

Discussion Paper

Root Causes of Radicalization in Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States

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Root Causes of Radicalization in Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States

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Executive Summary

The incidence of radicalization and violent extremism is of growing concern worldwide. In Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (ECIS) radicalization is increasingly seen as a threat to the peace and development of nations and communities. In order to preserve peace and increase development the creation of development-based programmes for countering radicalization and violent extremism is imperative. To create such programmes, it is necessary to first understand what the drivers or root causes of radicalization are, and then to establish practices that mitigate their effects. This paper looks at the roots of radicalization and other influencing factors of radicalization in the region to provide an initial assessment of the elements that should be included in counter radicalization programmes.

Radicalization is the process whereby individuals and groups move from mainstream beliefs to extreme ideologies. While radicalization may be a precondition for violent extremism, it does not imply that those who are radicalised are predetermined to becoming violent extremists. Rather the two exist on a continuum where radicalization presents only the potentiality for violent extremism.

Relative deprivation, weak state capacity, and denial of basic needs are the three root causes of radicalization looked at in this paper. Often seen as the main cause of radicalization, relative deprivation is the tension that develops from the difference between what people think should happen and what does happen to them. While weak state capacity creates an unstable environment that restricts upward mobility, personal safety, and general security, potentially leading people to seek out groups and ideologies that can provide what the government cannot. The final root cause is a denial of basic needs. More than just food, shelter, and water, basic needs can also be things such as an identity or cultural values. When such basic needs are denied to people in a society, they will find groups and beliefs that will provide those basic needs.

Beyond the root causes of radicalization it is necessary to understand the basic modes and means of recruitment to radicalization. Centers of recruitment are commonly thought to be mosques; in actuality it is more commonly mundane places such as schools, cafes, gyms, and especially prisons. Recruitment can also be through social networks, both online and offline, as recruiters of radicalization take advantage of the complex social networks in which people reside.

A look across the ECIS region provides context for a few commonalities concerning the demographics of those being radicalised. First, those under the age of 40 are more likely to radicalize, with younger people being targets in some contexts and older people in others. It is a mistake to think that only the young are being radicalised. Similarly, both uneducated and educated become radicalised. The main difference is that the educated help create an environment permissive to violence, while the uneducated are more likely to perpetuate the violence. More men become violent extremists than women. Yet with radicalization it can be difficult to ascertain if the same holds true, as women are viewed as influential in both radicalization and counter radicalization programmes. Finally, those who are socially isolated are targets of radicalization. Isolated individuals will be drawn to radicalised communities, and to the communities' beliefs, if they feel that they will be accepted or if they have a channel for their anger.

In order to look at the geographical areas that are being most affected by radicalization the paper uses data concerning terror attacks in the ECIS as a way to infer rates of radicalization in the region. There are two

main takeaways: 1.) places with separatist movements have more terror attacks; 2.) countries with ongoing protracted conflicts have more terror attacks.

Currently there is a dearth of counter radicalization programmes in the region, as well as data concerning many indicators of radicalization. Many of the existing programmes focus to a large extent on young, male Muslims. This is due to many factors, one of which is the perception of a growing threat to peace in the region in the form of foreign terrorist fighters. Governments are worried that citizens who have left to places such as Syria will return and wreak havoc. Unfortunately, this focus on young, male, Muslims leaves countries in the region vulnerable to other forms of radicalization.

As there are limited counter radicalization programmes in ECIS, it is necessary to look outside the region in order to garner information on best practices in the field. When looking at various programmes in counter radicalization there are a few general lessons that can be learned. The first lesson being that the more successful programmes seek to build resilience. Resilience is the ability to recover quickly from shocks or adverse events. Resilience is commonly viewed to help protect individuals and communities from becoming vulnerable to the root causes of radicalization.

Another lesson is that engagement of susceptible communities and individuals, as well as those already radicalised and their leaders, is a key aspect of successful programmes. Likewise empowering disenfranchised groups, especially women, is beneficial in terms of reducing the vulnerability of populations to radicalization.

The final lesson of successful counter radicalization programmes is the most controversial. Namely that reintegrating returning radicals into the larger society can be a better method of counter radicalization than prosecution.

If the goal of a counter radicalization programme is to increase peace, then UNDP is well suited to the creation of such a programme. Based on the research, mitigating the root causes of radicalization with a development approach will yield significant dividends, as much of the root causes are inequalities found in a society and best addressed through development rather than securitized programmes. Further, a development lens will allow for the successful application of many of the best practices learned by different counter radicalization strategies both within and without the ECIS region.

1. Introduction

Countering radicalization and violent extremism is of growing importance to countries throughout the world. Radicalization is seen as a threat to peace, as it is the seed of violent extremism. In order to be able to create programmes that successfully counter radicalization, it is essential to identify the root causes of radicalization. As each individual is subject to different internal turmoil and external stimuli, it is difficult to be able to positively identify all drivers of radicalization for all people. At best we are able to ascribe, in a general manner, certain underlying commonalities (root causes) across groups and individuals who have become radicalised.

The purpose of this paper is to present the root causes of radicalization in Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (ECIS). It will also show the manner in which regional dynamics affect both radicalization and current counter radicalization efforts. With the ultimate goal being to provide a basis for any future UNDP counter radicalization programming in the region in order to increase peace and development throughout the region.

1.1. Definitions

Before examining the root causes of radicalization it is necessary to explain a few concepts in order to create a common foundation on which to build. The first concept is peace. This is because peace, while not the focus of the paper, is ostensibly the underlying reason for creating any counter radicalization programme, as radicalization is perceived of as a threat to peace.

Oftentimes the term peace is deployed to promote various policies and ideas against opposition as “it is hard to be all-out against peace.”¹ At its most basic peace is the “absence of violence,”² though it can also be much more than just the complete lack of violence. Yet while this basic concept of peace as the absence of violence may create a dualistic construct that overly simplifies the world, it also creates a model that can be applied to a variety of settings. One such setting is the focus of this paper, creating an environment that can counter the radicalization and subsequent conflict that is occurring throughout the countries that constitute the ECIS region.

With radicalization being “seen as a first, prerequisite step along the road towards terrorism”,³ it would hold that if peace is the absence of violence, and radicalization leads to violence, then in order for there to be peace we should end radicalization. Yet radicalization is merely one step along a continuum that can potentially lead a person to being a violent extremist.⁴ Since it is but one step of many along a path it is important to keep in mind that “there is nothing preordained in the possible transition”⁵ from becoming radicalised to becoming a violent extremist, “in fact, only a few radicals venture into terrorism”.⁶

The conflation of radicalism and violence arises in part from the various historical circumstances that surround the word. This results in the confusion between radicalism and violence that arises when attempting to

¹ Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” *Journal of Peace Research* 6, 3(1969): 167.

² Ibid.

³ Jaime Bartlett and Carl Miller, “The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference Between Violent and Non-Violent Radicalisation”, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 24, 1(2012):1.

⁴ Omer Taspinar, “Fighting Radicalism, not ‘Terrorism’: Root Causes of an International Actor Redefined”, *SAIS Review*, 29, 2(2009): 77.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

define what exactly radicalization is, as “there is no universally accepted definition in academia or government”.⁷ The word radical comes from the Latin *radix*, meaning root or going to the original or fundamental.⁸ Historical usage of the word has mainly been for “liberal, anti-clerical, pro-democratic, progressive political positions”,⁹ but its current usage “tends to point in the opposite direction: embracing an anti-liberal, fundamentalist, anti-democratic and regressive agenda”.¹⁰ This change in usage shows the cultural contextualization that is always present in language. That context of radicalism changed following the attacks on 9/11 as prior to the attacks the long and continuing discourse on the drivers of extremism had been discussed in terms of terrorism’s ‘root causes’.¹¹ Yet, following the attacks “it suddenly became very difficult to talk about the ‘roots of terrorism’”¹² as it became according to some “an effort to excuse and justify the killing of innocent civilians”.¹³ This led to those who realized that there should be a discussion about the ‘root causes’ to begin “referring to the idea of ‘radicalization’ whenever they wanted to talk about ‘what goes on before the bomb goes off’”.¹⁴ Thus radicalization and the ‘root causes’ of terrorism have become intertwined and synonymous in many discussions.

