentioned in earlier chapters, Russia. Increased Russian dominion over territories in mid-Asia threatened Ottoman, and later, CUP power over their regional provinces and provided a rationale for the two points above, the homeland at risk and justification for aggression. The First World War disturbed what could have been a balanced compromise between Germany and Russia regarding the Armenians

(R14083/Ab.25202 1913); as it is, however, homeland ideology continued to radicalise and justify anti-Armenian policies encouraging their expulsion from the homeland.

Also worth noting is the idea that the Ottoman homeland is the sole property and dominion of Turks. This idea is present in CUP ideology but is instituted in whispers and suggestions rather than the shouts and protestations of my other two cases. My research intimates that this is primarily due to the latent remnants of attempted Ottoman multiculturalism. Though the ethnocentric tendencies of the CUP cast multiculturalism as the reason for Turkish decline, it still allowed for the existence of Jews, Kurds and other non-anti-nation other-groups to exist and even, in the Kurdish case, to flourish, as they were not seen as a direct threat to the existence of the homeland.

This is in direct contrast to the German case, where claims of Germanness were directly tied, from a very early stage, to the homeland. Germans were very clear about, and quite proud of the fact that, their homeland was for the German Volk, and their nation would live or die by the prosperity of the homeland itself. The early establishment of this theme is unique to Germany and was absolutely vital in its influence regarding early military manoeuvres; not only did the Germans need Lebensraum, but their military attempts were to re-establish 'Greater Germany' – goals that could only be established by a 'racially pure European state' under Nazi control (Kershaw 1989: 126). Thus, the expulsion of Jews from the homeland was a necessity. Not only were the Jews national persecutors, but also their very presence put the nation at risk of attack and victory by external enemies. This is well traced by Bloxham and Kushner, who note the territorial nature of the shifting answer to the 'Jewish Question'. The first step was to exclude Jews within Germany, the second to exclude Jews from Germany, the third was a spatial displacement, or the deportation to a specific destination far outside of Greater Germany, such as Madagascar or Argentina. Only after these three options had been dismissed was mass murder the decided campaign (2004: 72; see also Tribunals 09.01.1946 for Rosenberg's instructions regarding homeland purification in the East). The first three options, then, are territorial, whereas the fourth is not. As the need to save the homeland from the risk of internal and external enemies increases, the move towards justifying radicalisation increases rapidly.

The relationship between the idea of the homeland at risk and using homeland protection as a rationalisation for aggression also establishes itself early on in the Yugoslav case. However, the problem with Yugoslavia is *whom it needs to protect the homeland from*. As we see in Chapter 3, Milosevic predicts in the 1980s that 'Yugoslavia would disintegrate without Kosovo'; however, Kosovo's role in the creation and establishment of the homeland mentality is relatively minor through the early 1990s, though 'the fissures that spread from the unhappy province managed to splinter the rest of the country' (Judah 1997: 30), shifting the focus away from Kosovo and firmly onto Bosnia-Herzegovina after the 1990 elections. Of course, the Serbs never gave up on their homeland claims in this region, a situation that would cause further unrest and great bloodshed in the mid to late nineties and even into the 21st century.

Once homeland claims began to be made over Bosnia-Herzegovina, they began to be made exclusively for Serbs. My research shows that Bosnian Serbs made it very clear that if non-Serbs, particularly Croats, were to stay in their (Serbian) homeland, they would be expected to either live in severely limited situations with relatively no regard to their welfare, as seen by the lack of humanitarian aid during the crisis, or they would have to adopt a Serbian way of life, thereby cleansing the homeland of all non-Serb elements. The bounteous destruction of mosques and Catholic churches serve to support these claims, as they are the policy consequences of an ideology sanctifying the homeland and using ethnic cleansing as a legitimation for what was predominantly anti-Bosniak action. Thus, we see that genocide in the Balkans, like in Germany and the Ottoman Empire, was not built on the ideological expressions of historical ethnic hatred but is expressed by 'calculated means to expand the parameters of an ethnically homogeneous territory' (Wood 2001: 67–8).

Before moving on to conclude, I want to return again to the recurring variations on cumulative radicalisation and path dependency. In the chapters on the nation and anti-nation, we have seen some minor differences in each case regarding the way ideology is manifest as structure and agency, but, for the most part, the radicalisation process is similar. As we will see below, the thematic progression is comparable and provides us with keen insight as to how ideology evolves; nonetheless, this does not detract from the fact that the structure of ideology and its flexibility is most visible in this theme due to its variance from case to case.

Due predominantly to a long history of loss of empire, the CUP inherited a longstanding perception of the homeland under threat. In contrast, the Germans experienced a swift loss of empire and colonies after the First World War. The ideological structure within which the Nazis were working was one where the early focus was on regaining what had been lost rather than protecting what remained. The third approach is exhibited in the Balkan case where, more than in any other case, the goalposts keep moving from a Serb-led Yugoslavia to Greater Serbia to

All Serbs in One State to a pure Serbia. While in the other two cases, ideological structure shifts and radicalises in a more cumulatively progressive way, the Balkan case shows an ideological structure that shifts in extremes in order to keep up with a swiftly changing geopolitical atmosphere. I would suggest that regarding the homeland in the Balkan case, ideology has less agency and is used less as an incitement to action and more as a tool of legitimising state policy in reaction to events. Categorising these three cases in such a way offers interesting insight into how the institution of ideology works in radicalising states, and it will be returned to in greater detail in the next chapter.

Conclusion

Thus, evidence from each of my cases demonstrates that there are three main themes in genocidal ideology regarding the homeland – two that are interlinked and one that is moderately independent of the other two. In short, my analysis shows that genocidal ideology regarding the homeland manifests itself in three main ways: 1) *the homeland as the sole property of the nation,* 2) *the homeland at risk* and 3) *salvation of the homeland as justification for inner and outer aggression.* The independent theme is that of *the homeland as the sole property of the nation.* In the Turkish case, this idea takes longer to establish itself because of its recent history of attempted multiculturalism. The German case, in contrast, begins with a firm belief in *Blut und Boden,* predating anti-Semitic policy initiatives and being instrumental in early military decisions but becoming less influential as other themes of leadership and Volkishness take prominence. The Serbian case provides evidence that Serb interest in Bosnia-Herzegovina was present but not powerful until after the 1990 elections, growing in importance throughout the end of the conflict in the region, particularly as external actors become involved. Critically, all three of my cases seek to address ethnic boundaries in light of changing geopolitics.

