Araştırma Makalesi

SOCIOLOGICAL NEXUS BETWEEN CULTURE AND TERRORISM IN TERMS OF HOFSTEDE'S DIMENSIONS

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Abstract[1]

This study aims to indicate the cultural factors nexus terrorism in terms of Bourdieusian terminology's conceptual framework, which synthesizes social, economic, and cultural explanations and thus proves useful for studying political and religious radicalization, extremism, and recruitment to terrorism. This analysis can be used to comparatively assess the countries' cultural tendencies relevant to terrorism. In this study, Hofstede's culture scale, which is regarded as a paradigm and towering figure by most scholars was used. The research endeavors to illustrate the effects of Hofstede's cultural dimensions (widely known model of national culture) on Global Terrorism Index scores via a multiple linear regression model. Terrorists marginalized others and created their discourse to commit rhetoric narrated by fairy tales and protagonists. The findings expressed that whereas the power distance has an increasing effect on terrorism (while increasing terrorism), the long-term orientation has a mitigating effect (reduces terrorism). On the other

hand, no significant results were obtained from the dimension of individualism versus collectivism, femininity versus masculinity, avoidance of uncertainty, and indulgence versus restraint. However; we evaluate that social media usage has a centralizing and affiliating effect between collectivism and individualism.

Keywords: *Culture, Sociology of Culture, Terrorism, Hofstede's Cultural Dimensions, Global Terrorism Index, Multiple Linear Regression.*

HOFSTEDE`NİN BOYUTLARI KAPSAMINDA KÜLTÜR VE TERORİZMİN SOSYOLOJİK BAĞINTISI

Öz

Bu çalışma, sosyal, ekonomik ve kültürel açıklamaları sentezleyen ve dolayısıyla siyasi ve dini radikalleşme, aşırılık ve terörizme birey temin etme konularına yönelik çalışmada yararlı olduğunu kanıtlayan Bourdieu terminolojisinin kavramsal çerçevesi açısından terörle bağlantılı kültürel faktörleri göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu analiz, ülkelerin terörizmle ilgili kültürel eğilimlerini karşılaştırmalı olarak değerlendirmek için kullanılabilir. Bu çalışmada, çoğu bilim insanı tarafından bir paradigma ve önemli bir figür olarak kabul edilen Hofstede'nin kültür ölçeği kullanılmıştır. Araştırma, Hofstede'nin kültürel boyutlarının (yaygın olarak bilinen ulusal kültür modeli) Küresel Terörizm Endeksi puanları üzerindeki etkilerini çoklu doğrusal regresyon modeliyle göstermeye çalışmaktadır. Teröristler diğerlerini ötekileştirerek anlatılarını hayata geçirmek için elebaşları ve hikâyeleri ile kendi söylemlerini oluşturmaktadırlar. Bulgular, güç mesafesinin terörizmi artırıcı, uzun vadeli yönelimin ise hafifletici bir etkiye sahip olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Öte yandan bireyciliğe karşı kolektivizm, kadınlığa karşı erkeksilik, belirsizlikten kaçınma ve hoşgörüye karşı kısıtlama boyutunda anlamlı bir sonuç elde edilememiştir. Fakat sosyal medya kullanımının kolektivizm ile bireycilik arasında merkezileştirici ve bağlayıcı bir etkisinin olduğu değerlendirilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Kültür, Kültür Sosyolojisi, Terörizm, Hofstede'nin Kültürel Boyutları, Küresel Terörizm İndeksi, Çoklu Doğrusal Regresyon.*

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism, which is one of the most devastating security problems in the world, bizarrely affected the different aspects of the social world. Culture, as a main basis for the community, impacts the formation of terrorism. Many kinds of studies focus on the nexus between culture and terrorism in terms of distinct perspectives.

Bourdieu (1977, 1984, 1990) developed habitus and social capital theories to reveal how individuals respond to social structures in becoming agents. According to Bourdieu (2004), habitus is a deep structure generative of all thought and behavior, one that orients practice without producing it. The cultural frameworks imposed by habitus are ingrained as fundamental attitudes or orientations from an early age. His metaphor states that these "maps" of a person's social environments produce ideas, perceptions, expressions, and behaviors that are constrained by the social and

historical contexts in which they are created. "The aggregate of the actual potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition" is the definition of social capital given by Bourdieu (1986, p. 248). Therefore, culture, which is the surrounding framework of social structure, has a relationship with the terrorists as agents.

In Bourdieusian terminology, the outer field is conceptualized as heterodox, which indicates the opinions that differ from official teaching, a social space where notions of worth, value, and legitimacy deviate from those found in more traditional settings. In conventional spheres of socioeconomic life, an individual's advantages on the outside frequently invalidate their position (Sandberg, 2008, p. 157) Interpersonal aggression, the tendency to violence, and a tough exterior might be praised in the outer world to stand and stay alive, however; they may also be detrimental in the real world. Importantly, areas where specific demographic groups might be more excluded (through criminalization and marginalization) or included (through inclusion) are defined by the operation of state law-enforcement mechanisms and the regular operation of the society/economy (Shammas and Sandberg, 2016).