The use of radicalization to describe what happens before someone becomes a violent extremist or terrorist has led to the plethora of definitions that are used by academics and governments. Since the current usage of the word originated as a way to obliquely reference the concept of root causes in relation to violent extremism, it is no surprise that many of the definitions intertwine violence and radicalism. This can be seen in a 2008 Report by a European Commission’s Expert Group’s Report that stated that radicalization is the “socialization to extremism which manifests itself in terrorism”.¹⁵ As well as by experts such as Donatella Della Porta and Gary LaFree, who defined radicalization as “a process leading towards the increased use of political violence”.¹⁶ These types of definitions lead to the view that organizations that foster radicalization are ‘conveyor belts’ to extremist violence.^{17,18,19} This view not only takes away the agency of the individuals involved, but it creates a tautological argument that allows for any group that is perceived to be radical to be persecuted by the state, in order to preserve the peace. This creates a dangerous precedent as political expressions such as protests and activism against “political oppression that, while illegal under national law, are accepted [in] international

⁷ Alex P. Schmid, “Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review,” *International Center for Counter-Terrorism: The Hague*, (2013):5.

⁸ Royal Canadian Mounted Police, “Radicalisation: A Guide for the Perplexed”, *Royal Canadian Mounted Police: National Security Criminal Investigations*, (2009):1.

⁹ Alex P. Schmid, “Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review,” *International Center for Counter-Terrorism: The Hague*, (2013):7.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Peter Neumann, “Perspectives on Radicalisation and Political Violence: Papers From the First International Conference on Radicalisation and Political Violence, London, 17–18 January 2008” *London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence*, (2008): 4.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Expert Group, “Radicalisation Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism: A Concise Report prepared by the European Commission’s Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation” *Submitted to the European Commission* (May 15, 2008): 7.

¹⁶ Donatella Della Porta & Gary LaFree, Guest Editorial: ‘Processes of Radicalisation and De-Radicalisation’, *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, Vol. 6, No. 1, (2012): 5.

¹⁷ Alex P. Schmid, “Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review,” *International Center for Counter-Terrorism: The Hague*, (2013):10.

¹⁸ Zeyno Baran, “The Road from Tashkent to the Taliban”, *National Review*, (April 2, 2004).

¹⁹ Arun Kundnani, “A Decade Lost: Rethinking Radicalisation and Extremism”, *Claystone: London*, (2015):10.

humanitarian law"²⁰ can be grouped by as dangerous radicalism by an oppressive state which can then curtail such activities.

Other definitions focus more on the process of radicalization, such as that of The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, where radicalization is "the process by which individuals...are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs towards extreme views."²¹ Definitions such as this, that do not explicitly name violence as the outcome, create a larger space for counter-radicalization to operate, as the individuals that are becoming radicalised are not necessarily predetermined to perform violent actions.

Another way to look at radicalization and violent extremism, which is able to combine the different definitions of radicalization, is by looking at radicalization and extremism as belonging to one of Johan Galtung's dimension of violence, that of latent and manifest violence.²² Galtung's simple explanation is that "latent violence is something which is not there, yet might easily come about",²³ while in contrast "manifest violence... is observable".²⁴ By using this lense we can classify radicalization as latent violence (since we cannot see it, but it may arise) and violent extremism as manifest violence (see we can observe the violence). This classification creates three beneficial effects in constructing a wider definition of radicalization applicable for a development approach to counter radicalization.

First, radicalization and extremism can be placed on a spectrum, with radicalization being on the currently non-violent, or latent, end and extremism on the observably violent, or manifest, end. By doing this we can acknowledge the links between the two, but at the same time we do not have to affirm that violent extremism is the sole outcome of radicalism.

Second, this allows us to divest responsibility in the counter measures that can be employed for each. With 'manifest violence' being an inherent and observable outcome of violent extremism, it is best countered not by development agencies, but by security apparatuses such as governments, police, and intelligence agencies to name a few. This responsibility is primarily for the legitimate governments to deal with as it is one of the markers of the modern nation-state that it has "the legitimate state monopoly over the means of violence".²⁵ The acceptance of this responsibility by states for countering violent extremism, and to do so in a cooperative manner, can be seen in a variety of places. One of which is with the recent UN Security Council Resolution 2178. Unanimously passed by member states, the resolution includes "measures for international cooperation to counter international terrorism and prevent the growth of violent extremism."²⁶

²⁰ Alex P. Schmid, "Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review," *International Center for Counter-Terrorism: The Hague*, (2013):13.

²¹ Royal Canadian Mounted Police, "Radicalisation: A Guide for the Perplexed", *Royal Canadian Mounted Police: National Security Criminal Investigations*, (2009):1.

²² Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," *Journal of Peace Research* 6, no. 3(1969): 172.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ USIP, "Legitimate State Monopoly Over the Means of Violence", *United States Institute of Peace*, (2015), retrieved from: <http://www.usip.org/guiding-principles-stabilization-and-reconstruction-the-web-version/6-safe-and-secure-environment/le> .

²⁶ Security Council. "Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution Condemning Violent Extremism, Underscoring Need to Prevent Travel, Support for Foreign Terrorist Fighters". *United Nations Security Council: Meetings Coverage, 7272nd Meeting* (2014), retrieved May 20, 2015 from: <http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11580.doc.htm>

Lastly, by labeling radicalization as a form of “latent violence”²⁷ it becomes “primarily a political threat against which non-coercive measures should be given a chance”.²⁸ Those non-coercive actions, or counter-radicalization, are not the sole responsibility of governments, but can be accomplished by various societal and development organizations. These efforts should be directed at the root causes of radicalization in order to best prevent the ‘latent violence’ of radicalization from metastasizing into the ‘manifest violence’ of extremism. Unfortunately, there is no magic bullet for prevention, as the root causes “are extremely complex, multifaceted, and often intertwined.”²⁹

2. Root Causes

Due to radicalism's current usage arising as essentially a code word for the study of the *why* of extremist violence during the post-9/11 era, the focus on the study of radicalization has been on political Islam, and hence the root causes put forth have been of a limited scope. Yet radicalization is the process of individuals being socialized to *any* overtly ideological beliefs that move them towards extreme views outside of the mainstream.³⁰ This makes it imperative to widen the scope of inquiry into the root causes of radicalization in order to account for the phenomenon that is being witnessed with the rise of far-right nationalists,³¹ separatists, and other forms of radical beliefs. Too often “political violence committed by Muslims is interpreted as symptomatic of a wider clash of values and identity, political violence from the far Right has been downplayed and interpreted as a matter of ‘lone wolves’ operating outside of any broader enabling environment.”³²

2.1. Relative Deprivation

When discussing the root causes of radicalization “the style *du jour* is to point to ‘permissive’ factors that help establish an environment”³³ that is “conducive to radicalization processes”.³⁴ The most commonly viewed attributing factor that creates an enabling environment arises from feelings of relative deprivation. Relative deprivation is the idea put forth by Ted Gurr that “the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the “ought” and the “is”...disposes men to violence”.³⁵ One ramification of this is that “the greater the intensity and scope of relative deprivation, the greater the magnitude of collective violence”.³⁶ Another implication of this theory as applied to radicalization is that the traditional focus on absolute poverty will not be fully capable of countering radicalization. In a crude sense those who are born and raised in an environment of poverty, will not

²⁷ Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” *Journal of Peace Research* 6, no. 3(1969): 172.

²⁸ Omer Taspinar, “Fighting Radicalism, not ‘Terrorism’: Root Causes of an International Actor Redefined, *SAIS Review* 29, no. 2:77.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 76

³⁰ Royal Canadian Mounted Police, “Radicalisation: A Guide for the Perplexed”, *Royal Canadian Mounted Police: National Security Criminal Investigations*, (2009):1.

³¹ Katie Englehart, “The rise of the far right in Europe”, *Macleans*’s, (November 30, 2013), retrieved May 20, 2015 from: <http://www.macleans.ca/news/world/rise-of-the-far-right-in-europe/> ; Anila Shuka, “Nationalism on the rise in southeastern Europe”, *DW*, retrieved May 20, 2015 from: <http://www.dw.de/nationalism-on-the-rise-in-southeastern-europe/a-15976124>.

³² Arun Kundnani, “A Decade Lost: Rethinking Radicalisation and Extremism”, *Claystone: London*, (2015):29.

³³ Jaime Bartlett and Carl Miller, “The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference Between Violent and Non-Violent Radicalisation”, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 24, 1 (2012):1.