The second two themes of *the homeland at risk* and the *salvation of the homeland as justification for inner and outer aggression* generally move in conjunction with each other. The homeland is shown as being at risk, which results in aggressive radicalisation of policy shifts; this aggression is then justified as being carried out in order to save the homeland from internal and external enemies. This relationship is seen in each case and is particularly noteworthy as each case enters war. Accordingly, we see a rise in this theme in 1912 and in late 1914 in the Turkish case; for the Germans it occurs primarily from 1935 to 1938; and for the Yugoslav case, my research indicates that the most noticeable rise is between 1990 and 1992.

Before concluding, it is important to note that in all three cases the identification of the homeland happens against a backdrop of massive geopolitical shift. The way in which that change occurs is different in each case: the Ottoman Empire had experienced over a decade of slow disintegration as nationalist movements ate away at the empire. The German state was forced to renounce a considerable amount of its claimed homeland at the end of the Second World War. The Serbs were victims of the collapse of communism, which resulted in the swift, if democratic, dissolution of influence over important geographic regions. Thus, these are cases of conflict where geographical boundaries are new, in flux and at risk. Despite the difference in how the homeland had been lost, these regimes set out to redefine the boundaries of their homelands, claiming that the boundaries of the nation no longer fit the geographical parameters of the status quo.

Hence, in these three cases, the role of the homeland in genocidal ideology is threefold. Evidence of this nature, repeated in multiple cases, allows scholars to expect that similar findings may be present in other cases of genocide. If this is the case, then one might be able to infer that, for genocidal states, it is necessary to establish the homeland as geographically bounded, sanctified to such an extent as to legitimise the killing of its own citizenry and directly linked to the excellence of the nation itself.

6

Analysis and Conclusion: Mapping Genocidal Ideology

> 'Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past.'
>
> –Marx (1907: 5)

Introduction

The preceding chapters of this book can be roughly divided into two categories: substantive and theoretical; this chapter is divided in a similar fashion. The first section of this chapter returns to the qualitative chapters on anti-nation, nation and homeland. My approach to these subjects within each chapter is thematic, but here, the focus is on mapping ideology in a chronological way, comparing each of the three cases through the lens of the events used to structure my chapters. I discuss whether or not there are similar stages of radicalisation and how these macro themes shift and change over the course of radicalisation. This approach allows me to answer the key questions posed at the very beginning of the book: Does radicalising ideology evolve in a similar way in cases of modern genocide? How does that evolution occur? What are the thematic similarities and differences in this evolution?

The second section of this chapter deals with the methodological questions posed in Chapters 1 and 2, namely, is the dual structure/agency role of ideology I propose fitting in a genocidal context? Does ideology shape events, or do events shape ideology? And lastly, does the genocidal sequence follow a specifically path-dependent trajectory? Obviously, though I have grouped my analysis into these two different sections, they are strongly connected; answers to this group of secondary questions are tightly linked with the analysis coming out of the discussion in the first section, particularly regarding the role of ideology in institutionalism, path dependency and the greater body of work regarding HS.

Progression of Ideological Radicalisation

In Chapter 2, I argue that one of the strengths of my episodic approach is the ability to compare event with event, which thereby enables us to view an overall picture of ideology in situ. However, as each of the qualitative chapters has shown, the progression of these events is extremely complex and varies depending on the geopolitical context of the time. For instance, the second episode in both Germany and the Balkans occurs against a backdrop of establishing a new political regime; the CUP, however, is not only attempting to establish its power but is also in a state of war in the Balkans. Thus, the progression of radicalisation is different. However, thanks to my episodic approach, this does not restrain comparative analysis so long as it occurs within a wider framework. Thus, first reflections on the issues raised here are that *there are core tiers to the evolution of radicalising ideology*. These tiers are based around the geopolitical atmosphere occurring in each case. When approached in this manner, three tiers of ideological radicalisation arise which allow for differences in the geopolitical context. Using these categories as an overall guide, it becomes possible to continue comparing event with event.

The following section on the *foundational tier* of radicalising ideology looks at ideology in the early formulation of political ascendancy of the CUP, the NSDAP and the SDS/SPS, looking particularly at the transitions occurring as each regime comes into power and begins to establish political goals and objectives. The first event in all three of my cases is categorised at this level, as is the second event, the introduction of the Nuremberg Laws, in the German case.

The *progressional tier* of ideology focuses on states as they move further along the radicalised spectrum. Here, though the carriers of radicalising ideology are in power, each state has to legitimise its rationale for participating in aggressive geopolitical events. This section will look at how this assertive focus affects ideology in Turkey from 1908 to 1914, encompassing two events, in Germany from 1935 to 1938 and in the Balkans from 1987 to 1991. The third level of radicalisation, the *genocidal tier* of radicalising ideology, looks at ideology against a backdrop of genocidal aggression in war, focusing particularly on the transition into genocide in the latest stages of events discussed in this project.

The foundational tier

In each of my three cases, these early years of ideological evolution suggest some interesting points. Let us then revisit the main themes, starting with the nation. As we have seen through previous chapters, whether or not there is a true historical basis for establishing ethnic differences is irrelevant; in truth, ethnic ideology rarely refers back to factual history. Instead it 'transforms a mythological national past into a hypothetical past in order to appeal to those men and women displaced or frightened by modernity' (Mosse 1985: xiii), suggesting that Orwell was right in his cynical assertion that 'who controls the past controls the future: who controls the present controls the past' (1950: 248). In this hypothetical past, the nation is shown as being golden, pure and above reproach; its members are cast as heroic and chivalrous men and women who embody the ideals set forth by the regime; the chauvinist nationalism which buffers these ideas exists in this modern age because it bridges the gap from state to society. State elites in organic nationalist movements promise the nation that the glory of their past utopia can be rediscovered in the present under the ideology of the regime if the homeland can be cleansed of 'impurities' within.