The operation of social fields intersects with individual habitus, which is the result of a person's lifelong habits and dispositions that influence how they read their circumstances and respond to them. Although the habit is replicated "without any deliberate pursuit of coherence" or "without any conscious concentration" (Bourdieu 1984, p. 170), habit is established by the interaction of strategic agency and structures.

How the habitus orients people to see their traits and what they encounter around them differently such as advantageous and harmful is its fundamental operational element. The characteristics and assets that enable a person to succeed in the outer field are what Sandberg and Pedersen (2009) referred to as "*street capital*": a propensity for using violence against others. Bourdieu's framework synthesizes social, economic, and cultural explanations and thus proves useful for studying political and religious radicalization, extremism, and recruitment to terrorism (Bourdieu 1990). Furthermore, Bourdieu's framework provides a way to understand the interplay of cultures, ideologies, and socioeconomics in a way that can explain both broader trends and individual careers in contemporary terrorism. This goes beyond existing terrorism theories (Agnew, 2010) that operate at the macro geopolitical level, with ideology playing a more central role in explaining motivation.

In the conceptualization of Bourdieu (1990), terrorism is used as a social adapting instrument to create a "psycho-social habitat" for itself. In this case, an important question emerges clearly; "How effective are socio-cultural features in gaining social adaptation to terrorism?".

To answer this question, we try to understand which elements of culture can be associated with adaptation to terrorism to create the basic axis of the fight against terrorism in the global sense. Although it has been a long time since the emergence of international terrorism, the worldwide fight against terrorism has begun to increase after 9/11 (Rapoport, 2013; Mutua, 2002; Jackson, 2007; Altheide, 2010). Understanding the cultural characteristics of different societies may bring an integrated and comprehensive approach to the efforts in the fight against terrorism. Albeit there is a tremendous literature on the distinct aspects of terrorism, few mentioned the sociocultural perspective, e.g., Noricks (2009), Kumar et.al. (2012), and David (2013). We believe that this study will be a humble remedy to fulfill the gap in the scientific literature.

Culture theories are differentiated and use various types of indicators (Malinowski, 1936; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1973; Pacanowsky, 1982; Schein, 1990; Hofstede, 2003). In literature, there have been many articles and analysis methods to define and understand the culture (Cooke & Rousseau, 1988; Schein, 1990; Grönlund et al., 2011; Sassen, 2013). Also, in some of these researches, the levels change according to the target group - organizational/individual/strategic, etc. - and social stratification differences are considered according to the aim and view of the certain scholar.

In this study, Hofstede's culture scale (see Annex 1), which is regarded as a paradigm and towering figure by most scholars (Fernandez et. al., 1997; Wu, 2006; Javidan et al., 2006; Borum, 2007; Yoo et. al., 2011; Gerlach, 2021), is used as a cultural dimension indicator. This scale was first illustrated in 1984 in over 50 countries with four cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 2011), and in the 2000s, two extra dimensions were added and the range of research was extended to detain special cultural alterations over time (Hofstede et. al., 2010). The first reason to choose Hofstede's cultural dimensions is the extent of the study. Secondly, the availability of finding data in almost every country makes it applicable, attractive, and useful. And lastly, the data collection of Hofstede's study began in 1984. When we consider the historical genesis of the culture, Hofstede's research is the oldest one that provides data on an international base.

Besides these reasons that underpin and ease the usage of the scale in cross-cultural studies, the theoretical background of Hofstede's cultural model also provides a scientific base when compared with other cultural models. To construct his modeling, Hofstede made use of Parsons and Shils' (1951) ideas about human action. According to Parsons and Shils (1951), there are distinct pattern variables in all human actions and each time people choose between a pair of alternatives. They also claimed that these choices are actualized on three different levels: individual, group, and culture. However; they were not able to define whether the level of the analysis belongs to individual or group culture, and this ambiguity caused a methodological weakness (frailty) in their study.

These frailties are tackled by Inkeles and Levinson's article that was published in 1969. Inkeles and Levinson (1969) initially analyzed the literature mainly in the sociology and anthropology domains, scope themselves at the national level, and defined the natural character that they comment as "natural culture" later. At the end of their study, they found three separate analytic issues, which are related to authority, the way of handling conflicts and dilemmas, and masculinity versus femininity, and these analytic issues had been empirically supported by Hofstede's cultural dimension modeling for many years.

According to Hofstede (2011), there are six cultural dimensions, and "*the dimensions are statistically distinct and do occur in all possible combinations, although some combinations are more frequent than others*". These six dimensions are sequenced as; power distance, collectivism versus individualism, masculinity versus femininity, uncertainty avoidance, long-term versus short-term orientation, and indulge versus restraint.

Within this framework, this study strives to contribute to this void as an analysis effort to understand the cultural characteristics of societies that create sympathy for violence and terrorism. The study reveals the creation of the theoretical framework in the sections following this effort, analysis, findings, and conclusion.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Terrorism, which has devastating effects on the security of countries, is a global problem. While there is no consensus about the definition of terrorism, plentiful articles and rich literature submit humanity to discuss and consider it. Many scholars have worked on the issue of terrorism since the French Revolution, which is accepted as the beginning of terrorism (Tilly, 2004; Erlenbusch, 2015; Law, 2016), and tried to reveal the reasons that create terrorists. On the other hand, culture, in literature, has been counted as one of the causes of terrorism by many scholars (Mamdani, 2002; Lewis, 2005; Mythen & Walklate, 2006).