³⁴ Expert Group, “Radicalisation Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism: A Concise Report prepared by the European Commission’s Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation” *Submitted to the European Commission* (May 15, 2008), 9.

³⁵ Ted Robert Gurr, “Relative Deprivation and the Impetus to Violence”, *Why Men Rebel*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970): 23.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 30.

have as great of expectations for their future as those who are middle-class and educated who have great expectations for their future that are then frustrated by a lack of employment, political, or social possibilities that they have been lead to expect as their right. This can be seen in research on Islamic radicalization that has found that “many Islamic radicals are not economically dispossessed, are often better educated than their peers, and quite a few went to university... [and] many of them are engineers.”³⁷

This is not to dismiss the very real frustration, and subsequent aggression, felt by those who are in absolute poverty. They too can feel the effects of relative deprivation as “globalization creates an acute awareness about opportunities available elsewhere”.³⁸ Rather it is to point out that, often, the emphasis is only on those who are from a dire socio-economic background at the expense of recognizing that the effects of relative deprivation that can lead to radicalization can be felt at all levels of society.

What then are the conditions that create this disconnect between the hopes and realities of those in a society. Most generally speaking there are two main culprits: socioeconomic and political factors. Basically these factors of frustration can be seen as a result of “a demographic explosions, growing expectations, weak state capacity, and diminishing opportunities for upward mobility”.³⁹ In such environments, people will turn towards ideologies and beliefs that promise a redress of their situation.

How do these all contribute to driving radicalization? First a demographic explosion has the potential to create a situation where there are more young people than there are jobs, especially in a country facing a recession or slow growth. The globalization of the world creates a set of growing expectations that things should be better in the future.

2.2. Weak State Capacity

Another major driver of radicalization is weak state capacity. “The nature of state failure varies from place to place, sometimes dramatically,” but failed states are characterized by the fact that they “are incapable of projecting power and asserting authority within their own borders, leaving their territories governmentally empty”,⁴⁰ thereby creating ungoverned spaces with “other entities attempt[ing] to fill the gaps”⁴¹ in sovereignty and authority. This inability by sovereign authorities to effectively govern in large swathes of their nominal nation-state, and the entrance of other entities into the space, leads to enabling environments for radicalism and at worst “as reservoirs and exporters of terror”.⁴²

Finally a lack of upward mobility can take many different forms. It can be as overt as governmental oppression or as subtle as rising inequality. Regardless of the form taken though, the inability of people to have upward mobility in their society, especially when they expect to be able to do so, can provide a major source of frustration.

³⁷ Diego Gambetta and Steffan Hertog, “Engineers of Jihad,” Sociology Working Papers No. 10, *Oxford: University of Oxford*, (2007):3.

³⁸ Omer Taspinar, “Fighting Radicalism, not ‘Terrorism’: Root Causes of an International Actor Redefined, *SAIS Review* 29, no. 2:78.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed States in a World of Terror”, *Foreign Affairs* 81(4):127-140.

⁴¹ Phil Williams, “Here be Dragons”, in *Ungoverned Spaces*, edited by Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas, 38. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2010.

⁴² Ibid.

2.3. Denial of Basic Needs

Similar to relative deprivation is the concept of structural violence. Structural violence, sometimes known as social injustice, is an indirect form of violence that causes harm yet there is no specific actor that performs the violence.⁴³ This violence caused by cultural constructs can deprive people of their basic needs.⁴⁴ Basic needs encompass more than just food, shelter, and water. Identity, cultural values, and recognition are just a few of the basic needs of which a lack of can potentially lead to violence.⁴⁵ The frustration caused by being denied an identity by the larger society can lead to “religions and ethnic conflicts”⁴⁶ among others. Many groups have crises of identity that are the result of not being part of the larger culture. These can include Pan-Slavism, far-right movements, neo-Nazis, nationalists, Muslims, Christians, and others. These various crises of identity can make people more vulnerable to radicalization as “they find the appeal of a narrative by extremists to be something that they... [want to] take to the next level”⁴⁷ in response to not feeling that their personal identity is recognized as valid by the larger culture.

Relative deprivation, weak state capacity, structural violence, and denial of basic needs are just a few of the variety of ascribed root causes of radicalization. Together though, these three drivers of radicalization provide a clear argument for why a developmental approach to counter radicalization is necessary, as they indicate that the root causes and drivers of radicalization are the result of inequalities.

3. Modes and Means of Radicalization

If radicalization is at its most elementary level the process of moving from mainstream ideas to extreme beliefs fraught with the potential to violence, then in order to promote radicalism those extreme beliefs and ideologies need to be disseminated throughout a society. As new communicative methods proliferate becoming more widespread and inter-connected across country lines, the memetic replication of radicalised ideas become easier to transfer between cultures and contexts. Before discussing any potential counter-radicalism strategies, it is necessary to at least briefly relate the modes and means of radicalization.

3.1. Self-radicalization and Recruitment

There are two types of generally recognized modes of radicalization: self-radicalization and recruitment into radicalization. The seemingly *ex nihilo* mode of radicalization known as self-radicalization, or ‘lone wolf’, is the result of one of two things. First, lone-wolf terrorists are psychologically ill, having undergone a type of Mazeway Resynthesis (a psychological condition, likened to schizophrenia, where the individual reorganizes their values, beliefs, and identity).⁴⁸ Second, the self-radicalization is not truly out of nothing and that the individual has actually been recruited into radicalization, but that it has been through online means⁴⁹ that are not readily apparent to friends, family, and law enforcement.

⁴³ Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” *Journal of Peace Research* 6, 3(1969):170-171.

⁴⁴ John Burton, “Needs Theory”, *Violence Explained*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1997), 35.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 36.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 37.

⁴⁷ Johnathan Masters (Interviewer) and Farah Pandith (Interviewee), “Media Conference Call: Farah Pandith on Violent Extremism (transcript)”, *Council on Foreign Relations*, (January 9, 2015), retrieved March 17, 2015 from: <http://www.cfr.org/france/media-conference-call-farah-pandith-violent-extremism/p35944>

⁴⁸ Kevin Silber, *Schizophrenia*, (Palgrave Macmillian, July 23, 2014),75.

⁴⁹ Gabriel Weimann, “Recruiting Terrorists Online”, *Wilson Center*, retrieved June 18, 2015 from: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new_terrorism_F.pdf

Recruitment, be it online or in person, is the process where existing members of an organization or group, or in this case an ideology, enlist or obtain new members. Recruitment is the primary mode by which radicalization occurs. This process happens in a variety of contexts.

3.2. Schools

Recruitment for radicalization can occur in schools being run and funded by those seeking to radicalize youth. The institutions funded by extremist groups seeking to radicalize youths “are growing because of [a lack of] government-funded programmes that provide similar educational or social services,” and often times the targeted youth are the children of those who are laborers in other countries.⁵⁰ The youth educated in these schools become even more vulnerable to the ideology of extremist beliefs as these types of institutions leave their students “largely unprepared for the types of jobs needed to prosper in a modern economy,”⁵¹ as the focus of the schools is on enforcing beliefs and not teaching skills.

3.3. Mosques

Schools are not the only places that are used for recruitment. Common wisdom holds that most recruitment takes place in mosques. While “there are genuine instances in which religious institutions are used as a cover for political extremism and violence,” this is not always or even commonly the case, as most arrests related to “terrorism offence[s] shows that few recruitments were undertaken”⁵² in religious institutions. It is more common that recruitment occurs in “mundane places such as cafes and gym clubs or in a more closed environment such as prison.”⁵³

3.4. Social Networks (online and offline)

The last major area of recruitment is through social networks. It has been found that “social networks... are crucial in drawing vulnerable youths”⁵⁴ towards radicalization. Social networks are more than just the online versions that have become so common in media reports of radicalization recruitment.⁵⁵ While the use of social media is a new and increasingly utilized phenomenon, it is merely one tool used by recruiters. Recruiters will “use the communication tools that are available to them - yesterday tracts and newspapers, today [the] Internet”.⁵⁶ With so many young people leading digital lives it should surprise no one that recruiters will naturally use digital

⁵⁰ Jacob Zenn and Kathleen Kuehnast, “Preventing Violent Extremism in Kyrgyzstan”, *United States Institute of Peace: Special Report*, (2014):13.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Dider Bigo, Laurent Bonelli, Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet and Francesco Ragazzi, “Preventing and Countering Youth Radicalisation in the EU”, *Directorate General for Internal Policies*, (2014):13.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Alex P. Schmid, “Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review,” *International Center for Counter-Terrorism: The Hague*, (2013):20.