Beginning with this foundation, my analysis went on to highlight some insights into the theme of the nation in cases of radicalising ideology. At this early stage, every case begins with a relatively strong emphasis on the nation in the roles of culture bearer and disgraced victim; even in the multi-ethnic states of Yugoslavia and the Ottoman Empire, the idea that Turkish – or, in the earliest stages of the CUP, Ottoman – and Serbian honour was carried by the nation and was being flouted is strong. This disgrace is portrayed ideologically as being highly problematic because the health of the nation is in the hands of a culture-bearing nation: If the nation continues in its disgrace, the glorious history of the nation will falter and fail. I suggest the reason for this lies in a rather benign rationale: By undermining national pride through ideology, the Nazis, the Young Turks and the Serbian elite were attempting to throw doubt on the old system of governance, the Ottoman Empire, Yugoslavia and the Weimar Republic. A rising political party's attempt to undermine the current party in power is in no way unusual nor need it result in anything like genocide. The important thing to note here is that the blame is cast not only on the system of governance but on the nation itself; it is the German people, not the Weimar Republic, who are portrayed as being in disgrace. This is, in short, an ethnic rationale for a political problem.

Even this early on, however, radicalising ideology is quite clear that the nation is not solely to blame for its calamitous state; the anti-nation is also at fault. Propaganda claims it is the anti-nation that has driven the nation to collapse; Chapter 3 noted themes associated with this premise even during the earliest stage of radicalisation. The anti-nation, the ethnic antithesis of the nation, is seen to be thriving in times of national decline and is the persecutor of the nation. This leads to the dehumanisation of the anti-nation and, to a lesser degree at this stage, a surety that there must be physical separation between the nation and the anti-nation.

Here we can clearly see that the first of the two themes is strongest in the earliest stage of ideological radicalisation, particularly in the Jewish and Armenian cases; as the data shows, however, these themes are almost non-existent in the Balkans, where the establishment of the Bosniak anti-nation was slowest to manifest. At this time period in the Yugoslav case, the enemy was instead seen as almost any non-Serb group, but especially Kosovars; there were enough links between the two groups, Bosniak and Kosovar, to make the shift almost seamless in a shifting geopolitical climate, as we will see in the next section. In the Turkish and German cases, the anti-nation is not perceived to be suffering the same economic and political straits as the nation but is instead cast as thriving during a time of national decline. This is deemed a 'rational' occurrence, as the anti-nation is also cast quite clearly in each of my three cases as a group persecuting the nation, a malevolent enemy, allied with the national enemies from without, undermining the nation from within.

The physical delineation of this sort of without/within thinking in radicalising states grows primarily from the role of the homeland in genocidal ideology. The homeland provides geographic delineation for the nation, giving a boundary for both dominance and purification. The points identified in Chapter 5 suggest that, within genocidal nationalism, belief in the homeland as the sole possession of the nation and that the homeland is at risk provides justification for further aggression against *all* enemies, both within and without. At the earliest stage of ideological radicalisation, there is particular emphasis on the nation as the sole possessor of the homeland as one of the strongest themes in two of my three cases. This sense of possession is used to legitimise claims to power by galvanising the citizenry and imbuing a geographical space with an ethnic heritage. In Turkey, however, this idea is almost invisible before 1908; however, we need look just one step ahead to see this idea come to full fruition, becoming the strongest theme in Turkish ideology between 1908 and 1912. The reason for this almost certainly lies in the multi-ethnic status of the Ottoman state and the early intent of the CUP to reform the Ottoman governance system rather than to completely overhaul the state.

Note also that in each case identities are established at this early stage. Weitz (2003) points to the fixing of identities as being crucial to the progression of nationalism, but to find fixed identities at this stage in ideological progression is noteworthy. This harkens back to the type of nationalisms that these radicalising ideologies emerge from, to Mann's organic nationalism where 'in multiethnic circumstances, a majority ethnicity can rule through majoritarian democracy, as elections become ethnic censuses' (2005: 69). This was certainly the path taken by the Serbs in the elections through the early 1990s and, as I shall show shortly, the key rationale behind the establishment of the Bosniak anti-nation – though it was not the tactic used by either the CUP or the Nazis, both of whom played down their ethnic leanings in favour of political alliances helping them to achieve political prominence. Though none of my three cases had yet definitively established how to categorically distinguish the nation from the anti-nation, that there was a difference between these groups had been established and that this difference was ethnic had also been established. This is critical because, unlike with political, religious or class associations, ethnicity itself is perceived as fixed and cannot be easily changed. Though decisions still had to be made regarding how ethnicity was delineated, an ideology of fixed ethnicity is already established in this foundational tier of radicalisation.

Regardless of a recognised sense of otherness, however, it is critical to point out that what form policy regarding the anti-nation should take had not been established. As discussed in Chapter 3, the CUP inherited a legacy of anti-Armenian discrimination demonstrated in a moderate level of civic persecution, such as the limitation of judicial rights. At this early stage, this is the most advanced implementation of institutionalised anti-nation policy existing in any of my three cases. Though there is an existing idea that something should be 'done' about the Armenians, Jews and Muslim non-Serbs, what exactly that should be is not explicit.

It is not enough to focus only on the strongest themes at this stage of radicalisation; looking at the weaker themes also sheds light on the process of ideological evolution. This allows us not only to ascertain what characteristics are present in the early stages of radicalisation but what characteristics are absent; this provides us with both another level of analysis in my three cases and more markers for future policy and research initiatives. Regarding the nation, the need for national purification is the least important of all the identified themes. Nonetheless, it has manifested itself to a degree; Hitler's writings in *Mein Kampf* in particular give reference to the need for the German people to purify themselves in order to establish a more perfect racial form (1969 [1925]: 15, 297, 306). Nonetheless, the presence of these claims pales in comparison to the emphasis on the nation as a victim, as a culture bearer and, to a lesser extent, as being supreme.

This is directly tied to the fact that we see that the emphasis on separating the anti-nation and the nation has not ideologically manifested itself to any great degree. Separating the anti-nation from the nation is classed as a part of the purifying process for the nation; thus, in these early stages of radicalisation, the progress of national purification and the separation of the anti-nation from the nation go hand in hand. However, it is also worth noting that, while the idea of national purification was already established to a small degree, the idea of separation was not, to any notable extent. My research showed very little of this theme brought up in the earliest stage of both the German and Yugoslav cases and none in the earliest section of research done on Turkey. By the second timeframe, there are some scattered references to separation in Turkey (Anatolia particularly; see Ch. 5), but no reference to separating Bosniaks from Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina exists in my research at this stage. In short, in the early stages of ideological radicalisation, suggestions that the nation should be separate from the anti-nation are very weak and made quite quietly through the ideological megaphone.