Hofstede et al. (2010) articulated that besides global human nature, culture can be differentiated from the sui generis characteristic of individuals. Hofstede (1994a) explained culture as a learned activity instead of regarding it as heritage. The environment that people live in plays an important role from birth to death in shaping cognitive skills. From this perspective, it can be concluded that if the environmental and social impacts that emerge in the lives of members of terrorist organizations should be made known, then there might be some possibilities to mitigate these effects. So, it is very crucial to examine the environmental and social impacts on individuals and groups in terrorism nexus culture studies.

The collective programming of the mind has some impacts on the community, and this is called national culture (Hofstede, 1994b). When the nations are discussed, every country has a significant moral investment in the members of society, and the diversity among them can be triggered by ethnicity, religion, and

language besides culture. But culture, which is a protective and covering layer that includes all historical and sociological backgrounds of people, has been transferred from generation to generation with minor changes. The relations between Hofstede Culture Model dimensions and terrorism were analyzed by different scholars previously and the findings are presented below.

Power Distance (PDI)

PDI is a process that specifies cultural norms or beliefs in which the distribution of power is queried either in an equal or unequal way. Wiedenhaefer et. al. (2007) found that there was no significant junction between terrorism and power distance. Kluch and Vaux (2017) concluded that there is no relationship between PDI and terrorism.

Opposite to scholars mentioned above, Razzaq (2018) articulated that culture is a challenging factor for counter-terrorism, and power distance is one of these factors that both increases the effect of terror attacks in the eyes of people and encourages people who are prone to radicalization to engage in terror activities. In the group or societal context, Lawal (2002) indicated that the features of high-power distance and collectivist cultures compromise with terrorism.

When the power distance score is high, it refers to the meaning that members of the community tend to obey the rules and regulations that are put into effect by the leaders and directors. Xenophobia is regarded as the dominant impact on society. It is generally expected that these characteristics create an environment that is abused by terrorist organizations. Borum (2007) also stated that the presence of charismatic and ideological leaders can convert grievances into ideological and violent movements. In addition, Lemu (2016) explained the pillars of the ideology of violent extremist terrorists and stated that their policy depends on *"loyalty"*. So, it can be frankly articulated that a positive relationship between power distance and terrorism might have a high possibility.

Two of the factors that cause power distance are fear and anxiety. McBride (2011) studied the relations between terrorist ideologies and the logic of terrorism, and she found out that terrorist ideology has been used as a narrative to instill fear and anxiety among people including its followers, which reinforces its original ideology. The concept of PDI has been used as a rhetorical tool to create an identity for terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda and Daesh. Also, she utilized the science of psychology to explain the effect of fear and anxiety and she offers the concept of Terror Management Theory (TMT), which explicates emotions like fear of death and existential anxiety as a natural consequence of human consciousness. These two phenomena augment the PDI and aid terrorist ideologies and leaders to spread their views on others. As a result, it is estimated that both the organizational and the national culture of any group or country that has a high PDI will probably correlate with high terrorist incidents.

Individualism Versus Collectivism (IDV)

This dimension has spread into two edge points, while individualism expresses that people are dependent on their thoughts, especially in decision-making, collectivism emphasizes that social norms and collective mind mechanisms are at the forefront rather than individuals. On the other way, while the collectivist framework allows people to construct strong ties with groups, such as family, school, or organization, individualists have some intrinsic motivational resources and are less attracted by group affiliations.

Collectivism refers to showing great respect and regard for common interests when compared with individual ones. Weinberg and Eubank (1994) expressed that culture is more predominant when compared with religion, and collectivist cultures were more prone to terrorism than individualist cultures.

According to Davis (2009), collectivist culture is one of the needed instruments that lead to suicide terrorism campaigns. He concluded that terrorist groups, which emerged in countries that have collectivist cultures are accountable for approximately 98 percent (2,149 or 2,202) of all suicide attacks from 1981 through 2006. In addition, he claimed that suicide terror campaigns have never arisen in countries that have individualist cultures.

Braun and Genkin (2014) found similar results to Davis (2009). According to them, the members of terrorist organizations, who carry the properties of collectivist culture, are prone to suicide bombing. Ramakhrisna (2013) stated that societies, which are considered collectivist according to the scales of Hofstede's cultural dimensions, are significantly susceptible to violent intergroup strife which is one of the main triggering effects of terrorism. Peterka-Benton and Benton (2014) hypothesize that acts of terrorism have been more common in collectivist countries. According to their correlation analysis, they found that collective cultures are more appropriate for terrorism strategies in creating programs.

Milla et al. (2020) studied the effect of terrorist leaders and their impacts on culture. According to their research, while some personal characteristics of the leaders of terrorist organizations and cells, such as ability, benevolence, and integrity have important effects on the members of the terrorist groups both operationally and ideologically, the collectivist culture of Indonesia has an additional impact in an augmenting way.