⁵⁵ Sandra Laville, “Social media used to recruit new wave of British jihadis in Syria”, *The Guardian*, (2014), retrieved March 17, 2015 from: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/15/social-media-recruit-british-jihadis-syria-twitter-facebook> ; Sharon Marris, “Terrorist travel guide: British radicals using social media to recruit would-be jihadists”, *Metro*, (2014), retrieved March 17, 2015 from: <http://metro.co.uk/2014/06/19/terrorist-travel-guide-british-radicals-using-social-media-to-recruit-would-be-jihadists-4767299/>; Andrew Grossman and Nicole Hong, “Social Media Emboldens Islamists, Challenges Law Enforcement”, *The Wall Street Journal*, (2015), retrieved March 17, 2015 from: <http://www.wsj.com/articles/social-media-emboldens-islamists-challenges-law-enforcement-1424997011>

⁵⁶ Dider Bigo and Laurent Bonelli and Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet and Francesco Ragazzi. “Preventing and Countering youth radicalisation in the EU”, *Directorate General for Internal Policies*, (2014):16.

media as a tool. Yet the use of social media is but one tool, and it does not wholly explain the transition to violence.

This transition from radicalization to violence leads to the non-digital aspect of recruitment as “violent action is unlikely to originate from purely virtual ties if they are not sustained by previous face-to-face interaction”.⁵⁷ The face-to-face aspect of social networks is something that is unique to each context. In Central Asia a broad description of social networks is that they are kinship-based, extending through marriages into clans and tribes consisting of both personal and political considerations.⁵⁸ While in other regions, such as the Balkans, the social networks penetrated by recruiters may be based more on “political, religious, and social institutions” or isolated villages where everyone knows each other.⁵⁹ Other contexts ripe for recruitment, generally speaking, may include social networks organized around considerations of identity, such as nationalism, ethnicity, or language.⁶⁰

3.5. Returnees

Recently a focus has been on returnees from foreign conflicts as a source of radicalization and violence.⁶¹ Returnees may provide a point of contact with different social networks, yet there is currently a lack of evidence concerning the role of the returnee in recruitment.⁶² If anything a returnee becomes just another tool for the recruiter to use based on the context of the social networks of the region.

Recruitment for radicalization can take many forms. There is no simple path that can be countered, if certain avenues become blocked the recruiter will find other ways to reach those that are vulnerable to radicalization. Instead of focusing on countering isolated modes of recruitment, a holistic approach, taking into consideration the varying contexts surrounding recruitment and vulnerability towards radicalization, may yield the most profound results.

4. Areas Involved

4.1. Separatist Movements

As is the case with countries that have been created in the wake of fallen empires, the ethnic and cultural make up of many of the countries in the region are heterogeneous. While not unique to the region, ethnic and cultural heterogeneity is one of many factors, which also include economic inequality, political turmoil, and the

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Barnett R. Rubin, “Central Asia Wars and Ethnic Conflicts-Rebuilding Failed States”, *UNDP: Background paper for HDR 2004*, (2004):6.

⁵⁹ Gordon N. Bardos, “Jihad in the Balkans: The Next Generation”, *World Affairs*, (2014).

⁶⁰ Pavlos-Ioannis Koktsidis, “A Success Story? Analyzing Albanian Ethno-Nationalist Extremism in the Balkans”, *East European Quarterly*, (2008), 42(2):163; International Crisis Group, “Bosnia’s Dangerous Tango: Islam and Nationalism”, *International Crisis Group: Policy Briefing, Europe Briefing*, (2013), 70:2.

⁶¹ Security Council, “Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution Condemning Violent Extremism, Underscoring Need to Prevent Travel, Support for Foreign Terrorist Fighters”, *United Nations Security Council: Meetings Coverage, 7272nd Meeting*, (2014), retrieved March 18, 2015 from: <http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11580.doc.htm>

⁶² Dider Bigo and Laurent Bonelli and Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet and Francesco Ragazzi. “Preventing and Countering Youth Radicalisation in the EU”, *Directorate General for Internal Policies*, (2014):16.

availability of natural resources, that have led to widespread separatist movements throughout the region. Some of the more prominent separatist movements of each country can be seen in figure 1.




Figure 1: Separatists Movements of Europe and CIS⁶³

The various separatist movements in the region are diverse in their influence on radicalism, each with their own stories. In the interest of brevity though, only two of the separatist movements will be quickly discussed. In Ukraine with the Donbass Region and Crimea, the radicalism derived from nationalistic ideology has moved from a latent violence to a manifest form as conflict has erupted in the country.

The overt violence in Ukraine is in contrast to Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which Republika Srpska is one of the two sub-entities. Even though the Republika Srpska is a governing entity in the country, its leader Milorad Dodik, "has long been an advocate of independence for Republika Srpska".⁶⁴ Yet having the various "challenges to the state's territorial integrity", "economic stagnation", and a population "deeply frustrated with the dysfunctional government"⁶⁵ has created an environment highly susceptible to radicalism. A cyclical element may also be posited, as increased radicalism could be a driver of some of the challenges to territorial integrity and dysfunction in the government. Compounding this are influences from outside the country, such as those coming from the Sandžak region in Serbia, who view themselves as Bosniaks whose homeland is Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁶⁶ Other outside influences that are taking advantage of a weak state capacity can be seen in the village of Gornja Maoča. The remote village has become a Salafi haven,⁶⁷ and "is considered a training ground for fighters aiming to be deployed in Syria and Iraq".⁶⁸ All these factors have led to Bosnia and Herzegovina becoming the "main Jihadist recruitment center in Europe".⁶⁹

⁶³ All maps made using cartodb.com

⁶⁴ Luke Coffey, "Trouble is Brewing in the Balkans", *Aljazeera*, (February 4, 2015).

⁶⁵ International Crisis Group, "Bosnia's Dangerous Tango: Islam and Nationalism", *International Crisis Group: Policy Briefing, Europe Briefing*, (February 26, 2013)70:1.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 13

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 14

⁶⁸ "ISIS: Croatian Press, Bosnia Is Main Recruitment Centre", *Nuova Europa*, (March 11, 2015), retrieved March 17, 2015 from: http://www.ansa.it/nuova_europa/en/news/sections/politics/2015/03/11/isis-croatian-press-bosnia-is-main-recruitment-centre_511663d4-d142-4316-bceb-0867a4ca9c83.html

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

4.2. Protracted Conflicts

The next map (Figure 2) shows the protracted conflicts in the ECIS. Protracted conflicts are essentially separatist movements that have fought for secession, but are in a 'frozen' state with limited conflict, and with varying degrees of autonomy. Due to the limbic nature of the regions in the protracted conflicts, many of the root causes of radicalism, as well as the mobilizing forces that can lead to extremist violence, are present.




Figure 2: Protracted Conflicts of Europe and CIS

4.3. Terrorist Attacks

If radicalism and violent extremism exist on a continuum, then a look at where violent attacks have taken place in the region can yield information on areas with high rates of radicalization. Using data from the University of Maryland's Global Terrorism Database⁷⁰ the following map (figure 3) plots out attacks in the region from 2003 to 2013 (the latest available data). The Global Terrorism Database was chosen due to availability and comprehensiveness as it uses various definitions of terrorism when collecting information on attacks, as there is not a universally accepted definition.⁷¹ It should be noted that the information is gathered from the news, so the

⁷⁰ "National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)", *Global Terrorism Database [Data file]*, (2013), retrieved April 7, 2015 from <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>

⁷¹ "Frequently Asked Questions", *Global Terrorism Database*, retrieved April 7, 2015 from: <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/faq/>

incidents of the attacks are not necessarily officially acknowledged by the various countries. The specific attack incidents by country and year, and organization and year can be seen in Annex 1.




Figure 3: Europe and CIS Region Terror Attacks 2003-2013 Map

While all the countries in the region are affected by terrorist attacks to some degree, not all of them are affected to the same extent. Specific locations such as capitals and other major cities such as Istanbul are overwhelmingly targeted. On a larger level the Western Balkans, Turkey, the Caucasus, and Russia are afflicted with a much higher number of attacks than other countries in the region such as Romania and Turkmenistan.