As mentioned earlier in this section, the homeland provides the geographical boundaries for the nation; during the early manifestations of radicalising ideology, those boundaries are largely uncontested in my cases because of the state of the political process in those early stages. None of my three cases were openly preparing, politically or ideologically, for war at this point. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the weakest point in the early stage of ideological radicalisation has to do with using the homeland ideologically as a means for justifying aggression, both within and without. This changes drastically as war begins to loom on the horizon.

Thus, we can clearly see that, for the radicalisation process, the foundational tier of ideology is vital. Not only can we see certain similarities that suggest a pattern regarding how ideology evolves, but we can also see that radicalising political parties are sometimes willing to sacrifice ideological 'purity' to acquire power. Three weak political institutions – the crumbling Ottoman Empire, the economically destitute Weimar Republic and the headless Yugoslavia – provide opportunities for ethnically driven movements to become established on the political spectrum ideologically. Associating the shame of the nation with the weak state, promising new glories based on the culture-bearing aspects inherent in the nation and claiming the geographical boundaries of the state for the nation form the ideological patchwork crafted to fill a power gap as the institutional threads of 'old' governance unravel. These power gaps allow for swifter geopolitical change than would be expected under stable political institutions.

The progressional tier

After radicalising political parties gain power, certain aspects of ideology change to reflect the shift in focus from gaining access to the power institutions of the state to gaining and retaining control over those power institutions. The speed at which this takes place varies from case to case; hence, the progressional tier of radicalising ideology addresses the years between 1908 and 1914 in Turkey, 1935 and 1938 in Germany and 1987 and 1991 in Yugoslavia. Though the time discussed in Turkey is longer than in my other two cases, the effects of the Balkan Wars fought during this time at once speed up and delay various aspects of ideological progression which need to be taken into account in order to properly understand why ideology evolves in this way in this particular case.

When we consider ideology during these time periods, some significant changes become apparent. A look at analysis regarding the homeland offers perhaps the most interesting shifts between the foundational and progressional tiers. Each of the sub-themes regarding homeland rises over the course of this stage, and some of them change quite dramatically. Take, for example, the theme of the homeland being the sole possession of the nation. Whilst in the early stages of ideology it was comparatively one of the strongest overall themes regarding the homeland, in Turkey it was weak. By the time we get to the progressional tier of radicalisation, the idea that the homeland is the sole possession of the nation to the exclusion not only of the anti-nation but of other groups as well is one of the strongest ideological themes – not only regarding the homeland, but overall. This picks up on the idea expressed by Wood, who notes that genocide is directed at groups living in the 'wrong place' (2001: 66). Equally, we also see a distinct rise in ideological focus regarding the homeland at risk from inner and outer enemies – though more of the focus at this stage is on the level of threat from the outer enemy. This drastic rise in the ideological expression of threat engenders the greater sense of fear within the nation so necessary for the radicalisation of policy to be accepted as legitimate.

The reasoning behind the rises in these themes becomes clear when one looks at the final sub-theme regarding homeland, that of using the salvation of the homeland to justify aggression. For reasons largely outside the scope of this monograph, by the end of this category, each of my three cases is on the brink of war, and Turkey is fighting and loses a war during the events covered in this mid-level category. The relationship between war and genocide has been established and well documented. As mentioned in Chapter 1, a wide variety of scholars from historians to psychologists to sociologists have noted the influence war has on genocide. However, most of these accounts have focused on the physical accounts and the historical occurrences possible because of the state of war; few have looked to the ideological shifts occurring once radicalising states have entered a state of war. This project's scope has allowed us to look at these effects, as regards nation, anti-nation and homeland.

This progression towards war allows for and causes massive shifts in both policy and ideology. In this instance, by portraying the homeland at risk, national elites are then legitimising actions and alliances leading them into WWI, WWII and civil war respectively. Equally, this transition into war sees another ideological shift away from the portrayal of the nation in disgrace. In the early foundations of ideological radicalisation, the disgrace of the nation was largely placed under the responsibility of the former party in state power; under current power brokers, the CUP, Nazis and Serbs notably move away from discussing the disgrace of the nation. Instead, the nation is portrayed as being constructed of honourable men willing to fight for their country.

Thus, the message shifts to one of national supremacy, where the nation is considered above all in an almost sanctified state. This legitimises nationalist policies of the state and, to some extent, deifies state leaders and ideologues. For instance, this is the time when Hitler received a gain in popularity and was commended by some institutions, like the Catholic Church, with which he would soon be in conflict (Phayer 2000: Ch. 1; Evans 2005: Ch. 3). Nonetheless, whilst the theme of the nation in disgrace declines, the perception of the nation as a victim may endure, particularly in Yugoslavia and Turkey, though it does significantly decline. This perceived victimisation inspires fear, and with fear comes the idea that losses in war, both historical and present, are just punishment for a lack of ethnic purity.

The way national purification is expressed in policy making at this mid-level radicalisation varies from state to state and between events.

However, as I discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, the institutionalisation of persecution through the judicial system, principally under the CUP and the Nazis, is of significant importance. Looking particularly at the relationship between Reich Citizenship Law and the Enabling Act as well as the CUP's Law of Associations and the Law for the Prevention of Brigandage and Sedition, we see the state legitimising the restriction of rights and formalising ethnicity as separate from other types of identities.

A critical note here is that during the progressional tier in the Balkans, the Bosniak anti-nation is identified. There is a pre-established ideological idea of the Muslims in the region as being of a lesser status than Serbs; however, this was significantly repressed during Tito's rule, and after his death this was manifested through the 1980s as a mistrust and fear of Kosovars rather than of Bosniaks. However, looming Bosnian independence changed both homeland claims and shifted the idea of the national enemy away from Kosovars and refocused it on the greater Muslim enemy and particularly the Bosniak enemy. In short, the buildup to Croatian secession and fears of further Bosnian independence provided Serbian ideologues the opportunity to use Kosovo as a means to legitimise attacks on the Bosniak anti-nation.

In all three cases, this goes one step beyond the 'fixing' of identities expressed in the above section. Instead there now exists a formal distinction between nation and anti-nation; as discussed in Chapter 3, the identification of the anti-nation in radicalising ideology is critical to legitimising the policy and practice of the genocidal state in such a way as to place the anti-nation outside the bounds of mere otherness. This is part of the rationale behind the rise in dehumanising language used to describe the anti-nation in the progressional tier. This rise in persecution leads directly to the fact that it is during this time that the theme of the anti-nation thriving in times of national decline takes a significant downturn, particularly as the events considered within this period progress. As persecution increases on both political and cultural levels, it is no longer a viable option to continue to profess the thriving nature of the anti-nation.