In their research, Maheswaran and Agrawal (2004) worked on the terrorists' motivations for immortality and concluded that in individualistic cultures life is accepted as a privileged phenomenon while death is regarded as the very last end of existence, therefore in individualistic countries the recruitment and participation of people to terrorist organizations is less. Mortality binds the people robustly to secure their lives and this style of living mitigates and reduces terror. Even though collectivist people are more dependent on their families and groups, they can also devote their lives to the sake of their relatives and friends without considering their

presence (Zelin, 2016). Contrary to many researchers, Do Rosario (2018), found a positive relationship between individualism and terrorism in the duration of staying in a terrorist group.

From the results obtained by previous studies, collectivism seems to have created a more prone habitat for terrorist organizations, and the relationship between individualism and terrorism can be expected to be negative.

Masculinity Versus Femininity (MAS)

While masculinity refers to material assets, achievements, and money, femininity refers to relationships, spiritual earnings, and quality of life. For example, cultural masculinity and femininity might affect the media communication choices people make, with people from masculine cultures favoring nonfiction and those from feminine cultures favoring fiction (de Mooij, 1998).

Wiedenhaefer et al. (2007) found there was no significant junction between terrorism and masculinity. Do Rosario (2018), who was studying the impact of these phenomena in the duration of staying in a terrorist group, concluded that neither masculinity nor femininity has a significant relationship with terrorism.

According to Qirko (2009), altruism, which is one of the main features of femininity, is the most cited factor of terrorism. Especially, suicide bombers, who plan and execute violent use of suicide to further their organizational goals, show great altruism, and even dare to die. When we consider rational choice theory, simply which articulates that all human beings are rational creatures and they make their own choices according to their benefits, terrorists also need some materials or spiritual targets to motivate themselves. Helmus (2009) claimed that terrorists' perceived rewards are religious, social status, financial, friendship, and excitement. From this perspective, both material and spiritual assets can be motivating factors in terrorism.

The members of terrorist organizations are generally radicalized individuals. In their previous lives, they are commonly neglected by their parents, friends, etc. Furthermore, they generally conceptualized in their minds that they are subjected to social injustice (Kruglansky & Webber, 2014). According to Borum (2007), *"The experience of social injustice is a main motivating cause behind social revolutionary terrorism"*. Even though some scholars mentioned that poverty can force one to radicalize and be a member of a terrorist organization, a huge amount of data reveals the opposite (Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2023). Unlike, the results of the International Expert Meeting in Oslo in 2007, Borum (2007) stated that *"Terrorism occurs in wealthy countries as well as in poor countries"*. But, in the light of the last cases especially in Syria, the members of religiously motivated terror organizations both have ideological ideas and financial motivations even though material assets have some weight.

Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI)

UAI is a cross-cultural phenomenon that defines the different approaches of communities when they meet with ambiguity. It also describes whether people decide to struggle when they meet difficulties in life or prefer to escape from them. In this indicator, a high score means that society is not in favor of vagueness, and on the contrary whenever people come across some difficulties, they tend to get away.

According to Wiedenhaefer et. al. (2007), uncertainty avoidance arises as the only cultural value that has a connection with terrorism. They also found that there is a strong relationship between rates of terrorism and UAI. Ramakhrisna (2013) articulated that in societies that have strong un-avoidance, there is a great tendency toward xenophobia and ethnic prejudice that causes radicalization, extremism, and terrorism.

Peter et. al. (2014) studied New Zealand's preparation for terrorist attacks and understood the level of readiness for the risk management system and resilience. According to the authors, New Zealand, because of having a low level of uncertainty, has insufficient protection against terrorist attacks.

Gommans (2019) made a comparative analysis of Flemish and Dutch newspapers after the 2016 Brussel bombings to analyze the cultural differences and expressed that even two countries that speak the same languages and have parallel characteristics are prone to terrorism because of the similarities that stem from high UAI. Contrary to the previous results that are obtained by different scholars, Do Rosario (2018) found an insignificant relation between UAI and staying in a terror organization.

High uncertainty avoidance refers to the formal relations between people, refraining from taking risks and showing powerful resistance to change. Terrorism has a conflicting and undefined nature. Terrorism has ideological, political, and religiously motivated targets (Drake, 1998). Terrorism does not take into account human life. In a nutshell, the expected relationship between terrorism and UAI is in the reverse direction.

Long-Term Orientation Versus Short-Term Normative Orientation (LTO)

Long-term versus short-term orientation has a direct relationship with the focal point of people. If members of the community have long-range plans, futuristic views, and a horizon mentality, this situation is generally called a long-term orientation. If the individuals of a society have short-range plans and concentrate on the present and past, this is generally regarded as the indicator of short-term orientation. In long-term orientation, relationships are ordered by status, while short-term orientation is not important to define mutual and bilateral affairs.

Because of the relative newness of this indicator when compared with other ones, there was limited literature about long versus short orientation. For example, Do Rosario (2018) articulated a positive correlation between long-term orientation and the long-range of staying in a terrorist group.

Helmus (2009) stated that some terrorists and terror organizations may have high-level motivations to institute changes in their environments. Abrams (2006) argues that the organizational goals of terrorist groups are seldom firm and consistent. He articulated that even al-Qaeda's goals have been shifted from a defensive strategy in Afghanistan against Soviet Russia to an aggressor strategy to offense the USA.