4.4. Overlapping Spheres of Extremism

The final map (figure 4) combines the previous three maps to create a more contextual look at what is happening in the region. The map shows how the separatist movements and protracted conflicts interact with terrorist activity. By layering the different maps a pattern begins to emerge that can indicate which areas of the ECIS region are likely more prone to radicalization. Unsurprisingly the terror attacks become centralized mainly in the areas of the separatist movements and frozen conflicts. Other areas with high numbers of attacks include border regions along the countries with a recent history of conflict (internal or external), such as those in the Western Balkans.




Figure 4: Europe and CIS

5. Demographics of the Targeted Groups

The common conception of the demographics of those prone to radicalization and violence is that they are young, Muslim, poor, undereducated, and male. Narrowing the identities of targets of radicalization in such a manner can be a dangerous assumption as those that do not fit the perceived profile will remain vulnerable to radicalization, with no interventions created for them. Just as the context for the modes and means of recruitment changes, so too do the demographics of radicalised individuals.

5.1. Age Groups

In the Western Balkans it has been reported that from 2012 to 2014 somewhere between 218-654 radicalised individuals have left their countries to fight for extremist organizations in Syria.⁷² The report by West Point includes a section on the ages of the fighters. The average age of the foreign fighter from the Western Balkans is 32.6 years old; in contrast the average ages in France, 27 years old, and Belgium, 23.6 years old, and further there have been at the time of the report no mention of minors from the Western Balkans engaged in fighting, while there had been reports of French and Belgian minors fighting.⁷³ As can be seen from the report, in the context of the Western Balkans, just based on age those who have been radicalised are not the same as those in Western Europe.

In the Caucasus the process of radicalization has also not confined itself just to the young. The continuing strife in areas such as Chechnya has caused radicalization that is intergenerational, combining nationalism and religion.⁷⁴ Such intergenerational radicalization finds fertile ground due to the repressive nature^{75,76} of governments where space for citizen's representation is limited. In such cases the vulnerability to radicalization can encompass an entire society.

5.2. Education

The education and employment of the targeted demographic are often intertwined. When looking at individual outcomes of radicalization a difference emerges between those who commit violence and those who do not. It has been found that those who are "radicals [but had not committed violence] had marginally higher levels of education than terrorists, [and] were more likely to be employed".⁷⁷ Often data such as this is used to show that it is the undereducated and disadvantaged that are becoming radicalised. This misses the point though, that educated and uneducated, employed and unemployed are becoming radicalised. While the more educated and wealthier may not personally commit acts of extremist violence, the fact that all levels of a society are potentially vulnerable to radicalization shows that it is the societal environment, and not just education level or employment status, that creates the vulnerability for radicalization.

⁷² Timothy Holman, "Foreign Fighters from the Western Balkans in Syria", *Combating Terrorism Center at West Point*, (2014).

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Miriam Lansky, "Rights abuses feed radicalisation in North Caucasus", *Democracy Digest*, (2011).

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Anna, Nemtsova, "Chechnya's Lost Boys: Why young Muslims from Russia's war-torn republic are succumbing to the lure of the Islamic State", *Foreign Policy*, (2015).

⁷⁷ Jaime Bartlett and Carl Miller, "The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference Between Violent and Non-Violent Radicalisation", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, (2012), 24 (1):7.

5.3. Gender

In media reports of Western countries, there has been a trend of sensationalized reporting concerning the radicalization of women.⁷⁸ While there are some organizations such as the Hizb ut-Tahrir, which targets women in Kyrgyzstan for recruitment purposes,⁷⁹ most other reports of female radicalization are anecdotal.⁸⁰ Rather than representing a confirmation that only males are normally radicalised, this may be evidence of a lack of research and engagement surrounding the role of women in radicalization.

In recent months a rectification of this lack of research appears to be occurring. Much of the research though, such as that being done by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue,⁸¹ concerns the role and motivations of women who are choosing to join ISIS. Perhaps because of the nature of ISIS, or the fact that many of the women come from Western Europe, the age group of the women studied is very young, and much of the recruitment aspect is focused on the “women’s online presence”.⁸²

5.4. Identity

Identity, be it ethnicity, politics, or religion, is an important part of any discussion of the demographics of radicalization. In some circles Islam has become almost synonymous with radicalization,⁸³ yet this association between Islam and radicalization down plays the severity of the danger posed by other groups. Due to the fact that data concerning radicalization in the region being examined is difficult to obtain, a short look at data concerning attacks in the neighboring EU can help illuminate why a single-minded focus on Islam as the focal point of any counter-radicalization programme can be perilous. The data is from the EUROPOL reports entitled “European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report” for the years 2010 to 2014. According to the reports Religious violence accounted for only 10 of the attacks out of 2,176 total attacks, or 0.5% of the attacks. Separatists accounted for 70% of the attacks with 1,516 of the 2,176 attacks. Similarly Right-Wing extremists, another focus, committed 6 attacks over the 5 year period, or 0.3%, while left-wing extremists often thought to have “collapsed with the Soviet Union and the Cold War in the 1980s”,⁸⁴ committed 164 attacks, or 8%, which is ten times the amount committed over the five year period by the right-wing and religious groups combined.

⁷⁸ “First British teen to join Islamic State in Syria named”, *Channel 4* (2015), retrieved April 1, 2015 from: <http://www.channel4.com/news/syria-islamic-state-militants-teenage-girls-sharmeen-begum> ; “She loved Rihanna, clothes and make-up... then fell under the spell of Islamists: Meet the FIRST British schoolgirl who fled to join ISIS”, *The Daily Mail*, (2015), retrieved April 1, 2015 from: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2994085/She-loved-Rihanna-clothes-make-fell-spell-Islamists-British-schoolgirl-15-fled-join-ISIS.html> ; “Speculation over US girls stopped in Frankfurt”, *DW.com*, (2014), retrieved April 1, 2015 from: <http://www.dw.de/speculation-over-us-girls-stopped-in-frankfurt/a-18011373>

⁷⁹ Jacob Zenn and Kathleen Kuehnast, “Preventing Violent Extremism in Kyrgyzstan”, *United States Institute of Peace: Special Report*, (2014), 355:6.

⁸⁰ Sergio E. Sanchez, “The Internet and the Radicalisation of Muslim Women”, *Presentation at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Seattle, WA*, (April 2014), 3.

⁸¹ Erin Marie Saltman and Melanie Smith, “‘Till Martyrdom Do Us Part’ Gender and the ISIS Phenomenon”, *Institute for Strategic Dialogue*, (2015); Carolyn Hoyle and Alexandra Bradford and Ross Frenett, “Becoming Mulan? Female Migrants to ISIS”, *Institute for Strategic Dialogue*, (2015).

⁸² *Ibid.*, 33.

⁸³ Abbas Barzegar and Shawn Powers, “Muslim NGOs could help counter violent extremism”, *The Washington Post*, (2015), retrieved March 18, 2015 from: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/02/17/muslim-ngos-could-help-counter-violent-extremism/> ; Arun Kundnani, “A Decade Lost: Rethinking Radicalisation and Extremism”, *Claystone: London*, (2015):10.

⁸⁴ Amy Zalman, “History of Terrorism: where Did left Wing Terrorism Go?”, *About News*, retrieved May 20, 2015 from: <http://terrorism.about.com/od/originshistory/a/LeftWingTerror.htm>

| Failed, Foiled, and Completed Attacks in the EU ⁸⁵ | | | | | | |
|---|------------|------------|-----------|------------|---------------|----------------------------|
| 2009-2013* | | | | | | |
| Type | Religious* | Separatist | Left-Wing | Right-Wing | Not Specified | Total Number of Attacks*** |
| Number | 10 | 1516 | 164 | 6 | 146 | 2176 |
| Percentage of Total | 0.5% | 70% | 8% | 0.3% | 7% | 100% |

Figure 5.

*2009-2015 are the most recent five years available

**For the years 2009 and 2010 EUROPOL used Islamist

***There was one reported single-issue attack in 2010

| Number of Suspects Arrested in the EU on Terrorism Related Offenses ⁸⁶ | | | | | | | |
|---|-------------|------------|-----------|------------|--------------|---------------|-------------------------|
| 2009-2013* | | | | | | | |
| Type | Religious** | Separatist | Left-Wing | Right-wing | Single Issue | Not Specified | Total Number of Arrests |
| Number | 786 | 1446 | 178 | 41 | 5 | 298 | 2754 |
| Percentage of Total | 29% | 53% | 6% | 1% | 0.2% | 11% | 100% |

Figure 6.