The effect of war on radicalisation points not merely towards the time where enemies are engaged in battle but when wartime policies are being established, when the decision for war is made and the early, *non-genocidal* stages of war commence. This is not to say that the anti-nation feels no sense of persecution, or that the regime in place is in any way benevolent, but only that this persecution, and the ideological expression of the need for genocidal persecution, has yet to reach genocidal levels. War becomes an opportunity for these radicalising states to express the need to remove the anti-nation from the nation using any means possible, but ideology has not yet evolved from sustained persecution to total genocide.

The genocidal tier

It is, however, in this final section where we can view the evolution of ideological radicalisation shift into its final stage of genocidal ideology. In the genocidal tier of radicalising ideology, I aim to look at the events in post-1914 Turkey, post-1938 Germany and post-1991 Balkans. By following the course of these events, we can see ideology change from the progressional radicalisation of anti-nation persecution and national fear for the homeland to what is one of the most extreme types of ideology regarding nation, anti-nation and homeland. This, then, is perhaps the most intriguing level of analysis, as we see the kind of ideological shifts that take place between state-sponsored persecution and outright genocide.

The most obvious and perhaps most necessary ideological shift occurring at this point is the focus on the anti-nation as a national persecutor. At extreme levels in all three cases, the anti-nation is associated most importantly with an external enemy, either in the current crisis, as seen in Turkey and Germany, or with a historic enemy, as seen in the Balkans, where the Serbs persistently associate the Bosniaks with crimes committed against Serbs when the Balkans were part of the Ottoman state. This is a noteworthy difference because unlike in Turkey and Germany, Bosniaks did arm themselves and fight against the Serbs in community with other-groups as members of a sovereign state, Bosnia-Herzegovina, recognised by the international community. Though the conflict was in itself largely inspired by Bosnian independence, this evidence suggests that it was not enough to classify Bosniaks ideologically as 'merely' enemies; it was necessary to associate them with a historic enemy in order to fulfil the radicalisation level necessary in genocidal ideology, thus producing a similar outcome as in my other two cases, even if the approach in this area was different. Thus, we see again that as the need to save the homeland from the risk of internal and external enemies increases, the move towards justifying radicalisation increases.

The second prominent theme radically changing between the mid-level and genocidal level of radicalisation is the dehumanisation of the anti-nation. Whether described as 'cattle', 'vermin' or 'parasites', members of the anti-nation at this stage of ideology are consistently stripped of their humanity, thus relieving the nation of the moral obligations required by members of the nation and some non-anti-nation other-groups. In fact, in each of my three cases, though most clearly in the Balkans and in Germany, the eradication of the anti-nation from the geographical boundaries of the homeland is expressed ideologically as being the fulfilment of a moral obligation to the nation and as the just and good choice for future members of the nation. Extreme persecution, slavery and eventually genocide serves ideologically as a preventative measure against the future destruction of the homeland, allowing national elites to assure the nation that all was being done to protect their homeland from inner, as well as outer, enemies.

Thus, with the rise in the dehumanised anti-nation, the need for a purified nation also significantly increases in this final stage of radicalisation. By purging the nation of this 'inhuman' anti-nation, the nation is assured through ideology to become a purified, stronger, more efficient entity. There is a critical link here between the dehumanised anti-nation, the need to separate the anti-nation from the nation and war at this stage in ideological radicalisation – in order to guarantee victory in war, it is necessary to purify the nation from its inhuman and weak elements. This then legitimises not only the genocidal actions being committed against an ethnic anti-nation but also expresses the need to commit egregious crimes against other peripheral societal groups, such as prisoners, the sick and the mentally ill, all performed for the betterment of the nation. As expressed in Chapter 4, this reduction of individual needs and individual humanity makes it easier for the state elites to request that members of the nation sacrifice themselves on the battlefield as well as subject the anti-nation to death. As the genocidal state is portrayed as being just and good, victims are portrayed as being evil and thus deserving of the crimes committed against them. This extreme portrayal of identity, both for the anti-nation and for the nation, are, thus, necessary for elites in radicalising states in order to legitimise their aggressive policies and genocidal ideologies. Regardless of their differences, these cases of genocide occur within a greater context of mass death and include multiple victim-groups; however, mere self-awareness and a sense of otherness is not enough to produce the type of ideological allegiance necessary to instil trust in a state committing genocidal levels of aggression against any or multiple other-groups.

As in the progressional tier, this final stage also shows a rise in the level of ideological focus given using the homeland as an excuse to justify aggression. By this stage, it is not only the homeland that is portrayed as being under attack but the nation itself. This, of course, reflects the idea proposed in Chapter 5 that the homeland is ideologically linked to the nation in such a way as to entail the future of one on the other – when the sanctity of the nation is lost, so is the homeland lost and vice versa. That the nation is transcendent is never in question, but the fact that the nation is ideologically portrayed as being under attack explains why national election is, in each of my three cases, presented ideologically as established on the battlefield. This holds true even in the Serb case, where the relationship with the anti-nation is arguably the weakest. UN intervention spurred the Serbs to act, as UN action was portrayed by elites as an attack on the homeland by an external enemy, which had to be deterred as the health of the nation was tied directly to the sanctity of the homeland.

When we look across all three macro themes of anti-nation, nation and homeland, one other interesting point arises in each case at this stage of ideological evolution. Over the course of the final events occurring during this genocidal tier of radicalisation, we can see a direct link between fear and revenge for past wrongs, whether real or imagined. Fear of a weak nation leads to a need for revenge on a scapegoat for 'causing' that weakness; fear of a strong anti-nation leads to the nation's need to revenge themselves upon the anti-nation in order to re-establish national purity and regain economic security; fear of losing the homeland to either inner or outer enemies leads to an expressed need to commit offensive acts in revenge for what 'might' or 'could' have happened. The fears expressed might very well be false fears created by the very ideology supporting the need for revenge, but for ideologically inspired killers and for the bystanders who use ideology to justify inaction, the relationship between fear and revenge is key to understanding why ideology evolves and to understanding the relationship between ideology and events expressed in the next section of this chapter.