Besides these factors, sociological alienation and social identification processes are not immediate and short-term ones. When we consider the radicalization processes of terrorist members to recruit, before socializing with terror groups, people mostly suffer from alienation, and this situation gradually creates a cognitive opening (Wiktotwicz, 2004, p. 7). Apart from this, Silke (2008) noted that terrorists can feel a strong connection with some identities, and just to make the connection robust, they are eager to live long-term social identification. These two items, "alienation" and "identification" can also affect the terrorism recruiters to adopt long-term goals more easily.

Blomberg et. al. (2010) indicated that there are two types of terrorist organizations: recidivists and one hit wonderers. Recidivists attack consistently without considering the long-range impact and are less probably to survive and sustain. However, hit wonderers are not affected by external conditions and are more focused on their goals. Therefore, they are not easily deterred by socioeconomic factors.

Young and Dugan (2010) and Blomberg et. al. (2011) concluded that two factors prolong the life expectancy of terrorist groups: The first one is the diversification of the targets, and the second one is to choose more populous targets. Both articulate the importance of large-scale planning to increase the life span of terrorist organizations. In terrorist organizations, even though terrorist organizations themselves have long-term plans, generally members have short-term targets because of their vulnerability to being subjected to death in terms of the potentially hazardous environment of terrorism. Sudden and unexpected small assaults on their targets are the operational framework of terrorism. Hence, we expect a correlation between short-term orientation and terrorism.

Indulgence Versus Restraint (IVR)

This cultural dimension elucidates the distinctions between the depth of gratifications' approach versus control of imperative human needs related to enjoying life. In indulgent societies, freedom of speech is really important. Even though high crime rates occurred, a small police force was constituted. The birthrate percentage is generally high, even in the educated population. On the contrary, in restraint countries even though lower crime rates occurred, there was a prone to keep a strong police force. The birthrate percentage was low, even in the educated population. Additionally, maintaining order is frankly significant (Newton, 2018; Yamen et. al., 2019).

This indicator was annexed to Hofstede's Cultural Dimension in 2010. For the same reason as long versus short-term orientation, the academic literature and studies for indulgence versus restraint indicators are very limited. For instance, Do Rosario (2018) detected a significant relationship between restraint and terror organization failure.

While Silke (2008) highlights the importance of the radicalization process, he also articulated that terrorist organizations put some real and perceived rewards, as in the carrot-stick model, according to the identities of recruiters. These rewards can be financial, exciting, social, religious, or ideological. He claims that the devotion of terrorists to reach their personal and organizational goals gives them additional hedonism to taste different flavors in their own lives, for instance in Assassins of Sabbah.

The factor of indulgence is the newest and least studied of Hofstede's six cultural dimensions. This dimension is defined by leisure and pleasure; people who score poorly have a more negative attitude and place less importance on enjoying one's activities. This interpretation's extension would define this dimension as the capacity of a culture's members to put up with bad circumstances. According to Janis (1968), divisions form when victims of abuse feel ignored. Somaraju and Dallas (2010) indicated a connection between pleasure and grievance in terrorist organizations.

According to the knowledge that was obtained from the relationships with the indulgence versus restraint indicator and societal characteristics that are mentioned above, it has been estimated that there can be a positive correlation between indulgence and terrorism while there may be a negative conjunction in restraint.

Short Description of Global Terrorism Index (GTI)

GTI is constituted as a composite index (a scale of 0-10) for assuring the ranking of countries concerning the influences of terrorism. When we scrutinize the methodology of GTI, there are four leading indicators and this index ultimately ranks 163 countries all over the world. Each score of the country is established in an unsurpassed methodology to explain the relative effect of the terror events of that year. The score includes terror incidents, and additionally the number of fatalities, injuries, and hostages that originated from these events, and finally a complete figure of hostages that is created by terrorists in the related year. To give a weight coefficient, each dimension is multiplied by weight scores (e.g. terror incidents multiplied by 1).

To clarify the post impacts of shock caused by terror incidents on society and focus on the historical background of happenings - even if it includes a relatively small duration -, the GTI takes into account the cases of previous years as having an including on a country's current score (e.g. prevailing year's weight is 16 and covers 52% of the score) that emphasizes the weight coefficients of the duration.

HYPOTHESES

According to consideration of the results of the theoretical framework previously discussed, six hypotheses are constructed below. All the hypotheses are concerned with the noticing issue concerning GTI, which is accepted as an indicator of terrorism respectively.

H_1: Power distance affects terrorism in a positive direction (increases terrorism).

H_2: Collectivism affects terrorism in a positive direction (increases terrorism) while individualism affects terrorism in a negative direction (decreases terrorism).

H_3: Masculinity affects terrorism in a positive direction (increases terrorism) while femininity affects terrorism in a negative direction (reduces terrorism).

H_4: Uncertainty avoidance affects terrorism in a negative direction (reduces terrorism).

H_5: Long-term orientation affects terrorism in a negative direction (reduces terrorism) while short-term normative orientation affects terrorism in a positive direction (increases terrorism).

H_6: Indulgence affects terrorism in a positive direction (increases terrorism) while restraint affects terrorism in a negative direction (reduces terrorism).