*2009-2015 are the most recent five years available

**For the years 2009 and 2010 EUROPOL used Islamist

Yet looking at the arrests, it can be seen that law-enforcement is focused on religious extremists to a larger extent than would be expected given the number of attacks. This vast difference between arrests of Religious radicals and attacks by Religious extremists could represent an overwhelming victory for law-enforcement capabilities, or it may be due to the extreme focus of law-enforcement agencies on Religious radicals.

The data have not been presented as a way to downplay the role of religious radicals, but to show that context is important. In Muslim majority countries, the majority of radicals will be Muslim, regardless of if they are right-wing, left-wing, or separatists. This does not mean then that the demographic trait that denotes vulnerability to radicalization is that they are Muslim.

5.5. Isolation

Instead of focusing on a specific demographic identity, it is better to look at the context of identity though a lens of isolation. I am choosing to use the term isolation rather than exclusion, since the concept of isolation encompasses the entire "phenomenon of non-participation (of an individual or group) in a society's

⁸⁵ EUROPOL Reports, "European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report", *Europol*, (2010-2014), reports retrieved April 13, 2015 from: https://www.europol.europa.eu/latest_publications/37

⁸⁶ Ibid.

mainstream institutions”, while exclusion is only the subset of isolation that is imposed on the individual or group.⁸⁷

The main question in using a lens of isolation is which groups feel or are socially or physically isolated from society? Most counter-radicalization and counter-extremism programmes seem to have at least a vague sense of this when looking for those vulnerable to radicalization. Yet, this needs to be an explicit part of any counter-radicalization programme, as it is often the “socially isolated... [who] turn to extremism in their search for identity, acceptance and purpose which they are unable to find in the community”⁸⁸ at large. Unfortunately, this focus on the socially isolated is usually limited to young, Muslim, men⁸⁹ since they are the most easily recognized as being “other” in a Western and European context. This heavy focus misses others who also “feel disenfranchised in a society that does not fully accept them”⁹⁰ yet may look like or belong to the majority population in a region.

Physical isolation as a pathway to radicalization usually takes place in regions that are effectively beyond governmental control. Unlike the social type, this form of isolation is most often a choice that indicates either the occurrence or beginning of radicalization in individuals or groups. In such cases physical isolation is not the cause of radicalization in the manner that social isolation, as the radicalization movement “does not arise in the *most* remote areas” rather it is “developed in out-of-the-way locales”, it is as if the physical isolation becomes an accelerant in the move towards more extreme ideology.⁹¹ An example in the region of this type of isolation as an accelerant of radicalization can be seen in an isolated town such as Gornja Maoca where Wahhabis in the town limited access to outsiders,⁹² with the town subsequently becoming a hotbed of radicalization and extremism in the region.⁹³

The importance of context when creating demographic indicators for those vulnerable to radicalization cannot be understated. This is especially true as the research indicates that the commonly perceived profile of young, uneducated, unemployed men is not always the most accurate representation of those who are vulnerable to radicalization. Instead a focus on the root causes and the isolated groups will reveal a better understanding of those who are vulnerable to radicalization.

6. Counter-Radicalization Approaches

6.1. Regional Approaches

There are a variety of responses to radicalization around the world. In the ECIS there are few programmes that address radicalism and extremism directly. Most of these responses, such as the Commonwealth of Independent States Anti-Terrorism Center are designed to deal with the manifest violence of

⁸⁷ Brian Barry, “Social Exclusion, Social Isolation and the Distribution of Income”, *Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion: London School of Economics*, (1998).

⁸⁸ Margarita Bizina and David H. Gray, “Radicalisation of Youth as a Growing Concern for Counter-Terrorism Policy,” *Global Security Studies*, (2014), 5(1):72.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 73-74.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 74.

⁹¹ Michael Barkun, *Disaster and Millennium*, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1986): 96.

⁹² HRH Sarajevo, “Wahhabis in Bosnia Hercegovina forbid access to Gornja Maoca for anyone unknown,” *Human Rights House*, (2010), retrieved March 20, 2015 from: <http://humanrightshouse.org/Articles/13333.html>

⁹³ AFP/Reuters, “Islamic State: Bosnian police raid Gornja Maoca village after IS flags, signs displayed,” *ABC*, (2015), retrieved March 20, 2015 from: <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-02-06/police-raid-bosnian-village-that-displayed-islamic-state-flag/6076000>

extremism and terrorism as opposed to the latent violence of radicalism. These are usually run by governmental bodies and are policing activities. In Kazakhstan for example the government has invested significant financial resources on programmes such as shutting down extremist websites, creating their own anti-terrorism website, and changing “the Criminal Code and the Law on Combating Terrorism to combat the use of information systems or educational materials to radicalize others”.⁹⁴ While this type of counter-radicalization programme is common, it deals mostly with addressing the outwards signs of radicalization, such as the proliferation of extremist websites. Unfortunately, when these types of counter-radicalization programmes do address root causes of radicalization such as education, instead of creating a better education system as an alternative to the extremist run schools that are indoctrinating children into radical beliefs, they propose changes in laws to ‘combat’ the radical education. These changes in laws may serve to further strengthen the societal isolation of those in the targeted communities.

Other programmes in the region for countering violent extremism (CVE), such as those funded by USAID,⁹⁵ attempt to address the environment that benefits radical recruiters and drives individuals to VE. Yet these types of programmes still include a strong element of security policy. USAID initiatives use methods such as capacity building among governments and local organizations, creating community policing and dialogue engagement, building new social networks created around common endeavors such as the arts and sports, promoting the role of women and moderate voices in civil society. In these types of programmes that are more concentrated on root causes the concept behind the work is to build resilience among communities vulnerable to radicalization. The idea of resilience is people’s “ability to respond and recover from adverse events”.⁹⁶ This ability to respond and recover relies on the strengthening of the social, economic, and cultural ties that creates a community. By improving resilience people in the community will become less vulnerable to radicalization as they are better able to withstand factors that would otherwise increase the environment for radicalization. These programmes can be evaluated on short term measures related to the actual project such as how many women were engaged, or how many dialogues took place, but due to the fact that many of the areas being targeted are facing chronic developmental issues these programmes have to be long lasting as they can include many diverse components that seek to completely change the complexion of the community.

There are also a few other programmes in the region such as the UNDP’s Peace and Development Programme that are dedicated to the prevention of conflict and are not explicitly for counter-radicalization, even though they address many of the root causes of radicalization. An example of this is the UNDP Peace and Development Programme in Kyrgyzstan. The programme began by using a Peace and Development Analysis (PDA) that allows for projects to be more contextually based and dedicated to the needs of the people. Using the results of the PDA, the Kyrgyzstan Programme designed an initiative to strengthen governmental capacity, and introduced “conflict prevention measures in province development plans”.⁹⁷

A similarly promising measurement tool that can be used to identify troubled areas is the Social Cohesion and Reconciliation (SCORE) Index. Created through a UNDP-ACT and Center for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD) partnership and funded by USAID, SCORE is designed to be a measurement of

⁹⁴ Jacob Zenn, “Kazakhstan's Counter-Terrorism Strategies for the Post-2013 Security Environment”, *The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, (2013).

⁹⁵ “USAID-Supported Initiatives to Counter Violent Extremism”, *iipdigital.usembassy.gov*, retrieved March 23, 2015 from: <http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2015/02/20150220313704.html#axzz3VCDnahaX>

⁹⁶ “Human Development Report 2014”, *UNDP*, (2014): 4.

⁹⁷ “Peace and Development Plans”, *UNDP in Kyrgyzstan*, (2015), retrieved March 20, 2015 from: http://www.kg.undp.org/content/kyrgyzstan/en/home/operations/projects/crisis_prevention_and_recovery/peace-and-development-programme.html

peace in multi-ethnic societies.⁹⁸ The index is based on a variety of social dimensions that measure social cohesion and reconciliation in order to determine the level of peace in a society. SCORE has been used in Cyprus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Nepal.

Another conflict prevention programme in the region that helps change environments conducive to radicalization is the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC). Activities such as small arms reduction, gender mainstreaming of women in the police and military, and helping with disaster risk reduction and recovery in Serbia can be seen as not just preventing conflict in post-conflict states,⁹⁹ but also changing the atmosphere in those countries so that the use of violence is not acceptable, thereby making them less vulnerable to radicalization. Further facilitating work on disaster risk reduction and recovery can help make the communities in Serbia more resilient in the face of natural disasters.