Reflections on Genocidal Analysis in the Context of HI

It is now possible to draw the various threads together and establish a number of conclusions arising from my research. In a very unique way, radicalising ideology is both modern and primordial; modern because it promises wealth and achievement through modern technological advances, and primordial because it seeks to gain this wealth through the perceived traditional culture of the nation and a distinct ethnic identity. This combination is tucked neatly into the ideals of utopianism under the regime in power (Schwarzmantel 1998: 134; Malesevic 2006: 226). Even if modernity is portrayed by radicalising ideology as the ultimate evil, the promises of national glory and wealth are prominent within the ideology itself.

As I suggest in Chapter 1, ideology is a believable interpretive framework and a 'cynical, utilitarian political instrument' (Herf 2005: 54); it is flexible, dynamic and at times at odds with policy initiatives; lastly, it is a key participant in the dynamicisation process of policy – an ideological belief of the nation at risk instils fear, demanding that policies be put in place to secure the nation, leading to the persecution of the anti-nation and the restriction of civil rights and human liberties in the name of national purification in order to save the homeland. This leads to a life regarded as less valuable than a 'normal' life; this then leads to strife, poverty, persecution and acts of dehumanisation against the anti-nation, which then reinforces the language of dehumanisation present in the original ideology.

This raises one of the issues at the heart of this analysis: the relationship between ideology and events. Does ideology shape events, or do events shape ideology? The answer is not necessarily as clear as many scholars and policy makers would like for it to be. Events pivot around ideology when particular ideological beliefs are held by elites which then encourage them to act in certain ways. Thus, policies are implemented or actions are carried out in such a way as to fulfil that ideology. Sometimes this has unexpected consequences, producing events that necessitate a shift in ideology, which is then used to legitimise the further radicalisation of policy.

This cyclical relationship between ideology and events is only made possible through the flexible character of the institution of ideology itself. Therefore, when we reflect on the role of ideology in genocidal radicalisation, one of the first steps we need to take is to revisit the dual nature of ideology, the idea that it is an institution with the power of both structure and agency. In fact, Chapters 3 through 5 show us that the iterative nature of ideology is the key to understanding why institutions can change in times of conflict. As an institution of structure, ideology serves as a long-term constraint, limiting the choices states can choose from when decisions are made. These limits affect the process of radicalisation, particularly regarding how swiftly or slowly that process occurs in reaction to external geopolitical shifts. Ideology as structure provides a context to understand these shifts through the lens of radicalisation, providing a framework in which ontological perspectives are shaped, paradigms are formed and myths and histories are created or recast in a new, idealised light. Ideology thus is a structure made stronger by its flexibility and readiness to change; herein lies its vulnerability to the influence of events and its volatile sensitivities to fulfilling the power gaps in such an aggressive way, as discussed above. All three cases demonstrate states that decided to sacrifice their own political, social and economic interests in order to fulfil their own ideological goals. Why? Because ideology provides the grounds for legitimacy (Sells 1998: 57). This constant nature of ideological structure and its resulting ability to interpret events is perhaps ideology's greatest strength.

However, we must remember that *in times of conflict structures change* and thus we see that ideology as agency has the power to change the structure in which radicalising states exist. My work suggests that this is the main role of state elites in shaping ideology and enacting their power, as instruments of ideological agency. When ideology is used to legitimise policy, as an excuse or as an explanation, ideology becomes not only structure but an agent of policy implementation. As agency, ideology becomes a tool in the hands of policy makers, providing them with a flexible rationale behind policies shifting beyond the bounds of normal morality – when ideology pivots around events. Thus, this analysis has shown that though the intentions of my three genocidal states are bounded by institutional structure, the emphasis of these ideological trends are not fixed; the power of ideology as agency allows these themes to fluctuate and shift in order to guide the nature of implementation and to accommodate the changing geopolitical arena found in states in conflict.

As an instrument of structure and agency, ideology is a player in both motivation and in 'the psychological possibility' of the process of radicalisation towards genocide. I have shown that while ideology is often shaped by events, the reality of retaining political legitimacy in radicalising states sometimes requires national elites to move outside the ideological platform they themselves helped to create and to bend and change that ideology to fit the need immediately before them. In Chapter 1, I proposed that in states radicalising towards genocide, institutions do not hold constant and are highly susceptible to change, unlike in more balanced states. My research upholds this hypothesis as it applies to the radicalisation of ideology. As noted above, ideology changes with progressive swiftness in each of my three cases, both influencing events and as a consequence of events. In these cases, it is true that when state institutions are in a period of crisis and rapid change over a short period of time, ideological radicalisation has occurred equally quickly.

Ervin Staub posits that 'earlier, less harmful acts cause changes in individual perpetrators, bystanders, and the whole group that make more harmful acts possible . . . the motivation and the psychological possibility evolve gradually' (1989: 5). This leads into a final point about ideological structure and its influence in radicalising states. As mentioned in the introduction, ideology is a cohesive set of beliefs and moral standards usually held over a long period of time, though in times of conflict we have seen that ideology can change very swiftly and tends to change at a faster rate as states travel further along the radicalising process. I bring this up now because it is important to point out that certain ideological themes identified in this book have their roots in the years prior to the persecutor-national elites coming into power. By this I do not mean that these genocides were in some way predestined, in fact, I mean just the opposite. Each of these political parties led by national elites inherited an ideological structure that, under their care, evolved in such an extreme way so as to become genocidal. This suggests that though institutions do persevere and have self-reinforcing tendencies, institutions can be perverted and are subject to change by instruments of agency when under times of stress and external change.

Inherited ideological structures and the process of cumulative radicalisation we have seen throughout the course of my analysis throws new light on the effectiveness of Mahoney's theory of path dependency to explain institutional change in radicalising states. The episodic approach to studying the evolution of radicalising ideology has indeed proven an efficient mode in that we have been able to view not only the progression of each case, but it has also allowed us to compare 'snapshot' with 'snapshot'. This allows us to get at the heart of HI, to follow appropriately the struggles for power through the varying and complex patterns present when comparing three different cases across the 20th century. Taking an episodic approach, then, led me to question the relationship between the events themselves when ideology is used as the framing lens. Do patterns of ideological progression exist? Yes, comparison shows that patterns of ideological progression do exist. Are those patterns path dependent? Can the theories of path dependency so ardently supported by Mahoney be applied when mapping radicalising ideology?