The outline of the model and hypotheses related to Hofstede's Six Dimension Cultural Model is illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1. The Model and Hypotheses*

(*): Created by Authors

In our model, the scores of GTI are compared with the dimensions of Hofstede's Cultural Model. Albeit the terror incidents in one country can also stem

from the members that immigrate or move to that country, the immigrants and foreign terrorist fighters are neglected, because currently there is no scientific data to submit the existence and ratio of foreign terrorist fighters in terror organizations, and no information related with immigrants' impact on terrorism. Gaibulloev and Sandler (2023) enumerated the immigrants causing terrorism as a myth in their latest study. These kinds of assertions have no scientific base and are skeptical. Additionally, Bauman (2016) articulates that the immigration problem cannot be defined as a personnel and national security issue. Claims like the above will only serve especially three goals. First, it triggers hate against some populations like Muslims in Europe, and transforms the behaviors of society as in the "*Pygmalion Effect*". Second, it constructs a socially polarized environment and hinders the relationships among different groups. And finally, it causes "*Stigmatization*" and enlarges the depth between people that have distinct cultural backgrounds.

According to the GTI report (2022), nearly four of five terror incidents happen within the range of 50 km of the conflict zone. This means that conflict is one of the main catalysts of terrorism. In addition, the fact that the top ten countries most affected by terrorism in 2021 were also in the conflict in the previous year supports this finding. Nevertheless; even the social mobility of people among countries and regions can enhance the number of terror incidents, and have a positive correlation with terrorism; when it is compared with other factors such as conflict, these impacts can be neglected statistically. Therefore, we do not consider the effect of mitigation and foreign terrorist fighters in our model.

DATA COLLECTION AND METHOD

The GTI data consisting of the period of 2002-2019 is first collected from the official website of the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP, 2022). Then, the mean of the GTI score related to each country is computed, consisting of the same period. On the other side, the data of the National Culture Dimensions (NCD) relevant to each country is obtained from the Hofstede-Insights Centre website (HIC, 2022), which publishes vast data related to countries. Owing to the lack of data on GTI and NCD concerning some countries, we performed an analysis on the intersection of valid data from 88 countries. Since the data of NCD is not longitudinal because of its structure and has the same value over the years of the analysis period, we decided to perform a cross-sectional analysis used for finding possible effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable (GTI) rather than causality instead of a panel data analysis. Thus, we include the GTI score in the analysis by calculating the mean of its data for the 2002-2019 term. The data specification and descriptive statistics of the research are illustrated in Table 1.

Table 1. The Data Specification and Descriptive Statistics

	Variable	Abbr.	Source	Unit of Measurement	Descriptive Statistics			
					Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Deviation
	The Mean of Global Terrorism Index	MGTI	IEP, 2022	Mean of Index Score (2002-2019) (0-10)	0.00	8.80	2.08	2.07
National Culture Dimensions (NCD)	Power Distance	PDI	Hofstede Insight's CEO (Cultural Executive Ownership) Program	Dimension Score (0-100)	11	100	65.34	21.01
	Individualism	IDV			10	91	39.80	22.43
	Masculinity	MAS			5	100	47.99	18.80
	Uncertainty Avoidance	UAI			8	100	68.50	20.98
	Long-Term Orientation	LTO			4	100	45.63	24.67
	Indulgence	IVR			4	100	45.22	22.30
Countries (N=88)	Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia (FYR), Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, UK, US, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, and Zambia.							

Note: Created by Authors

In the research, for checking our hypotheses and releasing the relationship between these variables, firstly, the dimensions of NCD (*PDI, IDV, MAS, UAI, LTO*, and *IVR*) are determined as independent variables and MGTI are described as the dependent variable for the data of 88 countries as specified in Table 1. Secondly, a multiple linear regression model is performed to find the effects of NCD on the MGTI by defining explanatory modeling, which focuses on reducing bias to get the most proper presentation of the underlying theory, as proposed by Shmueli (2010). To success our goal, we recommended a multiple linear regression model, which is a statistical method utilizing numerous explanatory variables to explore the effects of independent variables on a defined dependent variable and to provide research to specify the variability of the model and the proportional contribution of each explanatory variable in the overall variance and it is presented in Equation 1.

$$MGTI_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 PDI_i + \beta_2 IDV_i + \beta_3 MAS_i + \beta_4 UAI_i + \beta_5 LTO + \beta_6 IVR_i + u_i \quad (1)$$

$MGTI_i$　　　: *The MGTI score of ith country covering 2008-2019.*

PDI_i　　　: *The PDI score of ith country.*

IDV_i　　　: *The IDV score of ith country.*

MAS_i　　　: *The MAS score of ith country.*

UAI_i　　　: *The UAI score of ith country.*

LTO_i　　　: *The LTO score of ith country.*

IVR_i　　　: *The IVR score of ith country.*

u_i　　　: *The error term of the multiple linear model.*

MODEL ESTIMATION AND RESULTS

To investigate the hypotheses relevant to our study, we perform multiple linear regression analysis and also check whether there are violations from assumptions of the regression, and the outline of this analysis is shown in Table 2.