In the Western Balkans there is growing support behind the Western Balkans Counter Terrorism Initiative (WBCTI). Focused mainly on the threat to peace in the region arising from foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) the WBCTI has instructed the Police Cooperation Convention for South East Europe (PCC SEE) to create a Counter Terrorism Network based on the EU's Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN). The CT Network will be designed to: exchange information such as best practices, analytical knowledge, trends and expertise; coordinate approaches and efforts as a way to avoid duplication of effort; and to create guidelines and recommendations for each of the partner nations.¹⁰⁰

6.2. Non-Regional Approaches

Outside of the region there are more programmes being used that bring different approaches to counter-radicalization. One of the programmes, known as the Aarhus Model, in Denmark is a strategy focused on bringing government and civil society together to counter violent extremism. The Danish strategy was first proposed in 2009 with the paper "A Common and Safe Future: An Action Plan to Prevent Extremist Views and Radicalization Among Young People"¹⁰¹ from the Government of Denmark. This paper lays out the initial strategy for the subsequent CVE initiatives in Denmark. The programmes that arose from this strategy, such as that in Aarhus, seek to engage young people who are vulnerable to radicalization. A quick overview of some of these methods include creating opportunities for dialogue with young people, strengthening their inclusion into the community based on rights and responsibilities, a focus on the living conditions of vulnerable residents by preventing ghettos, and a special focus on averting radicalization in prisons.¹⁰² These basic strategies, which arose in response to "the threat from Danish biker gangs and assorted far-right and far-left groups"¹⁰³, have been refined in places such as Aarhus to deal with the return of foreign fighters from Syria. Those refinements are focused on trying to help those who had left and returned to become reintegrated into society, through assistance in finding employment, education, housing, and counselling.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁸ "Welcome to SCORE", *scoreforpeace.org*, retrieved June 18, 2015 from: <http://www.scoreforpeace.org/>

⁹⁹ SEESAC, "What We Do", *seesac.org*, (2015), retrieved March 23, 2015 from: <http://www.seesac.org/project.php>

¹⁰⁰ Hungarian Chairmanship-in-Office, "Decision on the Establishment of a PCC SEE Network on Countering Terrorism", *PCC SEE Secretariat*, January 9, 2015, Budapest.

¹⁰¹ Government of Denmark, "A Common and Safe Future: An Action Plan to Prevent Extremist Views and Radicalisation Among Young People", *Government of Denmark*, (2009), retrieved April 20, 2015 from: https://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/58D048E7-0482-4AE8-99EB-928753EFC1F8/0/a_common_and_safe_future_danish_action_plan_to_prevent_extremism.pdf

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ John Henley, "How do you deradicalise returning Isis fighters?", *The Guardian*, (2014), retrieved March 23, 2015 from: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/12/deradicalise-isis-fighters-jihadists-denmark-syria>

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

While this method has its proponents, it also has its critics. The main criticism surrounds two points. First is the fact that according to best estimates, such as that released in August of 2014 by *The Economist*, that, since the start of the Syrian civil war, Denmark, with 15 foreign fighters per million, is second only to Belgium in the number of foreign fighters originating from Western Europe.¹⁰⁵ Critics point to this number to prove that the Aarhus model is not working. The second criticism is that by not prosecuting returning fighters who have fought in foreign wars and “violated anti-terrorism laws”¹⁰⁶, the government is following a “dangerous path”.¹⁰⁷ Proponents of the Aarhus model point out that while 30 people had left Aarhus in 2013 for Syria, only one had gone in 2014.¹⁰⁸ They also note that, while people may have broken Danish laws, they are not being prosecuted as “securing evidence in the war-torn country is difficult”.¹⁰⁹

While the Aarhus model represents an extreme version of a soft-handed counter radicalization programme in how it deals with returning foreign fighters, there are many others that have a similar engagement strategy, but with a sole focus on prevention of radicalization. Such programmes include the British Channel Programme, a multi-agency programme “targeted mainly at 15- to 24-year-olds at risk of being drawn into Islamist extremism” with “about 10% of cases... [being for] far-right extremists”.¹¹⁰ Or the United States domestic CVE strategy that is focused on building community resilience through engagement of communities with individuals prone to radicalization.¹¹¹ The key hallmark of these types of programmes is creating a method to identify those vulnerable to risk, and then to engage both the individuals and their community in various ways to counter-extremist narratives.

Successful programmes outside of a Western context include those in countries such as Bangladesh and Morocco. Both countries used a gendered approach to their counter-radicalization programmes. Each country decided that poverty was the main driver of radicalization in their countries, and that the best way to combat this was to empower women.¹¹² The reasoning behind this is that “women have been identified as a critical resource

¹⁰⁵ “It ain’t half hot here, mum”, *The Economist*, (August 30, 2014), retrieved March 30, 2015 from: <http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21614226-why-and-how-westerners-go-fight-syria-and-iraq-it-aint-half-hot-here-mum>

¹⁰⁶ “Militant rehab in Denmark: homework, football and Islam”, *The National*, (December 3, 2014), retrieved March 30, 2015 from: <http://www.thenational.ae/world/europe/militant-rehab-in-denmark-homework-football-and-islam>

¹⁰⁷ Anthony Faiola and Souad Mekhennet, “Denmark tries a soft-handed approach to returned Islamist fighters”, *The Washington Post*, (October 19, 2014), retrieved March 30, 2015 from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/denmark-tries-a-soft-handed-approach-to-returned-islamist-fighters/2014/10/19/3516e8f3-515e-4adc-a2cb-c0261dd7dd4a_story.html

¹⁰⁸ Bharati Naik, Atika Shubert and Nick Thompson, “Denmark offers some foreign fighters rehab without jail time -- but will it work?”, *CNN.com*, (October 28, 2014), retrieved March 30, 2015 from: <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/10/28/world/europe/denmark-syria-deradicalisation-programme/>

¹⁰⁹ “Militant rehab in Denmark: homework, football and Islam”, *The National*, (December 3, 2014), retrieved March 30, 2015 from: <http://www.thenational.ae/world/europe/militant-rehab-in-denmark-homework-football-and-islam>

¹¹⁰ Alan Travis, “Hundreds of young people have received anti-radicalisation support”, *The Guardian*, (2013), retrieved March 30, 2015 from: <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/mar/26/hundreds-people-anti-radicalisation-support>

¹¹¹ Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT SHEET: The White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism”, *The White House*, (2015), retrieved March 30, 2015 from: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/18/fact-sheet-white-house-summit-countering-violent-extremism>

¹¹² Krista Couture, “A Gendered Approach to Countering Violent Extremism: Lessons Learned From Women In Peacebuilding And Conflict Prevention Applied Successfully In Bangladesh And Morocco” *Foreign Policy at Brookings: Federal Executive Fellows Policy Papers*, (July 2014): viii-x.

in *imaging* and *imagining* a future for their children to understand tolerance, moderation, spirituality, and democratic values and to encourage and act as examples to others".¹¹³

The result of the focus on women in Bangladesh for their counter radicalization programme was that since 2005, following six years of violence, there has not been one ideological and non-political terrorist attack.¹¹⁴ For Morocco the success of the female focused programme can be seen in the fact that there has not been any significant terrorist attack since 2011.¹¹⁵ While the empowering of women in Bangladesh and Morocco looked different in practice, as they each took place within the contextual space of their cultures, having a focus on empowering women and decreasing poverty has led to a reduction in the radicalization of the entire population in both countries.

7. Conclusion

The goals of counter radicalization are to prevent the turn to violent extremism and to promote peace. Too often though these efforts to build peace become hyper targeted, focusing only on young male Muslims, while forgetting that radicalization has different faces in different areas. Looking across the ECIS region there are obvious differences in the type of radicalization present, with separatists for example being a major presence. Yet while there are differences in the types of radicalization in the region, there are also many commonalities in the drivers and root causes of the different types of radicalization. The main takeaway concerning the fact that there are so many commonalities is that it thus becomes possible to design a regional counter radicalization initiative that can address various types of radicalization ideology.