Unfortunately, there is not a straightforward answer to this question. There are two interlinked problems with path dependency. The first, and the point from which the second arises, is the problem of the critical juncture, or a key actor choice point usually occurring in a time of crisis. The second problem is that Mahoney's version of path dependency is one that is overly deterministic to be applied to cases of ideological radicalisation. Let us begin by briefly addressing the problem of the critical juncture.

Mahoney describes the critical juncture as being a choice point of significance outside of normal circumstance. Unfortunately, the elements of ideology, and particularly the structure radical regimes inherit when they come to power, restricts the applicability of this idea to these cases. One of Mahoney's reasons for the creation of the idea of 'critical juncture' is to allow historians and historical sociologists alike to 'avoid the problem of infinite explanatory regression into the past' (Mahoney 2001: 7). I propose that this project has a sufficiently regressive historical perspective as to cover the amount of time allowed between critical juncture and genocide. If the critical juncture for these events lies even further back in the past, then we merely find ourselves along this 'infinite path of regression' which Mahoney himself seeks to avoid.

Another problem with the idea of the critical juncture, and thus with path dependency itself, is that it is deterministic. Mahoney describes the difference between the critical juncture and other choice points as the fact that critical junctures place states onto paths of development that 'track certain outcomes' and cannot be easily reversed. He then goes on to suggest that this sequence of events is ultimately linked to a critical juncture period which 'lock[s] countries into particular paths of development . . . Once an option is selected, it becomes progressively more difficult to return to the initial point when multiple alternatives were still available' (Mahoney 2001: 7, 8). This deterministic quality is closer in line with the ideological-intentionalist debate seen in Holocaust literature but is not supported by the majority of ideological themes identified in my research. Instead, we see a progressively radicalising state in which each of the events I use to structure my work is a choice point along the process of radicalisation but is not a critical juncture. None of these events alone would have been enough to influence ideology to become genocidal.

Mahoney suggests that without a critical juncture, a sequence of events cannot follow a path-dependent process (2001: 5–10). Nonetheless, there are certain elements of path dependency which do help explain the sequential evolutionary process of ideological radicalisation which we see in my research. First, this research supports Mahoney's claim that history strongly influences and shapes the choices made by elites. I equally agree that the endurance of institutions and structures over time sometimes 'triggers a chain of causally linked events that, once itself in motion, unfolds independently of the institutional or structural factors that initially produced it'. This research also supports Mahoney's idea that the evolution of radicalising ideology is part of a reactive sequence in that it is part of a chain 'of temporally ordered and causally connected events' (2001: 10). When actors react to the vacuum created by power gaps, they are resisting the prevailing institutions existing within the case. Even if such resistance does not actually transform these institutions and structures, it can set in motion an autonomous process that encompasses events that lead, in my three cases, to the existence of a genocidal ideology.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, Mahoney's theory does point out that the consequences of previously made choices restrict the options available at the following choice point (2001: 6–8). Though his discussion on this point is limited to critical junctures, we see that each episode restricts, or at least *constrains*, the available choices of the next episode to some extent. As we see most clearly in the theme of homeland, ideological agency is not necessarily determined by prior choices and is highly sensitive to external actors; nonetheless, there is an identifiable amount of influence leading from one event to another, thus supporting the reactive sequence Mahoney identifies as being limited to path dependency.

Thus, we see here the link to cumulative radicalisation and the evolution of ideology. Ideology as agency and the sequential relationship between ideology and events as constructed by elite state actors links the radicalisation process to the reactive sequence. Thus, Mahoney himself limits the applicability of his own theory by implying that sequential events without a critical juncture are not involved in a path-dependent process (2001: 7); however, by broadening the boundaries of the theory to include sequences like those shown in my analysis, path dependency could be used to trace ideological evolution. In order to fully appreciate the applicability of the theory, an episodic approach to comparative analysis is particularly effective, as it provides a storyboard to be created in each case, allowing the path of radicalisation to be seen as a whole, whilst still highlighting the reactive events along the cumulative process of radicalisation.

This does not, however, negate the importance of intervention in states on a radicalising path. In fact, I suggest that though the perspective of radicalising states might be more immediately complex, intervention at any stage of radicalisation may be more effective, as states are not 'locked' into a genocidal path. Though it might be necessary to implement varying types of interferences depending on the stage of radicalisation – again, another opportunity for further research – the burden of intervening might well be lighter without the weight of the critical juncture around the necks of policy makers, though more research should be done in order to know for certain.

This analysis has produced a broad framework for comparative ideological analysis in states radicalising towards genocide through investigation into how ideology both affects and is affected by structural shifts that pertain to the anti-nation, nation and homeland. If we wish to conduct debates about issues fundamental to genocide, certainly substantial discussion of ideology is desirable, as understanding radicalising ideology is critical to both understanding how elite actors compete for power and in preventing radicalisation from occurring to genocidal levels.

Studying genocide helps us understand the way ideology evolves, the factors that influence it and the type of geopolitical atmosphere necessary to foster particular types of changes. Studying ideological evolution comparatively by addressing the history of a case through socio-institutional frameworks provides a strong platform for achieving this intellectual agenda.

Notes

Chapter 01

1 We see this often in biographies of important political figures, such as Adolf Hitler. The Holocaust is claimed to have occurred because Hitler was denied a place in art school, because his sickly mother was doctored by a Jew, because he was born in Austria and so on.

2 For more information on the trials themselves, see Dawidowicz (1976); during these trials, we see the introduction of the term 'crime against humanity', a significant contribution to international law used throughout the 20th century in the prosecution of war criminals (Akçam 2006: 368), including those used in this research in the ICTY trials.

3 A discussion on why these events were chosen and their importance in context is found in Chapter 2.

4 For more information on the history of *Mein Kampf* (Hitler 2009 [1925]), see D. C. Watt's introduction to the text.

Chapter 02

1 This list includes a number of nationalist movements, most of which contain a high level of civic involvement (Snyder 2000: 39; Hutchinson 1999, 2001). For information on non-violent nationalist nationalism, see Hearn's *Identity, Class and Civil Society in Scotland's Neo-Nationalism* (2002), Breton's *From Ethnic to Civic Nationalism: The Case of Canada* (2002), Kennedy's *A Switzerland of the North?* (2004), Keating's *Stateless Nation-Building* (1997), Haesly's *Identifying Scotland and Wales* (2005), Morton's *Scottish Rights and 'Centralisation' in the Mid-Nineteenth Century* (1996) and Guibernau's *National Identity, Devolution and Secession in Canada, Britain and Spain* (2006).