Table 2: The Outline of Multiple Linear Regression Analysis*

R^2	SE	F	p	IDV	b_i	t	p	Collinearity Statistics		Hypothesis	
								Tolerance	VIF	ID	Results
0.1883	1.9336	3.1325	0.0082[b]	(Constant)	-0.0300	-0.0159	0.9873	-	-	-	-
				PDI	0.0420	2.6497	0.0097[c]	0.3884[d]	2.5749[d]	H₁	*Accepted*
				IDV	0.0238	1.7019	0.0926	0.4352[d]	2.2978[d]	H₂	**Rejected**
				MAS	0.0130	1.1380	0.2585	0.9328[d]	1.0720[d]	H₃	**Rejected**
				UAI	-0.0104	-0.9626	0.3386	0.8431[d]	1.1861[d]	H₄	**Rejected**
				LTO	-0.0260	-2.6327	0.0101[c]	0.7263[d]	1.3769[d]	H₅	*Accepted*
				IVR	-0.0069	-0.5955	0.5531	0.6363[d]	1.5715[d]	H₆	**Rejected**

IDV: Independent Variable. **SE:** Standard Error.

(**a**)**:** Dependent Variable: MGTI.
(**b**): The regression model is overall significant at =0.05 level. α
(**c**): The coefficients of the regression are significant at the significance level of =0.05 level. α
(**d**): The values of Tolerance and VIF of the independent variables are proper for the limit values (($\geq$0.1 and $\leq$10 successively), which indicate that there is no multi-collinearity in the regression model (Hair et al., 2014).
(*): Created by Authors.

As dissecting the results in Table 2, one can infer that the multiple linear regression model is overall statistically significant at the significance level of α=0.05. The coefficients of independent variables *(PDI and LTO)* of the multiple linear regression model are also significant at the significance level of α=0.05. These findings promote the hypotheses (*H₁* and *H₅*) defining NCD (*PDI* and *LTO*) as having an influence on *MGTI* and the signs of the coefficients of these variables match with our relevance hypothesis. Nonetheless, different from our expectations, the coefficients of other independent variables (*IDV, MAS, UAI,* and *IVR*) are not statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval. Meanwhile, the R^2 of the multiple linear regression model is 0.1883, defining that the 18.83% variance for the dependent variable (*MGTI*) is clarified by the exogenous variables. On the other hand, whereas one unit change in *PDI* leads to a 0.0420 unit change in the same (positive) direction, one unit change in *LTO* leads to a 0.0260 unit change in *MGTI* in the reverse (negative) direction at the %5 significance level under ceteris paribus conditions. Consequently, the outputs obtained from the analysis motivate us to interpret these findings in the next section.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Culture, which can be described as an umbrella term for the social values and norms of people, is the main characteristic property of communities (Schein, 1991). It has evolved since the beginning of mankind's history, shaped by traditions and customs, and has not changed easily. The effects of culture on all other social

phenomena have been inevitable, furthermore analyzing and understanding these impacts have added great value to social science studies.

According to the first hypothesis of the study, PDI affects terrorism in a positive direction. The results of the analysis have concluded the same findings. PDI is a cultural specification, which emphasizes the status of relationships in the community. Terrorism has been naturally constructed on fear and violence. In both power distance and terrorism, domination of power is on the front stage. If the power is in the right hands, power can turn into irresistible leverage to bring peace and balance; if it is vice versa, it can change into an indispensable force to cause turmoil and struggle. In another theory, "*Hubris Syndrome*", this term was used to define the acts of powerful people while over-weening pride and self-confidence and treating others in a non-tolerable, impatient, arrogant, and humiliating way (Owen, 2008). According to Owen and Davidson (2009), the power used by people can change their attitudes toward people over time. Power is defined as having the freedom of choice and the means to asymmetrically impose one's will on others.

Gottschalk and Gottschalk (2004), executed a study, in which they interviewed 57 Middle Eastern terrorists and applied the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) test to 90 jailed Middle Eastern terrorists, and found that terrorists were vulnerable to powerful figures. In a nutshell, terrorists marginalized others and created their discourse to commit rhetoric narrated by fairy tales and protagonists. In accordance with the conclusions of Owen and Davidson (2009) and Gottschalk and Gottschalk (2004), the members of terrorist organizations culturally are prone to power. We also found that power distance is the most significant predictor and indicator of terrorism.

The second hypothesis is statistically meaningless about collectivism versus individualism (although it is significant at the 90% confidence level). Albeit some other researches abovementioned in the theoretical framework part emphasized that collectivism triggers the recruitment of terrorists, we found no relationship. From our perspective, the lack of GTI's architecture to include incidents where the nationality of perpetrators is the main reason to reach no conclusion.

By increasing movement, technology, and communication capabilities, people can grow social contact with each other quickly. Post-Fordism and Globalization are two social phenomena, which are the main global characteristics causing these perceptions. While globalization occurs, at the same time localization also actualizes. Besides these impacts most importantly, the usage of social media has increased especially among young people (Lenhart et al., 2010). Teens have been spending time for a long while with the internet and cell phones and sharing less time with their parents, friends, and elders. According to Acar (2013), there is a subtle and complicated relationship between culture and social media and he found that Japanese students sent more self-related messages compared to American students, even though they belong to the collectivist culture. In another study, Sheldon et al.