While there are the beginnings of programmatic efforts to do this, as yet there is no region wide counter radicalization project being implemented throughout ECIS. For UNDP this creates an opportunity as counter radicalization is at its base developmental work, unlike CVE which at its base is police work. This of course does not mean to imply that UNDP should be limited only to counter radicalization, especially as radicalization and violent extremism are two points on the same spectrum, with radicalization being a first step on the shared continuum. If radicalization is the step before violent extremism, then any counter radicalization programme is also a CVE programme. The idea that CVE is at its base police work is due to the fact that by its very nature CVE is often dealing with those who have made the switch to violence, which necessitates a modicum of securitization. Counter radicalization though, does not need to be part of a security apparatus, as it can rely on developmental projects that seek to address root causes of radicalization and violent extremism that are pervasive throughout a society.

The pervasiveness of the potentiality for radicalization throughout a society should be a key point for any counter radicalization programme. This is because root causes of radicalization such as relative deprivation, weak state capacity, and a lack of basic needs affect all levels and demographics of society. This means that for counter radicalization programmes to be successful they need to engage the entire community, both the enfranchised and the disenfranchised, while also empowering the disenfranchised individuals and groups within the society. Counter radicalization programmes that do this, such as those seen in Bangladesh and Morocco, have a greater chance of success since they are creating an inclusive environment that works against the root causes of radicalization. One reason for this success is that such societal wide programming builds resilience in communities, with the positive inclusion of the various groups into the greater community becoming a

¹¹³ Ibid., x.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 20.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 28.

reinforcing effect strengthening the bonds of the community and weakening the rhetoric of radicalization. Too often people forget that anger and trauma can be passed down through the generations causing a “breakdown of ‘the tissue of community’”¹¹⁶ which leaves all of a society vulnerable to radicalization. By structuring projects that include the enfranchised and the disenfranchised, developmental based counter radicalization can build both societal inclusion and resilience, each of which are essential outcomes to any successful counter radicalization programme and ultimately to the peace and development of the region.

Annex 1

| Terrorist Attacks by Country (2003-2013) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|------------|-----------|------------|------------|-----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|
| Country | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | Grand Total |
| Albania | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | | | 1 | 3 |
| Armenia | | | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | 1 | 3 |
| Azerbaijan | | | | | 1 | 2 | 2 | | | | | 5 |
| Belarus | | | | 1 | | 1 | | 2 | 1 | 3 | | 8 |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina | 1 | | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | 1 | 13 |
| Croatia | | | 1 | | | 2 | 1 | | | | 2 | 6 |
| Cyprus | | 1 | | | 1 | | | | | 1 | 9 | 12 |
| Georgia | 6 | 3 | 6 | 3 | | 33 | 25 | 7 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 91 |
| Kazakhstan | | | | | | 1 | | | 5 | 4 | 4 | 14 |
| Kosovo* | 9 | 1 | 8 | 6 | 5 | 11 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 53 |
| Kyrgyzstan | 1 | | 2 | 3 | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | | | 9 |
| fYROMacedonia | 5 | | | 3 | 1 | 9 | 1 | | | 1 | | 20 |
| Moldova | | | | 1 | | | 1 | | | 1 | | 3 |
| Montenegro | | | | | 1 | | | | | | 2 | 3 |
| Romania | | | | | | 1 | | | | | | 1 |
| Russia | 76 | 43 | 63 | 56 | 51 | 170 | 152 | 251 | 188 | 151 | 141 | 1342 |
| Serbia | | | | | | 4 | 3 | 1 | | 3 | | 11 |
| Serbia-Montenegro | 6 | 1 | 2 | 2 | | | | | | | | 11 |
| Tajikistan | | | 1 | | 1 | | 1 | 1 | | 5 | | 9 |
| Turkey | 19 | 27 | 41 | 40 | 29 | 32 | 13 | 20 | 51 | 189 | 42 | 503 |
| Turkmenistan | | | | | | | | | | | | 0 |
| Ukraine | 1 | | | | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 8 | 4 | 24 |
| Uzbekistan | | 5 | 2 | | | | 2 | | | | | 9 |
| Grand Total | 125 | 81 | 127 | 116 | 95 | 271 | 207 | 289 | 254 | 373 | 215 | 2153 |

¹¹⁶ Vamik Volkan, *Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism*, (Colorado, Westview Press, 1997): 40.

| Terrorist Attacks by Group (2003-2013) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------------|
| Group Name | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | Grand Total |
| Abkhazian guerrillas | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | 1 |
| Abkhazian Separatists | | | | | | 1 | | | | | | 1 |
| Albanian National Army (ANA) | 3 | | | | | | | | | | | 3 |
| Al-Qa'ida | 2 | | | | | 1 | | | | | | 3 |
| Ansaru ash-Sharia (Russia) | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | 1 |
| Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria | | | 9 | | | | | | | | | 9 |
| Black Hawks (Anti-Wahhabists) | | | | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 |
| Caspian Group | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | 1 |
| Caucasus Emirate | | | | | | 11 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 1 | 5 | 36 |
| Chechen Rebels | 45 | 11 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 11 | 1 | | | | | 79 |
| Civilian Defense | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | 1 |
| Dagestani Shari'ah Jamaat | | | 2 | | | 2 | | 1 | | | | 5 |
| Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Cephesi (DHKP/C) | 2 | | | | | | 1 | | | 4 | 5 | 12 |
| Forest Brothers | | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | | | 2 |
| Friends of Freedom | | | | | | | | 2 | | | | 2 |
| Great Eastern Islamic Raiders Front (IBDA-C) | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | 2 |
| Gunmen | | | | | | | | | 7 | | | 7 |
| Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (HT) | | | 1 | | | | | | | | | 1 |
| Individual | 1 | 1 | | 2 | 1 | | | | 3 | 3 | | 11 |
| Ingush Rebels | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | 1 |
| Islambouli Brigades of al-Qa'ida | | 4 | | | | | | | | | | 4 |
| Islamic Jihad Group (IJG) | | 3 | | | | | | | | | | 3 |
| Islamic Jihad Union (Uzbekistan) | | | | | | | 2 | | | | | 2 |
| Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) | | | | | | | | 1 | | | | 1 |
| Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant | | | | | | | | | | | 2 | 2 |
| Islamist Extremists | | | | | | | | | 2 | | | 2 |
| Izberbash Gang | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | 1 |
| Karabulak Gang | | | | | | | | 1 | | | | 1 |
| Kata'ib al-Khoul | | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | | | 2 |
| Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) | | | | | | 1 | | | | | | 1 |
| Kurdish Militants | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | 1 |
| Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK) | | 4 | 2 | 6 | | | | | | 2 | | 14 |
| Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) | 3 | 10 | 29 | 14 | 15 | 20 | 4 | 15 | 34 | 14 | 21 | 305 |
| Liberation Army for Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac (UCPMB) | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | 1 |
| Macedonian nationalists | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | 1 |
| Militant Organization of Russian Nationalists | | | | | | 1 | | | | | | 1 |
| Mlada Bosna | | | | | | 1 | | | | | | 1 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|------------|-----------|------------|------------|-----------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|
| Muslim Fundamentalists | | | | | | | | | | 3 | 5 | 8 |
| Muslim Separatists | | | | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 |
| Neo-Nazi Group | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | 1 |
| NVF | | | | | | | 2 | 1 | 1 | | | 4 |
| Other | 1 | | | 2 | 1 | | | | | | | 4 |
| Revolutionary Headquarters (Turkey) | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | 1 |
| Right-Wing Extremists | | | | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 |
| Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs | | 3 | 1 | | 2 | | 2 | 1 | 1 | | | 10 |
| Sayfullakh | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | 1 |
| Skinheads | | | | 2 | | | | | | | | 2 |
| Soldiers of the Caliphate | | | | | | | | | 2 | | | 2 |
| South Ossetian Separatists | | | | | | 9 | | 1 | | | | 10 |
| The Black Sun | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | 1 |
| Tolib Ayombekov loyalists | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | 1 |
| Turkish Communist Party/Marxist (TKP-ML) | 1 | | | | | | | | | | 1 | 2 |
| Unknown | 63 | 45 | 80 | 84 | 73 | 21 | 18 | 25 | 19 | 21 | 17 | 1579 |
| Vanguard of Red Youth (AKM) | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | 1 |
| Wahhabi Movement | | | | | | | | 1 | | | | 1 |
| Zemun Clan | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | 1 |
| Grand Total | 125 | 81 | 127 | 116 | 95 | 271 | 207 | 289 | 254 | 373 | 215 | 2153 |