2 Of particular relevance here is the work of Lemkin, discussed shortly, and the debate over his own struggles to craft a definition for genocide. For a thoughtful and lively debate on this subject, see the *Journal of Genocide Research*'s special issue on the subject (Schaller and Zimmerer 2005).

3 Nor is Chalk and Jonassohn's definition flawless. For further debates, see Fein (2002 [1993]: 80–1), Dadrian (1991) and Shaw (2007: 30–2).

4 Though, of course, religion has played a large part in the three cases of genocide I present, it is only here ever a secondary actor to ethnicity – which will be made clear in the upcoming chapters. For more information on mass killing based primarily on religious affiliation, see Fox (2004a; 2004b), Levine (1986) and Frisch and Sandler (2004).

5 The theocratic nature of the Ottoman state is under heavy debate. For an interesting discussion, see Akçam (2006: 431).

6 This massacre also resulted in the death of approximately 1000 Muslims who would not join with the attackers. For a more fulsome account, see Mann 2005: 129; Akçam 2006: 54–5, 59–62; Balakian 2003: Ch. 12.

7 The actual number of deaths remains uncertain, though most scholars estimate between 800,000 and 1.5 million deaths of a pre-war population of just 2 million (Mann 2005: 140; Levene 2005: 70–3; Valentino 2004: 157; Winter 2003b: 193). These numbers, of course, do not cover such atrocities as the rape of women and children or those sold into slavery – again, a crime occurring mostly to women and children.

8 The tenets of social Darwinism were influential in both the Armenian and Jewish genocides; they involve the application of Darwinist premises of eugenics not to individual species but to individual people groups who were considered to be in a life-or-death struggle for supremacy. For works addressing the application of social Darwinist principles to the Holocaust, see Evans (2004). Though there are fewer works addressing the application of social Darwinist principles to the Armenian genocide, some good examples can be found in Bloxham (2003; 2005), Al-Azmeh (1991) and Koch (1984).

9 The Four Year Plan was published in November 1936; drafted by Hitler himself in a memorandum in August of that year, it outlined certain economic policies to be put in place in hopes of bringing Germany out of economic crisis. For more information, see Kershaw (2001b) and Evans (2005).

10 Unfortunately, there is not room within the bounds of the book to expound on the injustices and terrors that took place at Auschwitz or the other camps in the Holocaust or the other cases. For more information about the camps, see Dawidowicz (1975; 1976).

11 This is not to say that there were not strong nationalists emerging at this time with pointedly nationalist ideas, such as streamlining the alphabet or arguing that one language was distinct from another (Rusinow 2003: 19); however, most of these leaders were exiled or thrown into prison, many without trial or cause. This led to an extreme sense of national sentiment when the exiles were able to return (Judah 1997: 145; Silber and Little 1997: 29).

Chapter 03

1 *Nations and Nationalism* recently published parts of this chapter (Murray 2014); there one can find a discussion on varying levels of otherness.

2 For an in-depth look at the massacres from 1894–96, see Melson (1982), Kirakossian (2004; 2007) and Lewy (2005).

3 This is not to say, however, that all politicians in the Weimar state system supported these policies or that they were acceptable under the NSDAP. Of the members of the Weimar Reichstag, approximately 80 were prosecuted and summarily killed by the Nazi regime; well over 150 were exiled from the Reich (Burleigh 2001: 155).

4 See Mazower (1999) for further insights into the Nazis' use of the legal system and its role in a genocidal state.

5 Much writing has been done on the relationship between fear and mass death. Some of the best examples on this topic are found in Shaw (2003), Snyder (2000), Winter (2003a; 2003b) and Mann (1993; 2001; 2005).

6 Though *ausrotten* and *vernichten* are both used circumspectly to discuss the killing of the Jews, Herf goes on to mention that when used in the context of propaganda, they are usually in terms of something the Jews will do or are currently doing to the German nation (2005: 55); this, of course, further instilled fear of the Jews into the greater German society.

7 As explained in Chapter 2, religious identity here does not mean to entail any faith but was used as a marker distinguishing one group from another, a cultural marker maintaining an ethnic connection. For more information, see Bringa (1995).

8 An encouraging amount of work has been done in this field by scholars of politics, war and gender alike. For more information, see Hayden (2000), Campbell (1998), Nikoliâc-Ristanoviâc (2000), Fletcher (1993) and Engle (2005).

Chapter 04

1 Because of the ideological focus of this book, I have not wholly addressed the role of rape as a weapon of warfare in this case. For more on this subject, and on the symbolic nature of gender in the Balkans expressed outside of ideology, see Engle (2005), Fletcher (1993), Hayden (2000), Nikoliâc-Ristanoviâc (2000), Ramet (2010) and Salzman (1998).

2 For literature on the relationship between genocide, nationalism and war, see Chapter 3.

Chapter 05

1 This attempted political alliance should not detract from the fact that, as seen in Chapter 4, the Young Turks were insistent on Muslim supremacy (see Staub 1989: 181). An offered alliance for political gain was not to be mistaken for a promise of equality on either a political or cultural level.

2 The revised service oath read: 'I swear this holy oath by God that I will implicitly obey the Leader of the German Reich and people, Adolf Hitler, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and that, as a brave soldier, I will be willing to stake my life at any time for this oath', replacing 'his Fatherland' with Hitler (Tribunals 15.01.1946a).

3 For more information on the use of nationalist discourse in warfare, see Eibl-Eibesfeldt and Salter 1998; Young 2001; McGarry and O'Leary 1993.

4 The ARK eventually included: Banja Luka, Bosanska Dubica, Bosanska Gradiska, Bosanski Novi, Bosanski Petrovac, Celinac Donji, Kotar Varos, Krupa, Prijedor, Prnjavor, Sanski Most, Sipovo, Skender Vakuf, Teslic and Vakuf Kljuc.

5 Prijedor's population also included 5.6 per cent (6316) Croats, 5.7 per cent (6459) labelling themselves as Yugoslavs and 2.5 per cent (2836) who were classified as 'other' (IT-97-24-PT 2001).

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