(2020) concluded that collectivist users of social media prefer artistic hashtags instead of entertaining ones. These two examples reveal that the members of collectivist countries are more susceptible to showing their individualistic characteristics on social media. We assume that social media usage has a centralizing and affiliating effect between collectivism and individualism. However, this proposition also needs future and further analysis.

The third hypothesis on masculinity versus femininity indicates the same conclusion similar to Wiedenhaefer et al. (2007) and Do Rosario (2018). We assume that terrorists' different motivation sources like material and intangible mitigated the gap between both dimensions.

Uncertainty avoidance in our fourth hypothesis highlighted similar results to Do Rosario (2018). Hypothetically speaking, we expected to find a meaningful conclusion from this dimension. Generally, most of the terrorists are regarded as adventure seekers. However, we witnessed well-decorated and educated people's participation in terror organizations in the past decades. Therefore, we evaluate that both cultural dimensions pave the way to perpetrate terrorism.

In the fifth hypothesis, long-term orientation affects terrorism in a negative direction (reduces terrorism) while short-term normative orientation affects terrorism in a positive direction (increases terrorism). In this study, the findings illustrated that long-term orientation and terrorism have opposite relationships. Long-term orientation refers to rational intelligence and requires planning and programming step by step. Short-term orientation uses emotional intelligence and response to actions simultaneously. Even though all terrorist organizations have some ideological, political, and long-term targets, they are generally under the control of a few people, who are generally egocentric, authoritarian, uneducated, and devoid of vision.

Two factors increase the lifespan of terrorist groups. One of them is the diversification of goals. A second variation is to choose a more populous target. Both stress the importance of long-term planning to extend the life of terrorist organizations. Terrorist organizations themselves have long-term plans, but members of terrorist organizations usually have short-term goals, as they can die in a potentially dangerous terrorist environment. A sudden, unexpected, small-scale attack on a target forms the operational framework of terrorism. Finally, we found that when long-term orientation mitigates, terrorism augments.

There are no significant results obtained from the sixth hypothesis, which includes indulgence versus restraint at the 95% confidence level. As expressed, before in the literature review section, indulgence versus restraint is a relatively new dimension when it is compared with other ones. For this reason, further researches are needed to be executed in this area to find the additional alibis.

The significance of this study is the usage of GTI. While the other studies on terrorism nexus culture prefer the numbers of terrorism incidents, types of attacks,

and targets that are assaulted by terrorists, in this research we use GTI to provide a comprehensive and holistic understanding.

It has to be clarified that there are some limitations to the data sets. As explained in the introduction and theoretical framework part, the intersection of valid data from 88 countries concerning the Hofstede Cultural Dimension and the GTI (2002-2019 term) is analyzed.

Additionally, because of the absence of data related to Hofstede's Cultural Dimension that may have a low score (referring to the extent of terrorism is high) of terrorism (such as Afghanistan, Syria, Niger, Tunisia, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka), unfortunately, some nations are not included in this study. It should be better to scrutinize these countries that have high incidents of radicalization and terrorism to understand the global cultural impacts of terrorism. In the future, regional studies may be executed with different data sets, to understand territorial and sub-regional diversities. Differing from our explanatory modeling, it can be designed as predictive modeling as proposed by Shmueli (2010) by adding more determinants (such as demographic, economic, political, etc.) and examining the predictive power of these determinants. Furthermore, different cultural indexes can be used to define related and unrelated relationships between terrorism and culture.

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ANNEX 1. Explanations of Hofstede's Six-Dimension Model

Dimension	Explanation
Power Distance (PDI)	This indicator states the extent to which the less powerful members of a community admit and anticipate that power is delivered unequally. The main subject here is how society approaches inequality among people. A high-power Distance score is referring to meaning that people of that society accept a hierarchical order and have no additional needs for justification. When the score is low, it means that people struggle to balance the dispersion of power and they request justification for the unequal distribution of power.
Individualism versus Collectivism (IDV)	This indicator has two opposite edges. While Individualism refers to individuals who are looking forward to paying attention to only themselves and their close families, Collectivism represents individuals, who can expect their relatives or members of a specific group to take care of them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.
Masculinity versus femininity (MAS)	At the Masculinity edge of this indicator, achievements like heroism, assertiveness, and material rewards are accepted for success. On the opposite side, femininity stands for a preference for cooperation, humility, caring for the weak, and quality of life.
Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI)	The Uncertainty Avoidance indicator states the extent to which the individuals feel troubled with limbo and ambiguity. The main subject here is how a community deals with the obscurity of the future. This refers to whether people struggle to change their faith, or accept and keep away from scrambling.
Long Term Orientation Versus Short Term Normative Orientation (LTO)	These two opposite edge indicators mainly show resistance to change. If the people are very bound to traditional affairs, it is very hard to direct the members of it for long-term projects. On the opposite side, individuals are more volunteer for new projects and modifications.
Indulgence versus Restraint (IVR)	Indulgence refers to the community that permits satisfaction for main and innate requirements such as taking pleasure. Restraint refers to the society that suppresses enjoying life and gratification of needs and arranges it via tight social norms.